security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
   2 /*
   3  *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   4  *
   5  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   6  *
   7  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
   8  *            Chris Vance, <[email protected]>
   9  *            Wayne Salamon, <[email protected]>
  10  *            James Morris <[email protected]>
  11  *
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
  14  *                                         Eric Paris <[email protected]>
  15  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  16  *                          <[email protected]>
  17  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  18  *      Paul Moore <[email protected]>
  19  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  20  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <[email protected]>
  21  *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
  22  */
  23
  24 #include <linux/init.h>
  25 #include <linux/kd.h>
  26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
  28 #include <linux/errno.h>
  29 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
  31 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  40 #include <linux/swap.h>
  41 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  42 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  43 #include <linux/dcache.h>
  44 #include <linux/file.h>
  45 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  46 #include <linux/namei.h>
  47 #include <linux/mount.h>
  48 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
  49 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
  50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  52 #include <linux/tty.h>
  53 #include <net/icmp.h>
  54 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  55 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
  57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
  62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  64 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  65 #include <net/netlink.h>
  66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  67 #include <linux/udp.h>
  68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  69 #include <linux/sctp.h>
  70 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
  71 #include <linux/quota.h>
  72 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  73 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  74 #include <linux/parser.h>
  75 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  76 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  77 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  78 #include <linux/personality.h>
  79 #include <linux/audit.h>
  80 #include <linux/string.h>
  81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
  84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
  85 #include <linux/export.h>
  86 #include <linux/msg.h>
  87 #include <linux/shm.h>
  88 #include <uapi/linux/shm.h>
  89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
  90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
  91 #include <linux/stringhash.h>   /* for hashlen_string() */
  92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
  93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
  94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
  95 #include <linux/io_uring/cmd.h>
  96 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
  97
  98 #include "avc.h"
  99 #include "objsec.h"
 100 #include "netif.h"
 101 #include "netnode.h"
 102 #include "netport.h"
 103 #include "ibpkey.h"
 104 #include "xfrm.h"
 105 #include "netlabel.h"
 106 #include "audit.h"
 107 #include "avc_ss.h"
 108
 109 #define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
 110
 111 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
 112
 113 /* SECMARK reference count */
 114 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 115
 116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 117 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
 118
 119 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 120 {
 121         unsigned long enforcing;
 122         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 123                 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 124         return 1;
 125 }
 126 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 127 #else
 128 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
 129 #endif
 130
 131 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
 132 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 133 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 134 {
 135         unsigned long enabled;
 136         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 137                 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 138         return 1;
 139 }
 140 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 141 #endif
 142
 143 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 144 {
 145         unsigned long checkreqprot;
 146
 147         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
 148                 if (checkreqprot)
 149                         pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter.  This is no longer supported.\n");
 150         }
 151         return 1;
 152 }
 153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 154
 155 /**
 156  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 157  *
 158  * Description:
 159  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 160  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 161  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 162  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
 163  * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
 164  *
 165  */
 166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 167 {
 168         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
 169                 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 170 }
 171
 172 /**
 173  * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
 174  *
 175  * Description:
 176  * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
 177  * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
 178  * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
 179  * is always considered enabled.
 180  *
 181  */
 182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 183 {
 184         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
 185                 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 186 }
 187
 188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
 189 {
 190         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 191                 sel_netif_flush();
 192                 sel_netnode_flush();
 193                 sel_netport_flush();
 194                 synchronize_net();
 195         }
 196         return 0;
 197 }
 198
 199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
 200 {
 201         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 202                 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
 203                 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 204         }
 205
 206         return 0;
 207 }
 208
 209 /*
 210  * initialise the security for the init task
 211  */
 212 static void cred_init_security(void)
 213 {
 214         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 215
 216         tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
 217         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 218 }
 219
 220 /*
 221  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 222  */
 223 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 224 {
 225         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 226
 227         tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 228         return tsec->sid;
 229 }
 230
 231 static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
 232                           struct lsm_network_audit *net,
 233                           int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 234 {
 235         ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 236         ad->u.net = net;
 237         net->netif = ifindex;
 238         net->sk = sk;
 239         net->family = family;
 240 }
 241
 242 static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
 243                                 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
 244                                 struct sock *sk)
 245 {
 246         __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
 247 }
 248
 249 static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
 250                                  struct lsm_network_audit *net,
 251                                  int ifindex, u16 family)
 252 {
 253         __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
 254 }
 255
 256 /*
 257  * get the objective security ID of a task
 258  */
 259 static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
 260 {
 261         u32 sid;
 262
 263         rcu_read_lock();
 264         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 265         rcu_read_unlock();
 266         return sid;
 267 }
 268
 269 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 270
 271 /*
 272  * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid.  The
 273  * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
 274  * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
 275  * invalid.  The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
 276  */
 277 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 278                                        struct dentry *dentry,
 279                                        bool may_sleep)
 280 {
 281         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
 282
 283         might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 284
 285         if (selinux_initialized() &&
 286             isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 287                 if (!may_sleep)
 288                         return -ECHILD;
 289
 290                 /*
 291                  * Try reloading the inode security label.  This will fail if
 292                  * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
 293                  * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
 294                  */
 295                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
 296         }
 297         return 0;
 298 }
 299
 300 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
 301 {
 302         return selinux_inode(inode);
 303 }
 304
 305 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
 306 {
 307         int error;
 308
 309         error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
 310         if (error)
 311                 return ERR_PTR(error);
 312         return selinux_inode(inode);
 313 }
 314
 315 /*
 316  * Get the security label of an inode.
 317  */
 318 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
 319 {
 320         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
 321         return selinux_inode(inode);
 322 }
 323
 324 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
 325 {
 326         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 327
 328         return selinux_inode(inode);
 329 }
 330
 331 /*
 332  * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
 333  */
 334 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
 335 {
 336         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 337
 338         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
 339         return selinux_inode(inode);
 340 }
 341
 342 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 343 {
 344         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
 345         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 346
 347         if (!isec)
 348                 return;
 349         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 350         /*
 351          * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
 352          * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
 353          * time taking a lock doing nothing.
 354          *
 355          * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
 356          * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
 357          * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
 358          * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
 359          */
 360         if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
 361                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 362                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 363                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 364         }
 365 }
 366
 367 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
 368         u32 fscontext_sid;
 369         u32 context_sid;
 370         u32 rootcontext_sid;
 371         u32 defcontext_sid;
 372 };
 373
 374 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
 375 {
 376         kfree(mnt_opts);
 377 }
 378
 379 enum {
 380         Opt_error = -1,
 381         Opt_context = 0,
 382         Opt_defcontext = 1,
 383         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 384         Opt_rootcontext = 3,
 385         Opt_seclabel = 4,
 386 };
 387
 388 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
 389 static const struct {
 390         const char *name;
 391         int len;
 392         int opt;
 393         bool has_arg;
 394 } tokens[] = {
 395         A(context, true),
 396         A(fscontext, true),
 397         A(defcontext, true),
 398         A(rootcontext, true),
 399         A(seclabel, false),
 400 };
 401 #undef A
 402
 403 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
 404 {
 405         int i;
 406
 407         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
 408                 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
 409                 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
 410                         continue;
 411                 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
 412                         if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
 413                                 continue;
 414                         *arg = s + len + 1;
 415                 } else if (len != l)
 416                         continue;
 417                 return tokens[i].opt;
 418         }
 419         return Opt_error;
 420 }
 421
 422 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 423
 424 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 425                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 426                         const struct cred *cred)
 427 {
 428         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 429         int rc;
 430
 431         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 432                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 433         if (rc)
 434                 return rc;
 435
 436         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 437                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 438         return rc;
 439 }
 440
 441 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 442                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 443                         const struct cred *cred)
 444 {
 445         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 446         int rc;
 447         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 448                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 449         if (rc)
 450                 return rc;
 451
 452         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 453                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 454         return rc;
 455 }
 456
 457 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
 458 {
 459         /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
 460         return  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 461                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
 462                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 463                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 464                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
 465                 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
 466                  (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 467                   !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
 468 }
 469
 470 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 471 {
 472         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 473
 474         /*
 475          * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
 476          * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
 477          */
 478         BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
 479
 480         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
 481         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 482         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
 483         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 484         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
 485                 return 1;
 486
 487         case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
 488                 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
 489
 490         /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
 491         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
 492         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
 493         default:
 494                 return 0;
 495         }
 496 }
 497
 498 static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
 499 {
 500         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 501         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 502         struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 503         u32 sid;
 504         int rc;
 505
 506         /*
 507          * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 508          * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 509          * the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 510          * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 511          * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
 512          */
 513         if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
 514                 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
 515                         sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 516                 goto fallback;
 517         }
 518
 519         rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 520         if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 521                 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 522                         pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 523                                 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 524                         goto fallback;
 525                 } else {
 526                         pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
 527                                 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 528                         return rc;
 529                 }
 530         }
 531         return 0;
 532
 533 fallback:
 534         /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
 535         rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
 536                                 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
 537         if (rc)
 538                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 539
 540         pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
 541                 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 542         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
 543         sbsec->sid = sid;
 544         return 0;
 545 }
 546
 547 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 548 {
 549         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 550         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 551         struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 552         int rc = 0;
 553
 554         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 555                 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
 556                 if (rc)
 557                         return rc;
 558         }
 559
 560         sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
 561
 562         /*
 563          * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT.  It's not sufficient to simply
 564          * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
 565          * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
 566          */
 567         if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
 568                 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 569         else
 570                 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
 571
 572         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 573         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 574
 575         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 576            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 577            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 578            populates itself. */
 579         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 580         while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 581                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 582                                 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
 583                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 584                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 585                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 586                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 587                 inode = igrab(inode);
 588                 if (inode) {
 589                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 590                                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 591                         iput(inode);
 592                 }
 593                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 594         }
 595         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 596         return rc;
 597 }
 598
 599 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 600                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 601 {
 602         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 603
 604         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 605         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 606                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 607                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 608                         return 1;
 609
 610         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 611          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 612          */
 613         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 614                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 615                         return 1;
 616         return 0;
 617 }
 618
 619 /*
 620  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 621  * labeling information.
 622  */
 623 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 624                                 void *mnt_opts,
 625                                 unsigned long kern_flags,
 626                                 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 627 {
 628         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 629         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 630         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 631         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
 632         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
 633         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 634         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 635         int rc = 0;
 636
 637         /*
 638          * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 639          * place the results is not allowed
 640          */
 641         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
 642                 return -EINVAL;
 643
 644         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 645
 646         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
 647                 if (!opts) {
 648                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 649                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 650                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 651                         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
 652                                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
 653                                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 654                         }
 655                         goto out;
 656                 }
 657                 rc = -EINVAL;
 658                 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 659                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 660                 goto out;
 661         }
 662
 663         /*
 664          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 665          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 666          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 667          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 668          *
 669          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 670          * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
 671          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 672          * will be used for both mounts)
 673          */
 674         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 675             && !opts)
 676                 goto out;
 677
 678         root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
 679
 680         /*
 681          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 682          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 683          * than once with different security options.
 684          */
 685         if (opts) {
 686                 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
 687                         fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
 688                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 689                                         fscontext_sid))
 690                                 goto out_double_mount;
 691                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 692                 }
 693                 if (opts->context_sid) {
 694                         context_sid = opts->context_sid;
 695                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 696                                         context_sid))
 697                                 goto out_double_mount;
 698                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 699                 }
 700                 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
 701                         rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
 702                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 703                                         rootcontext_sid))
 704                                 goto out_double_mount;
 705                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 706                 }
 707                 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
 708                         defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
 709                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 710                                         defcontext_sid))
 711                                 goto out_double_mount;
 712                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 713                 }
 714         }
 715
 716         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 717                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 718                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
 719                         goto out_double_mount;
 720                 rc = 0;
 721                 goto out;
 722         }
 723
 724         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 725                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
 726
 727         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 728             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 729             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
 730             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
 731             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
 732             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
 733                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 734
 735         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 736             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 737             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
 738                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
 739
 740         if (!sbsec->behavior) {
 741                 /*
 742                  * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 743                  * filesystem type.
 744                  */
 745                 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
 746                 if (rc) {
 747                         pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 748                                         __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 749                         goto out;
 750                 }
 751         }
 752
 753         /*
 754          * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
 755          * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
 756          * line and security labels must be ignored.
 757          */
 758         if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
 759             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
 760             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
 761             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
 762             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
 763                 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
 764                     defcontext_sid) {
 765                         rc = -EACCES;
 766                         goto out;
 767                 }
 768                 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 769                         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 770                         rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
 771                                                      current_sid(),
 772                                                      SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
 773                                                      &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
 774                         if (rc)
 775                                 goto out;
 776                 }
 777                 goto out_set_opts;
 778         }
 779
 780         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 781         if (fscontext_sid) {
 782                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 783                 if (rc)
 784                         goto out;
 785
 786                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 787         }
 788
 789         /*
 790          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 791          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 792          * the superblock context if not already set.
 793          */
 794         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
 795                 /*
 796                  * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
 797                  * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
 798                  * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
 799                  * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
 800                  * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
 801                  * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
 802                  */
 803                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 804         } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
 805                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 806                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 807         }
 808
 809         if (context_sid) {
 810                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 811                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 812                                                           cred);
 813                         if (rc)
 814                                 goto out;
 815                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 816                 } else {
 817                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 818                                                              cred);
 819                         if (rc)
 820                                 goto out;
 821                 }
 822                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 823                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 824
 825                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 826                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 827         }
 828
 829         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 830                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 831                                                      cred);
 832                 if (rc)
 833                         goto out;
 834
 835                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 836                 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 837         }
 838
 839         if (defcontext_sid) {
 840                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
 841                         sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
 842                         rc = -EINVAL;
 843                         pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
 844                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 845                         goto out;
 846                 }
 847
 848                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 849                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 850                                                              sbsec, cred);
 851                         if (rc)
 852                                 goto out;
 853                 }
 854
 855                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 856         }
 857
 858 out_set_opts:
 859         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 860 out:
 861         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 862         return rc;
 863 out_double_mount:
 864         rc = -EINVAL;
 865         pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 866                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
 867                sb->s_type->name);
 868         goto out;
 869 }
 870
 871 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 872                                     const struct super_block *newsb)
 873 {
 874         struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
 875         struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
 876         char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 877         char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 878
 879         if (oldflags != newflags)
 880                 goto mismatch;
 881         if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
 882                 goto mismatch;
 883         if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
 884                 goto mismatch;
 885         if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
 886                 goto mismatch;
 887         if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 888                 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
 889                 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 890                 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
 891                         goto mismatch;
 892         }
 893         return 0;
 894 mismatch:
 895         pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
 896                             "different security settings for (dev %s, "
 897                             "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
 898         return -EBUSY;
 899 }
 900
 901 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 902                                         struct super_block *newsb,
 903                                         unsigned long kern_flags,
 904                                         unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 905 {
 906         int rc = 0;
 907         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
 908                                                 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
 909         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
 910
 911         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 912         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 913         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 914
 915         /*
 916          * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 917          * place the results is not allowed.
 918          */
 919         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
 920                 return -EINVAL;
 921
 922         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 923
 924         /*
 925          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 926          * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 927          */
 928         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
 929                 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
 930                         newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
 931                         *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 932                 }
 933                 goto out;
 934         }
 935
 936         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 937         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 938
 939         /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
 940         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 941                 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 942                 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
 943                         *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 944                 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
 945         }
 946
 947         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 948
 949         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 950         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 951         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 952
 953         if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
 954                 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
 955                 rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
 956                 if (rc)
 957                         goto out;
 958         }
 959
 960         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
 961                 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 962                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 963         }
 964
 965         if (set_context) {
 966                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 967
 968                 if (!set_fscontext)
 969                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 970                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 971                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 972                         newisec->sid = sid;
 973                 }
 974                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 975         }
 976         if (set_rootcontext) {
 977                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
 978                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 979
 980                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 981         }
 982
 983         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 984 out:
 985         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 986         return rc;
 987 }
 988
 989 /*
 990  * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
 991  */
 992 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
 993 {
 994         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
 995         u32 *dst_sid;
 996         int rc;
 997
 998         if (token == Opt_seclabel)
 999                 /* eaten and completely ignored */
1000                 return 0;
1001         if (!s)
1002                 return -EINVAL;
1003
1004         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
1005                 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
1006                 return -EINVAL;
1007         }
1008
1009         if (!opts) {
1010                 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1011                 if (!opts)
1012                         return -ENOMEM;
1013                 *mnt_opts = opts;
1014         }
1015
1016         switch (token) {
1017         case Opt_context:
1018                 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1019                         goto err;
1020                 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
1021                 break;
1022         case Opt_fscontext:
1023                 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
1024                         goto err;
1025                 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
1026                 break;
1027         case Opt_rootcontext:
1028                 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
1029                         goto err;
1030                 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
1031                 break;
1032         case Opt_defcontext:
1033                 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1034                         goto err;
1035                 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
1036                 break;
1037         default:
1038                 WARN_ON(1);
1039                 return -EINVAL;
1040         }
1041         rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1042         if (rc)
1043                 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1044                         s, rc);
1045         return rc;
1046
1047 err:
1048         pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1049         return -EINVAL;
1050 }
1051
1052 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1053 {
1054         char *context = NULL;
1055         u32 len;
1056         int rc;
1057
1058         rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
1059         if (!rc) {
1060                 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1061
1062                 seq_putc(m, '=');
1063                 if (has_comma)
1064                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1065                 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1066                 if (has_comma)
1067                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1068         }
1069         kfree(context);
1070         return rc;
1071 }
1072
1073 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1074 {
1075         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1076         int rc;
1077
1078         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1079                 return 0;
1080
1081         if (!selinux_initialized())
1082                 return 0;
1083
1084         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1085                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1086                 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1087                 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1088                 if (rc)
1089                         return rc;
1090         }
1091         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1092                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1093                 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1094                 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1095                 if (rc)
1096                         return rc;
1097         }
1098         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1099                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1100                 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1101                 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1102                 if (rc)
1103                         return rc;
1104         }
1105         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1106                 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1107                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1108                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1109                 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1110                 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1111                 if (rc)
1112                         return rc;
1113         }
1114         if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1115                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1116                 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1117         }
1118         return 0;
1119 }
1120
1121 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1122 {
1123         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1124         case S_IFSOCK:
1125                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1126         case S_IFLNK:
1127                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1128         case S_IFREG:
1129                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1130         case S_IFBLK:
1131                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1132         case S_IFDIR:
1133                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1134         case S_IFCHR:
1135                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1136         case S_IFIFO:
1137                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1138
1139         }
1140
1141         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1142 }
1143
1144 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1145 {
1146         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1147                 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1148 }
1149
1150 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1151 {
1152         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1153 }
1154
1155 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1156 {
1157         bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1158
1159         switch (family) {
1160         case PF_UNIX:
1161                 switch (type) {
1162                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1163                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1164                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1165                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1166                 case SOCK_RAW:
1167                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1168                 }
1169                 break;
1170         case PF_INET:
1171         case PF_INET6:
1172                 switch (type) {
1173                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1174                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1175                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1176                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1177                         else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1178                                 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1179                         else
1180                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1181                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1182                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1183                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1184                         else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1185                                                   protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1186                                 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1187                         else
1188                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1189                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1190                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1191                 default:
1192                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1193                 }
1194                 break;
1195         case PF_NETLINK:
1196                 switch (protocol) {
1197                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1198                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1199                 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1200                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1201                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1202                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1203                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1204                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1205                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1206                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1207                 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1208                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1209                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1210                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1211                 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1212                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1213                 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1214                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1215                 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1216                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1217                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1218                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1219                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1220                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1221                 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1222                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1223                 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1224                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1225                 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1226                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1227                 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1228                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1229                 default:
1230                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1231                 }
1232         case PF_PACKET:
1233                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1234         case PF_KEY:
1235                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1236         case PF_APPLETALK:
1237                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1238         }
1239
1240         if (extsockclass) {
1241                 switch (family) {
1242                 case PF_AX25:
1243                         return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1244                 case PF_IPX:
1245                         return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1246                 case PF_NETROM:
1247                         return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1248                 case PF_ATMPVC:
1249                         return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1250                 case PF_X25:
1251                         return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1252                 case PF_ROSE:
1253                         return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1254                 case PF_DECnet:
1255                         return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1256                 case PF_ATMSVC:
1257                         return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1258                 case PF_RDS:
1259                         return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1260                 case PF_IRDA:
1261                         return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1262                 case PF_PPPOX:
1263                         return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1264                 case PF_LLC:
1265                         return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1266                 case PF_CAN:
1267                         return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1268                 case PF_TIPC:
1269                         return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1270                 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1271                         return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1272                 case PF_IUCV:
1273                         return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1274                 case PF_RXRPC:
1275                         return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1276                 case PF_ISDN:
1277                         return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1278                 case PF_PHONET:
1279                         return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1280                 case PF_IEEE802154:
1281                         return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1282                 case PF_CAIF:
1283                         return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1284                 case PF_ALG:
1285                         return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1286                 case PF_NFC:
1287                         return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1288                 case PF_VSOCK:
1289                         return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1290                 case PF_KCM:
1291                         return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1292                 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1293                         return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1294                 case PF_SMC:
1295                         return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1296                 case PF_XDP:
1297                         return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1298                 case PF_MCTP:
1299                         return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1300 #if PF_MAX > 46
1301 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1302 #endif
1303                 }
1304         }
1305
1306         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1307 }
1308
1309 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1310                                  u16 tclass,
1311                                  u16 flags,
1312                                  u32 *sid)
1313 {
1314         int rc;
1315         struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1316         char *buffer, *path;
1317
1318         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1319         if (!buffer)
1320                 return -ENOMEM;
1321
1322         path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1323         if (IS_ERR(path))
1324                 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1325         else {
1326                 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1327                         /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1328                          * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1329                          * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1330                         while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1331                                 path[1] = '/';
1332                                 path++;
1333                         }
1334                 }
1335                 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
1336                                         path, tclass, sid);
1337                 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1338                         /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1339                         *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1340                         rc = 0;
1341                 }
1342         }
1343         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1344         return rc;
1345 }
1346
1347 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1348                                   u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1349 {
1350 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1351         char *context;
1352         unsigned int len;
1353         int rc;
1354
1355         len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1356         context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1357         if (!context)
1358                 return -ENOMEM;
1359
1360         context[len] = '\0';
1361         rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1362         if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1363                 kfree(context);
1364
1365                 /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1366                 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1367                 if (rc < 0)
1368                         return rc;
1369
1370                 len = rc;
1371                 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1372                 if (!context)
1373                         return -ENOMEM;
1374
1375                 context[len] = '\0';
1376                 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1377                                     context, len);
1378         }
1379         if (rc < 0) {
1380                 kfree(context);
1381                 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1382                         pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1383                                 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1384                         return rc;
1385                 }
1386                 *sid = def_sid;
1387                 return 0;
1388         }
1389
1390         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
1391                                              def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1392         if (rc) {
1393                 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1394                 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1395
1396                 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1397                         pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1398                                               ino, dev, context);
1399                 } else {
1400                         pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1401                                 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1402                 }
1403         }
1404         kfree(context);
1405         return 0;
1406 }
1407
1408 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1409 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1410 {
1411         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1412         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1413         u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1414         u16 sclass;
1415         struct dentry *dentry;
1416         int rc = 0;
1417
1418         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1419                 return 0;
1420
1421         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1422         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1423                 goto out_unlock;
1424
1425         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1426                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1427
1428         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1429         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1430                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1431                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1432                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1433                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1434                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1435                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1436                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1437                 goto out_unlock;
1438         }
1439
1440         sclass = isec->sclass;
1441         task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1442         sid = isec->sid;
1443         isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1444         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1445
1446         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1447         /*
1448          * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
1449          * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
1450          */
1451         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1452         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1453                 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1454                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1455                         break;
1456                 }
1457                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1458                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1459                 if (opt_dentry) {
1460                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1461                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1462                 } else {
1463                         /*
1464                          * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1465                          * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1466                          * that first.  We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1467                          * two, depending upon that...
1468                          */
1469                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1470                         if (!dentry)
1471                                 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1472                 }
1473                 if (!dentry) {
1474                         /*
1475                          * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1476                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1477                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1478                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
1479                          * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1480                          * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1481                          * be used again by userspace.
1482                          */
1483                         goto out_invalid;
1484                 }
1485
1486                 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1487                                             &sid);
1488                 dput(dentry);
1489                 if (rc)
1490                         goto out;
1491                 break;
1492         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1493                 sid = task_sid;
1494                 break;
1495         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1496                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1497                 sid = sbsec->sid;
1498
1499                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1500                 rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
1501                                              sclass, NULL, &sid);
1502                 if (rc)
1503                         goto out;
1504                 break;
1505         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1506                 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1507                 break;
1508         default:
1509                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1510                 sid = sbsec->sid;
1511
1512                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1513                      (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1514                       selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1515                         /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1516                          * procfs inodes */
1517                         if (opt_dentry) {
1518                                 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1519                                  * d_splice_alias. */
1520                                 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1521                         } else {
1522                                 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1523                                  * find a dentry.  Some filesystems really want
1524                                  * a connected one, so try that first.
1525                                  */
1526                                 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1527                                 if (!dentry)
1528                                         dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1529                         }
1530                         /*
1531                          * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1532                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1533                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1534                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
1535                          * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1536                          * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1537                          * could be used again by userspace.
1538                          */
1539                         if (!dentry)
1540                                 goto out_invalid;
1541                         rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1542                                                    sbsec->flags, &sid);
1543                         if (rc) {
1544                                 dput(dentry);
1545                                 goto out;
1546                         }
1547
1548                         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1549                             (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1550                                 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1551                                                             sid, &sid);
1552                                 if (rc) {
1553                                         dput(dentry);
1554                                         goto out;
1555                                 }
1556                         }
1557                         dput(dentry);
1558                 }
1559                 break;
1560         }
1561
1562 out:
1563         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1564         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1565                 if (rc) {
1566                         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1567                         goto out_unlock;
1568                 }
1569                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1570                 isec->sid = sid;
1571         }
1572
1573 out_unlock:
1574         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1575         return rc;
1576
1577 out_invalid:
1578         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1579         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1580                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1581                 isec->sid = sid;
1582         }
1583         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1584         return 0;
1585 }
1586
1587 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1588 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1589 {
1590         u32 perm = 0;
1591
1592         switch (sig) {
1593         case SIGCHLD:
1594                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1595                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1596                 break;
1597         case SIGKILL:
1598                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1599                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1600                 break;
1601         case SIGSTOP:
1602                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1603                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1604                 break;
1605         default:
1606                 /* All other signals. */
1607                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1608                 break;
1609         }
1610
1611         return perm;
1612 }
1613
1614 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1615 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1616 #endif
1617
1618 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1619 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1620                                int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1621 {
1622         struct common_audit_data ad;
1623         struct av_decision avd;
1624         u16 sclass;
1625         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1626         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1627         int rc;
1628
1629         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1630         ad.u.cap = cap;
1631
1632         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1633         case 0:
1634                 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1635                 break;
1636         case 1:
1637                 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1638                 break;
1639         default:
1640                 pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1641                 BUG();
1642                 return -EINVAL;
1643         }
1644
1645         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1646         if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1647                 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1648                 if (rc2)
1649                         return rc2;
1650         }
1651         return rc;
1652 }
1653
1654 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1655    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1656    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1657 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1658                           struct inode *inode,
1659                           u32 perms,
1660                           struct common_audit_data *adp)
1661 {
1662         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1663         u32 sid;
1664
1665         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1666                 return 0;
1667
1668         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1669         isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1670
1671         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1672 }
1673
1674 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1675    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1676    pathname if needed. */
1677 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1678                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1679                                   u32 av)
1680 {
1681         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1682         struct common_audit_data ad;
1683
1684         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1685         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1686         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1687         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1688 }
1689
1690 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1691    the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1692    pathname if needed. */
1693 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1694                                 const struct path *path,
1695                                 u32 av)
1696 {
1697         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1698         struct common_audit_data ad;
1699
1700         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1701         ad.u.path = *path;
1702         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1703         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1704 }
1705
1706 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1707 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1708                                      struct file *file,
1709                                      u32 av)
1710 {
1711         struct common_audit_data ad;
1712
1713         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1714         ad.u.file = file;
1715         return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1716 }
1717
1718 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1719 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
1720 #endif
1721
1722 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1723    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1724    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1725    check a particular permission to the file.
1726    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1727    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1728    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1729    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1730 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1731                          struct file *file,
1732                          u32 av)
1733 {
1734         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1735         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1736         struct common_audit_data ad;
1737         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1738         int rc;
1739
1740         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1741         ad.u.file = file;
1742
1743         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1744                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1745                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1746                                   FD__USE,
1747                                   &ad);
1748                 if (rc)
1749                         goto out;
1750         }
1751
1752 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1753         rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1754         if (rc)
1755                 return rc;
1756 #endif
1757
1758         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1759         rc = 0;
1760         if (av)
1761                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1762
1763 out:
1764         return rc;
1765 }
1766
1767 /*
1768  * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1769  */
1770 static int
1771 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1772                                  struct inode *dir,
1773                                  const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1774                                  u32 *_new_isid)
1775 {
1776         const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1777                                                 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1778
1779         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1780             (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1781                 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1782         } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1783                    tsec->create_sid) {
1784                 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1785         } else {
1786                 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1787                 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
1788                                                dsec->sid, tclass,
1789                                                name, _new_isid);
1790         }
1791
1792         return 0;
1793 }
1794
1795 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1796 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1797                       struct dentry *dentry,
1798                       u16 tclass)
1799 {
1800         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1801         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1802         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1803         u32 sid, newsid;
1804         struct common_audit_data ad;
1805         int rc;
1806
1807         dsec = inode_security(dir);
1808         sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1809
1810         sid = tsec->sid;
1811
1812         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1813         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1814
1815         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1816                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1817                           &ad);
1818         if (rc)
1819                 return rc;
1820
1821         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1822                                            &newsid);
1823         if (rc)
1824                 return rc;
1825
1826         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1827         if (rc)
1828                 return rc;
1829
1830         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1831                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1832                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1833 }
1834
1835 #define MAY_LINK        0
1836 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1837 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1838
1839 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1840 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1841                     struct dentry *dentry,
1842                     int kind)
1843
1844 {
1845         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1846         struct common_audit_data ad;
1847         u32 sid = current_sid();
1848         u32 av;
1849         int rc;
1850
1851         dsec = inode_security(dir);
1852         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1853
1854         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1855         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1856
1857         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1858         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1859         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1860         if (rc)
1861                 return rc;
1862
1863         switch (kind) {
1864         case MAY_LINK:
1865                 av = FILE__LINK;
1866                 break;
1867         case MAY_UNLINK:
1868                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1869                 break;
1870         case MAY_RMDIR:
1871                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1872                 break;
1873         default:
1874                 pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1875                         __func__, kind);
1876                 return 0;
1877         }
1878
1879         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1880         return rc;
1881 }
1882
1883 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1884                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1885                              struct inode *new_dir,
1886                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1887 {
1888         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1889         struct common_audit_data ad;
1890         u32 sid = current_sid();
1891         u32 av;
1892         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1893         int rc;
1894
1895         old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1896         old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1897         old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1898         new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1899
1900         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1901
1902         ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1903         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1904                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1905         if (rc)
1906                 return rc;
1907         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1908                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1909         if (rc)
1910                 return rc;
1911         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1912                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1913                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1914                 if (rc)
1915                         return rc;
1916         }
1917
1918         ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1919         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1920         if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1921                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1922         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1923         if (rc)
1924                 return rc;
1925         if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1926                 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1927                 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1928                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1929                                   new_isec->sclass,
1930                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1931                 if (rc)
1932                         return rc;
1933         }
1934
1935         return 0;
1936 }
1937
1938 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1939 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1940                                const struct super_block *sb,
1941                                u32 perms,
1942                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
1943 {
1944         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1945         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1946
1947         sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1948         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1949 }
1950
1951 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1952 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1953 {
1954         u32 av = 0;
1955
1956         if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1957                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1958                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1959                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1960                         av |= FILE__READ;
1961
1962                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1963                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1964                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1965                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1966
1967         } else {
1968                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1969                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1970                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1971                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1972                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1973                         av |= DIR__READ;
1974         }
1975
1976         return av;
1977 }
1978
1979 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1980 static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
1981 {
1982         u32 av = 0;
1983
1984         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1985                 av |= FILE__READ;
1986         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1987                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1988                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1989                 else
1990                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1991         }
1992         if (!av) {
1993                 /*
1994                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1995                  */
1996                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1997         }
1998
1999         return av;
2000 }
2001
2002 /*
2003  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2004  * open permission.
2005  */
2006 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2007 {
2008         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2009         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2010
2011         if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2012             inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2013                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2014
2015         return av;
2016 }
2017
2018 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2019
2020 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
2021 {
2022         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2023                             BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2024 }
2025
2026 static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2027                                       const struct cred *to)
2028 {
2029         u32 mysid = current_sid();
2030         u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2031         u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2032         int rc;
2033
2034         if (mysid != fromsid) {
2035                 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2036                                   BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2037                 if (rc)
2038                         return rc;
2039         }
2040
2041         return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
2042                             SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2043 }
2044
2045 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2046                                           const struct cred *to)
2047 {
2048         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2049                             SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2050                             NULL);
2051 }
2052
2053 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2054                                         const struct cred *to,
2055                                         const struct file *file)
2056 {
2057         u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2058         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2059         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2060         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2061         struct common_audit_data ad;
2062         int rc;
2063
2064         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2065         ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2066
2067         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2068                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2069                                   SECCLASS_FD,
2070                                   FD__USE,
2071                                   &ad);
2072                 if (rc)
2073                         return rc;
2074         }
2075
2076 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2077         rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2078         if (rc)
2079                 return rc;
2080 #endif
2081
2082         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2083                 return 0;
2084
2085         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2086         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2087                             &ad);
2088 }
2089
2090 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2091                                        unsigned int mode)
2092 {
2093         u32 sid = current_sid();
2094         u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2095
2096         if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2097                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
2098                                 NULL);
2099
2100         return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
2101                         NULL);
2102 }
2103
2104 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2105 {
2106         return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2107                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2108 }
2109
2110 static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2111                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2112 {
2113         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
2114                         SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2115 }
2116
2117 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2118                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2119                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2120                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2121 {
2122         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2123                             PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2124 }
2125
2126 /*
2127  * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2128  * which was removed).
2129  *
2130  * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2131  * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2132  * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
2133  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2134  */
2135
2136 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2137                            int cap, unsigned int opts)
2138 {
2139         return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2140 }
2141
2142 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
2143 {
2144         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2145         int rc = 0;
2146
2147         if (!sb)
2148                 return 0;
2149
2150         switch (cmds) {
2151         case Q_SYNC:
2152         case Q_QUOTAON:
2153         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2154         case Q_SETINFO:
2155         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2156         case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2157         case Q_XQUOTAON:
2158         case Q_XSETQLIM:
2159                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2160                 break;
2161         case Q_GETFMT:
2162         case Q_GETINFO:
2163         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2164         case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2165         case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2166         case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2167         case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2168                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2169                 break;
2170         default:
2171                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2172                 break;
2173         }
2174         return rc;
2175 }
2176
2177 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2178 {
2179         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2180
2181         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2182 }
2183
2184 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2185 {
2186         switch (type) {
2187         case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:    /* Read last kernel messages */
2188         case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2189                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2190                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2191         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2192         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:  /* Enable logging to console */
2193         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2194         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2195                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2196                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2197                                     NULL);
2198         }
2199         /* All other syslog types */
2200         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2201                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2202 }
2203
2204 /*
2205  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2206  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2207  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2208  *
2209  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2210  * processes that allocate mappings.
2211  */
2212 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2213 {
2214         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2215
2216         rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2217                                  CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2218         if (rc == 0)
2219                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2220
2221         return cap_sys_admin;
2222 }
2223
2224 /* binprm security operations */
2225
2226 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2227 {
2228         u32 sid = 0;
2229         struct task_struct *tracer;
2230
2231         rcu_read_lock();
2232         tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2233         if (tracer)
2234                 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2235         rcu_read_unlock();
2236
2237         return sid;
2238 }
2239
2240 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2241                             const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2242                             const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2243 {
2244         int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2245         int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2246         int rc;
2247         u32 av;
2248
2249         if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2250                 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2251
2252         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2253                 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2254
2255         /*
2256          * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2257          * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2258          * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2259          * the old and new contexts.
2260          */
2261         if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2262                 av = 0;
2263                 if (nnp)
2264                         av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2265                 if (nosuid)
2266                         av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2267                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2268                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2269                 if (!rc)
2270                         return 0;
2271         }
2272
2273         /*
2274          * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2275          * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2276          * of the permissions of the current SID.
2277          */
2278         rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid,
2279                                          new_tsec->sid);
2280         if (!rc)
2281                 return 0;
2282
2283         /*
2284          * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2285          * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
2286          * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
2287          */
2288         if (nnp)
2289                 return -EPERM;
2290         return -EACCES;
2291 }
2292
2293 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2294 {
2295         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2296         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2297         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2298         struct common_audit_data ad;
2299         struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2300         int rc;
2301
2302         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2303          * the script interpreter */
2304
2305         old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2306         new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2307         isec = inode_security(inode);
2308
2309         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2310         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2311         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2312
2313         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2314         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2315         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2316         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2317
2318         /*
2319          * Before policy is loaded, label any task outside kernel space
2320          * as SECINITSID_INIT, so that any userspace tasks surviving from
2321          * early boot end up with a label different from SECINITSID_KERNEL
2322          * (if the policy chooses to set SECINITSID_INIT != SECINITSID_KERNEL).
2323          */
2324         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
2325                 new_tsec->sid = SECINITSID_INIT;
2326                 /* also clear the exec_sid just in case */
2327                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2328                 return 0;
2329         }
2330
2331         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2332                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2333                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2334                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2335
2336                 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2337                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2338                 if (rc)
2339                         return rc;
2340         } else {
2341                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2342                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid,
2343                                              isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2344                                              &new_tsec->sid);
2345                 if (rc)
2346                         return rc;
2347
2348                 /*
2349                  * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2350                  * transition.
2351                  */
2352                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2353                 if (rc)
2354                         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2355         }
2356
2357         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2358         ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2359
2360         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2361                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2362                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2363                 if (rc)
2364                         return rc;
2365         } else {
2366                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2367                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2368                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2369                 if (rc)
2370                         return rc;
2371
2372                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2373                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2374                 if (rc)
2375                         return rc;
2376
2377                 /* Check for shared state */
2378                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2379                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2380                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2381                                           NULL);
2382                         if (rc)
2383                                 return -EPERM;
2384                 }
2385
2386                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2387                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2388                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2389                         u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2390                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2391                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2392                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2393                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2394                                 if (rc)
2395                                         return -EPERM;
2396                         }
2397                 }
2398
2399                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2400                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2401
2402                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2403                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2404                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2405                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2406                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2407                                   NULL);
2408                 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2409         }
2410
2411         return 0;
2412 }
2413
2414 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2415 {
2416         return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2417 }
2418
2419 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2420 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2421                                             struct files_struct *files)
2422 {
2423         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2424         struct tty_struct *tty;
2425         int drop_tty = 0;
2426         unsigned n;
2427
2428         tty = get_current_tty();
2429         if (tty) {
2430                 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2431                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2432                         struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2433
2434                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2435                            Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2436                            rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2437                            open file may belong to another process and we are
2438                            only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2439                         file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2440                                                 struct tty_file_private, list);
2441                         file = file_priv->file;
2442                         if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2443                                 drop_tty = 1;
2444                 }
2445                 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2446                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2447         }
2448         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2449         if (drop_tty)
2450                 no_tty();
2451
2452         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2453         n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2454         if (!n) /* none found? */
2455                 return;
2456
2457         devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2458         if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2459                 devnull = NULL;
2460         /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2461         do {
2462                 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2463         } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2464         if (devnull)
2465                 fput(devnull);
2466 }
2467
2468 /*
2469  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2470  */
2471 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2472 {
2473         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2474         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2475         int rc, i;
2476
2477         new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2478         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2479                 return;
2480
2481         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2482         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2483
2484         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2485         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2486
2487         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2488          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2489          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2490          *
2491          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2492          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2493          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2494          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2495          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2496          */
2497         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2498                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2499         if (rc) {
2500                 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2501                 task_lock(current);
2502                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2503                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2504                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2505                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2506                 }
2507                 task_unlock(current);
2508                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2509                         update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2510         }
2511 }
2512
2513 /*
2514  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2515  * due to exec
2516  */
2517 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2518 {
2519         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2520         u32 osid, sid;
2521         int rc;
2522
2523         osid = tsec->osid;
2524         sid = tsec->sid;
2525
2526         if (sid == osid)
2527                 return;
2528
2529         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2530          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2531          * flush and unblock signals.
2532          *
2533          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2534          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2535          */
2536         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2537         if (rc) {
2538                 clear_itimer();
2539
2540                 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2541                 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2542                         flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
2543                         flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
2544                         flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2545                         sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2546                         recalc_sigpending();
2547                 }
2548                 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2549         }
2550
2551         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2552          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2553         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2554         __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2555         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2556 }
2557
2558 /* superblock security operations */
2559
2560 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2561 {
2562         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2563
2564         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2565         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2566         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2567         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2568         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2569         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2570
2571         return 0;
2572 }
2573
2574 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2575 {
2576         bool open_quote = false;
2577         int len;
2578         char c;
2579
2580         for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2581                 if (c == '"')
2582                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2583                 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2584                         break;
2585         }
2586         return len;
2587 }
2588
2589 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2590 {
2591         char *from = options;
2592         char *to = options;
2593         bool first = true;
2594         int rc;
2595
2596         while (1) {
2597                 int len = opt_len(from);
2598                 int token;
2599                 char *arg = NULL;
2600
2601                 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2602
2603                 if (token != Opt_error) {
2604                         char *p, *q;
2605
2606                         /* strip quotes */
2607                         if (arg) {
2608                                 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2609                                         char c = *p;
2610                                         if (c != '"')
2611                                                 *q++ = c;
2612                                 }
2613                                 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2614                                 if (!arg) {
2615                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
2616                                         goto free_opt;
2617                                 }
2618                         }
2619                         rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2620                         kfree(arg);
2621                         arg = NULL;
2622                         if (unlikely(rc)) {
2623                                 goto free_opt;
2624                         }
2625                 } else {
2626                         if (!first) {   // copy with preceding comma
2627                                 from--;
2628                                 len++;
2629                         }
2630                         if (to != from)
2631                                 memmove(to, from, len);
2632                         to += len;
2633                         first = false;
2634                 }
2635                 if (!from[len])
2636                         break;
2637                 from += len + 1;
2638         }
2639         *to = '\0';
2640         return 0;
2641
2642 free_opt:
2643         if (*mnt_opts) {
2644                 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2645                 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2646         }
2647         return rc;
2648 }
2649
2650 static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2651 {
2652         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2653         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2654
2655         /*
2656          * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2657          * options specified, otherwise accept.
2658          */
2659         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2660                 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2661
2662         /*
2663          * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2664          * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2665          */
2666         if (!opts)
2667                 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2668
2669         if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2670                 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2671                                opts->fscontext_sid))
2672                         return 1;
2673         }
2674         if (opts->context_sid) {
2675                 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2676                                opts->context_sid))
2677                         return 1;
2678         }
2679         if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2680                 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2681
2682                 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2683                 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2684                                opts->rootcontext_sid))
2685                         return 1;
2686         }
2687         if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2688                 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2689                                opts->defcontext_sid))
2690                         return 1;
2691         }
2692         return 0;
2693 }
2694
2695 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2696 {
2697         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2698         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2699
2700         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2701                 return 0;
2702
2703         if (!opts)
2704                 return 0;
2705
2706         if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2707                 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2708                                opts->fscontext_sid))
2709                         goto out_bad_option;
2710         }
2711         if (opts->context_sid) {
2712                 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2713                                opts->context_sid))
2714                         goto out_bad_option;
2715         }
2716         if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2717                 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2718                 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2719                 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2720                                opts->rootcontext_sid))
2721                         goto out_bad_option;
2722         }
2723         if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2724                 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2725                                opts->defcontext_sid))
2726                         goto out_bad_option;
2727         }
2728         return 0;
2729
2730 out_bad_option:
2731         pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2732                "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2733                sb->s_type->name);
2734         return -EINVAL;
2735 }
2736
2737 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(const struct super_block *sb)
2738 {
2739         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2740         struct common_audit_data ad;
2741
2742         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2743         ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2744         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2745 }
2746
2747 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2748 {
2749         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2750         struct common_audit_data ad;
2751
2752         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2753         ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2754         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2755 }
2756
2757 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2758                          const struct path *path,
2759                          const char *type,
2760                          unsigned long flags,
2761                          void *data)
2762 {
2763         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2764
2765         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2766                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2767                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2768         else
2769                 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2770 }
2771
2772 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2773                               const struct path *to_path)
2774 {
2775         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2776
2777         return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2778 }
2779
2780 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2781 {
2782         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2783
2784         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2785                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2786 }
2787
2788 static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
2789                                    struct super_block *reference)
2790 {
2791         const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
2792         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2793
2794         /*
2795          * Ensure that fc->security remains NULL when no options are set
2796          * as expected by selinux_set_mnt_opts().
2797          */
2798         if (!(sbsec->flags & (FSCONTEXT_MNT|CONTEXT_MNT|DEFCONTEXT_MNT)))
2799                 return 0;
2800
2801         opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2802         if (!opts)
2803                 return -ENOMEM;
2804
2805         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
2806                 opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
2807         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
2808                 opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2809         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
2810                 opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
2811         fc->security = opts;
2812         return 0;
2813 }
2814
2815 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2816                                   struct fs_context *src_fc)
2817 {
2818         const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2819
2820         if (!src)
2821                 return 0;
2822
2823         fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2824         return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2825 }
2826
2827 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2828         fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR,     Opt_context),
2829         fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR,  Opt_defcontext),
2830         fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR,   Opt_fscontext),
2831         fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2832         fsparam_flag  (SECLABEL_STR,    Opt_seclabel),
2833         {}
2834 };
2835
2836 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2837                                           struct fs_parameter *param)
2838 {
2839         struct fs_parse_result result;
2840         int opt;
2841
2842         opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2843         if (opt < 0)
2844                 return opt;
2845
2846         return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2847 }
2848
2849 /* inode security operations */
2850
2851 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2852 {
2853         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2854         u32 sid = current_sid();
2855
2856         spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2857         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2858         isec->inode = inode;
2859         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2860         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2861         isec->task_sid = sid;
2862         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2863
2864         return 0;
2865 }
2866
2867 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2868 {
2869         inode_free_security(inode);
2870 }
2871
2872 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2873                                         const struct qstr *name,
2874                                         const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2875                                         u32 *ctxlen)
2876 {
2877         u32 newsid;
2878         int rc;
2879
2880         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2881                                            d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2882                                            inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2883                                            &newsid);
2884         if (rc)
2885                 return rc;
2886
2887         if (xattr_name)
2888                 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2889
2890         return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx,
2891                                        ctxlen);
2892 }
2893
2894 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2895                                           struct qstr *name,
2896                                           const struct cred *old,
2897                                           struct cred *new)
2898 {
2899         u32 newsid;
2900         int rc;
2901         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2902
2903         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2904                                            d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2905                                            inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2906                                            &newsid);
2907         if (rc)
2908                 return rc;
2909
2910         tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2911         tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2912         return 0;
2913 }
2914
2915 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2916                                        const struct qstr *qstr,
2917                                        struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
2918 {
2919         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2920         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2921         struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
2922         u32 newsid, clen;
2923         u16 newsclass;
2924         int rc;
2925         char *context;
2926
2927         sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2928
2929         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2930         newsclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2931         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr, newsclass, &newsid);
2932         if (rc)
2933                 return rc;
2934
2935         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2936         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2937                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2938                 isec->sclass = newsclass;
2939                 isec->sid = newsid;
2940                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2941         }
2942
2943         if (!selinux_initialized() ||
2944             !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2945                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2946
2947         if (xattr) {
2948                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
2949                                                    &context, &clen);
2950                 if (rc)
2951                         return rc;
2952                 xattr->value = context;
2953                 xattr->value_len = clen;
2954                 xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2955         }
2956
2957         return 0;
2958 }
2959
2960 static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2961                                             const struct qstr *name,
2962                                             const struct inode *context_inode)
2963 {
2964         u32 sid = current_sid();
2965         struct common_audit_data ad;
2966         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2967         int rc;
2968
2969         if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
2970                 return 0;
2971
2972         isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2973
2974         /*
2975          * We only get here once per ephemeral inode.  The inode has
2976          * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2977          * untouched.
2978          */
2979
2980         if (context_inode) {
2981                 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2982                         selinux_inode(context_inode);
2983                 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2984                         pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized\n");
2985                         return -EACCES;
2986                 }
2987
2988                 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2989                 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2990         } else {
2991                 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2992                 rc = security_transition_sid(
2993                         sid, sid,
2994                         isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2995                 if (rc)
2996                         return rc;
2997         }
2998
2999         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3000         /*
3001          * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
3002          * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
3003          */
3004
3005         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
3006         ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
3007
3008         return avc_has_perm(sid,
3009                             isec->sid,
3010                             isec->sclass,
3011                             FILE__CREATE,
3012                             &ad);
3013 }
3014
3015 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3016 {
3017         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3018 }
3019
3020 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3021 {
3022         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3023 }
3024
3025 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3026 {
3027         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3028 }
3029
3030 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3031 {
3032         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3033 }
3034
3035 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3036 {
3037         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3038 }
3039
3040 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3041 {
3042         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3043 }
3044
3045 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3046 {
3047         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3048 }
3049
3050 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3051                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3052 {
3053         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3054 }
3055
3056 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3057 {
3058         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3059
3060         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3061 }
3062
3063 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3064                                      bool rcu)
3065 {
3066         struct common_audit_data ad;
3067         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3068         u32 sid = current_sid();
3069
3070         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3071         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3072         isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3073         if (IS_ERR(isec))
3074                 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3075
3076         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3077 }
3078
3079 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3080                                            u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3081                                            int result)
3082 {
3083         struct common_audit_data ad;
3084         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3085
3086         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3087         ad.u.inode = inode;
3088
3089         return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3090                             audited, denied, result, &ad);
3091 }
3092
3093 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3094 {
3095         u32 perms;
3096         bool from_access;
3097         bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3098         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3099         u32 sid = current_sid();
3100         struct av_decision avd;
3101         int rc, rc2;
3102         u32 audited, denied;
3103
3104         from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3105         mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3106
3107         /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3108         if (!mask)
3109                 return 0;
3110
3111         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3112                 return 0;
3113
3114         perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3115
3116         isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3117         if (IS_ERR(isec))
3118                 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3119
3120         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3121                                   &avd);
3122         audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3123                                      from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3124                                      &denied);
3125         if (likely(!audited))
3126                 return rc;
3127
3128         rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3129         if (rc2)
3130                 return rc2;
3131         return rc;
3132 }
3133
3134 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
3135                                  struct iattr *iattr)
3136 {
3137         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3138         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3139         unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3140         __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3141
3142         /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3143         if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3144                 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3145                               ATTR_FORCE);
3146                 if (!ia_valid)
3147                         return 0;
3148         }
3149
3150         if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3151                         ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3152                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3153
3154         if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3155             inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3156             (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3157             !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3158                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3159
3160         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3161 }
3162
3163 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3164 {
3165         return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3166 }
3167
3168 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3169 {
3170         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3171         unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3172
3173         if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3174                 return false;
3175         if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3176                 return false;
3177         return true;
3178 }
3179
3180 /**
3181  * selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks?
3182  * @name: name of the xattr
3183  *
3184  * Returns 1 to indicate that SELinux "owns" the access control rights to xattrs
3185  * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional
3186  * capability based access controls on this xattr.  Returns 0 to indicate that
3187  * SELinux does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is
3188  * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability
3189  * based controls.
3190  */
3191 static int selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name)
3192 {
3193         /* require capability check if not a selinux xattr */
3194         return !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3195 }
3196
3197 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3198                                   struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3199                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3200 {
3201         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3202         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3203         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3204         struct common_audit_data ad;
3205         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3206         int rc = 0;
3207
3208         /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
3209         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3210                 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3211
3212         if (!selinux_initialized())
3213                 return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3214
3215         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3216         if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3217                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3218
3219         if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
3220                 return -EPERM;
3221
3222         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3223         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3224
3225         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3226         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3227                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3228         if (rc)
3229                 return rc;
3230
3231         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3232                                      GFP_KERNEL);
3233         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3234                 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3235                         struct audit_buffer *ab;
3236                         size_t audit_size;
3237
3238                         /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3239                          * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3240                         if (value) {
3241                                 const char *str = value;
3242
3243                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3244                                         audit_size = size - 1;
3245                                 else
3246                                         audit_size = size;
3247                         } else {
3248                                 audit_size = 0;
3249                         }
3250                         ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3251                                              GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3252                         if (!ab)
3253                                 return rc;
3254                         audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3255                         audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3256                         audit_log_end(ab);
3257
3258                         return rc;
3259                 }
3260                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
3261                                                    size, &newsid);
3262         }
3263         if (rc)
3264                 return rc;
3265
3266         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3267                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3268         if (rc)
3269                 return rc;
3270
3271         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
3272                                           sid, isec->sclass);
3273         if (rc)
3274                 return rc;
3275
3276         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3277                             sbsec->sid,
3278                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3279                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3280                             &ad);
3281 }
3282
3283 static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3284                                  struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3285                                  struct posix_acl *kacl)
3286 {
3287         return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3288 }
3289
3290 static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3291                                  struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3292 {
3293         return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3294 }
3295
3296 static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3297                                     struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3298 {
3299         return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3300 }
3301
3302 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3303                                         const void *value, size_t size,
3304                                         int flags)
3305 {
3306         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3307         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3308         u32 newsid;
3309         int rc;
3310
3311         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3312                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3313                 return;
3314         }
3315
3316         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
3317                 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3318                  * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3319                  * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3320                  * we've since initialized.
3321                  */
3322                 return;
3323         }
3324
3325         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
3326                                            &newsid);
3327         if (rc) {
3328                 pr_err("SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
3329                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3330                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3331                 return;
3332         }
3333
3334         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3335         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3336         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3337         isec->sid = newsid;
3338         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3339         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3340 }
3341
3342 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3343 {
3344         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3345
3346         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3347 }
3348
3349 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3350 {
3351         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3352
3353         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3354 }
3355
3356 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3357                                      struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3358 {
3359         /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */
3360         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3361                 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3362
3363         if (!selinux_initialized())
3364                 return 0;
3365
3366         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3367            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3368         return -EACCES;
3369 }
3370
3371 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3372                                                 unsigned int obj_type)
3373 {
3374         int ret;
3375         u32 perm;
3376
3377         struct common_audit_data ad;
3378
3379         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3380         ad.u.path = *path;
3381
3382         /*
3383          * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3384          * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3385          */
3386         switch (obj_type) {
3387         case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3388                 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3389                 break;
3390         case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3391                 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3392                 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3393                                                 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3394                 if (ret)
3395                         return ret;
3396                 break;
3397         case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3398                 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3399                 break;
3400         default:
3401                 return -EINVAL;
3402         }
3403
3404         /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3405         if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3406                 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3407
3408         /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3409         if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3410                 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3411
3412         return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3413 }
3414
3415 /*
3416  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3417  *
3418  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3419  */
3420 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3421                                      struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3422                                      void **buffer, bool alloc)
3423 {
3424         u32 size;
3425         int error;
3426         char *context = NULL;
3427         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3428
3429         /*
3430          * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3431          * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3432          */
3433         if (!selinux_initialized() ||
3434             strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3435                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3436
3437         /*
3438          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3439          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3440          * use the in-core value under current policy.
3441          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3442          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3443          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3444          * in-core context value, not a denial.
3445          */
3446         isec = inode_security(inode);
3447         if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3448                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3449                                                       &size);
3450         else
3451                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
3452                                                 &context, &size);
3453         if (error)
3454                 return error;
3455         error = size;
3456         if (alloc) {
3457                 *buffer = context;
3458                 goto out_nofree;
3459         }
3460         kfree(context);
3461 out_nofree:
3462         return error;
3463 }
3464
3465 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3466                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3467 {
3468         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3469         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3470         u32 newsid;
3471         int rc;
3472
3473         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3474                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3475
3476         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3477         if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3478                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3479
3480         if (!value || !size)
3481                 return -EACCES;
3482
3483         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3484                                      GFP_KERNEL);
3485         if (rc)
3486                 return rc;
3487
3488         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3489         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3490         isec->sid = newsid;
3491         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3492         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3493         return 0;
3494 }
3495
3496 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3497 {
3498         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3499
3500         if (!selinux_initialized())
3501                 return 0;
3502
3503         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3504                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3505         return len;
3506 }
3507
3508 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3509 {
3510         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3511         *secid = isec->sid;
3512 }
3513
3514 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3515 {
3516         u32 sid;
3517         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3518         struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3519
3520         if (new_creds == NULL) {
3521                 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3522                 if (!new_creds)
3523                         return -ENOMEM;
3524         }
3525
3526         tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3527         /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3528         selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3529         tsec->create_sid = sid;
3530         *new = new_creds;
3531         return 0;
3532 }
3533
3534 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3535 {
3536         /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3537          * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3538          * xattrs up.  Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following
3539          * policy load.
3540          */
3541         if (selinux_initialized() && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3542                 return 1; /* Discard */
3543         /*
3544          * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3545          * by selinux.
3546          */
3547         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3548 }
3549
3550 /* kernfs node operations */
3551
3552 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3553                                         struct kernfs_node *kn)
3554 {
3555         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3556         u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3557         int rc;
3558         char *context;
3559
3560         rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3561         if (rc == -ENODATA)
3562                 return 0;
3563         else if (rc < 0)
3564                 return rc;
3565
3566         clen = (u32)rc;
3567         context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3568         if (!context)
3569                 return -ENOMEM;
3570
3571         rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3572         if (rc < 0) {
3573                 kfree(context);
3574                 return rc;
3575         }
3576
3577         rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
3578                                      GFP_KERNEL);
3579         kfree(context);
3580         if (rc)
3581                 return rc;
3582
3583         if (tsec->create_sid) {
3584                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3585         } else {
3586                 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3587                 struct qstr q;
3588
3589                 q.name = kn->name;
3590                 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3591
3592                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3593                                              parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3594                                              &newsid);
3595                 if (rc)
3596                         return rc;
3597         }
3598
3599         rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
3600                                            &context, &clen);
3601         if (rc)
3602                 return rc;
3603
3604         rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3605                               XATTR_CREATE);
3606         kfree(context);
3607         return rc;
3608 }
3609
3610
3611 /* file security operations */
3612
3613 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3614 {
3615         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3616         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3617
3618         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3619         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3620                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3621
3622         return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3623                              file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3624 }
3625
3626 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3627 {
3628         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3629         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3630         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3631         u32 sid = current_sid();
3632
3633         if (!mask)
3634                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3635                 return 0;
3636
3637         isec = inode_security(inode);
3638         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3639             fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3640                 /* No change since file_open check. */
3641                 return 0;
3642
3643         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3644 }
3645
3646 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3647 {
3648         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3649         u32 sid = current_sid();
3650
3651         fsec->sid = sid;
3652         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3653
3654         return 0;
3655 }
3656
3657 /*
3658  * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3659  * operation to an inode.
3660  */
3661 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3662                 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3663 {
3664         struct common_audit_data ad;
3665         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3666         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3667         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3668         struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3669         u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3670         int rc;
3671         u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3672         u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3673
3674         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3675         ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3676         ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3677         ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3678
3679         if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3680                 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3681                                 SECCLASS_FD,
3682                                 FD__USE,
3683                                 &ad);
3684                 if (rc)
3685                         goto out;
3686         }
3687
3688         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3689                 return 0;
3690
3691         isec = inode_security(inode);
3692         rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3693                                     requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3694 out:
3695         return rc;
3696 }
3697
3698 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3699                               unsigned long arg)
3700 {
3701         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3702         int error = 0;
3703
3704         switch (cmd) {
3705         case FIONREAD:
3706         case FIBMAP:
3707         case FIGETBSZ:
3708         case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3709         case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3710                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3711                 break;
3712
3713         case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3714         case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3715                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3716                 break;
3717
3718         /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3719         case FIONBIO:
3720         case FIOASYNC:
3721                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3722                 break;
3723
3724         case KDSKBENT:
3725         case KDSKBSENT:
3726                 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3727                                             CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3728                 break;
3729
3730         case FIOCLEX:
3731         case FIONCLEX:
3732                 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3733                         error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3734                 break;
3735
3736         /* default case assumes that the command will go
3737          * to the file's ioctl() function.
3738          */
3739         default:
3740                 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3741         }
3742         return error;
3743 }
3744
3745 static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3746                               unsigned long arg)
3747 {
3748         /*
3749          * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
3750          * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
3751          */
3752         switch (cmd) {
3753         case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
3754                 cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
3755                 break;
3756         case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
3757                 cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
3758                 break;
3759         case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
3760                 cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
3761                 break;
3762         case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
3763                 cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
3764                 break;
3765         default:
3766                 break;
3767         }
3768
3769         return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
3770 }
3771
3772 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3773
3774 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3775 {
3776         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3777         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3778         int rc = 0;
3779
3780         if (default_noexec &&
3781             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3782                                    (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3783                 /*
3784                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3785                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3786                  * This has an additional check.
3787                  */
3788                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3789                                   PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3790                 if (rc)
3791                         goto error;
3792         }
3793
3794         if (file) {
3795                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3796                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3797
3798                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3799                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3800                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3801
3802                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3803                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3804
3805                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3806         }
3807
3808 error:
3809         return rc;
3810 }
3811
3812 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3813 {
3814         int rc = 0;
3815
3816         if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3817                 u32 sid = current_sid();
3818                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3819                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3820         }
3821
3822         return rc;
3823 }
3824
3825 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
3826                              unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3827                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3828 {
3829         struct common_audit_data ad;
3830         int rc;
3831
3832         if (file) {
3833                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3834                 ad.u.file = file;
3835                 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3836                                     FILE__MAP, &ad);
3837                 if (rc)
3838                         return rc;
3839         }
3840
3841         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3842                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3843 }
3844
3845 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3846                                  unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3847                                  unsigned long prot)
3848 {
3849         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3850         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3851
3852         if (default_noexec &&
3853             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3854                 int rc = 0;
3855                 if (vma_is_initial_heap(vma)) {
3856                         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3857                                           PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3858                 } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
3859                             vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3860                         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3861                                           PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3862                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3863                         /*
3864                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3865                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3866                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3867                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3868                          * occur for text relocations.
3869                          */
3870                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3871                 }
3872                 if (rc)
3873                         return rc;
3874         }
3875
3876         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3877 }
3878
3879 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3880 {
3881         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3882
3883         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3884 }
3885
3886 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3887                               unsigned long arg)
3888 {
3889         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3890         int err = 0;
3891
3892         switch (cmd) {
3893         case F_SETFL:
3894                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3895                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3896                         break;
3897                 }
3898                 fallthrough;
3899         case F_SETOWN:
3900         case F_SETSIG:
3901         case F_GETFL:
3902         case F_GETOWN:
3903         case F_GETSIG:
3904         case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3905                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3906                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3907                 break;
3908         case F_GETLK:
3909         case F_SETLK:
3910         case F_SETLKW:
3911         case F_OFD_GETLK:
3912         case F_OFD_SETLK:
3913         case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3914 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3915         case F_GETLK64:
3916         case F_SETLK64:
3917         case F_SETLKW64:
3918 #endif
3919                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3920                 break;
3921         }
3922
3923         return err;
3924 }
3925
3926 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3927 {
3928         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3929
3930         fsec = selinux_file(file);
3931         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3932 }
3933
3934 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3935                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3936 {
3937         struct file *file;
3938         u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3939         u32 perm;
3940         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3941
3942         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3943         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3944
3945         fsec = selinux_file(file);
3946
3947         if (!signum)
3948                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3949         else
3950                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3951
3952         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3953                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3954 }
3955
3956 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3957 {
3958         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3959
3960         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3961 }
3962
3963 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3964 {
3965         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3966         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3967
3968         fsec = selinux_file(file);
3969         isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3970         /*
3971          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3972          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3973          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3974          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3975          * struct as its SID.
3976          */
3977         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3978         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3979         /*
3980          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3981          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3982          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3983          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3984          * new inode label or new policy.
3985          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3986          */
3987         return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3988 }
3989
3990 /* task security operations */
3991
3992 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3993                               unsigned long clone_flags)
3994 {
3995         u32 sid = current_sid();
3996
3997         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3998 }
3999
4000 /*
4001  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
4002  */
4003 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
4004                                 gfp_t gfp)
4005 {
4006         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4007         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4008
4009         *tsec = *old_tsec;
4010         return 0;
4011 }
4012
4013 /*
4014  * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
4015  */
4016 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4017 {
4018         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4019         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4020
4021         *tsec = *old_tsec;
4022 }
4023
4024 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4025 {
4026         *secid = cred_sid(c);
4027 }
4028
4029 /*
4030  * set the security data for a kernel service
4031  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4032  */
4033 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4034 {
4035         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4036         u32 sid = current_sid();
4037         int ret;
4038
4039         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
4040                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4041                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4042                            NULL);
4043         if (ret == 0) {
4044                 tsec->sid = secid;
4045                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4046                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4047                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4048         }
4049         return ret;
4050 }
4051
4052 /*
4053  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4054  * objective context of the specified inode
4055  */
4056 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4057 {
4058         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4059         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4060         u32 sid = current_sid();
4061         int ret;
4062
4063         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4064                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4065                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4066                            NULL);
4067
4068         if (ret == 0)
4069                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4070         return ret;
4071 }
4072
4073 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4074 {
4075         struct common_audit_data ad;
4076
4077         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4078         ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4079
4080         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4081                             SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4082 }
4083
4084 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4085 {
4086         struct common_audit_data ad;
4087         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4088         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4089         u32 sid = current_sid();
4090         int rc;
4091
4092         /* init_module */
4093         if (file == NULL)
4094                 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4095                                         SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4096
4097         /* finit_module */
4098
4099         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4100         ad.u.file = file;
4101
4102         fsec = selinux_file(file);
4103         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4104                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4105                 if (rc)
4106                         return rc;
4107         }
4108
4109         isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4110         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4111                                 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4112 }
4113
4114 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4115                                     enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4116                                     bool contents)
4117 {
4118         int rc = 0;
4119
4120         switch (id) {
4121         case READING_MODULE:
4122                 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4123                 break;
4124         default:
4125                 break;
4126         }
4127
4128         return rc;
4129 }
4130
4131 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4132 {
4133         int rc = 0;
4134
4135         switch (id) {
4136         case LOADING_MODULE:
4137                 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4138                 break;
4139         default:
4140                 break;
4141         }
4142
4143         return rc;
4144 }
4145
4146 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4147 {
4148         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4149                             PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4150 }
4151
4152 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4153 {
4154         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4155                             PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4156 }
4157
4158 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4159 {
4160         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4161                             PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4162 }
4163
4164 static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4165 {
4166         *secid = current_sid();
4167 }
4168
4169 static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4170 {
4171         *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4172 }
4173
4174 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4175 {
4176         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4177                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4178 }
4179
4180 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4181 {
4182         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4183                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4184 }
4185
4186 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4187 {
4188         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4189                             PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4190 }
4191
4192 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4193                                 unsigned int flags)
4194 {
4195         u32 av = 0;
4196
4197         if (!flags)
4198                 return 0;
4199         if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4200                 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4201         if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4202                 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4203         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4204                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4205 }
4206
4207 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4208                 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4209 {
4210         struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4211
4212         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4213            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4214            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4215            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4216         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4217                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4218                                     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4219
4220         return 0;
4221 }
4222
4223 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4224 {
4225         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4226                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4227 }
4228
4229 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4230 {
4231         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4232                             PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4233 }
4234
4235 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4236 {
4237         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4238                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4239 }
4240
4241 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4242                                 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4243 {
4244         u32 secid;
4245         u32 perm;
4246
4247         if (!sig)
4248                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4249         else
4250                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4251         if (!cred)
4252                 secid = current_sid();
4253         else
4254                 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4255         return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4256 }
4257
4258 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4259                                   struct inode *inode)
4260 {
4261         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4262         u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4263
4264         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4265         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4266         isec->sid = sid;
4267         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4268         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4269 }
4270
4271 static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4272 {
4273         u32 sid = current_sid();
4274
4275         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4276                         USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4277 }
4278
4279 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4280 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4281                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4282 {
4283         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4284         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4285
4286         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4287         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4288         if (ih == NULL)
4289                 goto out;
4290
4291         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4292         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4293                 goto out;
4294
4295         ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4296         ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4297         ret = 0;
4298
4299         if (proto)
4300                 *proto = ih->protocol;
4301
4302         switch (ih->protocol) {
4303         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4304                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4305
4306                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4307                         break;
4308
4309                 offset += ihlen;
4310                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4311                 if (th == NULL)
4312                         break;
4313
4314                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4315                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4316                 break;
4317         }
4318
4319         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4320                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4321
4322                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4323                         break;
4324
4325                 offset += ihlen;
4326                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4327                 if (uh == NULL)
4328                         break;
4329
4330                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4331                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4332                 break;
4333         }
4334
4335         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4336                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4337
4338                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4339                         break;
4340
4341                 offset += ihlen;
4342                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4343                 if (dh == NULL)
4344                         break;
4345
4346                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4347                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4348                 break;
4349         }
4350
4351 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4352         case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4353                 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4354
4355                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4356                         break;
4357
4358                 offset += ihlen;
4359                 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4360                 if (sh == NULL)
4361                         break;
4362
4363                 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4364                 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4365                 break;
4366         }
4367 #endif
4368         default:
4369                 break;
4370         }
4371 out:
4372         return ret;
4373 }
4374
4375 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4376
4377 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4378 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4379                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4380 {
4381         u8 nexthdr;
4382         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4383         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4384         __be16 frag_off;
4385
4386         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4387         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4388         if (ip6 == NULL)
4389                 goto out;
4390
4391         ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4392         ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4393         ret = 0;
4394
4395         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4396         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4397         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4398         if (offset < 0)
4399                 goto out;
4400
4401         if (proto)
4402                 *proto = nexthdr;
4403
4404         switch (nexthdr) {
4405         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4406                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4407
4408                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4409                 if (th == NULL)
4410                         break;
4411
4412                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4413                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4414                 break;
4415         }
4416
4417         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4418                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4419
4420                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4421                 if (uh == NULL)
4422                         break;
4423
4424                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4425                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4426                 break;
4427         }
4428
4429         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4430                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4431
4432                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4433                 if (dh == NULL)
4434                         break;
4435
4436                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4437                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4438                 break;
4439         }
4440
4441 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4442         case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4443                 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4444
4445                 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4446                 if (sh == NULL)
4447                         break;
4448
4449                 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4450                 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4451                 break;
4452         }
4453 #endif
4454         /* includes fragments */
4455         default:
4456                 break;
4457         }
4458 out:
4459         return ret;
4460 }
4461
4462 #endif /* IPV6 */
4463
4464 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4465                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4466 {
4467         char *addrp;
4468         int ret;
4469
4470         switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4471         case PF_INET:
4472                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4473                 if (ret)
4474                         goto parse_error;
4475                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4476                                        &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4477                 goto okay;
4478
4479 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4480         case PF_INET6:
4481                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4482                 if (ret)
4483                         goto parse_error;
4484                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4485                                        &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4486                 goto okay;
4487 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4488         default:
4489                 addrp = NULL;
4490                 goto okay;
4491         }
4492
4493 parse_error:
4494         pr_warn(
4495                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4496                " unable to parse packet\n");
4497         return ret;
4498
4499 okay:
4500         if (_addrp)
4501                 *_addrp = addrp;
4502         return 0;
4503 }
4504
4505 /**
4506  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4507  * @skb: the packet
4508  * @family: protocol family
4509  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4510  *
4511  * Description:
4512  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4513  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4514  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
4515  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4516  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4517  * peer labels.
4518  *
4519  */
4520 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4521 {
4522         int err;
4523         u32 xfrm_sid;
4524         u32 nlbl_sid;
4525         u32 nlbl_type;
4526
4527         err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4528         if (unlikely(err))
4529                 return -EACCES;
4530         err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4531         if (unlikely(err))
4532                 return -EACCES;
4533
4534         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
4535                                            nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4536         if (unlikely(err)) {
4537                 pr_warn(
4538                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4539                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4540                 return -EACCES;
4541         }
4542
4543         return 0;
4544 }
4545
4546 /**
4547  * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4548  * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4549  * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4550  * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4551  *
4552  * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4553  * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4554  * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4555  * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4556  *
4557  */
4558 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4559 {
4560         int err = 0;
4561
4562         if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4563                 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
4564                                             conn_sid);
4565         else
4566                 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4567
4568         return err;
4569 }
4570
4571 /* socket security operations */
4572
4573 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4574                                  u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4575 {
4576         if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4577                 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4578                 return 0;
4579         }
4580
4581         return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4582                                        secclass, NULL, socksid);
4583 }
4584
4585 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4586 {
4587         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4588         struct common_audit_data ad;
4589         struct lsm_network_audit net;
4590
4591         if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4592                 return 0;
4593
4594         /*
4595          * Before POLICYDB_CAP_USERSPACE_INITIAL_CONTEXT, sockets that
4596          * inherited the kernel context from early boot used to be skipped
4597          * here, so preserve that behavior unless the capability is set.
4598          *
4599          * By setting the capability the policy signals that it is ready
4600          * for this quirk to be fixed. Note that sockets created by a kernel
4601          * thread or a usermode helper executed without a transition will
4602          * still be skipped in this check regardless of the policycap
4603          * setting.
4604          */
4605         if (!selinux_policycap_userspace_initial_context() &&
4606             sksec->sid == SECINITSID_INIT)
4607                 return 0;
4608
4609         ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
4610
4611         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4612                             &ad);
4613 }
4614
4615 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4616                                  int protocol, int kern)
4617 {
4618         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4619         u32 newsid;
4620         u16 secclass;
4621         int rc;
4622
4623         if (kern)
4624                 return 0;
4625
4626         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4627         rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4628         if (rc)
4629                 return rc;
4630
4631         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4632 }
4633
4634 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4635                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
4636 {
4637         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4638         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4639         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4640         u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4641         u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4642         int err = 0;
4643
4644         if (!kern) {
4645                 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4646                 if (err)
4647                         return err;
4648         }
4649
4650         isec->sclass = sclass;
4651         isec->sid = sid;
4652         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4653
4654         if (sock->sk) {
4655                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4656                 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4657                 sksec->sid = sid;
4658                 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4659                 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4660                         sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4661
4662                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4663         }
4664
4665         return err;
4666 }
4667
4668 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4669                                      struct socket *sockb)
4670 {
4671         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4672         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4673
4674         sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4675         sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4676
4677         return 0;
4678 }
4679
4680 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4681    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4682    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4683
4684 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4685 {
4686         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4687         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4688         u16 family;
4689         int err;
4690
4691         err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4692         if (err)
4693                 goto out;
4694
4695         /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4696         family = sk->sk_family;
4697         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4698                 char *addrp;
4699                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4700                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4701                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4702                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4703                 u16 family_sa;
4704                 unsigned short snum;
4705                 u32 sid, node_perm;
4706
4707                 /*
4708                  * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4709                  * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4710                  * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4711                  * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4712                  */
4713                 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4714                         return -EINVAL;
4715                 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4716                 switch (family_sa) {
4717                 case AF_UNSPEC:
4718                 case AF_INET:
4719                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4720                                 return -EINVAL;
4721                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4722                         if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4723                                 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4724                                         /* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
4725                                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4726                                                 return -EINVAL;
4727                                         /* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
4728                                         goto err_af;
4729                                 }
4730                                 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4731                                  * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4732                                  */
4733                                 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4734                                         goto err_af;
4735                                 family_sa = AF_INET;
4736                         }
4737                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4738                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4739                         break;
4740                 case AF_INET6:
4741                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4742                                 return -EINVAL;
4743                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4744                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4745                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4746                         break;
4747                 default:
4748                         goto err_af;
4749                 }
4750
4751                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4752                 ad.u.net = &net;
4753                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4754                 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4755
4756                 if (snum) {
4757                         int low, high;
4758
4759                         inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4760
4761                         if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4762                             snum < low || snum > high) {
4763                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4764                                                       snum, &sid);
4765                                 if (err)
4766                                         goto out;
4767                                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4768                                                    sksec->sclass,
4769                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4770                                 if (err)
4771                                         goto out;
4772                         }
4773                 }
4774
4775                 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4776                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4777                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4778                         break;
4779
4780                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4781                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4782                         break;
4783
4784                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4785                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4786                         break;
4787
4788                 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4789                         node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4790                         break;
4791
4792                 default:
4793                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4794                         break;
4795                 }
4796
4797                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4798                 if (err)
4799                         goto out;
4800
4801                 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4802                         ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4803                 else
4804                         ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4805
4806                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4807                                    sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4808                 if (err)
4809                         goto out;
4810         }
4811 out:
4812         return err;
4813 err_af:
4814         /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4815         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4816                 return -EINVAL;
4817         return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4818 }
4819
4820 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4821  * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4822  */
4823 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4824                                          struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4825 {
4826         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4827         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4828         int err;
4829
4830         err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4831         if (err)
4832                 return err;
4833         if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4834                 return -EINVAL;
4835
4836         /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4837          * way to disconnect the socket
4838          */
4839         if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4840                 return 0;
4841
4842         /*
4843          * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4844          * for the port.
4845          */
4846         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4847             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4848             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4849                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4850                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4851                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4852                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4853                 unsigned short snum;
4854                 u32 sid, perm;
4855
4856                 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4857                  * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4858                  * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4859                  * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4860                  */
4861                 switch (address->sa_family) {
4862                 case AF_INET:
4863                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4864                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4865                                 return -EINVAL;
4866                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4867                         break;
4868                 case AF_INET6:
4869                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4870                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4871                                 return -EINVAL;
4872                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4873                         break;
4874                 default:
4875                         /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4876                          * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4877                          */
4878                         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4879                                 return -EINVAL;
4880                         else
4881                                 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4882                 }
4883
4884                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4885                 if (err)
4886                         return err;
4887
4888                 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4889                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4890                         perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4891                         break;
4892                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4893                         perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4894                         break;
4895                 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4896                         perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4897                         break;
4898                 }
4899
4900                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4901                 ad.u.net = &net;
4902                 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4903                 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4904                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4905                 if (err)
4906                         return err;
4907         }
4908
4909         return 0;
4910 }
4911
4912 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4913 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4914                                   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4915 {
4916         int err;
4917         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4918
4919         err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4920         if (err)
4921                 return err;
4922
4923         return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4924 }
4925
4926 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4927 {
4928         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4929 }
4930
4931 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4932 {
4933         int err;
4934         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4935         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4936         u16 sclass;
4937         u32 sid;
4938
4939         err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4940         if (err)
4941                 return err;
4942
4943         isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4944         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4945         sclass = isec->sclass;
4946         sid = isec->sid;
4947         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4948
4949         newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4950         newisec->sclass = sclass;
4951         newisec->sid = sid;
4952         newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4953
4954         return 0;
4955 }
4956
4957 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4958                                   int size)
4959 {
4960         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4961 }
4962
4963 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4964                                   int size, int flags)
4965 {
4966         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4967 }
4968
4969 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4970 {
4971         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4972 }
4973
4974 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4975 {
4976         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4977 }
4978
4979 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4980 {
4981         int err;
4982
4983         err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4984         if (err)
4985                 return err;
4986
4987         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4988 }
4989
4990 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4991                                      int optname)
4992 {
4993         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4994 }
4995
4996 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4997 {
4998         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4999 }
5000
5001 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
5002                                               struct sock *other,
5003                                               struct sock *newsk)
5004 {
5005         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
5006         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
5007         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
5008         struct common_audit_data ad;
5009         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5010         int err;
5011
5012         ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
5013
5014         err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
5015                            sksec_other->sclass,
5016                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
5017         if (err)
5018                 return err;
5019
5020         /* server child socket */
5021         sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
5022         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
5023                                     sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
5024         if (err)
5025                 return err;
5026
5027         /* connecting socket */
5028         sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5029
5030         return 0;
5031 }
5032
5033 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5034                                         struct socket *other)
5035 {
5036         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5037         struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
5038         struct common_audit_data ad;
5039         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5040
5041         ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
5042
5043         return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5044                             &ad);
5045 }
5046
5047 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5048                                     char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5049                                     struct common_audit_data *ad)
5050 {
5051         int err;
5052         u32 if_sid;
5053         u32 node_sid;
5054
5055         err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5056         if (err)
5057                 return err;
5058         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5059                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5060         if (err)
5061                 return err;
5062
5063         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5064         if (err)
5065                 return err;
5066         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5067                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5068 }
5069
5070 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5071                                        u16 family)
5072 {
5073         int err = 0;
5074         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5075         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5076         struct common_audit_data ad;
5077         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5078         char *addrp;
5079
5080         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5081         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5082         if (err)
5083                 return err;
5084
5085         if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5086                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5087                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5088                 if (err)
5089                         return err;
5090         }
5091
5092         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5093         if (err)
5094                 return err;
5095         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5096
5097         return err;
5098 }
5099
5100 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5101 {
5102         int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
5103         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5104         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5105         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5106         struct common_audit_data ad;
5107         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5108         char *addrp;
5109
5110         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5111                 return 0;
5112
5113         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5114         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5115                 family = PF_INET;
5116
5117         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5118          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5119          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5120          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5121         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5122                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5123
5124         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5125         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5126         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5127                 return 0;
5128
5129         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5130         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5131         if (err)
5132                 return err;
5133
5134         if (peerlbl_active) {
5135                 u32 peer_sid;
5136
5137                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5138                 if (err)
5139                         return err;
5140                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5141                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5142                 if (err) {
5143                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5144                         return err;
5145                 }
5146                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5147                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
5148                 if (err) {
5149                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5150                         return err;
5151                 }
5152         }
5153
5154         if (secmark_active) {
5155                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5156                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5157                 if (err)
5158                         return err;
5159         }
5160
5161         return err;
5162 }
5163
5164 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5165                                             sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5166                                             unsigned int len)
5167 {
5168         int err = 0;
5169         char *scontext = NULL;
5170         u32 scontext_len;
5171         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5172         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5173
5174         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5175             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5176             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5177                 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5178         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5179                 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5180
5181         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
5182                                       &scontext_len);
5183         if (err)
5184                 return err;
5185         if (scontext_len > len) {
5186                 err = -ERANGE;
5187                 goto out_len;
5188         }
5189
5190         if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5191                 err = -EFAULT;
5192 out_len:
5193         if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5194                 err = -EFAULT;
5195         kfree(scontext);
5196         return err;
5197 }
5198
5199 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
5200                                            struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5201 {
5202         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5203         u16 family;
5204
5205         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5206                 family = PF_INET;
5207         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5208                 family = PF_INET6;
5209         else if (sock)
5210                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5211         else {
5212                 *secid = SECSID_NULL;
5213                 return -EINVAL;
5214         }
5215
5216         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5217                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5218                 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5219                 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5220         } else if (skb)
5221                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5222
5223         *secid = peer_secid;
5224         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5225                 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5226         return 0;
5227 }
5228
5229 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5230 {
5231         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5232
5233         sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5234         if (!sksec)
5235                 return -ENOMEM;
5236
5237         sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5238         sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5239         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5240         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5241         sk->sk_security = sksec;
5242
5243         return 0;
5244 }
5245
5246 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5247 {
5248         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5249
5250         sk->sk_security = NULL;
5251         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5252         kfree(sksec);
5253 }
5254
5255 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5256 {
5257         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5258         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5259
5260         newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5261         newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5262         newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5263
5264         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5265 }
5266
5267 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5268 {
5269         if (!sk)
5270                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5271         else {
5272                 const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5273
5274                 *secid = sksec->sid;
5275         }
5276 }
5277
5278 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5279 {
5280         struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5281                 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5282         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5283
5284         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5285             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5286                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5287         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5288 }
5289
5290 /*
5291  * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5292  * if it's the first association on the socket.
5293  */
5294 static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5295                                           struct sk_buff *skb)
5296 {
5297         struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5298         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5299         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5300         struct common_audit_data ad;
5301         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5302         int err;
5303
5304         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5305         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5306                 family = PF_INET;
5307
5308         if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5309                 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5310
5311                 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5312                  * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5313                  */
5314                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5315                 if (err)
5316                         return err;
5317
5318                 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5319                         asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5320         } else {
5321                 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5322         }
5323
5324         if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5325                 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5326
5327                 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5328                  * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5329                  * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5330                  * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5331                  */
5332                 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5333         } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5334                 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5335                  * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5336                  */
5337                 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
5338                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5339                                    sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5340                                    &ad);
5341                 if (err)
5342                         return err;
5343         }
5344         return 0;
5345 }
5346
5347 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5348  * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5349  * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5350  */
5351 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5352                                       struct sk_buff *skb)
5353 {
5354         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5355         u32 conn_sid;
5356         int err;
5357
5358         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5359                 return 0;
5360
5361         err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5362         if (err)
5363                 return err;
5364
5365         /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5366          * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5367          * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5368          * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5369          * plug this into the new socket.
5370          */
5371         err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5372         if (err)
5373                 return err;
5374
5375         asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5376
5377         /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5378         return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5379 }
5380
5381 /* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5382  * response to an association request (initited by us).
5383  */
5384 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5385                                           struct sk_buff *skb)
5386 {
5387         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5388
5389         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5390                 return 0;
5391
5392         /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5393          * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5394          * into a new socket.
5395          */
5396         asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5397
5398         return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5399 }
5400
5401 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5402  * based on their @optname.
5403  */
5404 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5405                                      struct sockaddr *address,
5406                                      int addrlen)
5407 {
5408         int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5409         void *addr_buf;
5410         struct sockaddr *addr;
5411         struct socket *sock;
5412
5413         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5414                 return 0;
5415
5416         /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5417         sock = sk->sk_socket;
5418         addr_buf = address;
5419
5420         while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5421                 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5422                         return -EINVAL;
5423
5424                 addr = addr_buf;
5425                 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5426                 case AF_UNSPEC:
5427                 case AF_INET:
5428                         len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5429                         break;
5430                 case AF_INET6:
5431                         len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5432                         break;
5433                 default:
5434                         return -EINVAL;
5435                 }
5436
5437                 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5438                         return -EINVAL;
5439
5440                 err = -EINVAL;
5441                 switch (optname) {
5442                 /* Bind checks */
5443                 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5444                 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5445                 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5446                         err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5447                         break;
5448                 /* Connect checks */
5449                 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5450                 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5451                 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5452                 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5453                         err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5454                         if (err)
5455                                 return err;
5456
5457                         /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5458                          * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5459                          * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5460                          * is called here. The situations handled are:
5461                          * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5462                          * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5463                          * primary address is selected.
5464                          * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5465                          * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5466                          * selinux_socket_connect().
5467                          */
5468                         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5469                         break;
5470                 }
5471
5472                 if (err)
5473                         return err;
5474
5475                 addr_buf += len;
5476                 walk_size += len;
5477         }
5478
5479         return 0;
5480 }
5481
5482 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5483 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5484                                   struct sock *newsk)
5485 {
5486         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5487         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5488
5489         /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5490          * the non-sctp clone version.
5491          */
5492         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5493                 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5494
5495         newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5496         newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5497         newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5498         selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5499 }
5500
5501 static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
5502 {
5503         struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security;
5504         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5505
5506         ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5507         ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5508
5509         /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
5510          * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
5511          */
5512         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
5513         return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
5514 }
5515
5516 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5517                                      struct request_sock *req)
5518 {
5519         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5520         int err;
5521         u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5522         u32 connsid;
5523         u32 peersid;
5524
5525         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5526         if (err)
5527                 return err;
5528         err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5529         if (err)
5530                 return err;
5531         req->secid = connsid;
5532         req->peer_secid = peersid;
5533
5534         return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5535 }
5536
5537 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5538                                    const struct request_sock *req)
5539 {
5540         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5541
5542         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5543         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5544         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5545            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5546            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5547            time it will have been created and available. */
5548
5549         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5550          * thread with access to newsksec */
5551         selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5552 }
5553
5554 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5555 {
5556         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5557         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5558
5559         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5560         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5561                 family = PF_INET;
5562
5563         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5564 }
5565
5566 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5567 {
5568         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5569                             NULL);
5570 }
5571
5572 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5573 {
5574         atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5575 }
5576
5577 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5578 {
5579         atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5580 }
5581
5582 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5583                                       struct flowi_common *flic)
5584 {
5585         flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5586 }
5587
5588 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5589 {
5590         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5591
5592         tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5593         if (!tunsec)
5594                 return -ENOMEM;
5595         tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5596
5597         *security = tunsec;
5598         return 0;
5599 }
5600
5601 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5602 {
5603         kfree(security);
5604 }
5605
5606 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5607 {
5608         u32 sid = current_sid();
5609
5610         /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5611          * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5612          * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5613          * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5614          * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5615          * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5616
5617         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5618                             NULL);
5619 }
5620
5621 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5622 {
5623         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5624
5625         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5626                             TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5627 }
5628
5629 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5630 {
5631         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5632         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5633
5634         /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5635          * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5636          * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5637          * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5638          * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5639          * protocols were being used */
5640
5641         sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5642         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5643
5644         return 0;
5645 }
5646
5647 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5648 {
5649         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5650         u32 sid = current_sid();
5651         int err;
5652
5653         err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5654                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5655         if (err)
5656                 return err;
5657         err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5658                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5659         if (err)
5660                 return err;
5661         tunsec->sid = sid;
5662
5663         return 0;
5664 }
5665
5666 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5667
5668 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5669                                        const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5670 {
5671         int ifindex;
5672         u16 family;
5673         char *addrp;
5674         u32 peer_sid;
5675         struct common_audit_data ad;
5676         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5677         int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5678
5679         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5680                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5681
5682         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5683         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5684         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5685                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5686
5687         family = state->pf;
5688         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5689                 return NF_DROP;
5690
5691         ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5692         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5693         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5694                 return NF_DROP;
5695
5696         if (peerlbl_active) {
5697                 int err;
5698
5699                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5700                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5701                 if (err) {
5702                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5703                         return NF_DROP;
5704                 }
5705         }
5706
5707         if (secmark_active)
5708                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5709                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5710                         return NF_DROP;
5711
5712         if (netlbl_enabled())
5713                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5714                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5715                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5716                  * protection */
5717                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5718                         return NF_DROP;
5719
5720         return NF_ACCEPT;
5721 }
5722
5723 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5724                                       const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5725 {
5726         struct sock *sk;
5727         u32 sid;
5728
5729         if (!netlbl_enabled())
5730                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5731
5732         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5733          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5734          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5735         sk = skb->sk;
5736         if (sk) {
5737                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5738
5739                 if (sk_listener(sk))
5740                         /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5741                          * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5742                          * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5743                          * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
5744                          * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5745                          * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5746                          * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5747                          * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5748                          * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5749                          * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5750                          * security label in the packet itself this is the
5751                          * best we can do. */
5752                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5753
5754                 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5755                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5756                 sid = sksec->sid;
5757         } else
5758                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5759         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5760                 return NF_DROP;
5761
5762         return NF_ACCEPT;
5763 }
5764
5765
5766 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5767                                         const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5768 {
5769         struct sock *sk;
5770         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5771         struct common_audit_data ad;
5772         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5773         u8 proto = 0;
5774
5775         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5776         if (sk == NULL)
5777                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5778         sksec = sk->sk_security;
5779
5780         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
5781         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5782                 return NF_DROP;
5783
5784         if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5785                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5786                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5787                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5788
5789         if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5790                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5791
5792         return NF_ACCEPT;
5793 }
5794
5795 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5796                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
5797                                          const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5798 {
5799         u16 family;
5800         u32 secmark_perm;
5801         u32 peer_sid;
5802         int ifindex;
5803         struct sock *sk;
5804         struct common_audit_data ad;
5805         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5806         char *addrp;
5807         int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5808
5809         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5810          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5811          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5812          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5813         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5814                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5815
5816         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5817         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5818         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5819                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5820
5821         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5822
5823 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5824         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5825          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5826          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5827          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5828          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5829          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5830          * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5831          *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5832          *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5833          *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5834          *       connection. */
5835         if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5836             !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5837                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5838 #endif
5839
5840         family = state->pf;
5841         if (sk == NULL) {
5842                 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5843                  * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5844                  * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5845                  * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5846                 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5847                         secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5848                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5849                                 return NF_DROP;
5850                 } else {
5851                         secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5852                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5853                 }
5854         } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5855                 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5856                  * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
5857                  * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5858                  * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5859                  * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5860                  * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5861                  * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5862                  * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
5863                  * for similar problems. */
5864                 u32 skb_sid;
5865                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5866
5867                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5868                 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5869                         return NF_DROP;
5870                 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5871                  * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5872                  * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5873                  * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5874                  * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5875                  * pass the packet. */
5876                 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5877                         switch (family) {
5878                         case PF_INET:
5879                                 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5880                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5881                                 break;
5882                         case PF_INET6:
5883                                 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5884                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5885                                 break;
5886                         default:
5887                                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5888                         }
5889                 }
5890                 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5891                         return NF_DROP;
5892                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5893         } else {
5894                 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5895                  * associated socket. */
5896                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5897                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5898                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5899         }
5900
5901         ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5902         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5903         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5904                 return NF_DROP;
5905
5906         if (secmark_active)
5907                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5908                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5909                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5910
5911         if (peerlbl_active) {
5912                 u32 if_sid;
5913                 u32 node_sid;
5914
5915                 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5916                         return NF_DROP;
5917                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5918                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5919                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5920
5921                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5922                         return NF_DROP;
5923                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5924                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5925                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5926         }
5927
5928         return NF_ACCEPT;
5929 }
5930 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5931
5932 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5933 {
5934         int rc = 0;
5935         unsigned int msg_len;
5936         unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5937         unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5938         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5939         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5940         u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5941         u32 perm;
5942
5943         while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5944                 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5945
5946                 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5947                  *       users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5948                  *       length fields; our solution is to follow what
5949                  *       netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5950                  *       messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5951                  */
5952                 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5953                         return 0;
5954
5955                 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5956                 if (rc == 0) {
5957                         rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5958                         if (rc)
5959                                 return rc;
5960                 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5961                         /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5962                         pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5963                                 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5964                                 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5965                                 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5966                                 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5967                                 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5968                         if (enforcing_enabled() &&
5969                             !security_get_allow_unknown())
5970                                 return rc;
5971                         rc = 0;
5972                 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5973                         /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5974                         rc = 0;
5975                 } else {
5976                         return rc;
5977                 }
5978
5979                 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5980                 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5981                 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5982                         return 0;
5983                 data_len -= msg_len;
5984                 data += msg_len;
5985         }
5986
5987         return rc;
5988 }
5989
5990 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5991 {
5992         isec->sclass = sclass;
5993         isec->sid = current_sid();
5994 }
5995
5996 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5997                         u32 perms)
5998 {
5999         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6000         struct common_audit_data ad;
6001         u32 sid = current_sid();
6002
6003         isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
6004
6005         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6006         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
6007
6008         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
6009 }
6010
6011 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6012 {
6013         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6014
6015         msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6016         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6017
6018         return 0;
6019 }
6020
6021 /* message queue security operations */
6022 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6023 {
6024         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6025         struct common_audit_data ad;
6026         u32 sid = current_sid();
6027
6028         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6029         ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6030
6031         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6032         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6033
6034         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6035                             MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
6036 }
6037
6038 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6039 {
6040         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6041         struct common_audit_data ad;
6042         u32 sid = current_sid();
6043
6044         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6045
6046         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6047         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6048
6049         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6050                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6051 }
6052
6053 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6054 {
6055         u32 perms;
6056
6057         switch (cmd) {
6058         case IPC_INFO:
6059         case MSG_INFO:
6060                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6061                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6062                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6063         case IPC_STAT:
6064         case MSG_STAT:
6065         case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6066                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6067                 break;
6068         case IPC_SET:
6069                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6070                 break;
6071         case IPC_RMID:
6072                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6073                 break;
6074         default:
6075                 return 0;
6076         }
6077
6078         return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6079 }
6080
6081 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6082 {
6083         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6084         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6085         struct common_audit_data ad;
6086         u32 sid = current_sid();
6087         int rc;
6088
6089         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6090         msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6091
6092         /*
6093          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6094          */
6095         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6096                 /*
6097                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
6098                  * message queue this message will be stored in
6099                  */
6100                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
6101                                              SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6102                 if (rc)
6103                         return rc;
6104         }
6105
6106         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6107         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6108
6109         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6110         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6111                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6112         if (!rc)
6113                 /* Can this process send the message */
6114                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6115                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
6116         if (!rc)
6117                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6118                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6119                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6120
6121         return rc;
6122 }
6123
6124 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6125                                     struct task_struct *target,
6126                                     long type, int mode)
6127 {
6128         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6129         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6130         struct common_audit_data ad;
6131         u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6132         int rc;
6133
6134         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6135         msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6136
6137         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6138         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6139
6140         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
6141                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6142         if (!rc)
6143                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
6144                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6145         return rc;
6146 }
6147
6148 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6149 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6150 {
6151         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6152         struct common_audit_data ad;
6153         u32 sid = current_sid();
6154
6155         isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6156         ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6157
6158         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6159         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6160
6161         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6162                             SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6163 }
6164
6165 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6166 {
6167         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6168         struct common_audit_data ad;
6169         u32 sid = current_sid();
6170
6171         isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6172
6173         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6174         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6175
6176         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6177                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6178 }
6179
6180 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6181 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6182 {
6183         u32 perms;
6184
6185         switch (cmd) {
6186         case IPC_INFO:
6187         case SHM_INFO:
6188                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6189                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6190                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6191         case IPC_STAT:
6192         case SHM_STAT:
6193         case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6194                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6195                 break;
6196         case IPC_SET:
6197                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6198                 break;
6199         case SHM_LOCK:
6200         case SHM_UNLOCK:
6201                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6202                 break;
6203         case IPC_RMID:
6204                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6205                 break;
6206         default:
6207                 return 0;
6208         }
6209
6210         return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6211 }
6212
6213 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6214                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6215 {
6216         u32 perms;
6217
6218         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6219                 perms = SHM__READ;
6220         else
6221                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6222
6223         return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6224 }
6225
6226 /* Semaphore security operations */
6227 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6228 {
6229         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6230         struct common_audit_data ad;
6231         u32 sid = current_sid();
6232
6233         isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6234         ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6235
6236         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6237         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6238
6239         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6240                             SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6241 }
6242
6243 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6244 {
6245         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6246         struct common_audit_data ad;
6247         u32 sid = current_sid();
6248
6249         isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6250
6251         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6252         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6253
6254         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6255                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6256 }
6257
6258 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6259 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6260 {
6261         int err;
6262         u32 perms;
6263
6264         switch (cmd) {
6265         case IPC_INFO:
6266         case SEM_INFO:
6267                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6268                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6269                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6270         case GETPID:
6271         case GETNCNT:
6272         case GETZCNT:
6273                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6274                 break;
6275         case GETVAL:
6276         case GETALL:
6277                 perms = SEM__READ;
6278                 break;
6279         case SETVAL:
6280         case SETALL:
6281                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6282                 break;
6283         case IPC_RMID:
6284                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6285                 break;
6286         case IPC_SET:
6287                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6288                 break;
6289         case IPC_STAT:
6290         case SEM_STAT:
6291         case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6292                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6293                 break;
6294         default:
6295                 return 0;
6296         }
6297
6298         err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6299         return err;
6300 }
6301
6302 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6303                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6304 {
6305         u32 perms;
6306
6307         if (alter)
6308                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6309         else
6310                 perms = SEM__READ;
6311
6312         return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6313 }
6314
6315 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6316 {
6317         u32 av = 0;
6318
6319         av = 0;
6320         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6321                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6322         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6323                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6324
6325         if (av == 0)
6326                 return 0;
6327
6328         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6329 }
6330
6331 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6332 {
6333         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6334         *secid = isec->sid;
6335 }
6336
6337 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6338 {
6339         if (inode)
6340                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6341 }
6342
6343 static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p,
6344                                char **value)
6345 {
6346         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6347         int error;
6348         u32 sid;
6349         u32 len;
6350
6351         rcu_read_lock();
6352         tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6353         if (p != current) {
6354                 error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tsec->sid,
6355                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6356                 if (error)
6357                         goto err_unlock;
6358         }
6359         switch (attr) {
6360         case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
6361                 sid = tsec->sid;
6362                 break;
6363         case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
6364                 sid = tsec->osid;
6365                 break;
6366         case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
6367                 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
6368                 break;
6369         case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
6370                 sid = tsec->create_sid;
6371                 break;
6372         case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
6373                 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6374                 break;
6375         case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
6376                 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6377                 break;
6378         default:
6379                 error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
6380                 goto err_unlock;
6381         }
6382         rcu_read_unlock();
6383
6384         if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
6385                 *value = NULL;
6386                 return 0;
6387         }
6388
6389         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
6390         if (error)
6391                 return error;
6392         return len;
6393
6394 err_unlock:
6395         rcu_read_unlock();
6396         return error;
6397 }
6398
6399 static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
6400 {
6401         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6402         struct cred *new;
6403         u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6404         int error;
6405         char *str = value;
6406
6407         /*
6408          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6409          */
6410         switch (attr) {
6411         case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
6412                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6413                                      PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6414                 break;
6415         case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
6416                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6417                                      PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6418                 break;
6419         case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
6420                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6421                                      PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6422                 break;
6423         case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
6424                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6425                                      PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6426                 break;
6427         case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
6428                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6429                                      PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6430                 break;
6431         default:
6432                 error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
6433                 break;
6434         }
6435         if (error)
6436                 return error;
6437
6438         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6439         if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6440                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6441                         str[size-1] = 0;
6442                         size--;
6443                 }
6444                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
6445                                                 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6446                 if (error == -EINVAL && attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
6447                         if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6448                                 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6449                                 size_t audit_size;
6450
6451                                 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end,
6452                                  * otherwise the context contains a nul and
6453                                  * we should audit that */
6454                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6455                                         audit_size = size - 1;
6456                                 else
6457                                         audit_size = size;
6458                                 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6459                                                      GFP_ATOMIC,
6460                                                      AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6461                                 if (!ab)
6462                                         return error;
6463                                 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6464                                 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value,
6465                                                             audit_size);
6466                                 audit_log_end(ab);
6467
6468                                 return error;
6469                         }
6470                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
6471                                                         &sid);
6472                 }
6473                 if (error)
6474                         return error;
6475         }
6476
6477         new = prepare_creds();
6478         if (!new)
6479                 return -ENOMEM;
6480
6481         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6482            performed during the actual operation (execve,
6483            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6484            operation.  See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6485            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6486            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6487         tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6488         if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
6489                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6490         } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
6491                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6492         } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE) {
6493                 if (sid) {
6494                         error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
6495                                              SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6496                         if (error)
6497                                 goto abort_change;
6498                 }
6499                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6500         } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE) {
6501                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6502         } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
6503                 error = -EINVAL;
6504                 if (sid == 0)
6505                         goto abort_change;
6506
6507                 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6508                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
6509                         if (error)
6510                                 goto abort_change;
6511                 }
6512
6513                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6514                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6516                 if (error)
6517                         goto abort_change;
6518
6519                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6520                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6521                 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6522                 if (ptsid != 0) {
6523                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6524                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6525                         if (error)
6526                                 goto abort_change;
6527                 }
6528
6529                 tsec->sid = sid;
6530         } else {
6531                 error = -EINVAL;
6532                 goto abort_change;
6533         }
6534
6535         commit_creds(new);
6536         return size;
6537
6538 abort_change:
6539         abort_creds(new);
6540         return error;
6541 }
6542
6543 /**
6544  * selinux_getselfattr - Get SELinux current task attributes
6545  * @attr: the requested attribute
6546  * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
6547  * @size: buffer size (input), buffer size used (output)
6548  * @flags: unused
6549  *
6550  * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
6551  * attribute.
6552  *
6553  * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
6554  * There will only ever be one attribute.
6555  */
6556 static int selinux_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
6557                                u32 *size, u32 flags)
6558 {
6559         int rc;
6560         char *val = NULL;
6561         int val_len;
6562
6563         val_len = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, current, &val);
6564         if (val_len < 0)
6565                 return val_len;
6566         rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size, val, val_len, LSM_ID_SELINUX, 0);
6567         kfree(val);
6568         return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
6569 }
6570
6571 static int selinux_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
6572                                u32 size, u32 flags)
6573 {
6574         int rc;
6575
6576         rc = selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
6577         if (rc > 0)
6578                 return 0;
6579         return rc;
6580 }
6581
6582 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6583                                const char *name, char **value)
6584 {
6585         unsigned int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
6586         int rc;
6587
6588         if (attr) {
6589                 rc = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, p, value);
6590                 if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
6591                         return rc;
6592         }
6593
6594         return -EINVAL;
6595 }
6596
6597 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6598 {
6599         int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
6600
6601         if (attr)
6602                 return selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, value, size);
6603         return -EINVAL;
6604 }
6605
6606 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6607 {
6608         return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6609 }
6610
6611 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6612 {
6613         return security_sid_to_context(secid,
6614                                        secdata, seclen);
6615 }
6616
6617 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6618 {
6619         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
6620                                        secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6621 }
6622
6623 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6624 {
6625         kfree(secdata);
6626 }
6627
6628 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6629 {
6630         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6631
6632         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6633         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6634         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6635 }
6636
6637 /*
6638  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
6639  */
6640 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6641 {
6642         int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6643                                            ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6644         /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6645         return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6646 }
6647
6648 /*
6649  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
6650  */
6651 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6652 {
6653         return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6654                                      ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6655 }
6656
6657 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6658 {
6659         int len = 0;
6660         len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
6661                                         XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6662         if (len < 0)
6663                 return len;
6664         *ctxlen = len;
6665         return 0;
6666 }
6667 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6668
6669 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6670                              unsigned long flags)
6671 {
6672         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6673         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6674
6675         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6676         if (!ksec)
6677                 return -ENOMEM;
6678
6679         tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6680         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6681                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6682         else
6683                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6684
6685         k->security = ksec;
6686         return 0;
6687 }
6688
6689 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6690 {
6691         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6692
6693         k->security = NULL;
6694         kfree(ksec);
6695 }
6696
6697 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6698                                   const struct cred *cred,
6699                                   enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6700 {
6701         struct key *key;
6702         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6703         u32 perm, sid;
6704
6705         switch (need_perm) {
6706         case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6707                 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6708                 break;
6709         case KEY_NEED_READ:
6710                 perm = KEY__READ;
6711                 break;
6712         case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6713                 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6714                 break;
6715         case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6716                 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6717                 break;
6718         case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6719                 perm = KEY__LINK;
6720                 break;
6721         case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6722                 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6723                 break;
6724         case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6725         case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6726         case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6727         case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6728                 return 0;
6729         default:
6730                 WARN_ON(1);
6731                 return -EPERM;
6732
6733         }
6734
6735         sid = cred_sid(cred);
6736         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6737         ksec = key->security;
6738
6739         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6740 }
6741
6742 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6743 {
6744         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6745         char *context = NULL;
6746         unsigned len;
6747         int rc;
6748
6749         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
6750                                      &context, &len);
6751         if (!rc)
6752                 rc = len;
6753         *_buffer = context;
6754         return rc;
6755 }
6756
6757 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6758 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6759 {
6760         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6761         u32 sid = current_sid();
6762
6763         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6764 }
6765 #endif
6766 #endif
6767
6768 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6769 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6770 {
6771         struct common_audit_data ad;
6772         int err;
6773         u32 sid = 0;
6774         struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6775         struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6776
6777         err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6778         if (err)
6779                 return err;
6780
6781         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6782         ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6783         ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6784         ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6785         return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6786                             SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6787                             INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6788 }
6789
6790 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6791                                             u8 port_num)
6792 {
6793         struct common_audit_data ad;
6794         int err;
6795         u32 sid = 0;
6796         struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6797         struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6798
6799         err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
6800                                       &sid);
6801
6802         if (err)
6803                 return err;
6804
6805         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6806         ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6807         ibendport.port = port_num;
6808         ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6809         return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6810                             SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6811                             INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6812 }
6813
6814 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6815 {
6816         struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6817
6818         sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6819         if (!sec)
6820                 return -ENOMEM;
6821         sec->sid = current_sid();
6822
6823         *ib_sec = sec;
6824         return 0;
6825 }
6826
6827 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6828 {
6829         kfree(ib_sec);
6830 }
6831 #endif
6832
6833 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6834 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6835                                      unsigned int size)
6836 {
6837         u32 sid = current_sid();
6838         int ret;
6839
6840         switch (cmd) {
6841         case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6842                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6843                                    NULL);
6844                 break;
6845         case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6846                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6847                                    NULL);
6848                 break;
6849         default:
6850                 ret = 0;
6851                 break;
6852         }
6853
6854         return ret;
6855 }
6856
6857 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6858 {
6859         u32 av = 0;
6860
6861         if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6862                 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6863         if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6864                 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6865         return av;
6866 }
6867
6868 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6869  * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6870  * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6871  * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6872  * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6873  * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6874  * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6875  */
6876 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
6877 {
6878         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6879         struct bpf_prog *prog;
6880         struct bpf_map *map;
6881         int ret;
6882
6883         if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6884                 map = file->private_data;
6885                 bpfsec = map->security;
6886                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6887                                    bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6888                 if (ret)
6889                         return ret;
6890         } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6891                 prog = file->private_data;
6892                 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6893                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6894                                    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6895                 if (ret)
6896                         return ret;
6897         }
6898         return 0;
6899 }
6900
6901 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6902 {
6903         u32 sid = current_sid();
6904         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6905
6906         bpfsec = map->security;
6907         return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6908                             bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6909 }
6910
6911 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6912 {
6913         u32 sid = current_sid();
6914         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6915
6916         bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6917         return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6918                             BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6919 }
6920
6921 static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr,
6922                                   struct bpf_token *token)
6923 {
6924         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6925
6926         bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6927         if (!bpfsec)
6928                 return -ENOMEM;
6929
6930         bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6931         map->security = bpfsec;
6932
6933         return 0;
6934 }
6935
6936 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6937 {
6938         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6939
6940         map->security = NULL;
6941         kfree(bpfsec);
6942 }
6943
6944 static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
6945                                  struct bpf_token *token)
6946 {
6947         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6948
6949         bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6950         if (!bpfsec)
6951                 return -ENOMEM;
6952
6953         bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6954         prog->aux->security = bpfsec;
6955
6956         return 0;
6957 }
6958
6959 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6960 {
6961         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6962
6963         prog->aux->security = NULL;
6964         kfree(bpfsec);
6965 }
6966
6967 static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr,
6968                                     struct path *path)
6969 {
6970         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6971
6972         bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6973         if (!bpfsec)
6974                 return -ENOMEM;
6975
6976         bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6977         token->security = bpfsec;
6978
6979         return 0;
6980 }
6981
6982 static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token)
6983 {
6984         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = token->security;
6985
6986         token->security = NULL;
6987         kfree(bpfsec);
6988 }
6989 #endif
6990
6991 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
6992         .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6993         .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6994         .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6995         .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6996         .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6997         .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6998         .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
6999 };
7000
7001 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7002 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
7003 {
7004         u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
7005
7006         if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
7007                 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
7008         else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
7009                 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
7010         else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
7011                 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
7012         else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
7013                 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
7014         else
7015                 return -EINVAL;
7016
7017         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
7018                             requested, NULL);
7019 }
7020
7021 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
7022 {
7023         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
7024
7025         perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
7026         if (!perfsec)
7027                 return -ENOMEM;
7028
7029         perfsec->sid = current_sid();
7030         event->security = perfsec;
7031
7032         return 0;
7033 }
7034
7035 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
7036 {
7037         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7038
7039         event->security = NULL;
7040         kfree(perfsec);
7041 }
7042
7043 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
7044 {
7045         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7046         u32 sid = current_sid();
7047
7048         return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
7049                             SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
7050 }
7051
7052 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
7053 {
7054         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7055         u32 sid = current_sid();
7056
7057         return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
7058                             SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
7059 }
7060 #endif
7061
7062 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7063 /**
7064  * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
7065  * @new: the target creds
7066  *
7067  * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
7068  * to service an io_uring operation.
7069  */
7070 static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
7071 {
7072         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
7073                             SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
7074 }
7075
7076 /**
7077  * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
7078  *
7079  * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
7080  * kernel polling thread.
7081  */
7082 static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
7083 {
7084         u32 sid = current_sid();
7085
7086         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
7087                             SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
7088 }
7089
7090 /**
7091  * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
7092  * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
7093  *
7094  * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
7095  * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
7096  *
7097  */
7098 static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
7099 {
7100         struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
7101         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
7102         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
7103         struct common_audit_data ad;
7104
7105         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
7106         ad.u.file = file;
7107
7108         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
7109                             SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
7110 }
7111 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
7112
7113 static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
7114         .name = "selinux",
7115         .id = LSM_ID_SELINUX,
7116 };
7117
7118 /*
7119  * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7120  * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7121  * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7122  *    structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7123  *    hooks),
7124  * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7125  *    hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7126  *
7127  * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7128  */
7129 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
7130         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7131         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7132         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7133         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7134
7135         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7136         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7137         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7138         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7139         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7140         LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7141         LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7142         LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7143         LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7144
7145         LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7146
7147         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7148         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7149         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7150
7151         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7152         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7153         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7154         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7155         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7156         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7157         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7158         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7159         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7160         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7161
7162         LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7163
7164         LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7165         LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7166
7167         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7168         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7169         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7170         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7171         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7172         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7173         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7174         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7175         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7176         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7177         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7178         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7179         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7180         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7181         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7182         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7183         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap),
7184         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7185         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7186         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7187         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7188         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7189         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7190         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7191         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7192         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7193         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7194         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7195         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7196         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7197         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7198         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7199
7200         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7201
7202         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7203         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7204         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7205         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
7206         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7207         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7208         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7209         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7210         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7211         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7212         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7213         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7214
7215         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7216
7217         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7218         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7219         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7220         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7221         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7222         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7223         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7224         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7225         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7226         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7227         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7228         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7229         LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7230         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7231         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7232         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7233         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7234         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7235         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7236         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7237         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7238         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7239         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7240         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7241         LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7242
7243         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7244         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7245
7246         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7247         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7248         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7249         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7250
7251         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7252         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7253         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7254
7255         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7256         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7257         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7258
7259         LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7260
7261         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, selinux_getselfattr),
7262         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, selinux_setselfattr),
7263         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7264         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7265
7266         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7267         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7268         LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7269         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7270         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7271         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7272
7273         LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7274         LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7275
7276         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7277         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7278         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7279         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7280         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7281         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7282         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7283         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7284         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7285         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7286         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7287         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7288         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7289         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7290         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7291         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7292                         selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7293         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7294         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7295         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7296         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7297         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7298         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7299         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7300         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7301         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7302         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
7303         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7304         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7305         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7306         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7307         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7308         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7309         LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7310         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7311         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7312         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7313         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7314         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7315 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7316         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7317         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7318                       selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7319         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7320 #endif
7321 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7322         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7323         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7324         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7325         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7326         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7327         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7328                         selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7329         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7330 #endif
7331
7332 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7333         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7334         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7335         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7336 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7337         LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7338 #endif
7339 #endif
7340
7341 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7342         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7343         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7344         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7345 #endif
7346
7347 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7348         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7349         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7350         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7351         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7352         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7353         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_free, selinux_bpf_token_free),
7354 #endif
7355
7356 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7357         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7358         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7359         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7360         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7361 #endif
7362
7363 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7364         LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7365         LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7366         LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7367 #endif
7368
7369         /*
7370          * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7371          */
7372         LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
7373         LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7374         LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7375         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7376 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7377         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7378 #endif
7379
7380         /*
7381          * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7382          */
7383         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7384         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7385                       selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7386         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7387         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7388         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7389         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7390         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7391         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7392         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7393         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7394 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7395         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7396 #endif
7397 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7398         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7399         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7400         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7401                       selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7402 #endif
7403 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7404         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7405 #endif
7406 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7407         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7408 #endif
7409 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7410         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create),
7411         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load),
7412         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create),
7413 #endif
7414 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7415         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7416 #endif
7417 };
7418
7419 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7420 {
7421         pr_info("SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
7422
7423         memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7424         enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
7425         selinux_avc_init();
7426         mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7427         mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7428
7429         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7430         cred_init_security();
7431
7432         default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7433         if (!default_noexec)
7434                 pr_notice("SELinux:  virtual memory is executable by default\n");
7435
7436         avc_init();
7437
7438         avtab_cache_init();
7439
7440         ebitmap_cache_init();
7441
7442         hashtab_cache_init();
7443
7444         security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
7445                            &selinux_lsmid);
7446
7447         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7448                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7449
7450         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7451                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7452
7453         if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7454                 pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7455         else
7456                 pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
7457
7458         fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7459
7460         return 0;
7461 }
7462
7463 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7464 {
7465         selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7466 }
7467
7468 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7469 {
7470         pr_debug("SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
7471
7472         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7473         pr_debug("SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7474         iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7475 }
7476
7477 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7478    all processes and objects when they are created. */
7479 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7480         .name = "selinux",
7481         .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7482         .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7483         .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7484         .init = selinux_init,
7485 };
7486
7487 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7488 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7489         {
7490                 .hook =         selinux_ip_postroute,
7491                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
7492                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7493                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7494         },
7495         {
7496                 .hook =         selinux_ip_forward,
7497                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
7498                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
7499                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7500         },
7501         {
7502                 .hook =         selinux_ip_output,
7503                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
7504                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7505                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7506         },
7507 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7508         {
7509                 .hook =         selinux_ip_postroute,
7510                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
7511                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7512                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7513         },
7514         {
7515                 .hook =         selinux_ip_forward,
7516                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
7517                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
7518                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7519         },
7520         {
7521                 .hook =         selinux_ip_output,
7522                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
7523                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7524                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7525         },
7526 #endif  /* IPV6 */
7527 };
7528
7529 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7530 {
7531         return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7532                                      ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7533 }
7534
7535 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7536 {
7537         nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7538                                 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7539 }
7540
7541 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7542         .init = selinux_nf_register,
7543         .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7544 };
7545
7546 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7547 {
7548         int err;
7549
7550         if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7551                 return 0;
7552
7553         pr_debug("SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7554
7555         err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7556         if (err)
7557                 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7558
7559         return 0;
7560 }
7561 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7562 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */