security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <[email protected]>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <[email protected]>
   9  *            James Morris <[email protected]>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <[email protected]>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <[email protected]>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *      Paul Moore <[email protected]>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <[email protected]>
  20  *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
  21  *
  22  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  23  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  24  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  25  */
  26
  27 #include <linux/init.h>
  28 #include <linux/kd.h>
  29 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  30 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  31 #include <linux/errno.h>
  32 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
  33 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
  34 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  35 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  36 #include <linux/capability.h>
  37 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  38 #include <linux/mm.h>
  39 #include <linux/mman.h>
  40 #include <linux/slab.h>
  41 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  42 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  43 #include <linux/swap.h>
  44 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  45 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  46 #include <linux/dcache.h>
  47 #include <linux/file.h>
  48 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  49 #include <linux/namei.h>
  50 #include <linux/mount.h>
  51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  53 #include <linux/tty.h>
  54 #include <net/icmp.h>
  55 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  56 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
  58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
  63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  65 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  66 #include <net/netlink.h>
  67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  68 #include <linux/udp.h>
  69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  70 #include <linux/quota.h>
  71 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  72 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  73 #include <linux/parser.h>
  74 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  75 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  76 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  77 #include <linux/personality.h>
  78 #include <linux/audit.h>
  79 #include <linux/string.h>
  80 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
  84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
  85 #include <linux/export.h>
  86 #include <linux/msg.h>
  87 #include <linux/shm.h>
  88
  89 #include "avc.h"
  90 #include "objsec.h"
  91 #include "netif.h"
  92 #include "netnode.h"
  93 #include "netport.h"
  94 #include "ibpkey.h"
  95 #include "xfrm.h"
  96 #include "netlabel.h"
  97 #include "audit.h"
  98 #include "avc_ss.h"
  99
 100 /* SECMARK reference count */
 101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 102
 103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 104 int selinux_enforcing;
 105
 106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 107 {
 108         unsigned long enforcing;
 109         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 110                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 111         return 1;
 112 }
 113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 114 #endif
 115
 116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 118
 119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 120 {
 121         unsigned long enabled;
 122         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 123                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 124         return 1;
 125 }
 126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 127 #else
 128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 129 #endif
 130
 131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 132 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
 133
 134 /**
 135  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 136  *
 137  * Description:
 138  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 139  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 140  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 141  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
 142  * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
 143  *
 144  */
 145 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 146 {
 147         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 148 }
 149
 150 /**
 151  * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
 152  *
 153  * Description:
 154  * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
 155  * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
 156  * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
 157  * is always considered enabled.
 158  *
 159  */
 160 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 161 {
 162         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 163 }
 164
 165 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
 166 {
 167         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 168                 sel_netif_flush();
 169                 sel_netnode_flush();
 170                 sel_netport_flush();
 171                 synchronize_net();
 172         }
 173         return 0;
 174 }
 175
 176 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
 177 {
 178         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 179                 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
 180                 call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 181         }
 182
 183         return 0;
 184 }
 185
 186 /*
 187  * initialise the security for the init task
 188  */
 189 static void cred_init_security(void)
 190 {
 191         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
 192         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 193
 194         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 195         if (!tsec)
 196                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 197
 198         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 199         cred->security = tsec;
 200 }
 201
 202 /*
 203  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 204  */
 205 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 206 {
 207         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 208
 209         tsec = cred->security;
 210         return tsec->sid;
 211 }
 212
 213 /*
 214  * get the objective security ID of a task
 215  */
 216 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
 217 {
 218         u32 sid;
 219
 220         rcu_read_lock();
 221         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 222         rcu_read_unlock();
 223         return sid;
 224 }
 225
 226 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 227
 228 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 229 {
 230         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 231         u32 sid = current_sid();
 232
 233         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 234         if (!isec)
 235                 return -ENOMEM;
 236
 237         spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
 238         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 239         isec->inode = inode;
 240         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 241         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 242         isec->task_sid = sid;
 243         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
 244         inode->i_security = isec;
 245
 246         return 0;
 247 }
 248
 249 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 250
 251 /*
 252  * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid.  The
 253  * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
 254  * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
 255  * invalid.  The @opt_dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode;
 256  * when no dentry is available, set it to NULL instead.
 257  */
 258 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 259                                        struct dentry *opt_dentry,
 260                                        bool may_sleep)
 261 {
 262         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 263
 264         might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 265
 266         if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 267                 if (!may_sleep)
 268                         return -ECHILD;
 269
 270                 /*
 271                  * Try reloading the inode security label.  This will fail if
 272                  * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
 273                  * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
 274                  */
 275                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, opt_dentry);
 276         }
 277         return 0;
 278 }
 279
 280 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
 281 {
 282         return inode->i_security;
 283 }
 284
 285 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
 286 {
 287         int error;
 288
 289         error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
 290         if (error)
 291                 return ERR_PTR(error);
 292         return inode->i_security;
 293 }
 294
 295 /*
 296  * Get the security label of an inode.
 297  */
 298 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
 299 {
 300         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
 301         return inode->i_security;
 302 }
 303
 304 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
 305 {
 306         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 307
 308         return inode->i_security;
 309 }
 310
 311 /*
 312  * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
 313  */
 314 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
 315 {
 316         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 317
 318         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
 319         return inode->i_security;
 320 }
 321
 322 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
 323 {
 324         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 325
 326         isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
 327         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 328 }
 329
 330 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 331 {
 332         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 333         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 334
 335         /*
 336          * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
 337          * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
 338          * time taking a lock doing nothing.
 339          *
 340          * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
 341          * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
 342          * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
 343          * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
 344          */
 345         if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
 346                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 347                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 348                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 349         }
 350
 351         /*
 352          * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
 353          * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
 354          * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
 355          * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
 356          * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
 357          * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
 358          * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
 359          */
 360         call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
 361 }
 362
 363 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 364 {
 365         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 366         u32 sid = current_sid();
 367
 368         fsec = kmem_cache_zalloc(file_security_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
 369         if (!fsec)
 370                 return -ENOMEM;
 371
 372         fsec->sid = sid;
 373         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
 374         file->f_security = fsec;
 375
 376         return 0;
 377 }
 378
 379 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 380 {
 381         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 382         file->f_security = NULL;
 383         kmem_cache_free(file_security_cache, fsec);
 384 }
 385
 386 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 387 {
 388         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 389
 390         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 391         if (!sbsec)
 392                 return -ENOMEM;
 393
 394         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 395         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 396         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 397         sbsec->sb = sb;
 398         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 399         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 400         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 401         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 402
 403         return 0;
 404 }
 405
 406 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 407 {
 408         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 409         sb->s_security = NULL;
 410         kfree(sbsec);
 411 }
 412
 413 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 414 {
 415         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 416 }
 417
 418 enum {
 419         Opt_error = -1,
 420         Opt_context = 1,
 421         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 422         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 423         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 424         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 425         Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
 426 };
 427
 428 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS        (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
 429
 430 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 431         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 432         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 433         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 434         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 435         {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 436         {Opt_error, NULL},
 437 };
 438
 439 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 440
 441 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 442                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 443                         const struct cred *cred)
 444 {
 445         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 446         int rc;
 447
 448         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 449                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 450         if (rc)
 451                 return rc;
 452
 453         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 454                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 455         return rc;
 456 }
 457
 458 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 459                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 460                         const struct cred *cred)
 461 {
 462         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 463         int rc;
 464         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 465                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 466         if (rc)
 467                 return rc;
 468
 469         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 470                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 471         return rc;
 472 }
 473
 474 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 475 {
 476         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 477
 478         return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
 479                 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
 480                 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
 481                 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
 482                 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
 483                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 484                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
 485                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 486                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 487                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
 488                 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
 489                  (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 490                   !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
 491 }
 492
 493 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 494 {
 495         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 496         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 497         struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 498         int rc = 0;
 499
 500         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 501                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 502                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 503                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 504                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 505                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 506                 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
 507                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 508                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 509                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 510                         goto out;
 511                 }
 512
 513                 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 514                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 515                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 516                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 517                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 518                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 519                         else
 520                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 521                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 522                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 523                         goto out;
 524                 }
 525         }
 526
 527         sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
 528
 529         /*
 530          * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT.  It's not sufficient to simply
 531          * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
 532          * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
 533          */
 534         if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
 535                 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 536         else
 537                 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
 538
 539         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 540         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 541
 542         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 543            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 544            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 545            populates itself. */
 546         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 547 next_inode:
 548         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 549                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 550                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 551                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 552                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 553                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 554                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 555                 inode = igrab(inode);
 556                 if (inode) {
 557                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 558                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 559                         iput(inode);
 560                 }
 561                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 562                 goto next_inode;
 563         }
 564         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 565 out:
 566         return rc;
 567 }
 568
 569 /*
 570  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 571  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 572  * mount options, or whatever.
 573  */
 574 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 575                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 576 {
 577         int rc = 0, i;
 578         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 579         char *context = NULL;
 580         u32 len;
 581         char tmp;
 582
 583         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 584
 585         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 586                 return -EINVAL;
 587
 588         if (!ss_initialized)
 589                 return -EINVAL;
 590
 591         /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
 592         BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
 593
 594         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 595         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 596         for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
 597                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 598                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 599                 tmp >>= 1;
 600         }
 601         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
 602         if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
 603                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 604
 605         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 606         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 607                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 608                 goto out_free;
 609         }
 610
 611         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 612         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 613                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 614                 goto out_free;
 615         }
 616
 617         i = 0;
 618         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 619                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 620                 if (rc)
 621                         goto out_free;
 622                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 623                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 624         }
 625         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 626                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 627                 if (rc)
 628                         goto out_free;
 629                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 630                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 631         }
 632         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 633                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 634                 if (rc)
 635                         goto out_free;
 636                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 637                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 638         }
 639         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 640                 struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
 641                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
 642
 643                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 644                 if (rc)
 645                         goto out_free;
 646                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 647                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 648         }
 649         if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
 650                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
 651                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
 652         }
 653
 654         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 655
 656         return 0;
 657
 658 out_free:
 659         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 660         return rc;
 661 }
 662
 663 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 664                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 665 {
 666         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 667
 668         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 669         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 670                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 671                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 672                         return 1;
 673
 674         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 675          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 676          */
 677         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 678                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 679                         return 1;
 680         return 0;
 681 }
 682
 683 /*
 684  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 685  * labeling information.
 686  */
 687 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 688                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
 689                                 unsigned long kern_flags,
 690                                 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 691 {
 692         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 693         int rc = 0, i;
 694         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 695         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 696         struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
 697         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
 698         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 699         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 700         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 701         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 702         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 703
 704         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 705
 706         if (!ss_initialized) {
 707                 if (!num_opts) {
 708                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 709                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 710                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 711                         goto out;
 712                 }
 713                 rc = -EINVAL;
 714                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 715                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 716                 goto out;
 717         }
 718         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
 719                 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 720                  * place the results is not allowed */
 721                 rc = -EINVAL;
 722                 goto out;
 723         }
 724
 725         /*
 726          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 727          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 728          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 729          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 730          *
 731          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 732          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 733          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 734          * will be used for both mounts)
 735          */
 736         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 737             && (num_opts == 0))
 738                 goto out;
 739
 740         root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
 741
 742         /*
 743          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 744          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 745          * than once with different security options.
 746          */
 747         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 748                 u32 sid;
 749
 750                 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 751                         continue;
 752                 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 753                 if (rc) {
 754                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 755                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 756                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 757                         goto out;
 758                 }
 759                 switch (flags[i]) {
 760                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 761                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 762
 763                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 764                                         fscontext_sid))
 765                                 goto out_double_mount;
 766
 767                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 768                         break;
 769                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 770                         context_sid = sid;
 771
 772                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 773                                         context_sid))
 774                                 goto out_double_mount;
 775
 776                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 777                         break;
 778                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 779                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 780
 781                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 782                                         rootcontext_sid))
 783                                 goto out_double_mount;
 784
 785                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 786
 787                         break;
 788                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 789                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 790
 791                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 792                                         defcontext_sid))
 793                                 goto out_double_mount;
 794
 795                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 796
 797                         break;
 798                 default:
 799                         rc = -EINVAL;
 800                         goto out;
 801                 }
 802         }
 803
 804         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 805                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 806                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 807                         goto out_double_mount;
 808                 rc = 0;
 809                 goto out;
 810         }
 811
 812         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 813                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
 814
 815         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 816             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 817             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 818             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
 819             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 820             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
 821                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 822
 823         if (!sbsec->behavior) {
 824                 /*
 825                  * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 826                  * filesystem type.
 827                  */
 828                 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
 829                 if (rc) {
 830                         printk(KERN_WARNING
 831                                 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 832                                         __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 833                         goto out;
 834                 }
 835         }
 836
 837         /*
 838          * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
 839          * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
 840          * line and security labels must be ignored.
 841          */
 842         if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
 843             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
 844             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
 845             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts")) {
 846                 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
 847                     defcontext_sid) {
 848                         rc = -EACCES;
 849                         goto out;
 850                 }
 851                 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 852                         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 853                         rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(),
 854                                                      SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
 855                                                      &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
 856                         if (rc)
 857                                 goto out;
 858                 }
 859                 goto out_set_opts;
 860         }
 861
 862         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 863         if (fscontext_sid) {
 864                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 865                 if (rc)
 866                         goto out;
 867
 868                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 869         }
 870
 871         /*
 872          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 873          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 874          * the superblock context if not already set.
 875          */
 876         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
 877                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 878                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 879         }
 880
 881         if (context_sid) {
 882                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 883                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 884                                                           cred);
 885                         if (rc)
 886                                 goto out;
 887                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 888                 } else {
 889                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 890                                                              cred);
 891                         if (rc)
 892                                 goto out;
 893                 }
 894                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 895                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 896
 897                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 898                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 899         }
 900
 901         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 902                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 903                                                      cred);
 904                 if (rc)
 905                         goto out;
 906
 907                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 908                 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 909         }
 910
 911         if (defcontext_sid) {
 912                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
 913                         sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
 914                         rc = -EINVAL;
 915                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 916                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 917                         goto out;
 918                 }
 919
 920                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 921                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 922                                                              sbsec, cred);
 923                         if (rc)
 924                                 goto out;
 925                 }
 926
 927                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 928         }
 929
 930 out_set_opts:
 931         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 932 out:
 933         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 934         return rc;
 935 out_double_mount:
 936         rc = -EINVAL;
 937         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 938                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 939         goto out;
 940 }
 941
 942 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 943                                     const struct super_block *newsb)
 944 {
 945         struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
 946         struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
 947         char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 948         char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 949
 950         if (oldflags != newflags)
 951                 goto mismatch;
 952         if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
 953                 goto mismatch;
 954         if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
 955                 goto mismatch;
 956         if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
 957                 goto mismatch;
 958         if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 959                 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
 960                 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 961                 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
 962                         goto mismatch;
 963         }
 964         return 0;
 965 mismatch:
 966         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
 967                             "different security settings for (dev %s, "
 968                             "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
 969         return -EBUSY;
 970 }
 971
 972 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 973                                         struct super_block *newsb,
 974                                         unsigned long kern_flags,
 975                                         unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 976 {
 977         int rc = 0;
 978         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 979         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 980
 981         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 982         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 983         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 984
 985         /*
 986          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 987          * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 988          */
 989         if (!ss_initialized)
 990                 return 0;
 991
 992         /*
 993          * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 994          * place the results is not allowed.
 995          */
 996         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
 997                 return -EINVAL;
 998
 999         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
1000         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
1001
1002         /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
1003         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
1004                 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
1005
1006         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
1007
1008         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
1009
1010         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
1011         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
1012         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
1013
1014         if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
1015                 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
1016                 rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
1017                 if (rc)
1018                         goto out;
1019         }
1020
1021         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
1022                 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
1023                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
1024         }
1025
1026         if (set_context) {
1027                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1028
1029                 if (!set_fscontext)
1030                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
1031                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
1032                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1033                         newisec->sid = sid;
1034                 }
1035                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
1036         }
1037         if (set_rootcontext) {
1038                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
1039                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
1040
1041                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
1042         }
1043
1044         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1045 out:
1046         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1047         return rc;
1048 }
1049
1050 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
1051                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1052 {
1053         char *p;
1054         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
1055         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
1056         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
1057
1058         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
1059
1060         /* Standard string-based options. */
1061         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
1062                 int token;
1063                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
1064
1065                 if (!*p)
1066                         continue;
1067
1068                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
1069
1070                 switch (token) {
1071                 case Opt_context:
1072                         if (context || defcontext) {
1073                                 rc = -EINVAL;
1074                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1075                                 goto out_err;
1076                         }
1077                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1078                         if (!context) {
1079                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1080                                 goto out_err;
1081                         }
1082                         break;
1083
1084                 case Opt_fscontext:
1085                         if (fscontext) {
1086                                 rc = -EINVAL;
1087                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1088                                 goto out_err;
1089                         }
1090                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1091                         if (!fscontext) {
1092                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1093                                 goto out_err;
1094                         }
1095                         break;
1096
1097                 case Opt_rootcontext:
1098                         if (rootcontext) {
1099                                 rc = -EINVAL;
1100                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1101                                 goto out_err;
1102                         }
1103                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1104                         if (!rootcontext) {
1105                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1106                                 goto out_err;
1107                         }
1108                         break;
1109
1110                 case Opt_defcontext:
1111                         if (context || defcontext) {
1112                                 rc = -EINVAL;
1113                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1114                                 goto out_err;
1115                         }
1116                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
1117                         if (!defcontext) {
1118                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1119                                 goto out_err;
1120                         }
1121                         break;
1122                 case Opt_labelsupport:
1123                         break;
1124                 default:
1125                         rc = -EINVAL;
1126                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
1127                         goto out_err;
1128
1129                 }
1130         }
1131
1132         rc = -ENOMEM;
1133         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_KERNEL);
1134         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1135                 goto out_err;
1136
1137         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
1138                                        GFP_KERNEL);
1139         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags)
1140                 goto out_err;
1141
1142         if (fscontext) {
1143                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1144                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1145         }
1146         if (context) {
1147                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1148                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1149         }
1150         if (rootcontext) {
1151                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1152                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1153         }
1154         if (defcontext) {
1155                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1156                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1157         }
1158
1159         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1160         return 0;
1161
1162 out_err:
1163         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
1164         kfree(context);
1165         kfree(defcontext);
1166         kfree(fscontext);
1167         kfree(rootcontext);
1168         return rc;
1169 }
1170 /*
1171  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1172  */
1173 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1174 {
1175         int rc = 0;
1176         char *options = data;
1177         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1178
1179         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1180
1181         if (!data)
1182                 goto out;
1183
1184         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1185
1186         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1187         if (rc)
1188                 goto out_err;
1189
1190 out:
1191         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1192
1193 out_err:
1194         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1195         return rc;
1196 }
1197
1198 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1199                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1200 {
1201         int i;
1202         char *prefix;
1203
1204         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1205                 char *has_comma;
1206
1207                 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1208                         has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1209                 else
1210                         has_comma = NULL;
1211
1212                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1213                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1214                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1215                         break;
1216                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1217                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1218                         break;
1219                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1220                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1221                         break;
1222                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1223                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1224                         break;
1225                 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1226                         seq_putc(m, ',');
1227                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1228                         continue;
1229                 default:
1230                         BUG();
1231                         return;
1232                 };
1233                 /* we need a comma before each option */
1234                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1235                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1236                 if (has_comma)
1237                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1238                 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1239                 if (has_comma)
1240                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1241         }
1242 }
1243
1244 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1245 {
1246         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1247         int rc;
1248
1249         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1250         if (rc) {
1251                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1252                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1253                         rc = 0;
1254                 return rc;
1255         }
1256
1257         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1258
1259         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1260
1261         return rc;
1262 }
1263
1264 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1265 {
1266         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1267         case S_IFSOCK:
1268                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1269         case S_IFLNK:
1270                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1271         case S_IFREG:
1272                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1273         case S_IFBLK:
1274                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1275         case S_IFDIR:
1276                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1277         case S_IFCHR:
1278                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1279         case S_IFIFO:
1280                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1281
1282         }
1283
1284         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1285 }
1286
1287 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1288 {
1289         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1290 }
1291
1292 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1293 {
1294         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1295 }
1296
1297 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1298 {
1299         int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
1300
1301         switch (family) {
1302         case PF_UNIX:
1303                 switch (type) {
1304                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1305                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1306                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1307                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1308                 case SOCK_RAW:
1309                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1310                 }
1311                 break;
1312         case PF_INET:
1313         case PF_INET6:
1314                 switch (type) {
1315                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1316                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1317                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1318                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1319                         else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1320                                 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1321                         else
1322                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1323                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1324                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1325                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1326                         else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1327                                                   protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1328                                 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1329                         else
1330                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1331                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1332                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1333                 default:
1334                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1335                 }
1336                 break;
1337         case PF_NETLINK:
1338                 switch (protocol) {
1339                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1340                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1341                 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1342                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1343                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1344                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1345                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1346                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1347                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1348                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1349                 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1350                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1351                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1352                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1353                 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1354                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1355                 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1356                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1357                 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1358                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1359                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1360                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1361                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1362                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1363                 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1364                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1365                 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1366                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1367                 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1368                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1369                 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1370                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1371                 default:
1372                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1373                 }
1374         case PF_PACKET:
1375                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1376         case PF_KEY:
1377                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1378         case PF_APPLETALK:
1379                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1380         }
1381
1382         if (extsockclass) {
1383                 switch (family) {
1384                 case PF_AX25:
1385                         return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1386                 case PF_IPX:
1387                         return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1388                 case PF_NETROM:
1389                         return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1390                 case PF_ATMPVC:
1391                         return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1392                 case PF_X25:
1393                         return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1394                 case PF_ROSE:
1395                         return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1396                 case PF_DECnet:
1397                         return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1398                 case PF_ATMSVC:
1399                         return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1400                 case PF_RDS:
1401                         return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1402                 case PF_IRDA:
1403                         return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1404                 case PF_PPPOX:
1405                         return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1406                 case PF_LLC:
1407                         return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1408                 case PF_CAN:
1409                         return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1410                 case PF_TIPC:
1411                         return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1412                 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1413                         return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1414                 case PF_IUCV:
1415                         return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1416                 case PF_RXRPC:
1417                         return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1418                 case PF_ISDN:
1419                         return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1420                 case PF_PHONET:
1421                         return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1422                 case PF_IEEE802154:
1423                         return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1424                 case PF_CAIF:
1425                         return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1426                 case PF_ALG:
1427                         return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1428                 case PF_NFC:
1429                         return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1430                 case PF_VSOCK:
1431                         return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1432                 case PF_KCM:
1433                         return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1434                 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1435                         return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1436                 case PF_SMC:
1437                         return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1438 #if PF_MAX > 44
1439 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1440 #endif
1441                 }
1442         }
1443
1444         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1445 }
1446
1447 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1448                                  u16 tclass,
1449                                  u16 flags,
1450                                  u32 *sid)
1451 {
1452         int rc;
1453         struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1454         char *buffer, *path;
1455
1456         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1457         if (!buffer)
1458                 return -ENOMEM;
1459
1460         path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1461         if (IS_ERR(path))
1462                 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1463         else {
1464                 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1465                         /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1466                          * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1467                          * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1468                         while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1469                                 path[1] = '/';
1470                                 path++;
1471                         }
1472                 }
1473                 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
1474         }
1475         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1476         return rc;
1477 }
1478
1479 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1480 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1481 {
1482         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1483         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1484         u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1485         u16 sclass;
1486         struct dentry *dentry;
1487 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1488         char *context = NULL;
1489         unsigned len = 0;
1490         int rc = 0;
1491
1492         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1493                 return 0;
1494
1495         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1496         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1497                 goto out_unlock;
1498
1499         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1500                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1501
1502         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1503         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1504                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1505                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1506                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1507                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1508                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1509                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1510                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1511                 goto out_unlock;
1512         }
1513
1514         sclass = isec->sclass;
1515         task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1516         sid = isec->sid;
1517         isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1518         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1519
1520         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1521         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1522                 break;
1523         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1524                 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1525                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1526                         break;
1527                 }
1528                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1529                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1530                 if (opt_dentry) {
1531                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1532                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1533                 } else {
1534                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1535                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1536                 }
1537                 if (!dentry) {
1538                         /*
1539                          * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1540                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1541                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1542                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
1543                          * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1544                          * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1545                          * be used again by userspace.
1546                          */
1547                         goto out;
1548                 }
1549
1550                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1551                 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1552                 if (!context) {
1553                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1554                         dput(dentry);
1555                         goto out;
1556                 }
1557                 context[len] = '\0';
1558                 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1559                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1560                         kfree(context);
1561
1562                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1563                         rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1564                         if (rc < 0) {
1565                                 dput(dentry);
1566                                 goto out;
1567                         }
1568                         len = rc;
1569                         context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1570                         if (!context) {
1571                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1572                                 dput(dentry);
1573                                 goto out;
1574                         }
1575                         context[len] = '\0';
1576                         rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1577                 }
1578                 dput(dentry);
1579                 if (rc < 0) {
1580                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1581                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1582                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1583                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1584                                 kfree(context);
1585                                 goto out;
1586                         }
1587                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1588                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1589                         rc = 0;
1590                 } else {
1591                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1592                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1593                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1594                         if (rc) {
1595                                 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1596                                 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1597
1598                                 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1599                                         if (printk_ratelimit())
1600                                                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1601                                                         "context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1602                                                         "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1603                                 } else {
1604                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1605                                                "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1606                                                __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1607                                 }
1608                                 kfree(context);
1609                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1610                                 rc = 0;
1611                                 break;
1612                         }
1613                 }
1614                 kfree(context);
1615                 break;
1616         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1617                 sid = task_sid;
1618                 break;
1619         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1620                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1621                 sid = sbsec->sid;
1622
1623                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1624                 rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid);
1625                 if (rc)
1626                         goto out;
1627                 break;
1628         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1629                 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1630                 break;
1631         default:
1632                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1633                 sid = sbsec->sid;
1634
1635                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1636                         /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1637                          * procfs inodes */
1638                         if (opt_dentry)
1639                                 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1640                                  * d_splice_alias. */
1641                                 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1642                         else
1643                                 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1644                                  * find a dentry. */
1645                                 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1646                         /*
1647                          * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1648                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1649                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1650                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
1651                          * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1652                          * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1653                          * could be used again by userspace.
1654                          */
1655                         if (!dentry)
1656                                 goto out;
1657                         rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1658                                                    sbsec->flags, &sid);
1659                         dput(dentry);
1660                         if (rc)
1661                                 goto out;
1662                 }
1663                 break;
1664         }
1665
1666 out:
1667         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1668         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1669                 if (!sid || rc) {
1670                         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1671                         goto out_unlock;
1672                 }
1673
1674                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1675                 isec->sid = sid;
1676         }
1677
1678 out_unlock:
1679         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1680         return rc;
1681 }
1682
1683 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1684 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1685 {
1686         u32 perm = 0;
1687
1688         switch (sig) {
1689         case SIGCHLD:
1690                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1691                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1692                 break;
1693         case SIGKILL:
1694                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1695                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1696                 break;
1697         case SIGSTOP:
1698                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1699                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1700                 break;
1701         default:
1702                 /* All other signals. */
1703                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1704                 break;
1705         }
1706
1707         return perm;
1708 }
1709
1710 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1711 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1712 #endif
1713
1714 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1715 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1716                                int cap, int audit, bool initns)
1717 {
1718         struct common_audit_data ad;
1719         struct av_decision avd;
1720         u16 sclass;
1721         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1722         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1723         int rc;
1724
1725         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1726         ad.u.cap = cap;
1727
1728         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1729         case 0:
1730                 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1731                 break;
1732         case 1:
1733                 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1734                 break;
1735         default:
1736                 printk(KERN_ERR
1737                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1738                 BUG();
1739                 return -EINVAL;
1740         }
1741
1742         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1743         if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1744                 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1745                 if (rc2)
1746                         return rc2;
1747         }
1748         return rc;
1749 }
1750
1751 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1752    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1753    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1754 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1755                           struct inode *inode,
1756                           u32 perms,
1757                           struct common_audit_data *adp)
1758 {
1759         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1760         u32 sid;
1761
1762         validate_creds(cred);
1763
1764         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1765                 return 0;
1766
1767         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1768         isec = inode->i_security;
1769
1770         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1771 }
1772
1773 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1774    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1775    pathname if needed. */
1776 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1777                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1778                                   u32 av)
1779 {
1780         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1781         struct common_audit_data ad;
1782
1783         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1784         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1785         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1786         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1787 }
1788
1789 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1790    the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1791    pathname if needed. */
1792 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1793                                 const struct path *path,
1794                                 u32 av)
1795 {
1796         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1797         struct common_audit_data ad;
1798
1799         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1800         ad.u.path = *path;
1801         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1802         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1803 }
1804
1805 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1806 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1807                                      struct file *file,
1808                                      u32 av)
1809 {
1810         struct common_audit_data ad;
1811
1812         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1813         ad.u.file = file;
1814         return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1815 }
1816
1817 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1818    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1819    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1820    check a particular permission to the file.
1821    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1822    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1823    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1824    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1825 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1826                          struct file *file,
1827                          u32 av)
1828 {
1829         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1830         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1831         struct common_audit_data ad;
1832         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1833         int rc;
1834
1835         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1836         ad.u.file = file;
1837
1838         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1839                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1840                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1841                                   FD__USE,
1842                                   &ad);
1843                 if (rc)
1844                         goto out;
1845         }
1846
1847         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1848         rc = 0;
1849         if (av)
1850                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1851
1852 out:
1853         return rc;
1854 }
1855
1856 /*
1857  * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1858  */
1859 static int
1860 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1861                                  struct inode *dir,
1862                                  const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1863                                  u32 *_new_isid)
1864 {
1865         const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1866
1867         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1868             (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1869                 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1870         } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1871                    tsec->create_sid) {
1872                 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1873         } else {
1874                 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1875                 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1876                                                name, _new_isid);
1877         }
1878
1879         return 0;
1880 }
1881
1882 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1883 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1884                       struct dentry *dentry,
1885                       u16 tclass)
1886 {
1887         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1888         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1889         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1890         u32 sid, newsid;
1891         struct common_audit_data ad;
1892         int rc;
1893
1894         dsec = inode_security(dir);
1895         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1896
1897         sid = tsec->sid;
1898
1899         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1900         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1901
1902         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1903                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1904                           &ad);
1905         if (rc)
1906                 return rc;
1907
1908         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
1909                                            &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
1910         if (rc)
1911                 return rc;
1912
1913         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1914         if (rc)
1915                 return rc;
1916
1917         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1918                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1919                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1920 }
1921
1922 #define MAY_LINK        0
1923 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1924 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1925
1926 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1927 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1928                     struct dentry *dentry,
1929                     int kind)
1930
1931 {
1932         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1933         struct common_audit_data ad;
1934         u32 sid = current_sid();
1935         u32 av;
1936         int rc;
1937
1938         dsec = inode_security(dir);
1939         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1940
1941         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1942         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1943
1944         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1945         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1946         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1947         if (rc)
1948                 return rc;
1949
1950         switch (kind) {
1951         case MAY_LINK:
1952                 av = FILE__LINK;
1953                 break;
1954         case MAY_UNLINK:
1955                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1956                 break;
1957         case MAY_RMDIR:
1958                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1959                 break;
1960         default:
1961                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1962                         __func__, kind);
1963                 return 0;
1964         }
1965
1966         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1967         return rc;
1968 }
1969
1970 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1971                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1972                              struct inode *new_dir,
1973                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1974 {
1975         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1976         struct common_audit_data ad;
1977         u32 sid = current_sid();
1978         u32 av;
1979         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1980         int rc;
1981
1982         old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1983         old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1984         old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1985         new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1986
1987         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1988
1989         ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1990         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1991                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1992         if (rc)
1993                 return rc;
1994         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1995                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1996         if (rc)
1997                 return rc;
1998         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1999                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
2000                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
2001                 if (rc)
2002                         return rc;
2003         }
2004
2005         ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
2006         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
2007         if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
2008                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
2009         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
2010         if (rc)
2011                 return rc;
2012         if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
2013                 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
2014                 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
2015                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
2016                                   new_isec->sclass,
2017                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
2018                 if (rc)
2019                         return rc;
2020         }
2021
2022         return 0;
2023 }
2024
2025 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
2026 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
2027                                struct super_block *sb,
2028                                u32 perms,
2029                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
2030 {
2031         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2032         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2033
2034         sbsec = sb->s_security;
2035         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
2036 }
2037
2038 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
2039 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2040 {
2041         u32 av = 0;
2042
2043         if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2044                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2045                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2046                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2047                         av |= FILE__READ;
2048
2049                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2050                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
2051                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2052                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2053
2054         } else {
2055                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2056                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
2057                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2058                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
2059                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2060                         av |= DIR__READ;
2061         }
2062
2063         return av;
2064 }
2065
2066 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2067 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2068 {
2069         u32 av = 0;
2070
2071         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2072                 av |= FILE__READ;
2073         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2074                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2075                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
2076                 else
2077                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2078         }
2079         if (!av) {
2080                 /*
2081                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2082                  */
2083                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2084         }
2085
2086         return av;
2087 }
2088
2089 /*
2090  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
2091  * open permission.
2092  */
2093 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2094 {
2095         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2096         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2097
2098         if (selinux_policycap_openperm && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2099                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2100
2101         return av;
2102 }
2103
2104 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2105
2106 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2107 {
2108         u32 mysid = current_sid();
2109         u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
2110
2111         return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2112                             BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2113 }
2114
2115 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2116                                       struct task_struct *to)
2117 {
2118         u32 mysid = current_sid();
2119         u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2120         u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2121         int rc;
2122
2123         if (mysid != fromsid) {
2124                 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2125                                   BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2126                 if (rc)
2127                         return rc;
2128         }
2129
2130         return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
2131                             NULL);
2132 }
2133
2134 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2135                                           struct task_struct *to)
2136 {
2137         u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
2138         u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
2139
2140         return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2141                             NULL);
2142 }
2143
2144 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2145                                         struct task_struct *to,
2146                                         struct file *file)
2147 {
2148         u32 sid = task_sid(to);
2149         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2150         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2151         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2152         struct common_audit_data ad;
2153         int rc;
2154
2155         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2156         ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2157
2158         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2159                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2160                                   SECCLASS_FD,
2161                                   FD__USE,
2162                                   &ad);
2163                 if (rc)
2164                         return rc;
2165         }
2166
2167         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2168                 return 0;
2169
2170         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2171         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2172                             &ad);
2173 }
2174
2175 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2176                                      unsigned int mode)
2177 {
2178         u32 sid = current_sid();
2179         u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2180
2181         if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2182                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2183
2184         return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2185 }
2186
2187 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2188 {
2189         return avc_has_perm(task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2190                             PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2191 }
2192
2193 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2194                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2195 {
2196         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2197                             PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2198 }
2199
2200 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2201                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2202                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2203                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2204 {
2205         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2206                             PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2207 }
2208
2209 /*
2210  * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2211  * which was removed).
2212  *
2213  * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2214  * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2215  * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
2216  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2217  */
2218
2219 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2220                            int cap, int audit)
2221 {
2222         return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit, ns == &init_user_ns);
2223 }
2224
2225 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2226 {
2227         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2228         int rc = 0;
2229
2230         if (!sb)
2231                 return 0;
2232
2233         switch (cmds) {
2234         case Q_SYNC:
2235         case Q_QUOTAON:
2236         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2237         case Q_SETINFO:
2238         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2239                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2240                 break;
2241         case Q_GETFMT:
2242         case Q_GETINFO:
2243         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2244                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2245                 break;
2246         default:
2247                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2248                 break;
2249         }
2250         return rc;
2251 }
2252
2253 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2254 {
2255         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2256
2257         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2258 }
2259
2260 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2261 {
2262         switch (type) {
2263         case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:    /* Read last kernel messages */
2264         case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2265                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2266                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2267         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2268         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:  /* Enable logging to console */
2269         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2270         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2271                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2272                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2273                                     NULL);
2274         }
2275         /* All other syslog types */
2276         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2277                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2278 }
2279
2280 /*
2281  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2282  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2283  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2284  *
2285  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2286  * processes that allocate mappings.
2287  */
2288 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2289 {
2290         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2291
2292         rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2293                                  SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
2294         if (rc == 0)
2295                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2296
2297         return cap_sys_admin;
2298 }
2299
2300 /* binprm security operations */
2301
2302 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2303 {
2304         u32 sid = 0;
2305         struct task_struct *tracer;
2306
2307         rcu_read_lock();
2308         tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2309         if (tracer)
2310                 sid = task_sid(tracer);
2311         rcu_read_unlock();
2312
2313         return sid;
2314 }
2315
2316 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2317                             const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2318                             const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2319 {
2320         int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2321         int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2322         int rc;
2323         u32 av;
2324
2325         if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2326                 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2327
2328         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2329                 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2330
2331         /*
2332          * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2333          * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2334          * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2335          * the old and new contexts.
2336          */
2337         if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
2338                 av = 0;
2339                 if (nnp)
2340                         av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2341                 if (nosuid)
2342                         av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2343                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2344                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2345                 if (!rc)
2346                         return 0;
2347         }
2348
2349         /*
2350          * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2351          * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2352          * of the permissions of the current SID.
2353          */
2354         rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2355         if (!rc)
2356                 return 0;
2357
2358         /*
2359          * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2360          * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
2361          * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
2362          */
2363         if (nnp)
2364                 return -EPERM;
2365         return -EACCES;
2366 }
2367
2368 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2369 {
2370         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2371         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2372         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2373         struct common_audit_data ad;
2374         struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2375         int rc;
2376
2377         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2378          * the script interpreter */
2379         if (bprm->called_set_creds)
2380                 return 0;
2381
2382         old_tsec = current_security();
2383         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2384         isec = inode_security(inode);
2385
2386         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2387         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2388         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2389
2390         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2391         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2392         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2393         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2394
2395         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2396                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2397                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2398                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2399
2400                 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2401                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2402                 if (rc)
2403                         return rc;
2404         } else {
2405                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2406                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2407                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2408                                              &new_tsec->sid);
2409                 if (rc)
2410                         return rc;
2411
2412                 /*
2413                  * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2414                  * transition.
2415                  */
2416                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2417                 if (rc)
2418                         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2419         }
2420
2421         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2422         ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2423
2424         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2425                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2426                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2427                 if (rc)
2428                         return rc;
2429         } else {
2430                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2431                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2432                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2433                 if (rc)
2434                         return rc;
2435
2436                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2437                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2438                 if (rc)
2439                         return rc;
2440
2441                 /* Check for shared state */
2442                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2443                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2444                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2445                                           NULL);
2446                         if (rc)
2447                                 return -EPERM;
2448                 }
2449
2450                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2451                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2452                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2453                         u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2454                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2455                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2456                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2457                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2458                                 if (rc)
2459                                         return -EPERM;
2460                         }
2461                 }
2462
2463                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2464                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2465
2466                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2467                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2468                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2469                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2470                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2471                                   NULL);
2472                 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2473         }
2474
2475         return 0;
2476 }
2477
2478 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2479 {
2480         return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2481 }
2482
2483 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2484 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2485                                             struct files_struct *files)
2486 {
2487         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2488         struct tty_struct *tty;
2489         int drop_tty = 0;
2490         unsigned n;
2491
2492         tty = get_current_tty();
2493         if (tty) {
2494                 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2495                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2496                         struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2497
2498                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2499                            Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2500                            rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2501                            open file may belong to another process and we are
2502                            only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2503                         file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2504                                                 struct tty_file_private, list);
2505                         file = file_priv->file;
2506                         if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2507                                 drop_tty = 1;
2508                 }
2509                 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2510                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2511         }
2512         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2513         if (drop_tty)
2514                 no_tty();
2515
2516         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2517         n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2518         if (!n) /* none found? */
2519                 return;
2520
2521         devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2522         if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2523                 devnull = NULL;
2524         /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2525         do {
2526                 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2527         } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2528         if (devnull)
2529                 fput(devnull);
2530 }
2531
2532 /*
2533  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2534  */
2535 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2536 {
2537         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2538         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2539         int rc, i;
2540
2541         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2542         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2543                 return;
2544
2545         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2546         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2547
2548         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2549         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2550
2551         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2552          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2553          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2554          *
2555          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2556          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2557          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2558          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2559          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2560          */
2561         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2562                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2563         if (rc) {
2564                 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2565                 task_lock(current);
2566                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2567                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2568                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2569                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2570                 }
2571                 task_unlock(current);
2572                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2573                         update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2574         }
2575 }
2576
2577 /*
2578  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2579  * due to exec
2580  */
2581 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2582 {
2583         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2584         struct itimerval itimer;
2585         u32 osid, sid;
2586         int rc, i;
2587
2588         osid = tsec->osid;
2589         sid = tsec->sid;
2590
2591         if (sid == osid)
2592                 return;
2593
2594         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2595          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2596          * flush and unblock signals.
2597          *
2598          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2599          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2600          */
2601         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2602         if (rc) {
2603                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
2604                         memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2605                         for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2606                                 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2607                 }
2608                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2609                 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2610                         flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
2611                         flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
2612                         flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2613                         sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2614                         recalc_sigpending();
2615                 }
2616                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2617         }
2618
2619         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2620          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2621         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2622         __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2623         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2624 }
2625
2626 /* superblock security operations */
2627
2628 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2629 {
2630         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2631 }
2632
2633 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2634 {
2635         superblock_free_security(sb);
2636 }
2637
2638 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2639 {
2640         if (plen > olen)
2641                 return 0;
2642
2643         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2644 }
2645
2646 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2647 {
2648         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2649                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2650                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2651                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2652                 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2653 }
2654
2655 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2656 {
2657         if (!*first) {
2658                 **to = ',';
2659                 *to += 1;
2660         } else
2661                 *first = 0;
2662         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2663         *to += len;
2664 }
2665
2666 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2667                                        int len)
2668 {
2669         int current_size = 0;
2670
2671         if (!*first) {
2672                 **to = '|';
2673                 *to += 1;
2674         } else
2675                 *first = 0;
2676
2677         while (current_size < len) {
2678                 if (*from != '"') {
2679                         **to = *from;
2680                         *to += 1;
2681                 }
2682                 from += 1;
2683                 current_size += 1;
2684         }
2685 }
2686
2687 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2688 {
2689         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2690         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2691         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2692         int open_quote = 0;
2693
2694         in_curr = orig;
2695         sec_curr = copy;
2696
2697         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2698         if (!nosec) {
2699                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2700                 goto out;
2701         }
2702
2703         nosec_save = nosec;
2704         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2705         in_save = in_end = orig;
2706
2707         do {
2708                 if (*in_end == '"')
2709                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2710                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2711                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2712                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2713
2714                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2715                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2716                         else
2717                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2718
2719                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2720                 }
2721         } while (*in_end++);
2722
2723         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2724         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2725 out:
2726         return rc;
2727 }
2728
2729 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2730 {
2731         int rc, i, *flags;
2732         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2733         char *secdata, **mount_options;
2734         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2735
2736         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2737                 return 0;
2738
2739         if (!data)
2740                 return 0;
2741
2742         if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2743                 return 0;
2744
2745         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2746         secdata = alloc_secdata();
2747         if (!secdata)
2748                 return -ENOMEM;
2749         rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2750         if (rc)
2751                 goto out_free_secdata;
2752
2753         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2754         if (rc)
2755                 goto out_free_secdata;
2756
2757         mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2758         flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2759
2760         for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2761                 u32 sid;
2762
2763                 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2764                         continue;
2765                 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
2766                 if (rc) {
2767                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
2768                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2769                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2770                         goto out_free_opts;
2771                 }
2772                 rc = -EINVAL;
2773                 switch (flags[i]) {
2774                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2775                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2776                                 goto out_bad_option;
2777                         break;
2778                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2779                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2780                                 goto out_bad_option;
2781                         break;
2782                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2783                         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2784                         root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2785
2786                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2787                                 goto out_bad_option;
2788                         break;
2789                 }
2790                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2791                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2792                                 goto out_bad_option;
2793                         break;
2794                 default:
2795                         goto out_free_opts;
2796                 }
2797         }
2798
2799         rc = 0;
2800 out_free_opts:
2801         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2802 out_free_secdata:
2803         free_secdata(secdata);
2804         return rc;
2805 out_bad_option:
2806         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2807                "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2808                sb->s_type->name);
2809         goto out_free_opts;
2810 }
2811
2812 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2813 {
2814         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2815         struct common_audit_data ad;
2816         int rc;
2817
2818         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2819         if (rc)
2820                 return rc;
2821
2822         /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2823         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2824                 return 0;
2825
2826         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2827         ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2828         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2829 }
2830
2831 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2832 {
2833         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2834         struct common_audit_data ad;
2835
2836         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2837         ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2838         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2839 }
2840
2841 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2842                          const struct path *path,
2843                          const char *type,
2844                          unsigned long flags,
2845                          void *data)
2846 {
2847         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2848
2849         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2850                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2851                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2852         else
2853                 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2854 }
2855
2856 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2857 {
2858         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2859
2860         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2861                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2862 }
2863
2864 /* inode security operations */
2865
2866 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2867 {
2868         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2869 }
2870
2871 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2872 {
2873         inode_free_security(inode);
2874 }
2875
2876 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2877                                         const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2878                                         u32 *ctxlen)
2879 {
2880         u32 newsid;
2881         int rc;
2882
2883         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2884                                            d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2885                                            inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2886                                            &newsid);
2887         if (rc)
2888                 return rc;
2889
2890         return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2891 }
2892
2893 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2894                                           struct qstr *name,
2895                                           const struct cred *old,
2896                                           struct cred *new)
2897 {
2898         u32 newsid;
2899         int rc;
2900         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2901
2902         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
2903                                            d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2904                                            inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2905                                            &newsid);
2906         if (rc)
2907                 return rc;
2908
2909         tsec = new->security;
2910         tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2911         return 0;
2912 }
2913
2914 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2915                                        const struct qstr *qstr,
2916                                        const char **name,
2917                                        void **value, size_t *len)
2918 {
2919         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2920         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2921         u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2922         int rc;
2923         char *context;
2924
2925         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2926
2927         sid = tsec->sid;
2928         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2929
2930         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
2931                 dir, qstr,
2932                 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2933                 &newsid);
2934         if (rc)
2935                 return rc;
2936
2937         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2938         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2939                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2940                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2941                 isec->sid = newsid;
2942                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2943         }
2944
2945         if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2946                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2947
2948         if (name)
2949                 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2950
2951         if (value && len) {
2952                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2953                 if (rc)
2954                         return rc;
2955                 *value = context;
2956                 *len = clen;
2957         }
2958
2959         return 0;
2960 }
2961
2962 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2963 {
2964         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2965 }
2966
2967 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2968 {
2969         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2970 }
2971
2972 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2973 {
2974         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2975 }
2976
2977 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2978 {
2979         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2980 }
2981
2982 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2983 {
2984         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2985 }
2986
2987 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2988 {
2989         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2990 }
2991
2992 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2993 {
2994         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2995 }
2996
2997 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2998                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2999 {
3000         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3001 }
3002
3003 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3004 {
3005         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3006
3007         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3008 }
3009
3010 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3011                                      bool rcu)
3012 {
3013         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3014         struct common_audit_data ad;
3015         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3016         u32 sid;
3017
3018         validate_creds(cred);
3019
3020         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3021         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3022         sid = cred_sid(cred);
3023         isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3024         if (IS_ERR(isec))
3025                 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3026
3027         return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
3028                                   rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
3029 }
3030
3031 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3032                                            u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3033                                            int result,
3034                                            unsigned flags)
3035 {
3036         struct common_audit_data ad;
3037         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3038         int rc;
3039
3040         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3041         ad.u.inode = inode;
3042
3043         rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3044                             audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
3045         if (rc)
3046                 return rc;
3047         return 0;
3048 }
3049
3050 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3051 {
3052         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3053         u32 perms;
3054         bool from_access;
3055         unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3056         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3057         u32 sid;
3058         struct av_decision avd;
3059         int rc, rc2;
3060         u32 audited, denied;
3061
3062         from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3063         mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3064
3065         /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3066         if (!mask)
3067                 return 0;
3068
3069         validate_creds(cred);
3070
3071         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3072                 return 0;
3073
3074         perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3075
3076         sid = cred_sid(cred);
3077         isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, flags & MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
3078         if (IS_ERR(isec))
3079                 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3080
3081         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
3082         audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3083                                      from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3084                                      &denied);
3085         if (likely(!audited))
3086                 return rc;
3087
3088         rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
3089         if (rc2)
3090                 return rc2;
3091         return rc;
3092 }
3093
3094 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3095 {
3096         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3097         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3098         unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3099         __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3100
3101         /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3102         if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3103                 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3104                               ATTR_FORCE);
3105                 if (!ia_valid)
3106                         return 0;
3107         }
3108
3109         if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3110                         ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3111                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3112
3113         if (selinux_policycap_openperm &&
3114             inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3115             (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3116             !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3117                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3118
3119         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3120 }
3121
3122 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3123 {
3124         return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3125 }
3126
3127 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3128 {
3129         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3130
3131         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
3132                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
3133                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
3134                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
3135                                 return -EPERM;
3136                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
3137                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
3138                            Restrict to administrator. */
3139                         return -EPERM;
3140                 }
3141         }
3142
3143         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3144            ordinary setattr permission. */
3145         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3146 }
3147
3148 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3149 {
3150         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3151         int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
3152
3153         if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
3154                 return false;
3155         if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
3156                 return false;
3157         return true;
3158 }
3159
3160 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3161                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3162 {
3163         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3164         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3165         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3166         struct common_audit_data ad;
3167         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3168         int rc = 0;
3169
3170         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3171                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3172
3173         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3174         if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3175                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3176
3177         if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3178                 return -EPERM;
3179
3180         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3181         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3182
3183         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3184         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3185                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3186         if (rc)
3187                 return rc;
3188
3189         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3190         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3191                 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3192                         struct audit_buffer *ab;
3193                         size_t audit_size;
3194                         const char *str;
3195
3196                         /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3197                          * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3198                         if (value) {
3199                                 str = value;
3200                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3201                                         audit_size = size - 1;
3202                                 else
3203                                         audit_size = size;
3204                         } else {
3205                                 str = "";
3206                                 audit_size = 0;
3207                         }
3208                         ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3209                         audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3210                         audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3211                         audit_log_end(ab);
3212
3213                         return rc;
3214                 }
3215                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3216         }
3217         if (rc)
3218                 return rc;
3219
3220         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3221                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3222         if (rc)
3223                 return rc;
3224
3225         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3226                                           isec->sclass);
3227         if (rc)
3228                 return rc;
3229
3230         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3231                             sbsec->sid,
3232                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3233                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3234                             &ad);
3235 }
3236
3237 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3238                                         const void *value, size_t size,
3239                                         int flags)
3240 {
3241         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3242         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3243         u32 newsid;
3244         int rc;
3245
3246         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3247                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3248                 return;
3249         }
3250
3251         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3252         if (rc) {
3253                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
3254                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3255                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3256                 return;
3257         }
3258
3259         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3260         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3261         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3262         isec->sid = newsid;
3263         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3264         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3265
3266         return;
3267 }
3268
3269 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3270 {
3271         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3272
3273         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3274 }
3275
3276 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3277 {
3278         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3279
3280         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3281 }
3282
3283 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3284 {
3285         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3286                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3287
3288         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3289            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3290         return -EACCES;
3291 }
3292
3293 /*
3294  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3295  *
3296  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3297  */
3298 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3299 {
3300         u32 size;
3301         int error;
3302         char *context = NULL;
3303         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3304
3305         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3306                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3307
3308         /*
3309          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3310          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3311          * use the in-core value under current policy.
3312          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3313          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3314          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3315          * in-core context value, not a denial.
3316          */
3317         isec = inode_security(inode);
3318         if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3319                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3320                                                       &size);
3321         else
3322                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3323         if (error)
3324                 return error;
3325         error = size;
3326         if (alloc) {
3327                 *buffer = context;
3328                 goto out_nofree;
3329         }
3330         kfree(context);
3331 out_nofree:
3332         return error;
3333 }
3334
3335 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3336                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3337 {
3338         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3339         u32 newsid;
3340         int rc;
3341
3342         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3343                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3344
3345         if (!value || !size)
3346                 return -EACCES;
3347
3348         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3349         if (rc)
3350                 return rc;
3351
3352         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3353         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3354         isec->sid = newsid;
3355         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3356         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3357         return 0;
3358 }
3359
3360 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3361 {
3362         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3363         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3364                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3365         return len;
3366 }
3367
3368 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3369 {
3370         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3371         *secid = isec->sid;
3372 }
3373
3374 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3375 {
3376         u32 sid;
3377         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3378         struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3379
3380         if (new_creds == NULL) {
3381                 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3382                 if (!new_creds)
3383                         return -ENOMEM;
3384         }
3385
3386         tsec = new_creds->security;
3387         /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3388         selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3389         tsec->create_sid = sid;
3390         *new = new_creds;
3391         return 0;
3392 }
3393
3394 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3395 {
3396         /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3397          * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3398          * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3399          */
3400         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3401                 return 1; /* Discard */
3402         /*
3403          * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3404          * by selinux.
3405          */
3406         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3407 }
3408
3409 /* file security operations */
3410
3411 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3412 {
3413         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3414         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3415
3416         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3417         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3418                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3419
3420         return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3421                              file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3422 }
3423
3424 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3425 {
3426         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3427         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3428         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3429         u32 sid = current_sid();
3430
3431         if (!mask)
3432                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3433                 return 0;
3434
3435         isec = inode_security(inode);
3436         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3437             fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3438                 /* No change since file_open check. */
3439                 return 0;
3440
3441         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3442 }
3443
3444 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3445 {
3446         return file_alloc_security(file);
3447 }
3448
3449 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3450 {
3451         file_free_security(file);
3452 }
3453
3454 /*
3455  * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3456  * operation to an inode.
3457  */
3458 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3459                 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3460 {
3461         struct common_audit_data ad;
3462         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3463         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3464         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3465         struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3466         u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3467         int rc;
3468         u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3469         u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3470
3471         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3472         ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3473         ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3474         ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3475
3476         if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3477                 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3478                                 SECCLASS_FD,
3479                                 FD__USE,
3480                                 &ad);
3481                 if (rc)
3482                         goto out;
3483         }
3484
3485         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3486                 return 0;
3487
3488         isec = inode_security(inode);
3489         rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3490                         requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3491 out:
3492         return rc;
3493 }
3494
3495 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3496                               unsigned long arg)
3497 {
3498         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3499         int error = 0;
3500
3501         switch (cmd) {
3502         case FIONREAD:
3503         /* fall through */
3504         case FIBMAP:
3505         /* fall through */
3506         case FIGETBSZ:
3507         /* fall through */
3508         case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3509         /* fall through */
3510         case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3511                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3512                 break;
3513
3514         case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3515         /* fall through */
3516         case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3517                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3518                 break;
3519
3520         /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3521         case FIONBIO:
3522         /* fall through */
3523         case FIOASYNC:
3524                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3525                 break;
3526
3527         case KDSKBENT:
3528         case KDSKBSENT:
3529                 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3530                                             SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT, true);
3531                 break;
3532
3533         /* default case assumes that the command will go
3534          * to the file's ioctl() function.
3535          */
3536         default:
3537                 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3538         }
3539         return error;
3540 }
3541
3542 static int default_noexec;
3543
3544 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3545 {
3546         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3547         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3548         int rc = 0;
3549
3550         if (default_noexec &&
3551             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3552                                    (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3553                 /*
3554                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3555                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3556                  * This has an additional check.
3557                  */
3558                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3559                                   PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3560                 if (rc)
3561                         goto error;
3562         }
3563
3564         if (file) {
3565                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3566                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3567
3568                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3569                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3570                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3571
3572                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3573                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3574
3575                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3576         }
3577
3578 error:
3579         return rc;
3580 }
3581
3582 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3583 {
3584         int rc = 0;
3585
3586         if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3587                 u32 sid = current_sid();
3588                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3589                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3590         }
3591
3592         return rc;
3593 }
3594
3595 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3596                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3597 {
3598         struct common_audit_data ad;
3599         int rc;
3600
3601         if (file) {
3602                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3603                 ad.u.file = file;
3604                 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3605                                     FILE__MAP, &ad);
3606                 if (rc)
3607                         return rc;
3608         }
3609
3610         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3611                 prot = reqprot;
3612
3613         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3614                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3615 }
3616
3617 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3618                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3619                                  unsigned long prot)
3620 {
3621         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3622         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3623
3624         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3625                 prot = reqprot;
3626
3627         if (default_noexec &&
3628             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3629                 int rc = 0;
3630                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3631                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3632                         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3633                                           PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3634                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3635                            ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3636                              vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3637                             vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3638                         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3639                                           PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3640                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3641                         /*
3642                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3643                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3644                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3645                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3646                          * occur for text relocations.
3647                          */
3648                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3649                 }
3650                 if (rc)
3651                         return rc;
3652         }
3653
3654         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3655 }
3656
3657 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3658 {
3659         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3660
3661         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3662 }
3663
3664 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3665                               unsigned long arg)
3666 {
3667         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3668         int err = 0;
3669
3670         switch (cmd) {
3671         case F_SETFL:
3672                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3673                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3674                         break;
3675                 }
3676                 /* fall through */
3677         case F_SETOWN:
3678         case F_SETSIG:
3679         case F_GETFL:
3680         case F_GETOWN:
3681         case F_GETSIG:
3682         case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3683                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3684                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3685                 break;
3686         case F_GETLK:
3687         case F_SETLK:
3688         case F_SETLKW:
3689         case F_OFD_GETLK:
3690         case F_OFD_SETLK:
3691         case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3692 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3693         case F_GETLK64:
3694         case F_SETLK64:
3695         case F_SETLKW64:
3696 #endif
3697                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3698                 break;
3699         }
3700
3701         return err;
3702 }
3703
3704 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3705 {
3706         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3707
3708         fsec = file->f_security;
3709         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3710 }
3711
3712 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3713                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3714 {
3715         struct file *file;
3716         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3717         u32 perm;
3718         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3719
3720         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3721         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3722
3723         fsec = file->f_security;
3724
3725         if (!signum)
3726                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3727         else
3728                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3729
3730         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3731                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3732 }
3733
3734 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3735 {
3736         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3737
3738         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3739 }
3740
3741 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3742 {
3743         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3744         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3745
3746         fsec = file->f_security;
3747         isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3748         /*
3749          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3750          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3751          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3752          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3753          * struct as its SID.
3754          */
3755         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3756         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3757         /*
3758          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3759          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3760          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3761          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3762          * new inode label or new policy.
3763          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3764          */
3765         return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3766 }
3767
3768 /* task security operations */
3769
3770 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3771                               unsigned long clone_flags)
3772 {
3773         u32 sid = current_sid();
3774
3775         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3776 }
3777
3778 /*
3779  * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3780  */
3781 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3782 {
3783         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3784
3785         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3786         if (!tsec)
3787                 return -ENOMEM;
3788
3789         cred->security = tsec;
3790         return 0;
3791 }
3792
3793 /*
3794  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3795  */
3796 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3797 {
3798         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3799
3800         /*
3801          * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3802          * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3803          */
3804         BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3805         cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3806         kfree(tsec);
3807 }
3808
3809 /*
3810  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3811  */
3812 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3813                                 gfp_t gfp)
3814 {
3815         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3816         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3817
3818         old_tsec = old->security;
3819
3820         tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3821         if (!tsec)
3822                 return -ENOMEM;
3823
3824         new->security = tsec;
3825         return 0;
3826 }
3827
3828 /*
3829  * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3830  */
3831 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3832 {
3833         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3834         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3835
3836         *tsec = *old_tsec;
3837 }
3838
3839 /*
3840  * set the security data for a kernel service
3841  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3842  */
3843 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3844 {
3845         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3846         u32 sid = current_sid();
3847         int ret;
3848
3849         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3850                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3851                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3852                            NULL);
3853         if (ret == 0) {
3854                 tsec->sid = secid;
3855                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3856                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3857                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3858         }
3859         return ret;
3860 }
3861
3862 /*
3863  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3864  * objective context of the specified inode
3865  */
3866 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3867 {
3868         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
3869         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3870         u32 sid = current_sid();
3871         int ret;
3872
3873         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3874                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3875                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3876                            NULL);
3877
3878         if (ret == 0)
3879                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3880         return ret;
3881 }
3882
3883 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3884 {
3885         struct common_audit_data ad;
3886
3887         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3888         ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3889
3890         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3891                             SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3892 }
3893
3894 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
3895 {
3896         struct common_audit_data ad;
3897         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3898         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3899         u32 sid = current_sid();
3900         int rc;
3901
3902         /* init_module */
3903         if (file == NULL)
3904                 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3905                                         SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
3906
3907         /* finit_module */
3908
3909         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3910         ad.u.file = file;
3911
3912         fsec = file->f_security;
3913         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
3914                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
3915                 if (rc)
3916                         return rc;
3917         }
3918
3919         isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3920         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3921                                 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
3922 }
3923
3924 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
3925                                     enum kernel_read_file_id id)
3926 {
3927         int rc = 0;
3928
3929         switch (id) {
3930         case READING_MODULE:
3931                 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(file);
3932                 break;
3933         default:
3934                 break;
3935         }
3936
3937         return rc;
3938 }
3939
3940 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3941 {
3942         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3943                             PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
3944 }
3945
3946 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3947 {
3948         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3949                             PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
3950 }
3951
3952 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3953 {
3954         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3955                             PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
3956 }
3957
3958 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3959 {
3960         *secid = task_sid(p);
3961 }
3962
3963 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3964 {
3965         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3966                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
3967 }
3968
3969 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3970 {
3971         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3972                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
3973 }
3974
3975 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3976 {
3977         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3978                             PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
3979 }
3980
3981 int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
3982                          unsigned int flags)
3983 {
3984         u32 av = 0;
3985
3986         if (!flags)
3987                 return 0;
3988         if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
3989                 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
3990         if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
3991                 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
3992         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
3993                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
3994 }
3995
3996 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3997                 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3998 {
3999         struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4000
4001         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4002            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4003            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4004            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4005         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4006                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p),
4007                                     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4008
4009         return 0;
4010 }
4011
4012 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4013 {
4014         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4015                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4016 }
4017
4018 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4019 {
4020         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4021                             PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4022 }
4023
4024 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4025 {
4026         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4027                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4028 }
4029
4030 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
4031                                 int sig, u32 secid)
4032 {
4033         u32 perm;
4034
4035         if (!sig)
4036                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4037         else
4038                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4039         if (!secid)
4040                 secid = current_sid();
4041         return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4042 }
4043
4044 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4045                                   struct inode *inode)
4046 {
4047         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
4048         u32 sid = task_sid(p);
4049
4050         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4051         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4052         isec->sid = sid;
4053         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4054         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4055 }
4056
4057 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4058 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4059                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4060 {
4061         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4062         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4063
4064         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4065         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4066         if (ih == NULL)
4067                 goto out;
4068
4069         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4070         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4071                 goto out;
4072
4073         ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4074         ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4075         ret = 0;
4076
4077         if (proto)
4078                 *proto = ih->protocol;
4079
4080         switch (ih->protocol) {
4081         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4082                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4083
4084                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4085                         break;
4086
4087                 offset += ihlen;
4088                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4089                 if (th == NULL)
4090                         break;
4091
4092                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4093                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4094                 break;
4095         }
4096
4097         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4098                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4099
4100                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4101                         break;
4102
4103                 offset += ihlen;
4104                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4105                 if (uh == NULL)
4106                         break;
4107
4108                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4109                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4110                 break;
4111         }
4112
4113         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4114                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4115
4116                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4117                         break;
4118
4119                 offset += ihlen;
4120                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4121                 if (dh == NULL)
4122                         break;
4123
4124                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4125                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4126                 break;
4127         }
4128
4129         default:
4130                 break;
4131         }
4132 out:
4133         return ret;
4134 }
4135
4136 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4137
4138 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4139 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4140                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4141 {
4142         u8 nexthdr;
4143         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4144         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4145         __be16 frag_off;
4146
4147         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4148         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4149         if (ip6 == NULL)
4150                 goto out;
4151
4152         ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4153         ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4154         ret = 0;
4155
4156         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4157         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4158         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4159         if (offset < 0)
4160                 goto out;
4161
4162         if (proto)
4163                 *proto = nexthdr;
4164
4165         switch (nexthdr) {
4166         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4167                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4168
4169                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4170                 if (th == NULL)
4171                         break;
4172
4173                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4174                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4175                 break;
4176         }
4177
4178         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4179                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4180
4181                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4182                 if (uh == NULL)
4183                         break;
4184
4185                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4186                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4187                 break;
4188         }
4189
4190         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4191                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4192
4193                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4194                 if (dh == NULL)
4195                         break;
4196
4197                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4198                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4199                 break;
4200         }
4201
4202         /* includes fragments */
4203         default:
4204                 break;
4205         }
4206 out:
4207         return ret;
4208 }
4209
4210 #endif /* IPV6 */
4211
4212 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4213                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4214 {
4215         char *addrp;
4216         int ret;
4217
4218         switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4219         case PF_INET:
4220                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4221                 if (ret)
4222                         goto parse_error;
4223                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4224                                        &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4225                 goto okay;
4226
4227 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4228         case PF_INET6:
4229                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4230                 if (ret)
4231                         goto parse_error;
4232                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4233                                        &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4234                 goto okay;
4235 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4236         default:
4237                 addrp = NULL;
4238                 goto okay;
4239         }
4240
4241 parse_error:
4242         printk(KERN_WARNING
4243                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4244                " unable to parse packet\n");
4245         return ret;
4246
4247 okay:
4248         if (_addrp)
4249                 *_addrp = addrp;
4250         return 0;
4251 }
4252
4253 /**
4254  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4255  * @skb: the packet
4256  * @family: protocol family
4257  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4258  *
4259  * Description:
4260  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4261  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4262  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
4263  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4264  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4265  * peer labels.
4266  *
4267  */
4268 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4269 {
4270         int err;
4271         u32 xfrm_sid;
4272         u32 nlbl_sid;
4273         u32 nlbl_type;
4274
4275         err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4276         if (unlikely(err))
4277                 return -EACCES;
4278         err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4279         if (unlikely(err))
4280                 return -EACCES;
4281
4282         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4283         if (unlikely(err)) {
4284                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4285                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4286                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4287                 return -EACCES;
4288         }
4289
4290         return 0;
4291 }
4292
4293 /**
4294  * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4295  * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4296  * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4297  * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4298  *
4299  * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4300  * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4301  * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4302  * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4303  *
4304  */
4305 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4306 {
4307         int err = 0;
4308
4309         if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4310                 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
4311         else
4312                 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4313
4314         return err;
4315 }
4316
4317 /* socket security operations */
4318
4319 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4320                                  u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4321 {
4322         if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4323                 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4324                 return 0;
4325         }
4326
4327         return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4328                                        socksid);
4329 }
4330
4331 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4332 {
4333         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4334         struct common_audit_data ad;
4335         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4336
4337         if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4338                 return 0;
4339
4340         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4341         ad.u.net = &net;
4342         ad.u.net->sk = sk;
4343
4344         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4345                             &ad);
4346 }
4347
4348 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4349                                  int protocol, int kern)
4350 {
4351         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4352         u32 newsid;
4353         u16 secclass;
4354         int rc;
4355
4356         if (kern)
4357                 return 0;
4358
4359         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4360         rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4361         if (rc)
4362                 return rc;
4363
4364         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4365 }
4366
4367 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4368                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
4369 {
4370         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4371         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4372         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4373         u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4374         u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4375         int err = 0;
4376
4377         if (!kern) {
4378                 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4379                 if (err)
4380                         return err;
4381         }
4382
4383         isec->sclass = sclass;
4384         isec->sid = sid;
4385         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4386
4387         if (sock->sk) {
4388                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4389                 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4390                 sksec->sid = sid;
4391                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4392         }
4393
4394         return err;
4395 }
4396
4397 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4398    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4399    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4400
4401 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4402 {
4403         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4404         u16 family;
4405         int err;
4406
4407         err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4408         if (err)
4409                 goto out;
4410
4411         /*
4412          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4413          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4414          * check the first address now.
4415          */
4416         family = sk->sk_family;
4417         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4418                 char *addrp;
4419                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4420                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4421                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4422                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4423                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4424                 unsigned short snum;
4425                 u32 sid, node_perm;
4426
4427                 if (family == PF_INET) {
4428                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
4429                                 err = -EINVAL;
4430                                 goto out;
4431                         }
4432                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4433                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4434                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4435                 } else {
4436                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) {
4437                                 err = -EINVAL;
4438                                 goto out;
4439                         }
4440                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4441                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4442                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4443                 }
4444
4445                 if (snum) {
4446                         int low, high;
4447
4448                         inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4449
4450                         if (snum < max(inet_prot_sock(sock_net(sk)), low) ||
4451                             snum > high) {
4452                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4453                                                       snum, &sid);
4454                                 if (err)
4455                                         goto out;
4456                                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4457                                 ad.u.net = &net;
4458                                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4459                                 ad.u.net->family = family;
4460                                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4461                                                    sksec->sclass,
4462                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4463                                 if (err)
4464                                         goto out;
4465                         }
4466                 }
4467
4468                 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4469                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4470                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4471                         break;
4472
4473                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4474                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4475                         break;
4476
4477                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4478                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4479                         break;
4480
4481                 default:
4482                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4483                         break;
4484                 }
4485
4486                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4487                 if (err)
4488                         goto out;
4489
4490                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4491                 ad.u.net = &net;
4492                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4493                 ad.u.net->family = family;
4494
4495                 if (family == PF_INET)
4496                         ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4497                 else
4498                         ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4499
4500                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4501                                    sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4502                 if (err)
4503                         goto out;
4504         }
4505 out:
4506         return err;
4507 }
4508
4509 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4510 {
4511         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4512         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4513         int err;
4514
4515         err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4516         if (err)
4517                 return err;
4518
4519         /*
4520          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4521          */
4522         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4523             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4524                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4525                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4526                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4527                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4528                 unsigned short snum;
4529                 u32 sid, perm;
4530
4531                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4532                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4533                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4534                                 return -EINVAL;
4535                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4536                 } else {
4537                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4538                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4539                                 return -EINVAL;
4540                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4541                 }
4542
4543                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4544                 if (err)
4545                         goto out;
4546
4547                 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4548                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4549
4550                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4551                 ad.u.net = &net;
4552                 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4553                 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4554                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4555                 if (err)
4556                         goto out;
4557         }
4558
4559         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4560
4561 out:
4562         return err;
4563 }
4564
4565 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4566 {
4567         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4568 }
4569
4570 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4571 {
4572         int err;
4573         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4574         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4575         u16 sclass;
4576         u32 sid;
4577
4578         err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4579         if (err)
4580                 return err;
4581
4582         isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4583         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4584         sclass = isec->sclass;
4585         sid = isec->sid;
4586         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4587
4588         newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4589         newisec->sclass = sclass;
4590         newisec->sid = sid;
4591         newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4592
4593         return 0;
4594 }
4595
4596 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4597                                   int size)
4598 {
4599         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4600 }
4601
4602 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4603                                   int size, int flags)
4604 {
4605         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4606 }
4607
4608 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4609 {
4610         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4611 }
4612
4613 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4614 {
4615         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4616 }
4617
4618 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4619 {
4620         int err;
4621
4622         err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4623         if (err)
4624                 return err;
4625
4626         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4627 }
4628
4629 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4630                                      int optname)
4631 {
4632         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4633 }
4634
4635 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4636 {
4637         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4638 }
4639
4640 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4641                                               struct sock *other,
4642                                               struct sock *newsk)
4643 {
4644         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4645         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4646         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4647         struct common_audit_data ad;
4648         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4649         int err;
4650
4651         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4652         ad.u.net = &net;
4653         ad.u.net->sk = other;
4654
4655         err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4656                            sksec_other->sclass,
4657                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4658         if (err)
4659                 return err;
4660
4661         /* server child socket */
4662         sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4663         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4664                                     &sksec_new->sid);
4665         if (err)
4666                 return err;
4667
4668         /* connecting socket */
4669         sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4670
4671         return 0;
4672 }
4673
4674 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4675                                         struct socket *other)
4676 {
4677         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4678         struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4679         struct common_audit_data ad;
4680         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4681
4682         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4683         ad.u.net = &net;
4684         ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4685
4686         return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4687                             &ad);
4688 }
4689
4690 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4691                                     char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4692                                     struct common_audit_data *ad)
4693 {
4694         int err;
4695         u32 if_sid;
4696         u32 node_sid;
4697
4698         err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4699         if (err)
4700                 return err;
4701         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4702                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4703         if (err)
4704                 return err;
4705
4706         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4707         if (err)
4708                 return err;
4709         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4710                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4711 }
4712
4713 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4714                                        u16 family)
4715 {
4716         int err = 0;
4717         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4718         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4719         struct common_audit_data ad;
4720         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4721         char *addrp;
4722
4723         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4724         ad.u.net = &net;
4725         ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4726         ad.u.net->family = family;
4727         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4728         if (err)
4729                 return err;
4730
4731         if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4732                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4733                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4734                 if (err)
4735                         return err;
4736         }
4737
4738         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4739         if (err)
4740                 return err;
4741         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4742
4743         return err;
4744 }
4745
4746 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4747 {
4748         int err;
4749         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4750         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4751         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4752         struct common_audit_data ad;
4753         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4754         char *addrp;
4755         u8 secmark_active;
4756         u8 peerlbl_active;
4757
4758         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4759                 return 0;
4760
4761         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4762         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4763                 family = PF_INET;
4764
4765         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4766          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4767          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4768          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4769         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4770                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4771
4772         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4773         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4774         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4775                 return 0;
4776
4777         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4778         ad.u.net = &net;
4779         ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4780         ad.u.net->family = family;
4781         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4782         if (err)
4783                 return err;
4784
4785         if (peerlbl_active) {
4786                 u32 peer_sid;
4787
4788                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4789                 if (err)
4790                         return err;
4791                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4792                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4793                 if (err) {
4794                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
4795                         return err;
4796                 }
4797                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4798                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4799                 if (err) {
4800                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
4801                         return err;
4802                 }
4803         }
4804
4805         if (secmark_active) {
4806                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4807                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4808                 if (err)
4809                         return err;
4810         }
4811
4812         return err;
4813 }
4814
4815 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4816                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4817 {
4818         int err = 0;
4819         char *scontext;
4820         u32 scontext_len;
4821         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4822         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4823
4824         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4825             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4826                 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4827         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4828                 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4829
4830         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4831         if (err)
4832                 return err;
4833
4834         if (scontext_len > len) {
4835                 err = -ERANGE;
4836                 goto out_len;
4837         }
4838
4839         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4840                 err = -EFAULT;
4841
4842 out_len:
4843         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4844                 err = -EFAULT;
4845         kfree(scontext);
4846         return err;
4847 }
4848
4849 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4850 {
4851         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4852         u16 family;
4853         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4854
4855         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4856                 family = PF_INET;
4857         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4858                 family = PF_INET6;
4859         else if (sock)
4860                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4861         else
4862                 goto out;
4863
4864         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
4865                 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4866                 peer_secid = isec->sid;
4867         } else if (skb)
4868                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4869
4870 out:
4871         *secid = peer_secid;
4872         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4873                 return -EINVAL;
4874         return 0;
4875 }
4876
4877 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4878 {
4879         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4880
4881         sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4882         if (!sksec)
4883                 return -ENOMEM;
4884
4885         sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4886         sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4887         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
4888         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4889         sk->sk_security = sksec;
4890
4891         return 0;
4892 }
4893
4894 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4895 {
4896         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4897
4898         sk->sk_security = NULL;
4899         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4900         kfree(sksec);
4901 }
4902
4903 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4904 {
4905         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4906         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4907
4908         newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4909         newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4910         newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4911
4912         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4913 }
4914
4915 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4916 {
4917         if (!sk)
4918                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4919         else {
4920                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4921
4922                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4923         }
4924 }
4925
4926 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4927 {
4928         struct inode_security_struct *isec =
4929                 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
4930         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4931
4932         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4933             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4934                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4935         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4936 }
4937
4938 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4939                                      struct request_sock *req)
4940 {
4941         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4942         int err;
4943         u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4944         u32 connsid;
4945         u32 peersid;
4946
4947         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4948         if (err)
4949                 return err;
4950         err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4951         if (err)
4952                 return err;
4953         req->secid = connsid;
4954         req->peer_secid = peersid;
4955
4956         return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4957 }
4958
4959 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4960                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4961 {
4962         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4963
4964         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4965         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4966         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4967            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4968            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4969            time it will have been created and available. */
4970
4971         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4972          * thread with access to newsksec */
4973         selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4974 }
4975
4976 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4977 {
4978         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4979         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4980
4981         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4982         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4983                 family = PF_INET;
4984
4985         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4986 }
4987
4988 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4989 {
4990         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4991         u32 tsid;
4992
4993         __tsec = current_security();
4994         tsid = __tsec->sid;
4995
4996         return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4997 }
4998
4999 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5000 {
5001         atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5002 }
5003
5004 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5005 {
5006         atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5007 }
5008
5009 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5010                                       struct flowi *fl)
5011 {
5012         fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
5013 }
5014
5015 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5016 {
5017         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5018
5019         tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5020         if (!tunsec)
5021                 return -ENOMEM;
5022         tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5023
5024         *security = tunsec;
5025         return 0;
5026 }
5027
5028 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5029 {
5030         kfree(security);
5031 }
5032
5033 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5034 {
5035         u32 sid = current_sid();
5036
5037         /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5038          * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5039          * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5040          * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5041          * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5042          * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5043
5044         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5045                             NULL);
5046 }
5047
5048 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5049 {
5050         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5051
5052         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5053                             TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5054 }
5055
5056 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5057 {
5058         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5059         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5060
5061         /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5062          * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5063          * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5064          * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5065          * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5066          * protocols were being used */
5067
5068         sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5069         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5070
5071         return 0;
5072 }
5073
5074 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5075 {
5076         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5077         u32 sid = current_sid();
5078         int err;
5079
5080         err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5081                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5082         if (err)
5083                 return err;
5084         err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5085                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5086         if (err)
5087                 return err;
5088         tunsec->sid = sid;
5089
5090         return 0;
5091 }
5092
5093 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5094 {
5095         int err = 0;
5096         u32 perm;
5097         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5098         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5099
5100         if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
5101                 err = -EINVAL;
5102                 goto out;
5103         }
5104         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
5105
5106         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5107         if (err) {
5108                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
5109                         pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5110                                " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5111                                " pig=%d comm=%s\n",
5112                                sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5113                                secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
5114                                task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5115                         if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
5116                                 err = 0;
5117                 }
5118
5119                 /* Ignore */
5120                 if (err == -ENOENT)
5121                         err = 0;
5122                 goto out;
5123         }
5124
5125         err = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5126 out:
5127         return err;
5128 }
5129
5130 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5131
5132 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5133                                        const struct net_device *indev,
5134                                        u16 family)
5135 {
5136         int err;
5137         char *addrp;
5138         u32 peer_sid;
5139         struct common_audit_data ad;
5140         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5141         u8 secmark_active;
5142         u8 netlbl_active;
5143         u8 peerlbl_active;
5144
5145         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
5146                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5147
5148         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5149         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5150         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5151         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5152                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5153
5154         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5155                 return NF_DROP;
5156
5157         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5158         ad.u.net = &net;
5159         ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5160         ad.u.net->family = family;
5161         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5162                 return NF_DROP;
5163
5164         if (peerlbl_active) {
5165                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5166                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5167                 if (err) {
5168                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5169                         return NF_DROP;
5170                 }
5171         }
5172
5173         if (secmark_active)
5174                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5175                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5176                         return NF_DROP;
5177
5178         if (netlbl_active)
5179                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5180                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5181                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5182                  * protection */
5183                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5184                         return NF_DROP;
5185
5186         return NF_ACCEPT;
5187 }
5188
5189 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5190                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
5191                                          const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5192 {
5193         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5194 }
5195
5196 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5197 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5198                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
5199                                          const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5200 {
5201         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5202 }
5203 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5204
5205 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5206                                       u16 family)
5207 {
5208         struct sock *sk;
5209         u32 sid;
5210
5211         if (!netlbl_enabled())
5212                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5213
5214         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5215          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5216          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5217         sk = skb->sk;
5218         if (sk) {
5219                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5220
5221                 if (sk_listener(sk))
5222                         /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5223                          * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5224                          * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5225                          * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
5226                          * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5227                          * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5228                          * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5229                          * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5230                          * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5231                          * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5232                          * security label in the packet itself this is the
5233                          * best we can do. */
5234                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5235
5236                 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5237                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5238                 sid = sksec->sid;
5239         } else
5240                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5241         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5242                 return NF_DROP;
5243
5244         return NF_ACCEPT;
5245 }
5246
5247 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5248                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
5249                                         const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5250 {
5251         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5252 }
5253
5254 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5255 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5256                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
5257                                         const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5258 {
5259         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5260 }
5261 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5262
5263 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5264                                                 int ifindex,
5265                                                 u16 family)
5266 {
5267         struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5268         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5269         struct common_audit_data ad;
5270         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5271         char *addrp;
5272         u8 proto;
5273
5274         if (sk == NULL)
5275                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5276         sksec = sk->sk_security;
5277
5278         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5279         ad.u.net = &net;
5280         ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5281         ad.u.net->family = family;
5282         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5283                 return NF_DROP;
5284
5285         if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5286                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5287                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5288                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5289
5290         if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5291                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5292
5293         return NF_ACCEPT;
5294 }
5295
5296 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5297                                          const struct net_device *outdev,
5298                                          u16 family)
5299 {
5300         u32 secmark_perm;
5301         u32 peer_sid;
5302         int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5303         struct sock *sk;
5304         struct common_audit_data ad;
5305         struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5306         char *addrp;
5307         u8 secmark_active;
5308         u8 peerlbl_active;
5309
5310         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5311          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5312          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5313          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5314         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
5315                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5316
5317         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5318         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5319         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5320                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5321
5322         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5323
5324 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5325         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5326          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5327          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5328          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5329          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5330          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5331          * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5332          *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5333          *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5334          *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5335          *       connection. */
5336         if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5337             !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5338                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5339 #endif
5340
5341         if (sk == NULL) {
5342                 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5343                  * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5344                  * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5345                  * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5346                 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5347                         secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5348                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5349                                 return NF_DROP;
5350                 } else {
5351                         secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5352                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5353                 }
5354         } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5355                 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5356                  * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
5357                  * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5358                  * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5359                  * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5360                  * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5361                  * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5362                  * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
5363                  * for similar problems. */
5364                 u32 skb_sid;
5365                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5366
5367                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5368                 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5369                         return NF_DROP;
5370                 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5371                  * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5372                  * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5373                  * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5374                  * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5375                  * pass the packet. */
5376                 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5377                         switch (family) {
5378                         case PF_INET:
5379                                 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5380                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5381                                 break;
5382                         case PF_INET6:
5383                                 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5384                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5385                                 break;
5386                         default:
5387                                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5388                         }
5389                 }
5390                 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5391                         return NF_DROP;
5392                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5393         } else {
5394                 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5395                  * associated socket. */
5396                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5397                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5398                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5399         }
5400
5401         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5402         ad.u.net = &net;
5403         ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5404         ad.u.net->family = family;
5405         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5406                 return NF_DROP;
5407
5408         if (secmark_active)
5409                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5410                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5411                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5412
5413         if (peerlbl_active) {
5414                 u32 if_sid;
5415                 u32 node_sid;
5416
5417                 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5418                         return NF_DROP;
5419                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5420                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5421                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5422
5423                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5424                         return NF_DROP;
5425                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5426                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5427                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5428         }
5429
5430         return NF_ACCEPT;
5431 }
5432
5433 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5434                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
5435                                            const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5436 {
5437         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5438 }
5439
5440 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5441 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
5442                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
5443                                            const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5444 {
5445         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5446 }
5447 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5448
5449 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5450
5451 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5452 {
5453         return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5454 }
5455
5456 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5457                               u16 sclass)
5458 {
5459         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5460
5461         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5462         if (!isec)
5463                 return -ENOMEM;
5464
5465         isec->sclass = sclass;
5466         isec->sid = current_sid();
5467         perm->security = isec;
5468
5469         return 0;
5470 }
5471
5472 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5473 {
5474         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5475         perm->security = NULL;
5476         kfree(isec);
5477 }
5478
5479 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5480 {
5481         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5482
5483         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5484         if (!msec)
5485                 return -ENOMEM;
5486
5487         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5488         msg->security = msec;
5489
5490         return 0;
5491 }
5492
5493 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5494 {
5495         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5496
5497         msg->security = NULL;
5498         kfree(msec);
5499 }
5500
5501 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5502                         u32 perms)
5503 {
5504         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5505         struct common_audit_data ad;
5506         u32 sid = current_sid();
5507
5508         isec = ipc_perms->security;
5509
5510         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5511         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5512
5513         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5514 }
5515
5516 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5517 {
5518         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5519 }
5520
5521 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5522 {
5523         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5524 }
5525
5526 /* message queue security operations */
5527 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5528 {
5529         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5530         struct common_audit_data ad;
5531         u32 sid = current_sid();
5532         int rc;
5533
5534         rc = ipc_alloc_security(&msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5535         if (rc)
5536                 return rc;
5537
5538         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5539
5540         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5541         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5542
5543         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5544                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5545         if (rc) {
5546                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5547                 return rc;
5548         }
5549         return 0;
5550 }
5551
5552 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5553 {
5554         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5555 }
5556
5557 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5558 {
5559         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5560         struct common_audit_data ad;
5561         u32 sid = current_sid();
5562
5563         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5564
5565         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5566         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5567
5568         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5569                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5570 }
5571
5572 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5573 {
5574         int err;
5575         int perms;
5576
5577         switch (cmd) {
5578         case IPC_INFO:
5579         case MSG_INFO:
5580                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5581                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5582                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5583         case IPC_STAT:
5584         case MSG_STAT:
5585                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5586                 break;
5587         case IPC_SET:
5588                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5589                 break;
5590         case IPC_RMID:
5591                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5592                 break;
5593         default:
5594                 return 0;
5595         }
5596
5597         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5598         return err;
5599 }
5600
5601 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5602 {
5603         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5604         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5605         struct common_audit_data ad;
5606         u32 sid = current_sid();
5607         int rc;
5608
5609         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5610         msec = msg->security;
5611
5612         /*
5613          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5614          */
5615         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5616                 /*
5617                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
5618                  * message queue this message will be stored in
5619                  */
5620                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5621                                              NULL, &msec->sid);
5622                 if (rc)
5623                         return rc;
5624         }
5625
5626         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5627         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5628
5629         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5630         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5631                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5632         if (!rc)
5633                 /* Can this process send the message */
5634                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5635                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
5636         if (!rc)
5637                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5638                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5639                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5640
5641         return rc;
5642 }
5643
5644 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5645                                     struct task_struct *target,
5646                                     long type, int mode)
5647 {
5648         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5649         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5650         struct common_audit_data ad;
5651         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5652         int rc;
5653
5654         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5655         msec = msg->security;
5656
5657         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5658         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5659
5660         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5661                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5662         if (!rc)
5663                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5664                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5665         return rc;
5666 }
5667
5668 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5669 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5670 {
5671         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5672         struct common_audit_data ad;
5673         u32 sid = current_sid();
5674         int rc;
5675
5676         rc = ipc_alloc_security(&shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5677         if (rc)
5678                 return rc;
5679
5680         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5681
5682         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5683         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5684
5685         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5686                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5687         if (rc) {
5688                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5689                 return rc;
5690         }
5691         return 0;
5692 }
5693
5694 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5695 {
5696         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5697 }
5698
5699 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5700 {
5701         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5702         struct common_audit_data ad;
5703         u32 sid = current_sid();
5704
5705         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5706
5707         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5708         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5709
5710         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5711                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5712 }
5713
5714 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5715 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5716 {
5717         int perms;
5718         int err;
5719
5720         switch (cmd) {
5721         case IPC_INFO:
5722         case SHM_INFO:
5723                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5724                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5725                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5726         case IPC_STAT:
5727         case SHM_STAT:
5728                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5729                 break;
5730         case IPC_SET:
5731                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5732                 break;
5733         case SHM_LOCK:
5734         case SHM_UNLOCK:
5735                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5736                 break;
5737         case IPC_RMID:
5738                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5739                 break;
5740         default:
5741                 return 0;
5742         }
5743
5744         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5745         return err;
5746 }
5747
5748 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5749                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5750 {
5751         u32 perms;
5752
5753         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5754                 perms = SHM__READ;
5755         else
5756                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5757
5758         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5759 }
5760
5761 /* Semaphore security operations */
5762 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5763 {
5764         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5765         struct common_audit_data ad;
5766         u32 sid = current_sid();
5767         int rc;
5768
5769         rc = ipc_alloc_security(&sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5770         if (rc)
5771                 return rc;
5772
5773         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5774
5775         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5776         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5777
5778         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5779                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5780         if (rc) {
5781                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5782                 return rc;
5783         }
5784         return 0;
5785 }
5786
5787 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5788 {
5789         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5790 }
5791
5792 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5793 {
5794         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5795         struct common_audit_data ad;
5796         u32 sid = current_sid();
5797
5798         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5799
5800         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5801         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5802
5803         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5804                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5805 }
5806
5807 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5808 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5809 {
5810         int err;
5811         u32 perms;
5812
5813         switch (cmd) {
5814         case IPC_INFO:
5815         case SEM_INFO:
5816                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5817                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
5818                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
5819         case GETPID:
5820         case GETNCNT:
5821         case GETZCNT:
5822                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5823                 break;
5824         case GETVAL:
5825         case GETALL:
5826                 perms = SEM__READ;
5827                 break;
5828         case SETVAL:
5829         case SETALL:
5830                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5831                 break;
5832         case IPC_RMID:
5833                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5834                 break;
5835         case IPC_SET:
5836                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5837                 break;
5838         case IPC_STAT:
5839         case SEM_STAT:
5840                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5841                 break;
5842         default:
5843                 return 0;
5844         }
5845
5846         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5847         return err;
5848 }
5849
5850 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5851                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5852 {
5853         u32 perms;
5854
5855         if (alter)
5856                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5857         else
5858                 perms = SEM__READ;
5859
5860         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5861 }
5862
5863 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5864 {
5865         u32 av = 0;
5866
5867         av = 0;
5868         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5869                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5870         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5871                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5872
5873         if (av == 0)
5874                 return 0;
5875
5876         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5877 }
5878
5879 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5880 {
5881         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5882         *secid = isec->sid;
5883 }
5884
5885 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5886 {
5887         if (inode)
5888                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5889 }
5890
5891 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5892                                char *name, char **value)
5893 {
5894         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5895         u32 sid;
5896         int error;
5897         unsigned len;
5898
5899         rcu_read_lock();
5900         __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5901
5902         if (current != p) {
5903                 error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
5904                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
5905                 if (error)
5906                         goto bad;
5907         }
5908
5909         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5910                 sid = __tsec->sid;
5911         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5912                 sid = __tsec->osid;
5913         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5914                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5915         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5916                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5917         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5918                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5919         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5920                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5921         else {
5922                 error = -EINVAL;
5923                 goto bad;
5924         }
5925         rcu_read_unlock();
5926
5927         if (!sid)
5928                 return 0;
5929
5930         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5931         if (error)
5932                 return error;
5933         return len;
5934
5935 bad:
5936         rcu_read_unlock();
5937         return error;
5938 }
5939
5940 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5941 {
5942         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5943         struct cred *new;
5944         u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
5945         int error;
5946         char *str = value;
5947
5948         /*
5949          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5950          */
5951         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5952                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5953                                      PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
5954         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5955                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5956                                      PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
5957         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5958                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5959                                      PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
5960         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5961                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5962                                      PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
5963         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5964                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5965                                      PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
5966         else
5967                 error = -EINVAL;
5968         if (error)
5969                 return error;
5970
5971         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5972         if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
5973                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5974                         str[size-1] = 0;
5975                         size--;
5976                 }
5977                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5978                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5979                         if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
5980                                 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5981                                 size_t audit_size;
5982
5983                                 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5984                                  * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5985                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5986                                         audit_size = size - 1;
5987                                 else
5988                                         audit_size = size;
5989                                 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5990                                 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5991                                 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5992                                 audit_log_end(ab);
5993
5994                                 return error;
5995                         }
5996                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5997                                                               &sid);
5998                 }
5999                 if (error)
6000                         return error;
6001         }
6002
6003         new = prepare_creds();
6004         if (!new)
6005                 return -ENOMEM;
6006
6007         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6008            performed during the actual operation (execve,
6009            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6010            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
6011            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6012            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6013         tsec = new->security;
6014         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6015                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6016         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6017                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6018         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6019                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
6020                                      NULL);
6021                 if (error)
6022                         goto abort_change;
6023                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6024         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6025                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6026         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6027                 error = -EINVAL;
6028                 if (sid == 0)
6029                         goto abort_change;
6030
6031                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6032                 error = -EPERM;
6033                 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6034                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
6035                         if (error)
6036                                 goto abort_change;
6037                 }
6038
6039                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6040                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6041                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6042                 if (error)
6043                         goto abort_change;
6044
6045                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6046                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6047                 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6048                 if (ptsid != 0) {
6049                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6050                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6051                         if (error)
6052                                 goto abort_change;
6053                 }
6054
6055                 tsec->sid = sid;
6056         } else {
6057                 error = -EINVAL;
6058                 goto abort_change;
6059         }
6060
6061         commit_creds(new);
6062         return size;
6063
6064 abort_change:
6065         abort_creds(new);
6066         return error;
6067 }
6068
6069 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6070 {
6071         return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6072 }
6073
6074 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6075 {
6076         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
6077 }
6078
6079 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6080 {
6081         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6082 }
6083
6084 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6085 {
6086         kfree(secdata);
6087 }
6088
6089 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6090 {
6091         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
6092
6093         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6094         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6095         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6096 }
6097
6098 /*
6099  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
6100  */
6101 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6102 {
6103         return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6104 }
6105
6106 /*
6107  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
6108  */
6109 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6110 {
6111         return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6112 }
6113
6114 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6115 {
6116         int len = 0;
6117         len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6118                                                 ctx, true);
6119         if (len < 0)
6120                 return len;
6121         *ctxlen = len;
6122         return 0;
6123 }
6124 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6125
6126 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6127                              unsigned long flags)
6128 {
6129         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6130         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6131
6132         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6133         if (!ksec)
6134                 return -ENOMEM;
6135
6136         tsec = cred->security;
6137         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6138                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6139         else
6140                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6141
6142         k->security = ksec;
6143         return 0;
6144 }
6145
6146 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6147 {
6148         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6149
6150         k->security = NULL;
6151         kfree(ksec);
6152 }
6153
6154 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6155                                   const struct cred *cred,
6156                                   unsigned perm)
6157 {
6158         struct key *key;
6159         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6160         u32 sid;
6161
6162         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
6163            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
6164            appear to be created. */
6165         if (perm == 0)
6166                 return 0;
6167
6168         sid = cred_sid(cred);
6169
6170         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6171         ksec = key->security;
6172
6173         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6174 }
6175
6176 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6177 {
6178         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6179         char *context = NULL;
6180         unsigned len;
6181         int rc;
6182
6183         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
6184         if (!rc)
6185                 rc = len;
6186         *_buffer = context;
6187         return rc;
6188 }
6189 #endif
6190
6191 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6192 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6193 {
6194         struct common_audit_data ad;
6195         int err;
6196         u32 sid = 0;
6197         struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6198         struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6199
6200         err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6201         if (err)
6202                 return err;
6203
6204         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6205         ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6206         ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6207         ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6208         return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6209                             SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6210                             INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6211 }
6212
6213 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6214                                             u8 port_num)
6215 {
6216         struct common_audit_data ad;
6217         int err;
6218         u32 sid = 0;
6219         struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6220         struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6221
6222         err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid);
6223
6224         if (err)
6225                 return err;
6226
6227         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6228         strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
6229         ibendport.port = port_num;
6230         ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6231         return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6232                             SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6233                             INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6234 }
6235
6236 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6237 {
6238         struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6239
6240         sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6241         if (!sec)
6242                 return -ENOMEM;
6243         sec->sid = current_sid();
6244
6245         *ib_sec = sec;
6246         return 0;
6247 }
6248
6249 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6250 {
6251         kfree(ib_sec);
6252 }
6253 #endif
6254
6255 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
6256         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6257         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6258         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6259         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6260
6261         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6262         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6263         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6264         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6265         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6266         LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6267         LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6268         LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6269         LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6270
6271         LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6272
6273         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
6274         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6275         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6276
6277         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
6278         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
6279         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
6280         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6281         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6282         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6283         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6284         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6285         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6286         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6287         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6288         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
6289
6290         LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6291         LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6292
6293         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
6294         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6295         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6296         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
6297         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
6298         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
6299         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
6300         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
6301         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
6302         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
6303         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
6304         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
6305         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
6306         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
6307         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
6308         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
6309         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
6310         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
6311         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
6312         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
6313         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
6314         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
6315         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
6316         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
6317         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
6318         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
6319         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
6320
6321         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
6322         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
6323         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
6324         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
6325         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
6326         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
6327         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
6328         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
6329         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
6330         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
6331         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
6332         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
6333
6334         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
6335
6336         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
6337         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
6338         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
6339         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
6340         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
6341         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
6342         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
6343         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
6344         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
6345         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
6346         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
6347         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
6348         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
6349         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
6350         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
6351         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
6352         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
6353         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
6354         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
6355         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
6356         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
6357         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
6358         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
6359
6360         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
6361         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
6362
6363         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
6364         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
6365
6366         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
6367                         selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
6368         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
6369         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
6370         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
6371         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
6372         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
6373
6374         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
6375         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
6376         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
6377         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
6378         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
6379
6380         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
6381         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
6382         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
6383         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
6384         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
6385
6386         LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
6387
6388         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
6389         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
6390
6391         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
6392         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
6393         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
6394         LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
6395         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
6396         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
6397         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
6398         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
6399
6400         LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
6401         LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
6402
6403         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
6404         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
6405         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
6406         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
6407         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
6408         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
6409         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
6410         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
6411         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
6412         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
6413         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
6414         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
6415         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
6416         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
6417         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
6418                         selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
6419         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
6420         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
6421         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
6422         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
6423         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
6424         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
6425         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
6426         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
6427         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
6428         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
6429         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
6430         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
6431         LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
6432         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
6433         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
6434         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
6435         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
6436         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
6437         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
6438 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6439         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
6440         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
6441                       selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
6442         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
6443         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
6444 #endif
6445 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6446         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
6447         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
6448         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
6449         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
6450         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
6451         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6452                         selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
6453         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
6454         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
6455         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
6456         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6457                         selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
6458         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
6459 #endif
6460
6461 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6462         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
6463         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
6464         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
6465         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
6466 #endif
6467
6468 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
6469         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
6470         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
6471         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
6472         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
6473 #endif
6474 };
6475
6476 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6477 {
6478         if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6479                 selinux_enabled = 0;
6480                 return 0;
6481         }
6482
6483         if (!selinux_enabled) {
6484                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
6485                 return 0;
6486         }
6487
6488         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
6489
6490         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6491         cred_init_security();
6492
6493         default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6494
6495         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6496                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6497                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6498         file_security_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_file_security",
6499                                             sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6500                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6501         avc_init();
6502
6503         security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
6504
6505         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6506                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6507
6508         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6509                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
6510
6511         if (selinux_enforcing)
6512                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6513         else
6514                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
6515
6516         return 0;
6517 }
6518
6519 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6520 {
6521         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6522 }
6523
6524 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6525 {
6526         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
6527
6528         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6529         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6530         iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6531 }
6532
6533 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6534    all processes and objects when they are created. */
6535 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6536
6537 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6538
6539 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6540         {
6541                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6542                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
6543                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6544                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6545         },
6546         {
6547                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
6548                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
6549                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
6550                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6551         },
6552         {
6553                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
6554                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
6555                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6556                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6557         },
6558 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
6559         {
6560                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6561                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
6562                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6563                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6564         },
6565         {
6566                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
6567                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
6568                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
6569                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6570         },
6571         {
6572                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_output,
6573                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
6574                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6575                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6576         },
6577 #endif  /* IPV6 */
6578 };
6579
6580 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
6581 {
6582         return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
6583                                      ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6584 }
6585
6586 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
6587 {
6588         nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
6589                                 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6590 }
6591
6592 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
6593         .init = selinux_nf_register,
6594         .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
6595 };
6596
6597 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6598 {
6599         int err;
6600
6601         if (!selinux_enabled)
6602                 return 0;
6603
6604         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6605
6606         err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
6607         if (err)
6608                 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
6609
6610         return 0;
6611 }
6612 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6613
6614 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6615 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6616 {
6617         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6618
6619         unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
6620 }
6621 #endif
6622
6623 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6624
6625 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6626 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6627 #endif
6628
6629 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6630
6631 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6632 static int selinux_disabled;
6633
6634 int selinux_disable(void)
6635 {
6636         if (ss_initialized) {
6637                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6638                 return -EINVAL;
6639         }
6640
6641         if (selinux_disabled) {
6642                 /* Only do this once. */
6643                 return -EINVAL;
6644         }
6645
6646         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
6647
6648         selinux_disabled = 1;
6649         selinux_enabled = 0;
6650
6651         security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6652
6653         /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6654         avc_disable();
6655
6656         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6657         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6658
6659         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
6660         exit_sel_fs();
6661
6662         return 0;
6663 }
6664 #endif