NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__deactivate_traps);
/*
- * Disable IRQs in {activate,deactivate}_traps_vhe_{load,put}() to
+ * Disable IRQs in __vcpu_{load,put}_{activate,deactivate}_traps() to
* prevent a race condition between context switching of PMUSERENR_EL0
* in __{activate,deactivate}_traps_common() and IPIs that attempts to
* update PMUSERENR_EL0. See also kvm_set_pmuserenr().
*/
-void activate_traps_vhe_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void __vcpu_load_activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-void deactivate_traps_vhe_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static void __vcpu_put_deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long flags;
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
+void kvm_vcpu_load_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ __vcpu_load_switch_sysregs(vcpu);
+ __vcpu_load_activate_traps(vcpu);
+ __load_stage2(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu, vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->arch);
+}
+
+void kvm_vcpu_put_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ __vcpu_put_deactivate_traps(vcpu);
+ __vcpu_put_switch_sysregs(vcpu);
+}
+
static const exit_handler_fn hyp_exit_handlers[] = {
[0 ... ESR_ELx_EC_MAX] = NULL,
[ESR_ELx_EC_CP15_32] = kvm_hyp_handle_cp15_32,
[ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_dabt_low,
[ESR_ELx_EC_WATCHPT_LOW] = kvm_hyp_handle_watchpt_low,
[ESR_ELx_EC_PAC] = kvm_hyp_handle_ptrauth,
+ [ESR_ELx_EC_MOPS] = kvm_hyp_handle_mops,
};
static const exit_handler_fn *kvm_get_exit_handler_array(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
sysreg_save_host_state_vhe(host_ctxt);
/*
- * ARM erratum 1165522 requires us to configure both stage 1 and
- * stage 2 translation for the guest context before we clear
- * HCR_EL2.TGE.
- *
- * We have already configured the guest's stage 1 translation in
- * kvm_vcpu_load_sysregs_vhe above. We must now call
- * __load_stage2 before __activate_traps, because
- * __load_stage2 configures stage 2 translation, and
- * __activate_traps clear HCR_EL2.TGE (among other things).
+ * Note that ARM erratum 1165522 requires us to configure both stage 1
+ * and stage 2 translation for the guest context before we clear
+ * HCR_EL2.TGE. The stage 1 and stage 2 guest context has already been
+ * loaded on the CPU in kvm_vcpu_load_vhe().
*/
- __load_stage2(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu, vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->arch);
__activate_traps(vcpu);
__kvm_adjust_pc(vcpu);
static u64 reset_pmevtyper(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct sys_reg_desc *r)
{
+ /* This thing will UNDEF, who cares about the reset value? */
+ if (!kvm_vcpu_has_pmu(vcpu))
+ return 0;
+
reset_unknown(vcpu, r);
- __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg) &= ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_MASK;
+ __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg) &= kvm_pmu_evtyper_mask(vcpu->kvm);
return __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg);
}
kvm_pmu_set_counter_event_type(vcpu, p->regval, idx);
kvm_vcpu_pmu_restore_guest(vcpu);
} else {
- p->regval = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg) & ARMV8_PMU_EVTYPE_MASK;
+ p->regval = __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, reg);
}
return true;
return arm64_ftr_safe_value(&kvm_ftr, new, cur);
}
-/**
+/*
* arm64_check_features() - Check if a feature register value constitutes
* a subset of features indicated by the idreg's KVM sanitised limit.
*
ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_GPA3));
if (!cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_WFXT))
val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_WFxT);
- val &= ~ARM64_FEATURE_MASK(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_MOPS);
break;
case SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1:
val &= ~ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1_CCIDX_MASK;
* HCR_EL2.E2H==1, and only in the sysreg table for convenience of
* handling traps. Given that, they are always hidden from userspace.
*/
-static unsigned int elx2_visibility(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
+static unsigned int hidden_user_visibility(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ const struct sys_reg_desc *rd)
{
return REG_HIDDEN_USER;
}
.reset = rst, \
.reg = name##_EL1, \
.val = v, \
- .visibility = elx2_visibility, \
+ .visibility = hidden_user_visibility, \
}
/*
// DBGDTR[TR]X_EL0 share the same encoding
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_DBGDTRTX_EL0), trap_raz_wi },
- { SYS_DESC(SYS_DBGVCR32_EL2), NULL, reset_val, DBGVCR32_EL2, 0 },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_DBGVCR32_EL2), trap_undef, reset_val, DBGVCR32_EL2, 0 },
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_MPIDR_EL1), NULL, reset_mpidr, MPIDR_EL1 },
ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_API |
ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1_APA)),
ID_WRITABLE(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ~(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_RES0 |
- ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_MOPS |
ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_APA3 |
ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1_GPA3)),
ID_UNALLOCATED(6,3),
EL2_REG(VTTBR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(VTCR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
- { SYS_DESC(SYS_DACR32_EL2), NULL, reset_unknown, DACR32_EL2 },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_DACR32_EL2), trap_undef, reset_unknown, DACR32_EL2 },
EL2_REG(HDFGRTR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(HDFGWTR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(SPSR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(ELR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
{ SYS_DESC(SYS_SP_EL1), access_sp_el1},
- { SYS_DESC(SYS_IFSR32_EL2), NULL, reset_unknown, IFSR32_EL2 },
+ /* AArch32 SPSR_* are RES0 if trapped from a NV guest */
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_SPSR_irq), .access = trap_raz_wi,
+ .visibility = hidden_user_visibility },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_SPSR_abt), .access = trap_raz_wi,
+ .visibility = hidden_user_visibility },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_SPSR_und), .access = trap_raz_wi,
+ .visibility = hidden_user_visibility },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_SPSR_fiq), .access = trap_raz_wi,
+ .visibility = hidden_user_visibility },
+
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_IFSR32_EL2), trap_undef, reset_unknown, IFSR32_EL2 },
EL2_REG(AFSR0_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(AFSR1_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(ESR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
- { SYS_DESC(SYS_FPEXC32_EL2), NULL, reset_val, FPEXC32_EL2, 0x700 },
+ { SYS_DESC(SYS_FPEXC32_EL2), trap_undef, reset_val, FPEXC32_EL2, 0x700 },
EL2_REG(FAR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),
EL2_REG(HPFAR_EL2, access_rw, reset_val, 0),