ecdsa_impl: replace scalar if-checks with VERIFY_CHECKs in ecdsa_sig_sign

Whenever ecdsa_sig_sign is called, in the case that r == 0 or r overflows,
we want to retry with a different nonce rather than fail signing entirely.
Because of this, we always check the nonce conditions before calling
sig_sign, so these checks should always pass (and in particular, they
are inaccessible through the API and appear as uncovered code in test
coverage).

diff --git a/src/ecdsa_impl.h b/src/ecdsa_impl.h
index 9a42e519bd580c6f505d66deec88bbed6dabecf8..52b2cb08af3650961784c6ebee3e9b8eeaa35919 100644 (file)
--- a/src/ecdsa_impl.h
+++ b/src/ecdsa_impl.h
@@ -285,14 +285,10 @@ static int secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_sign(const secp256k1_ecmult_gen_context *ctx, sec
     secp256k1_fe_normalize(&r.y);
     secp256k1_fe_get_b32(b, &r.x);
     secp256k1_scalar_set_b32(sigr, b, &overflow);
-    if (secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr)) {
-        /* P.x = order is on the curve, so technically sig->r could end up zero, which would be an invalid signature.
-         * This branch is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log of P.x = N.
-         */
-        secp256k1_gej_clear(&rp);
-        secp256k1_ge_clear(&r);
-        return 0;
-    }
+    /* These two conditions should be checked before calling */
+    VERIFY_CHECK(!secp256k1_scalar_is_zero(sigr));
+    VERIFY_CHECK(overflow == 0);
+
     if (recid) {
         /* The overflow condition is cryptographically unreachable as hitting it requires finding the discrete log
          * of some P where P.x >= order, and only 1 in about 2^127 points meet this criteria.