The local_utimensat() callback is vulnerable to symlink attacks because it
calls qemu_utimens()->utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) which follows symbolic
links in all path elements but the rightmost one or qemu_utimens()->utimes()
which follows symbolic links for all path elements.
This patch converts local_utimensat() to rely on opendir_nofollow() and
utimensat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) directly instead of using qemu_utimens().
It is hence assumed that the OS supports utimensat(), i.e. has glibc 2.6
or higher and linux 2.6.22 or higher, which seems reasonable nowadays.
This partly fixes CVE-2016-9602.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
static int local_utimensat(FsContext *s, V9fsPath *fs_path,
const struct timespec *buf)
{
- char *buffer;
- int ret;
- char *path = fs_path->data;
+ char *dirpath = g_path_get_dirname(fs_path->data);
+ char *name = g_path_get_basename(fs_path->data);
+ int dirfd, ret = -1;
- buffer = rpath(s, path);
- ret = qemu_utimens(buffer, buf);
- g_free(buffer);
+ dirfd = local_opendir_nofollow(s, dirpath);
+ if (dirfd == -1) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = utimensat(dirfd, name, buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+ close_preserve_errno(dirfd);
+out:
+ g_free(dirpath);
+ g_free(name);
return ret;
}