1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
5 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
12 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
14 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
15 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
18 #include <linux/xattr.h>
19 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
20 #include <linux/mount.h>
21 #include <linux/stat.h>
23 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
25 #include <linux/tcp.h>
26 #include <linux/udp.h>
27 #include <linux/dccp.h>
28 #include <linux/icmpv6.h>
29 #include <linux/slab.h>
30 #include <linux/mutex.h>
31 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
34 #include <linux/audit.h>
35 #include <linux/magic.h>
36 #include <linux/dcache.h>
37 #include <linux/personality.h>
38 #include <linux/msg.h>
39 #include <linux/shm.h>
40 #include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
41 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
42 #include <linux/parser.h>
43 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
44 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
45 #include <linux/watch_queue.h>
46 #include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
47 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
50 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
51 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
53 #define SMK_CONNECTING 0
54 #define SMK_RECEIVING 1
58 * Smack uses multiple xattrs.
59 * SMACK64 - for access control,
60 * SMACK64TRANSMUTE - label initialization,
61 * Not saved on files - SMACK64IPIN and SMACK64IPOUT,
62 * Must be set explicitly - SMACK64EXEC and SMACK64MMAP
64 #define SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 2
66 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
67 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
68 static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
70 struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
71 int smack_enabled __initdata;
73 #define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
78 } smk_mount_opts[] = {
79 {"smackfsdef", sizeof("smackfsdef") - 1, Opt_fsdefault},
80 A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
84 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
88 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
89 size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
90 if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
92 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
95 return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
101 static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
102 "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
103 "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
104 "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
105 "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
108 static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
114 if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
118 if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
120 if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
130 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
131 static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
132 struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
134 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
138 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
141 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
142 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
143 sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
147 #define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
150 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
151 static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
154 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
155 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
159 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
162 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
163 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
164 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
165 acc, current->comm, note);
169 #define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
172 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
173 static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
175 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
176 struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct_obj(otp);
177 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
181 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
184 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
185 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
186 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
187 current->comm, otp->comm);
191 #define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
194 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
195 static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
197 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
198 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
199 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
201 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
202 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
203 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
207 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
209 if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
210 (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
211 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
213 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
215 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
216 tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
217 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
221 #define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
224 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
225 static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
227 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
228 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
229 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
230 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
231 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
233 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
234 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
235 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
239 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
242 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
243 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
244 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
245 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
250 #define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
253 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
254 static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
257 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
258 struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
259 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
260 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
261 char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
263 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
264 pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
265 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
269 if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
272 smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
273 pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
274 sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
275 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
280 #define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
284 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
285 * @name: type of the label (attribute)
286 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
287 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
289 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
290 * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
292 static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
297 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
299 if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
300 return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
302 buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
304 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
306 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
312 skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
320 * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
321 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
322 * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
325 static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
327 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
329 isp->smk_inode = skp;
334 * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
335 * @tsp: blob to initialize
336 * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
337 * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
340 static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
341 struct smack_known *forked)
343 tsp->smk_task = task;
344 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
345 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
346 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
347 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
351 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
352 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
353 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
354 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
356 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
358 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
361 struct smack_rule *nrp;
362 struct smack_rule *orp;
365 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
366 nrp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, gfp);
372 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
378 * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
379 * @nhead: new rules header pointer
380 * @ohead: old rules header pointer
381 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
383 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
385 static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
388 struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
389 struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
391 list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
392 nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
394 smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
397 nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
398 list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
405 * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
406 * @mode: input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
408 * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
410 static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
412 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
413 return MAY_READWRITE;
414 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
421 * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
422 * @tracer: tracer process
423 * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
424 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
425 * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
427 * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
429 static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
430 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
431 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
434 struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
435 struct task_smack *tsp;
436 struct smack_known *tracer_known;
437 const struct cred *tracercred;
439 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
440 smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
441 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
446 tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
447 tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
448 tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
450 if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
451 (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
452 smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
453 if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
455 else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
457 else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
463 smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
464 tracee_known->smk_known,
471 /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
472 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
480 * We he, that is fun!
484 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
485 * @ctp: child task pointer
486 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
488 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
490 * Do the capability checks.
492 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
494 struct smack_known *skp;
496 skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(ctp);
498 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
502 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
503 * @ptp: parent task pointer
505 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
507 * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
509 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
511 struct smack_known *skp;
513 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
515 return smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
519 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
520 * @typefrom_file: unused
522 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
524 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
527 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
529 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
532 if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
543 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
544 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
546 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
548 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
550 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
552 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
553 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
554 sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
555 sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
557 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
563 struct smack_mnt_opts {
564 const char *fsdefault;
568 const char *fstransmute;
571 static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
576 static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
578 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
579 struct smack_known *skp;
582 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
590 skp = smk_import_entry(s, 0);
598 opts->fsdefault = skp->smk_known;
603 opts->fsfloor = skp->smk_known;
608 opts->fshat = skp->smk_known;
613 opts->fsroot = skp->smk_known;
615 case Opt_fstransmute:
616 if (opts->fstransmute)
618 opts->fstransmute = skp->smk_known;
624 pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
629 * smack_fs_context_submount - Initialise security data for a filesystem context
630 * @fc: The filesystem context.
631 * @reference: reference superblock
633 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
635 static int smack_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
636 struct super_block *reference)
638 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
639 struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx;
640 struct inode_smack *isp;
642 ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
647 sbsp = smack_superblock(reference);
648 isp = smack_inode(reference->s_root->d_inode);
650 if (sbsp->smk_default) {
651 ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
656 if (sbsp->smk_floor) {
657 ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
663 ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
668 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
669 if (sbsp->smk_root) {
670 ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
671 if (!ctx->fstransmute)
679 * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
680 * @fc: The new filesystem context.
681 * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
683 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
685 static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
686 struct fs_context *src_fc)
688 struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
693 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
698 dst->fsdefault = src->fsdefault;
699 dst->fsfloor = src->fsfloor;
700 dst->fshat = src->fshat;
701 dst->fsroot = src->fsroot;
702 dst->fstransmute = src->fstransmute;
707 static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_fs_parameters[] = {
708 fsparam_string("smackfsdef", Opt_fsdefault),
709 fsparam_string("smackfsdefault", Opt_fsdefault),
710 fsparam_string("smackfsfloor", Opt_fsfloor),
711 fsparam_string("smackfshat", Opt_fshat),
712 fsparam_string("smackfsroot", Opt_fsroot),
713 fsparam_string("smackfstransmute", Opt_fstransmute),
718 * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
719 * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
720 * @param: The parameter.
722 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
725 static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
726 struct fs_parameter *param)
728 struct fs_parse_result result;
731 opt = fs_parse(fc, smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
735 rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
737 param->string = NULL;
741 static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
743 char *from = options, *to = options;
747 char *next = strchr(from, ',');
756 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
757 if (token != Opt_error) {
758 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
759 rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
763 smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
768 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
773 memmove(to, from, len);
786 * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
787 * @sb: the file system superblock
788 * @mnt_opts: Smack mount options
789 * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
790 * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
792 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
794 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
797 static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
799 unsigned long kern_flags,
800 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
802 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
803 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
804 struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
805 struct inode_smack *isp;
806 struct smack_known *skp;
807 struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
808 bool transmute = false;
810 if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
813 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
815 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
820 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
822 skp = smk_of_current();
824 sp->smk_default = skp;
826 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
827 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
828 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
830 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
831 sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
832 sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
834 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
838 sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
841 if (opts->fsdefault) {
842 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
845 sp->smk_default = skp;
848 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
854 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
860 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
865 if (opts->fstransmute) {
866 skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
875 * Initialize the root inode.
877 init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
880 isp = smack_inode(inode);
881 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
888 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
889 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
891 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
892 * and error code otherwise
894 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
896 struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
898 struct smk_audit_info ad;
900 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
901 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
903 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
904 rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
913 * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
914 * @bprm: the exec information
916 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
918 static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
920 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
921 struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
922 struct inode_smack *isp;
923 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
926 isp = smack_inode(inode);
927 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
930 sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
931 if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
932 isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
935 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
936 struct task_struct *tracer;
940 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
941 if (likely(tracer != NULL))
942 rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
951 if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
954 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
955 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
957 /* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
958 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
959 bprm->secureexec = 1;
969 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
970 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
974 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
976 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
978 init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
983 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
984 * @inode: the newly created inode
985 * @dir: containing directory object
987 * @xattrs: where to put the attributes
988 * @xattr_count: current number of LSM-provided xattrs (updated)
990 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
992 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
993 const struct qstr *qstr,
994 struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
996 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
997 struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
998 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
999 struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1000 struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
1001 struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
1005 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
1006 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
1008 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
1010 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
1016 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
1017 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
1018 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
1019 * Mark the inode as changed.
1021 if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
1022 (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
1023 smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
1024 struct xattr *xattr_transmute;
1027 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
1028 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
1029 * inode label was already set correctly in
1030 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
1032 if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
1033 isp = issp->smk_inode = dsp;
1035 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1036 xattr_transmute = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs,
1038 if (xattr_transmute) {
1039 xattr_transmute->value = kmemdup(TRANS_TRUE,
1042 if (!xattr_transmute->value)
1045 xattr_transmute->value_len = TRANS_TRUE_SIZE;
1046 xattr_transmute->name = XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE;
1050 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
1053 xattr->value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
1057 xattr->value_len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
1058 xattr->name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
1065 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
1066 * @old_dentry: the existing object
1068 * @new_dentry: the new object
1070 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1072 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
1073 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1075 struct smack_known *isp;
1076 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1079 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1080 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1082 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1083 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1084 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1086 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1087 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1088 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1089 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1090 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1097 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
1098 * @dir: containing directory object
1099 * @dentry: file to unlink
1101 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1102 * and the object, error code otherwise
1104 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1106 struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1107 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1110 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1111 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1114 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
1116 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1117 rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1120 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1122 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1123 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1124 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1125 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1131 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
1132 * @dir: containing directory object
1133 * @dentry: directory to unlink
1135 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
1136 * and the directory, error code otherwise
1138 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
1140 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1143 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1144 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1147 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
1149 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1150 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1153 * You also need write access to the containing directory
1155 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1156 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
1157 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1158 rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1165 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
1166 * @old_inode: unused
1167 * @old_dentry: the old object
1168 * @new_inode: unused
1169 * @new_dentry: the new object
1171 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
1174 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1176 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
1177 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1178 struct inode *new_inode,
1179 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1182 struct smack_known *isp;
1183 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1185 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1186 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
1188 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
1189 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1190 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1192 if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1193 isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
1194 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
1195 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
1196 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
1202 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
1203 * @inode: the inode in question
1204 * @mask: the access requested
1206 * This is the important Smack hook.
1208 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1210 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
1212 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1213 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1214 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
1217 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
1219 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
1224 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
1225 if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
1229 /* May be droppable after audit */
1232 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
1233 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
1234 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
1235 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
1240 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
1241 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1242 * @dentry: the object
1243 * @iattr: for the force flag
1245 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1247 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
1248 struct iattr *iattr)
1250 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1254 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
1256 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
1258 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1259 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1261 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1262 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1267 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
1268 * @path: path to extract the info from
1270 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1272 static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
1274 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1275 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1278 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1279 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
1280 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1281 rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
1286 * smack_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
1287 * @name: name of the xattr
1289 * Returns 1 to indicate that Smack "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
1290 * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
1291 * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that
1292 * Smack does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
1293 * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
1296 static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
1298 if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, strlen(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX)))
1301 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1302 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1303 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1304 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1305 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0 ||
1306 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1313 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
1314 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1315 * @dentry: the object
1316 * @name: name of the attribute
1317 * @value: value of the attribute
1318 * @size: size of the value
1321 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
1323 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1325 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1326 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1327 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1329 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1330 struct smack_known *skp;
1332 int check_import = 0;
1337 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
1339 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1340 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1341 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
1344 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1345 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1349 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1351 if (!S_ISDIR(d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_mode) ||
1352 size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
1353 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
1357 if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1360 if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
1361 skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
1364 else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
1365 (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
1369 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1370 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1373 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1374 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1381 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
1383 * @name: attribute name
1384 * @value: attribute value
1385 * @size: attribute size
1388 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
1389 * in the master label list.
1391 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
1392 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1394 struct smack_known *skp;
1395 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1397 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1398 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1402 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1403 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1405 isp->smk_inode = skp;
1406 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
1407 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1409 isp->smk_task = skp;
1410 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1411 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
1413 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
1420 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
1421 * @dentry: the object
1424 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1426 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1428 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1431 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1432 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1434 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1435 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1440 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
1441 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1442 * @dentry: the object
1443 * @name: name of the attribute
1445 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
1447 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1449 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1450 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
1452 struct inode_smack *isp;
1453 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1456 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
1457 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
1458 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
1459 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
1460 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
1461 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
1462 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
1469 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1470 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1472 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1473 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1477 isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
1479 * Don't do anything special for these.
1480 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
1481 * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
1483 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
1484 struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
1485 struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
1487 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
1488 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
1489 isp->smk_task = NULL;
1490 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
1491 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
1492 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
1493 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
1499 * smack_inode_set_acl - Smack check for setting posix acls
1500 * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
1501 * @dentry: the object
1502 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
1503 * @kacl: the posix acls
1505 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1507 static int smack_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1508 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
1509 struct posix_acl *kacl)
1511 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1514 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1515 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1517 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1518 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1523 * smack_inode_get_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
1524 * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
1525 * @dentry: the object
1526 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
1528 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1530 static int smack_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1531 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
1533 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1536 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1537 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1539 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
1540 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
1545 * smack_inode_remove_acl - Smack check for getting posix acls
1546 * @idmap: idmap of the mnt this request came from
1547 * @dentry: the object
1548 * @acl_name: name of the posix acl
1550 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
1552 static int smack_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1553 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
1555 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1558 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
1559 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
1561 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1562 rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
1567 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
1568 * @idmap: idmap of the mount
1569 * @inode: the object
1570 * @name: attribute name
1571 * @buffer: where to put the result
1572 * @alloc: duplicate memory
1574 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
1576 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
1577 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1578 void **buffer, bool alloc)
1580 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1581 struct socket *sock;
1582 struct super_block *sbp;
1583 struct inode *ip = inode;
1584 struct smack_known *isp;
1585 struct inode_smack *ispp;
1589 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1590 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1591 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
1592 ispp = smack_inode(inode);
1593 if (ispp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE)
1599 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1602 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1605 sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
1606 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1609 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1611 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1613 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
1620 label = isp->smk_known;
1622 label_len = strlen(label);
1625 *buffer = kstrdup(label, GFP_KERNEL);
1626 if (*buffer == NULL)
1635 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1636 * @inode: the object
1637 * @buffer: where they go
1638 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1640 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1643 int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1645 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
1646 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1652 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1653 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1654 * @secid: where result will be saved
1656 static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1658 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
1660 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
1668 * There is no smack_file_permission hook
1670 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1671 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1672 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1674 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1675 * label changing that SELinux does.
1679 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1682 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1683 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1685 * f_security is the owner security information. It
1686 * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
1690 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1692 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1694 *blob = smk_of_current();
1699 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1704 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1706 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1708 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1712 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1713 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1715 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1718 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1719 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1721 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
1722 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1723 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1726 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
1727 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
1728 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
1735 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1739 * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
1741 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1743 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1745 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1747 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1750 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1751 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1752 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1753 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1758 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1760 * @cmd: what action to check
1763 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1764 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1765 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1767 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1769 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1772 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1774 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1776 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1784 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1785 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1786 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
1787 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
1791 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1792 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1793 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1794 rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
1804 * smack_mmap_file - Check permissions for a mmap operation.
1805 * @file: contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1806 * @reqprot: contains the protection requested by the application.
1807 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1808 * @flags: contains the operational flags.
1810 * The @file may be NULL, e.g. if mapping anonymous memory.
1812 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1814 static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
1815 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1816 unsigned long flags)
1818 struct smack_known *skp;
1819 struct smack_known *mkp;
1820 struct smack_rule *srp;
1821 struct task_smack *tsp;
1822 struct smack_known *okp;
1823 struct inode_smack *isp;
1824 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
1833 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
1836 isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
1837 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1839 sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
1840 if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
1841 isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
1843 mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
1845 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
1846 skp = smk_of_current();
1851 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1852 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1853 * to that rule's object label.
1855 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1856 okp = srp->smk_object;
1858 * Matching labels always allows access.
1860 if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
1863 * If there is a matching local rule take
1864 * that into account as well.
1866 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
1870 may = srp->smk_access;
1872 may &= srp->smk_access;
1874 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1875 * possibly have less access.
1881 * Fetch the global list entry.
1882 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1883 * can't have as much access as current.
1885 mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1887 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1892 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1893 * potential access, too.
1895 tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
1897 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1901 * If there is any access available to current that is
1902 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1905 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1917 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1918 * @file: object in question
1921 static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1923 struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
1925 *blob = smk_of_current();
1929 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1930 * @tsk: The target task
1931 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1934 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1936 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1937 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1939 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1940 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1942 struct smack_known **blob;
1943 struct smack_known *skp;
1944 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
1945 const struct cred *tcred;
1948 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1951 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1953 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1955 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1956 blob = smack_file(file);
1958 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
1959 rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
1962 tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
1963 if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
1967 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1968 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1969 smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
1974 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1977 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1979 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1983 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1984 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1985 struct socket *sock;
1986 struct task_smack *tsp;
1987 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1989 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1992 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1993 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1995 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
1996 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1997 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1998 tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
2000 * If the receiving process can't write to the
2001 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
2002 * write to the receiving process don't accept
2003 * the passed socket.
2005 rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2006 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
2009 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2010 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
2014 * This code relies on bitmasks.
2016 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2018 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
2021 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
2022 rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
2027 * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
2030 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
2031 * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
2032 * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
2033 * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
2035 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
2037 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
2039 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
2040 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2041 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2044 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
2045 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
2046 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
2047 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
2057 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
2058 * @cred: the new credentials
2059 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2061 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
2062 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
2063 * complete without error.
2065 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
2067 init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
2073 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
2074 * @cred: the credentials in question
2077 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
2079 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
2080 struct smack_rule *rp;
2081 struct list_head *l;
2082 struct list_head *n;
2084 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
2086 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
2087 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
2088 list_del(&rp->list);
2089 kmem_cache_free(smack_rule_cache, rp);
2094 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
2095 * @new: the new credentials
2096 * @old: the original credentials
2097 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
2099 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
2101 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2104 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
2105 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2108 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
2110 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
2114 rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
2120 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
2121 * @new: the new credentials
2122 * @old: the original credentials
2124 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
2126 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2128 struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
2129 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2131 init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
2135 * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
2136 * @cred: the object creds
2137 * @secid: where to put the result
2139 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
2141 static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
2143 struct smack_known *skp;
2146 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2147 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2152 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
2153 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
2154 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
2156 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
2158 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
2160 struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
2162 new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
2167 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
2168 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
2169 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
2171 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
2172 * as the objective context of the specified inode
2174 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
2175 struct inode *inode)
2177 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2178 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
2180 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
2181 tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
2186 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
2187 * @p: the task object
2188 * @access: the access requested
2189 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
2191 * Return 0 if access is permitted
2193 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
2196 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2197 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2200 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2201 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2202 rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
2203 rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
2208 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
2209 * @p: the task object
2212 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2214 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2216 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2220 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
2221 * @p: the object task
2223 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2225 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2227 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2231 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
2232 * @p: the object task
2234 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
2236 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2238 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2242 * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
2243 * @secid: where to put the result
2245 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
2247 static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
2249 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2251 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2255 * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task
2257 * @secid: where to put the result
2259 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
2261 static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2263 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2265 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
2269 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
2270 * @p: the task object
2273 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2275 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2277 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2281 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
2282 * @p: the task object
2285 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2287 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2289 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2293 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
2294 * @p: the task object
2296 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2298 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2300 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2304 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
2305 * @p: the task object
2307 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2309 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2311 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2315 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
2316 * @p: the task object
2318 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
2320 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2322 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
2326 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
2327 * @p: the task object
2329 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2331 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2333 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
2337 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
2338 * @p: the task object
2341 * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
2343 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
2346 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
2347 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
2349 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2350 struct smack_known *skp;
2351 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2355 return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
2357 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
2358 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
2360 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
2361 * can write the receiver.
2364 rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2365 rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2369 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
2370 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
2371 * we can't take privilege into account.
2373 skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
2374 rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
2375 rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
2380 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
2381 * @p: task to copy from
2382 * @inode: inode to copy to
2384 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
2386 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
2388 struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
2389 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
2391 isp->smk_inode = skp;
2392 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2400 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
2403 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
2405 * Assign Smack pointers to current
2407 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
2409 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
2411 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
2412 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2414 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
2419 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2421 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2422 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2423 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2428 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
2430 sk->sk_security = ssp;
2436 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
2439 * Clears the blob pointer
2441 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
2443 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2444 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2446 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
2448 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2449 if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
2451 spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
2457 kfree(sk->sk_security);
2461 * smack_sk_clone_security - Copy security context
2462 * @sk: the old socket
2463 * @newsk: the new socket
2465 * Copy the security context of the old socket pointer to the cloned
2467 static void smack_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
2469 struct socket_smack *ssp_old = sk->sk_security;
2470 struct socket_smack *ssp_new = newsk->sk_security;
2472 *ssp_new = *ssp_old;
2476 * smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
2477 * @sip: the object end
2479 * looks for host based access restrictions
2481 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2482 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2483 * taken before calling this function.
2485 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2487 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
2489 struct smk_net4addr *snp;
2490 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
2492 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
2495 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
2497 * we break after finding the first match because
2498 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2499 * so we have found the most specific match
2501 if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
2502 (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
2503 return snp->smk_label;
2509 * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
2512 * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
2514 static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2516 __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2517 __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
2519 if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
2520 ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
2526 * smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
2527 * @sip: the object end
2529 * looks for host based access restrictions
2531 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
2532 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
2533 * taken before calling this function.
2535 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
2537 static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
2539 struct smk_net6addr *snp;
2540 struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
2545 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
2547 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
2550 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
2552 * If the label is NULL the entry has
2553 * been renounced. Ignore it.
2555 if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
2558 * we break after finding the first match because
2559 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
2560 * so we have found the most specific match
2562 for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
2563 if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
2564 snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
2570 return snp->smk_label;
2577 * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
2580 * Attach the outbound smack value (smk_out) to the socket.
2582 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
2584 static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
2586 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2587 struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
2591 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2593 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel,
2594 netlbl_sk_lock_check(sk));
2597 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_LABELED;
2600 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB;
2612 * smack_netlbl_delete - Remove the secattr from a socket
2615 * Remove the outbound smack value from a socket
2617 static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
2619 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2622 * Take the label off the socket if one is set.
2624 if (ssp->smk_state != SMK_NETLBL_LABELED)
2628 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
2629 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
2632 ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED;
2636 * smk_ipv4_check - Perform IPv4 host access checks
2638 * @sap: the destination address
2640 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
2641 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
2643 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
2646 static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
2648 struct smack_known *skp;
2650 struct smack_known *hkp;
2651 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2652 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2655 hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
2658 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2660 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2661 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
2662 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
2663 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
2666 rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2667 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2669 * Clear the socket netlabel if it's set.
2672 smack_netlbl_delete(sk);
2680 * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
2681 * @subject: subject Smack label
2682 * @object: object Smack label
2684 * @act: the action being taken
2686 * Check an IPv6 access
2688 static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
2689 struct smack_known *object,
2690 struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
2693 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2695 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2699 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2700 ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
2701 ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port;
2702 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2703 ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
2705 ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
2707 rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2708 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
2712 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2714 * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
2718 * Create or update the port list entry
2720 static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
2722 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2723 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
2724 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2725 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2726 unsigned short port = 0;
2728 if (address == NULL) {
2730 * This operation is changing the Smack information
2731 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
2735 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2736 if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
2738 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2739 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2744 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
2745 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
2751 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2752 port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2754 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
2760 * Look for an existing port list entry.
2761 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
2764 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2765 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
2767 if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
2771 spp->smk_port = port;
2773 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2774 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2775 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2781 * A new port entry is required.
2783 spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
2787 spp->smk_port = port;
2789 spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
2790 spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
2791 spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
2792 spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
2794 mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2795 list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
2796 mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
2801 * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
2804 * @act: the action being taken
2806 * Create or update the port list entry
2808 static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
2811 struct smk_port_label *spp;
2812 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2813 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
2814 unsigned short port;
2815 struct smack_known *object;
2817 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
2818 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2819 object = ssp->smk_in;
2822 object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
2826 * The other end is a single label host.
2828 if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
2829 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2831 skp = smack_net_ambient;
2833 object = smack_net_ambient;
2836 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
2838 if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
2839 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2842 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
2844 if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
2847 port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
2849 list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
2850 if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
2852 object = spp->smk_in;
2853 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
2854 ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
2859 return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
2864 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
2865 * @inode: the object
2866 * @name: attribute name
2867 * @value: attribute value
2868 * @size: size of the attribute
2871 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
2873 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
2875 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2876 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2878 struct smack_known *skp;
2879 struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
2880 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2881 struct socket *sock;
2884 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
2887 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
2888 if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
2889 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
2892 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
2896 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
2898 return PTR_ERR(skp);
2900 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2901 nsp->smk_inode = skp;
2902 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2906 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2908 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2911 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2912 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2915 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2917 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2919 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2921 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
2922 rc = smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2925 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2931 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2932 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
2933 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
2940 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2942 * @family: protocol family
2947 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2949 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2951 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2952 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2954 struct socket_smack *ssp;
2956 if (sock->sk == NULL)
2960 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
2962 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
2963 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2964 ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
2965 ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
2968 if (family != PF_INET)
2971 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2973 return smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
2977 * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
2978 * @socka: one socket
2979 * @sockb: another socket
2981 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
2985 static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
2986 struct socket *sockb)
2988 struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
2989 struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
2991 asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
2992 bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
2997 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
2999 * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
3001 * @address: the port address
3002 * @addrlen: size of the address
3004 * Records the label bound to a port.
3006 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
3008 static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
3011 if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
3012 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
3013 address->sa_family != AF_INET6)
3015 smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
3019 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
3022 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
3024 * @sap: the other end
3025 * @addrlen: size of sap
3027 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
3029 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
3031 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
3036 if (sock->sk == NULL)
3038 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
3039 (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
3041 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
3043 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
3044 struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
3045 struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
3047 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3049 if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
3050 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
3052 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3054 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
3057 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3058 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
3063 if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3065 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
3070 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
3071 * @flags: the S_ value
3073 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
3075 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
3079 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
3081 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
3083 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
3090 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
3095 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3097 struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
3099 *blob = smk_of_current();
3104 * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
3107 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
3109 static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
3111 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
3117 * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
3122 static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
3124 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
3126 *blob = smk_of_current();
3131 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
3133 * @access : access requested
3135 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3137 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3139 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3140 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3144 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3145 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3147 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3148 rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
3153 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
3155 * @shmflg: access requested
3157 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3159 static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
3163 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3164 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3168 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
3170 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3172 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3174 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3188 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3193 * System level information.
3199 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3203 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
3206 * @shmflg: access requested
3208 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3210 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, char __user *shmaddr,
3215 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
3216 return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
3220 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
3222 * @access : access requested
3224 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3226 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3228 struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3229 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3233 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3234 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3236 rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
3237 rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
3242 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
3244 * @semflg: access requested
3246 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3248 static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
3252 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
3253 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3257 * smack_sem_semctl - Smack access check for sem
3259 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3261 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3263 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3282 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3287 * System level information
3294 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
3298 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
3304 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
3306 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
3308 static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
3309 unsigned nsops, int alter)
3311 return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3315 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
3317 * @access : access requested
3319 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
3321 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
3323 struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
3324 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3328 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3329 ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
3331 rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
3332 rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
3337 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
3339 * @msqflg: access requested
3341 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3343 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
3347 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3348 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3352 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
3354 * @cmd: what it wants to do
3356 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3358 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
3370 may = MAY_READWRITE;
3375 * System level information
3382 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3386 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
3389 * @msqflg: access requested
3391 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
3393 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
3398 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
3399 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
3403 * smack_msg_queue_msgrcv - Smack access check for msg_queue
3410 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3412 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp,
3413 struct msg_msg *msg,
3414 struct task_struct *target, long type,
3417 return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
3421 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
3422 * @ipp: the object permissions
3423 * @flag: access requested
3425 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
3427 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
3429 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3430 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3431 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
3432 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3436 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
3437 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
3439 rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
3440 rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
3445 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
3446 * @ipp: the object permissions
3447 * @secid: where result will be saved
3449 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
3451 struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
3452 struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
3454 *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
3458 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
3459 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
3460 * @inode: the object
3462 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
3464 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
3466 struct super_block *sbp;
3467 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
3468 struct inode_smack *isp;
3469 struct smack_known *skp;
3470 struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
3471 struct smack_known *final;
3472 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
3480 isp = smack_inode(inode);
3483 * If the inode is already instantiated
3484 * take the quick way out
3486 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
3490 sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
3492 * We're going to use the superblock default label
3493 * if there's no label on the file.
3495 final = sbsp->smk_default;
3498 * If this is the root inode the superblock
3499 * may be in the process of initialization.
3500 * If that is the case use the root value out
3501 * of the superblock.
3503 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
3504 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3505 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3506 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3508 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
3509 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
3512 sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
3513 sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
3514 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3518 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
3519 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
3521 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3524 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
3528 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
3529 * structures associated with the task involved.
3531 isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
3534 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
3537 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
3542 * This is pretty hackish.
3543 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
3544 * file system specific code, but it does help
3545 * with keeping it simple.
3547 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
3549 case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
3550 case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
3552 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
3553 * that the smack file system doesn't do
3554 * extended attributes.
3556 * Cgroupfs is special
3558 final = &smack_known_star;
3560 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
3562 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
3563 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
3568 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
3570 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
3571 * The superblock default suffices.
3576 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
3577 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
3578 * getting recreated on every reboot.
3580 final = &smack_known_star;
3582 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
3583 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
3584 * to set mount options simulate setting the
3585 * superblock default.
3590 * This isn't an understood special case.
3591 * Get the value from the xattr.
3595 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
3597 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
3598 final = &smack_known_star;
3602 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
3603 * Use the aforeapplied default.
3604 * It would be curious if the label of the task
3605 * does not match that assigned.
3607 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
3610 * Get the dentry for xattr.
3612 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
3613 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
3614 if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
3618 * Transmuting directory
3620 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
3622 * If this is a new directory and the label was
3623 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
3624 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
3625 * and mark the inode.
3627 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
3628 * directory mark the inode.
3630 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
3631 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
3633 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
3634 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
3637 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
3640 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
3642 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
3643 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3644 skp == &smack_known_web)
3646 isp->smk_task = skp;
3648 skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
3649 if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
3650 skp == &smack_known_web)
3652 isp->smk_mmap = skp;
3659 isp->smk_inode = ckp;
3661 isp->smk_inode = final;
3663 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
3669 * smack_getselfattr - Smack current process attribute
3670 * @attr: which attribute to fetch
3671 * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
3672 * @size: available size in, actual size out
3675 * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
3678 * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
3679 * There will only ever be one attribute.
3681 static int smack_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
3682 u32 *size, u32 flags)
3685 struct smack_known *skp;
3687 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
3690 skp = smk_of_current();
3691 rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size,
3692 skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1,
3694 return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
3698 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
3699 * @p: the object task
3700 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3701 * @value: where to put the result
3703 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
3705 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3707 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *name, char **value)
3709 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
3713 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
3716 cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3726 * do_setattr - Smack process attribute setting
3727 * @attr: the ID of the attribute
3728 * @value: the value to set
3729 * @size: the size of the value
3731 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3732 * is permitted and only with privilege
3734 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3736 static int do_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
3738 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
3740 struct smack_known *skp;
3741 struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
3744 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
3747 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
3750 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_CURRENT)
3753 skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
3755 return PTR_ERR(skp);
3758 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
3759 * and the star ("*") label.
3761 if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
3764 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3766 list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
3767 if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
3775 new = prepare_creds();
3779 tsp = smack_cred(new);
3780 tsp->smk_task = skp;
3782 * process can change its label only once
3784 smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
3791 * smack_setselfattr - Set a Smack process attribute
3792 * @attr: which attribute to set
3793 * @ctx: buffer containing the data
3794 * @size: size of @ctx
3797 * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
3800 * Returns 0 on success, an error code otherwise.
3802 static int smack_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
3803 u32 size, u32 flags)
3807 rc = do_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
3814 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
3815 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
3816 * @value: the value to set
3817 * @size: the size of the value
3819 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
3820 * is permitted and only with privilege
3822 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
3824 static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
3826 int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
3828 if (attr != LSM_ATTR_UNDEF)
3829 return do_setattr(attr, value, size);
3834 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
3836 * @other: the other sock
3839 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3840 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3842 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3843 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
3845 struct smack_known *skp;
3846 struct smack_known *okp;
3847 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
3848 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
3849 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
3850 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3853 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3856 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
3860 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3861 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
3863 rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3864 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3868 rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3869 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
3876 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
3878 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
3879 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
3882 * new/child/established socket must inherit listening socket labels
3884 nsp->smk_out = osp->smk_out;
3885 nsp->smk_in = osp->smk_in;
3892 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
3894 * @other: the other socket
3896 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
3897 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
3899 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
3901 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3902 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
3903 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3907 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3909 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3910 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
3913 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
3916 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3917 rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
3922 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
3925 * @size: the size of the message
3927 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
3928 * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
3929 * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
3931 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3934 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
3935 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3936 struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
3938 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3939 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3940 struct smack_known *rsp;
3945 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
3950 switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
3952 if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ||
3953 sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
3955 rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, sip);
3957 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
3959 if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
3960 sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
3962 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
3963 rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
3965 rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
3968 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
3969 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
3971 #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
3978 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
3979 * @sap: netlabel secattr
3980 * @ssp: socket security information
3982 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
3984 static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
3985 struct socket_smack *ssp)
3987 struct smack_known *skp;
3993 * Netlabel found it in the cache.
3995 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
3996 return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
3998 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
4000 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
4002 return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
4004 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
4006 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
4007 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
4008 * behaving the way we expect it to.
4010 * Look it up in the label table
4011 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
4012 * for the packet fall back on the network
4016 list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
4017 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
4020 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
4022 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
4023 if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
4024 NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
4028 for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
4029 acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
4031 kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
4032 skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
4034 if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
4047 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
4048 return &smack_known_web;
4049 return &smack_known_star;
4052 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
4053 * for the packet fall back on the network
4056 return smack_net_ambient;
4059 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4060 static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
4064 int proto = -EINVAL;
4065 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
4066 struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
4068 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4069 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4070 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4074 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4075 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4078 sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
4080 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4081 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4082 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4089 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4091 sip->sin6_port = th->source;
4094 case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
4095 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4097 sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
4100 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4102 sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
4107 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4110 * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
4113 * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
4115 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
4116 static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
4118 if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
4121 return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
4124 static inline struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
4131 * smack_from_netlbl - Smack data from the IP options in an skb
4132 * @sk: socket data came in on
4133 * @family: address family
4136 * Find the Smack label in the IP options. If it hasn't been
4137 * added to the netlabel cache, add it here.
4139 * Returns smack_known of the IP options or NULL if that won't work.
4141 static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
4142 struct sk_buff *skb)
4144 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
4145 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4146 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
4148 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
4151 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4153 if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
4154 skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
4155 if (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE)
4156 netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
4159 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
4165 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
4169 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
4171 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4173 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4174 struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
4176 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4177 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4179 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4181 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4182 struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
4185 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4187 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4192 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4193 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4194 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4196 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4198 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4200 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4204 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4205 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4206 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4207 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4210 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
4211 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
4212 * This is the simplist possible security model
4215 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4216 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4219 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
4221 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4223 proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
4224 if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
4225 proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
4227 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4228 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4230 if (smk_ipv6_localhost(&sadd))
4232 skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
4234 skp = smack_net_ambient;
4237 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4238 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4239 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4240 ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4241 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4242 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4243 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
4245 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
4246 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
4247 rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
4248 #endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
4250 icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
4251 ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
4253 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4260 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
4262 * @optval: user's destination
4263 * @optlen: size thereof
4266 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
4268 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
4269 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
4272 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4277 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4278 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
4279 rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
4280 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
4287 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, rcp, slen))
4290 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &slen, sizeof(slen)))
4297 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
4298 * @sock: the peer socket
4300 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
4302 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
4304 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
4305 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4308 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
4309 struct smack_known *skp;
4310 struct sock *sk = NULL;
4311 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
4312 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
4315 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4317 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4318 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4320 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4322 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
4323 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4327 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
4328 s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
4331 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4337 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
4341 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4346 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
4347 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4360 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
4362 * @parent: parent socket
4364 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
4365 * is creating the new socket.
4367 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4369 struct socket_smack *ssp;
4370 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
4373 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
4376 ssp = sk->sk_security;
4379 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
4383 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
4384 * @sk: socket involved
4388 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
4389 * the socket, otherwise an error code
4391 static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4392 struct request_sock *req)
4394 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4395 struct smack_known *skp;
4396 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4397 struct sockaddr_in addr;
4399 struct smack_known *hskp;
4401 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4403 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4406 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4407 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4409 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
4410 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
4411 * processing on IPv6.
4413 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4418 #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
4421 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
4422 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
4423 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
4425 skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
4427 skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
4429 skp = &smack_known_huh;
4433 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
4434 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
4435 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4436 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
4439 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
4440 * here. Read access is not required.
4442 rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4443 rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4448 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
4449 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
4451 req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
4454 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
4455 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
4456 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
4459 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
4461 hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
4465 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &ssp->smk_out->smk_netlabel);
4467 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
4473 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
4474 * @sk: the new socket
4475 * @req: the connection's request_sock
4477 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
4479 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
4480 const struct request_sock *req)
4482 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
4483 struct smack_known *skp;
4485 if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
4486 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
4487 ssp->smk_packet = skp;
4489 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
4493 * Key management security hooks
4495 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
4496 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
4497 * If you care about keys please have a look.
4502 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
4504 * @cred: the credentials to use
4507 * No allocation required
4511 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
4512 unsigned long flags)
4514 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4516 key->security = skp;
4521 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
4524 * Clear the blob pointer
4526 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
4528 key->security = NULL;
4532 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
4533 * @key_ref: gets to the object
4534 * @cred: the credentials to use
4535 * @need_perm: requested key permission
4537 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
4538 * an error code otherwise
4540 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4541 const struct cred *cred,
4542 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
4545 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4546 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4551 * Validate requested permissions
4553 switch (need_perm) {
4555 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
4557 request |= MAY_READ;
4559 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
4561 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
4562 request |= MAY_WRITE;
4564 case KEY_NEED_UNSPECIFIED:
4565 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
4566 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
4567 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
4568 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
4574 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4578 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4581 if (keyp->security == NULL)
4584 * This should not occur
4589 if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
4593 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4594 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
4595 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
4597 rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
4598 rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
4603 * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
4604 * @key points to the key to be queried
4605 * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
4606 * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
4607 * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
4609 * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
4611 static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
4613 struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
4617 if (key->security == NULL) {
4622 copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
4625 length = strlen(copy) + 1;
4632 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
4634 * smack_watch_key - Smack access to watch a key for notifications.
4635 * @key: The key to be watched
4637 * Return 0 if the @watch->cred has permission to read from the key object and
4638 * an error otherwise.
4640 static int smack_watch_key(struct key *key)
4642 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4643 struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_current();
4649 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
4652 if (key->security == NULL)
4655 * This should not occur
4660 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
4664 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
4665 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = key->serial;
4666 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = key->description;
4668 rc = smk_access(tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, &ad);
4669 rc = smk_bu_note("key watch", tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, rc);
4672 #endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
4673 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
4675 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
4677 * smack_post_notification - Smack access to post a notification to a queue
4678 * @w_cred: The credentials of the watcher.
4679 * @cred: The credentials of the event source (may be NULL).
4680 * @n: The notification message to be posted.
4682 static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
4683 const struct cred *cred,
4684 struct watch_notification *n)
4686 struct smk_audit_info ad;
4687 struct smack_known *subj, *obj;
4690 /* Always let maintenance notifications through. */
4691 if (n->type == WATCH_TYPE_META)
4696 subj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
4697 obj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(w_cred));
4699 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION);
4700 rc = smk_access(subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
4701 rc = smk_bu_note("notification", subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, rc);
4704 #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
4709 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
4710 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
4711 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
4712 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
4714 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
4715 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
4716 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
4717 * model where nearly everything is a label.
4722 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
4723 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
4724 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
4725 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
4726 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
4727 * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
4729 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
4730 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
4732 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
4735 struct smack_known *skp;
4736 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
4739 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4742 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
4745 skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
4747 return PTR_ERR(skp);
4749 *rule = skp->smk_known;
4755 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
4756 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
4758 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
4759 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
4760 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
4762 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
4764 struct audit_field *f;
4767 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
4768 f = &krule->fields[i];
4770 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4778 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
4779 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
4780 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
4781 * @op: required testing operator
4782 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
4784 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
4785 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
4787 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
4789 struct smack_known *skp;
4792 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
4793 WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
4797 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
4800 skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4803 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
4804 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
4807 if (op == Audit_equal)
4808 return (rule == skp->smk_known);
4809 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
4810 return (rule != skp->smk_known);
4816 * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
4817 * No memory was allocated.
4820 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
4823 * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
4824 * @name: Full xattr name to check.
4826 static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
4828 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
4833 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
4834 * @secid: incoming integer
4835 * @secdata: destination
4836 * @seclen: how long it is
4838 * Exists for networking code.
4840 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4842 struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
4845 *secdata = skp->smk_known;
4846 *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4851 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
4852 * @secdata: smack label
4853 * @seclen: how long result is
4854 * @secid: outgoing integer
4856 * Exists for audit and networking code.
4858 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
4860 struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
4863 *secid = skp->smk_secid;
4870 * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
4871 * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
4872 * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
4875 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4877 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx,
4881 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
4883 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
4887 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
4889 struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
4891 *ctx = skp->smk_known;
4892 *ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
4896 static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
4899 struct task_smack *tsp;
4900 struct smack_known *skp;
4901 struct inode_smack *isp;
4902 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
4904 if (new_creds == NULL) {
4905 new_creds = prepare_creds();
4906 if (new_creds == NULL)
4910 tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
4913 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
4915 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry));
4916 skp = isp->smk_inode;
4917 tsp->smk_task = skp;
4922 static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
4925 * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
4927 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
4933 static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
4935 const struct cred *old,
4938 struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
4939 struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
4940 struct inode_smack *isp;
4944 * Use the process credential unless all of
4945 * the transmuting criteria are met
4947 ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
4950 * the attribute of the containing directory
4952 isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
4954 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
4956 may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
4957 isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
4958 &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
4962 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
4963 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
4964 * directory label instead of the process label.
4966 if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) {
4967 ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
4968 ntsp->smk_transmuted = ntsp->smk_task;
4974 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
4976 * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed?
4977 * @new: the target creds
4979 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
4980 * to service an io_uring operation.
4982 static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
4984 struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
4985 struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new);
4988 * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is
4989 * the same as the current Smack value.
4991 if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task)
4994 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
5001 * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
5003 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
5004 * kernel polling thread.
5006 static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
5008 if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred()))
5015 * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
5016 * @ioucmd: the command in question
5018 * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
5019 * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
5020 * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
5022 static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
5024 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
5025 struct smk_audit_info ad;
5026 struct task_smack *tsp;
5027 struct inode *inode;
5033 tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
5034 inode = file_inode(file);
5036 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
5037 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
5038 rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
5039 rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
5044 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
5046 struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
5047 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
5048 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5049 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
5050 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5051 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
5052 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
5053 .lbs_xattr_count = SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
5056 static const struct lsm_id smack_lsmid = {
5061 static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
5062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
5063 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
5064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
5066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, smack_fs_context_submount),
5067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
5068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
5070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
5071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
5072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
5073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
5074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
5076 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
5078 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
5079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
5080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
5081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
5082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
5083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
5084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
5085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
5086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
5087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap),
5088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
5089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
5090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
5091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
5092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, smack_inode_set_acl),
5093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, smack_inode_get_acl),
5094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, smack_inode_remove_acl),
5095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
5096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
5097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
5098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
5100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
5101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
5102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, smack_file_ioctl),
5103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
5104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
5105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
5106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
5107 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
5108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
5109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
5111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
5113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
5114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
5115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
5116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
5117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
5118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
5119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
5120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
5121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
5122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
5123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj),
5124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj),
5125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
5126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
5127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
5128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
5129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
5130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
5131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
5132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
5134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
5135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
5137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
5139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
5140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
5141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
5142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
5143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
5145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
5146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
5147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
5148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
5150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
5151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
5152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
5153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
5155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
5157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, smack_getselfattr),
5158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, smack_setselfattr),
5159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
5160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
5162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
5163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
5165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
5166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
5167 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
5168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
5170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
5171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
5172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
5173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
5174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
5175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
5176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
5177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, smack_sk_clone_security),
5178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
5179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
5180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
5182 /* key management security hooks */
5184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
5185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
5186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
5187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
5188 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
5189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, smack_watch_key),
5191 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
5193 #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
5194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(post_notification, smack_post_notification),
5199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
5200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
5201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
5202 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
5204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
5205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
5206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
5207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
5208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
5209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
5210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
5211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
5212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
5213 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
5214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
5215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
5216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
5221 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
5224 * Initialize rule list locks
5226 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
5227 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
5228 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
5229 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
5230 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
5232 * Initialize rule lists
5234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
5235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
5236 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
5237 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
5238 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
5240 * Create the known labels list
5242 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
5243 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
5244 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
5245 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
5246 smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
5250 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
5252 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
5254 static __init int smack_init(void)
5256 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
5257 struct task_smack *tsp;
5259 smack_rule_cache = KMEM_CACHE(smack_rule, 0);
5260 if (!smack_rule_cache)
5264 * Set the security state for the initial task.
5266 tsp = smack_cred(cred);
5267 init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
5272 security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid);
5275 pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
5276 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
5277 pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
5279 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
5280 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
5282 #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
5283 pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
5286 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
5287 init_smack_known_list();
5293 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
5294 * all processes and objects when they are created.
5296 DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
5298 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
5299 .blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,