"nt_len - CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE" is passed directly from
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob to ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2. Malicious requests
can set nt_len to less than CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE, which results in a negative
number (or large unsigned value) used for a subsequent memcpy in
ksmbd_auth_ntlvm2 and can cause a panic.
Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: William Liu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hrvoje Mišetić <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]>
dn_off = le32_to_cpu(authblob->DomainName.BufferOffset);
dn_len = le16_to_cpu(authblob->DomainName.Length);
- if (blob_len < (u64)dn_off + dn_len || blob_len < (u64)nt_off + nt_len)
+ if (blob_len < (u64)dn_off + dn_len || blob_len < (u64)nt_off + nt_len ||
+ nt_len < CIFS_ENCPWD_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
/* TODO : use domain name that imported from configuration file */