goto out;
}
- switch (ctx.version) {
- case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V1:
- memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, ctx.v1.nonce,
- FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
- break;
- case FSCRYPT_CONTEXT_V2:
- memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, ctx.v2.nonce,
- FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
- break;
- default:
- WARN_ON(1);
- res = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ memcpy(crypt_info->ci_nonce, fscrypt_context_nonce(&ctx),
+ FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE);
if (!fscrypt_supported_policy(&crypt_info->ci_policy, inode)) {
res = -EINVAL;
return 0;
mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0];
+ /*
+ * With proper, non-racy use of FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, all inodes
+ * protected by the key were cleaned by sync_filesystem(). But if
+ * userspace is still using the files, inodes can be dirtied between
+ * then and now. We mustn't lose any writes, so skip dirty inodes here.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_ALL)
+ return 0;
+
/*
* Note: since we aren't holding ->mk_secret_sem, the result here can
* immediately become outdated. But there's no correctness problem with