security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
   2 /*
   3  *  Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   4  *
   5  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   6  *
   7  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
   8  *            Chris Vance, <[email protected]>
   9  *            Wayne Salamon, <[email protected]>
  10  *            James Morris <[email protected]>
  11  *
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  13  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
  14  *                                         Eric Paris <[email protected]>
  15  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  16  *                          <[email protected]>
  17  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  18  *      Paul Moore <[email protected]>
  19  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  20  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <[email protected]>
  21  *  Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
  22  */
  23
  24 #include <linux/init.h>
  25 #include <linux/kd.h>
  26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
  28 #include <linux/errno.h>
  29 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
  31 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  40 #include <linux/swap.h>
  41 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  42 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  43 #include <linux/dcache.h>
  44 #include <linux/file.h>
  45 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  46 #include <linux/namei.h>
  47 #include <linux/mount.h>
  48 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
  49 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
  50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  52 #include <linux/tty.h>
  53 #include <net/icmp.h>
  54 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  55 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
  57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
  62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  64 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  65 #include <net/netlink.h>
  66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  67 #include <linux/udp.h>
  68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  69 #include <linux/sctp.h>
  70 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
  71 #include <linux/quota.h>
  72 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  73 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  74 #include <linux/parser.h>
  75 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  76 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  77 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  78 #include <linux/personality.h>
  79 #include <linux/audit.h>
  80 #include <linux/string.h>
  81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
  84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
  85 #include <linux/export.h>
  86 #include <linux/msg.h>
  87 #include <linux/shm.h>
  88 #include <linux/bpf.h>
  89 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
  90 #include <linux/stringhash.h>   /* for hashlen_string() */
  91 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
  92 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
  93 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
  94 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
  95
  96 #include "avc.h"
  97 #include "objsec.h"
  98 #include "netif.h"
  99 #include "netnode.h"
 100 #include "netport.h"
 101 #include "ibpkey.h"
 102 #include "xfrm.h"
 103 #include "netlabel.h"
 104 #include "audit.h"
 105 #include "avc_ss.h"
 106
 107 #define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
 108
 109 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
 110
 111 /* SECMARK reference count */
 112 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 113
 114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 115 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
 116
 117 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 118 {
 119         unsigned long enforcing;
 120         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 121                 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 122         return 1;
 123 }
 124 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 125 #else
 126 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
 127 #endif
 128
 129 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
 130 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 131 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 132 {
 133         unsigned long enabled;
 134         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 135                 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 136         return 1;
 137 }
 138 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 139 #endif
 140
 141 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 142 {
 143         unsigned long checkreqprot;
 144
 145         if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
 146                 if (checkreqprot)
 147                         pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter.  This is no longer supported.\n");
 148         }
 149         return 1;
 150 }
 151 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
 152
 153 /**
 154  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 155  *
 156  * Description:
 157  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 158  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 159  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 160  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
 161  * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
 162  *
 163  */
 164 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 165 {
 166         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
 167                 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 168 }
 169
 170 /**
 171  * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
 172  *
 173  * Description:
 174  * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
 175  * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
 176  * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
 177  * is always considered enabled.
 178  *
 179  */
 180 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 181 {
 182         return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
 183                 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 184 }
 185
 186 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
 187 {
 188         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 189                 sel_netif_flush();
 190                 sel_netnode_flush();
 191                 sel_netport_flush();
 192                 synchronize_net();
 193         }
 194         return 0;
 195 }
 196
 197 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
 198 {
 199         if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
 200                 sel_ib_pkey_flush();
 201                 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 202         }
 203
 204         return 0;
 205 }
 206
 207 /*
 208  * initialise the security for the init task
 209  */
 210 static void cred_init_security(void)
 211 {
 212         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 213
 214         tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
 215         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 216 }
 217
 218 /*
 219  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 220  */
 221 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 222 {
 223         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 224
 225         tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 226         return tsec->sid;
 227 }
 228
 229 static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
 230                           struct lsm_network_audit *net,
 231                           int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 232 {
 233         ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 234         ad->u.net = net;
 235         net->netif = ifindex;
 236         net->sk = sk;
 237         net->family = family;
 238 }
 239
 240 static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
 241                                 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
 242                                 struct sock *sk)
 243 {
 244         __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
 245 }
 246
 247 static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
 248                                  struct lsm_network_audit *net,
 249                                  int ifindex, u16 family)
 250 {
 251         __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
 252 }
 253
 254 /*
 255  * get the objective security ID of a task
 256  */
 257 static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
 258 {
 259         u32 sid;
 260
 261         rcu_read_lock();
 262         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 263         rcu_read_unlock();
 264         return sid;
 265 }
 266
 267 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 268
 269 /*
 270  * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid.  The
 271  * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
 272  * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
 273  * invalid.  The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
 274  */
 275 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 276                                        struct dentry *dentry,
 277                                        bool may_sleep)
 278 {
 279         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
 280
 281         might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 282
 283         if (selinux_initialized() &&
 284             isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 285                 if (!may_sleep)
 286                         return -ECHILD;
 287
 288                 /*
 289                  * Try reloading the inode security label.  This will fail if
 290                  * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
 291                  * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
 292                  */
 293                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
 294         }
 295         return 0;
 296 }
 297
 298 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
 299 {
 300         return selinux_inode(inode);
 301 }
 302
 303 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
 304 {
 305         int error;
 306
 307         error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
 308         if (error)
 309                 return ERR_PTR(error);
 310         return selinux_inode(inode);
 311 }
 312
 313 /*
 314  * Get the security label of an inode.
 315  */
 316 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
 317 {
 318         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
 319         return selinux_inode(inode);
 320 }
 321
 322 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
 323 {
 324         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 325
 326         return selinux_inode(inode);
 327 }
 328
 329 /*
 330  * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
 331  */
 332 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
 333 {
 334         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
 335
 336         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
 337         return selinux_inode(inode);
 338 }
 339
 340 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 341 {
 342         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
 343         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 344
 345         if (!isec)
 346                 return;
 347         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
 348         /*
 349          * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
 350          * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
 351          * time taking a lock doing nothing.
 352          *
 353          * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
 354          * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
 355          * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
 356          * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
 357          */
 358         if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
 359                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 360                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 361                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 362         }
 363 }
 364
 365 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
 366         u32 fscontext_sid;
 367         u32 context_sid;
 368         u32 rootcontext_sid;
 369         u32 defcontext_sid;
 370 };
 371
 372 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
 373 {
 374         kfree(mnt_opts);
 375 }
 376
 377 enum {
 378         Opt_error = -1,
 379         Opt_context = 0,
 380         Opt_defcontext = 1,
 381         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 382         Opt_rootcontext = 3,
 383         Opt_seclabel = 4,
 384 };
 385
 386 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
 387 static const struct {
 388         const char *name;
 389         int len;
 390         int opt;
 391         bool has_arg;
 392 } tokens[] = {
 393         A(context, true),
 394         A(fscontext, true),
 395         A(defcontext, true),
 396         A(rootcontext, true),
 397         A(seclabel, false),
 398 };
 399 #undef A
 400
 401 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
 402 {
 403         int i;
 404
 405         for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
 406                 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
 407                 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
 408                         continue;
 409                 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
 410                         if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
 411                                 continue;
 412                         *arg = s + len + 1;
 413                 } else if (len != l)
 414                         continue;
 415                 return tokens[i].opt;
 416         }
 417         return Opt_error;
 418 }
 419
 420 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 421
 422 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 423                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 424                         const struct cred *cred)
 425 {
 426         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 427         int rc;
 428
 429         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 430                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 431         if (rc)
 432                 return rc;
 433
 434         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 435                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 436         return rc;
 437 }
 438
 439 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 440                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 441                         const struct cred *cred)
 442 {
 443         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
 444         int rc;
 445         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 446                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 447         if (rc)
 448                 return rc;
 449
 450         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 451                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 452         return rc;
 453 }
 454
 455 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
 456 {
 457         /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
 458         return  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 459                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
 460                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 461                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 462                 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
 463                 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
 464                  (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 465                   !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
 466 }
 467
 468 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 469 {
 470         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 471
 472         /*
 473          * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
 474          * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
 475          */
 476         BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
 477
 478         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
 479         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
 480         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
 481         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
 482         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
 483                 return 1;
 484
 485         case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
 486                 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
 487
 488         /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
 489         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
 490         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
 491         default:
 492                 return 0;
 493         }
 494 }
 495
 496 static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
 497 {
 498         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 499         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 500         struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 501         u32 sid;
 502         int rc;
 503
 504         /*
 505          * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 506          * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 507          * the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 508          * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 509          * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
 510          */
 511         if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
 512                 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
 513                         sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 514                 goto fallback;
 515         }
 516
 517         rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 518         if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 519                 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 520                         pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 521                                 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 522                         goto fallback;
 523                 } else {
 524                         pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
 525                                 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 526                         return rc;
 527                 }
 528         }
 529         return 0;
 530
 531 fallback:
 532         /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
 533         rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
 534                                 SECCLASS_DIR, &sid);
 535         if (rc)
 536                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 537
 538         pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
 539                 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 540         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
 541         sbsec->sid = sid;
 542         return 0;
 543 }
 544
 545 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 546 {
 547         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 548         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 549         struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
 550         int rc = 0;
 551
 552         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 553                 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
 554                 if (rc)
 555                         return rc;
 556         }
 557
 558         sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
 559
 560         /*
 561          * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT.  It's not sufficient to simply
 562          * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
 563          * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
 564          */
 565         if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
 566                 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 567         else
 568                 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
 569
 570         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 571         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 572
 573         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 574            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 575            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 576            populates itself. */
 577         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 578         while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 579                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 580                                 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
 581                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 582                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 583                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 584                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 585                 inode = igrab(inode);
 586                 if (inode) {
 587                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 588                                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 589                         iput(inode);
 590                 }
 591                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 592         }
 593         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 594         return rc;
 595 }
 596
 597 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 598                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 599 {
 600         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 601
 602         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 603         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 604                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 605                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 606                         return 1;
 607
 608         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 609          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 610          */
 611         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 612                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 613                         return 1;
 614         return 0;
 615 }
 616
 617 /*
 618  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 619  * labeling information.
 620  */
 621 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 622                                 void *mnt_opts,
 623                                 unsigned long kern_flags,
 624                                 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 625 {
 626         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 627         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
 628         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 629         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
 630         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
 631         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 632         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 633         int rc = 0;
 634
 635         /*
 636          * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 637          * place the results is not allowed
 638          */
 639         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
 640                 return -EINVAL;
 641
 642         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 643
 644         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
 645                 if (!opts) {
 646                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 647                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 648                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 649                         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
 650                                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
 651                                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 652                         }
 653                         goto out;
 654                 }
 655                 rc = -EINVAL;
 656                 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 657                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 658                 goto out;
 659         }
 660
 661         /*
 662          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 663          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 664          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 665          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 666          *
 667          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 668          * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
 669          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 670          * will be used for both mounts)
 671          */
 672         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 673             && !opts)
 674                 goto out;
 675
 676         root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
 677
 678         /*
 679          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 680          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 681          * than once with different security options.
 682          */
 683         if (opts) {
 684                 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
 685                         fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
 686                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 687                                         fscontext_sid))
 688                                 goto out_double_mount;
 689                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 690                 }
 691                 if (opts->context_sid) {
 692                         context_sid = opts->context_sid;
 693                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 694                                         context_sid))
 695                                 goto out_double_mount;
 696                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 697                 }
 698                 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
 699                         rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
 700                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 701                                         rootcontext_sid))
 702                                 goto out_double_mount;
 703                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 704                 }
 705                 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
 706                         defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
 707                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 708                                         defcontext_sid))
 709                                 goto out_double_mount;
 710                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 711                 }
 712         }
 713
 714         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 715                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 716                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
 717                         goto out_double_mount;
 718                 rc = 0;
 719                 goto out;
 720         }
 721
 722         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 723                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
 724
 725         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 726             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 727             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
 728             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
 729             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
 730             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
 731                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
 732
 733         if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
 734             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 735             !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
 736                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
 737
 738         if (!sbsec->behavior) {
 739                 /*
 740                  * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 741                  * filesystem type.
 742                  */
 743                 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
 744                 if (rc) {
 745                         pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 746                                         __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 747                         goto out;
 748                 }
 749         }
 750
 751         /*
 752          * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
 753          * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
 754          * line and security labels must be ignored.
 755          */
 756         if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
 757             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
 758             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
 759             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
 760             strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
 761                 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
 762                     defcontext_sid) {
 763                         rc = -EACCES;
 764                         goto out;
 765                 }
 766                 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 767                         sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 768                         rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
 769                                                      current_sid(),
 770                                                      SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
 771                                                      &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
 772                         if (rc)
 773                                 goto out;
 774                 }
 775                 goto out_set_opts;
 776         }
 777
 778         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 779         if (fscontext_sid) {
 780                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 781                 if (rc)
 782                         goto out;
 783
 784                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 785         }
 786
 787         /*
 788          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 789          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 790          * the superblock context if not already set.
 791          */
 792         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
 793                 /*
 794                  * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
 795                  * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
 796                  * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
 797                  * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
 798                  * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
 799                  * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
 800                  */
 801                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 802         } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
 803                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 804                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 805         }
 806
 807         if (context_sid) {
 808                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 809                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 810                                                           cred);
 811                         if (rc)
 812                                 goto out;
 813                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 814                 } else {
 815                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 816                                                              cred);
 817                         if (rc)
 818                                 goto out;
 819                 }
 820                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 821                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 822
 823                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 824                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 825         }
 826
 827         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 828                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 829                                                      cred);
 830                 if (rc)
 831                         goto out;
 832
 833                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 834                 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 835         }
 836
 837         if (defcontext_sid) {
 838                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
 839                         sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
 840                         rc = -EINVAL;
 841                         pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
 842                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 843                         goto out;
 844                 }
 845
 846                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 847                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 848                                                              sbsec, cred);
 849                         if (rc)
 850                                 goto out;
 851                 }
 852
 853                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 854         }
 855
 856 out_set_opts:
 857         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 858 out:
 859         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 860         return rc;
 861 out_double_mount:
 862         rc = -EINVAL;
 863         pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 864                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
 865                sb->s_type->name);
 866         goto out;
 867 }
 868
 869 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 870                                     const struct super_block *newsb)
 871 {
 872         struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
 873         struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
 874         char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 875         char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 876
 877         if (oldflags != newflags)
 878                 goto mismatch;
 879         if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
 880                 goto mismatch;
 881         if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
 882                 goto mismatch;
 883         if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
 884                 goto mismatch;
 885         if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 886                 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
 887                 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 888                 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
 889                         goto mismatch;
 890         }
 891         return 0;
 892 mismatch:
 893         pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, "
 894                             "different security settings for (dev %s, "
 895                             "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
 896         return -EBUSY;
 897 }
 898
 899 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 900                                         struct super_block *newsb,
 901                                         unsigned long kern_flags,
 902                                         unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 903 {
 904         int rc = 0;
 905         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
 906                                                 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
 907         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
 908
 909         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 910         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 911         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 912
 913         /*
 914          * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
 915          * place the results is not allowed.
 916          */
 917         if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
 918                 return -EINVAL;
 919
 920         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 921
 922         /*
 923          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 924          * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 925          */
 926         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
 927                 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
 928                         newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
 929                         *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 930                 }
 931                 goto out;
 932         }
 933
 934         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 935         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 936
 937         /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
 938         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 939                 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 940                 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
 941                         *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 942                 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
 943         }
 944
 945         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 946
 947         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 948         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 949         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 950
 951         if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
 952                 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
 953                 rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
 954                 if (rc)
 955                         goto out;
 956         }
 957
 958         if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
 959                 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
 960                 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
 961         }
 962
 963         if (set_context) {
 964                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 965
 966                 if (!set_fscontext)
 967                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 968                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 969                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 970                         newisec->sid = sid;
 971                 }
 972                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 973         }
 974         if (set_rootcontext) {
 975                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
 976                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
 977
 978                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 979         }
 980
 981         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 982 out:
 983         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 984         return rc;
 985 }
 986
 987 /*
 988  * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
 989  */
 990 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
 991 {
 992         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
 993         u32 *dst_sid;
 994         int rc;
 995
 996         if (token == Opt_seclabel)
 997                 /* eaten and completely ignored */
 998                 return 0;
 999         if (!s)
1000                 return -EINVAL;
1001
1002         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
1003                 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
1004                 return -EINVAL;
1005         }
1006
1007         if (!opts) {
1008                 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1009                 if (!opts)
1010                         return -ENOMEM;
1011                 *mnt_opts = opts;
1012         }
1013
1014         switch (token) {
1015         case Opt_context:
1016                 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1017                         goto err;
1018                 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
1019                 break;
1020         case Opt_fscontext:
1021                 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
1022                         goto err;
1023                 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
1024                 break;
1025         case Opt_rootcontext:
1026                 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
1027                         goto err;
1028                 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
1029                 break;
1030         case Opt_defcontext:
1031                 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1032                         goto err;
1033                 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
1034                 break;
1035         default:
1036                 WARN_ON(1);
1037                 return -EINVAL;
1038         }
1039         rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1040         if (rc)
1041                 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1042                         s, rc);
1043         return rc;
1044
1045 err:
1046         pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1047         return -EINVAL;
1048 }
1049
1050 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1051 {
1052         char *context = NULL;
1053         u32 len;
1054         int rc;
1055
1056         rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
1057         if (!rc) {
1058                 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1059
1060                 seq_putc(m, '=');
1061                 if (has_comma)
1062                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1063                 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1064                 if (has_comma)
1065                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1066         }
1067         kfree(context);
1068         return rc;
1069 }
1070
1071 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1072 {
1073         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1074         int rc;
1075
1076         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1077                 return 0;
1078
1079         if (!selinux_initialized())
1080                 return 0;
1081
1082         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1083                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1084                 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1085                 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1086                 if (rc)
1087                         return rc;
1088         }
1089         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1090                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1091                 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1092                 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1093                 if (rc)
1094                         return rc;
1095         }
1096         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1097                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1098                 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1099                 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1100                 if (rc)
1101                         return rc;
1102         }
1103         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1104                 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1105                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1106                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1107                 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1108                 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1109                 if (rc)
1110                         return rc;
1111         }
1112         if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1113                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1114                 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1115         }
1116         return 0;
1117 }
1118
1119 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1120 {
1121         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1122         case S_IFSOCK:
1123                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1124         case S_IFLNK:
1125                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1126         case S_IFREG:
1127                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1128         case S_IFBLK:
1129                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1130         case S_IFDIR:
1131                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1132         case S_IFCHR:
1133                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1134         case S_IFIFO:
1135                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1136
1137         }
1138
1139         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1140 }
1141
1142 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1143 {
1144         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1145                 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1146 }
1147
1148 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1149 {
1150         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1151 }
1152
1153 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1154 {
1155         bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1156
1157         switch (family) {
1158         case PF_UNIX:
1159                 switch (type) {
1160                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1161                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1162                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1163                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1164                 case SOCK_RAW:
1165                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1166                 }
1167                 break;
1168         case PF_INET:
1169         case PF_INET6:
1170                 switch (type) {
1171                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1172                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1173                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1174                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1175                         else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1176                                 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1177                         else
1178                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1179                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1180                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1181                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1182                         else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1183                                                   protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1184                                 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1185                         else
1186                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1187                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1188                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1189                 default:
1190                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1191                 }
1192                 break;
1193         case PF_NETLINK:
1194                 switch (protocol) {
1195                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1196                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1197                 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1198                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1199                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1200                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1201                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1202                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1203                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1204                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1205                 case NETLINK_ISCSI:
1206                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1207                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1208                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1209                 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1210                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1211                 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1212                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1213                 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1214                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1215                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1216                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1217                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1218                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1219                 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1220                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1221                 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1222                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1223                 case NETLINK_RDMA:
1224                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1225                 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1226                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1227                 default:
1228                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1229                 }
1230         case PF_PACKET:
1231                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1232         case PF_KEY:
1233                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1234         case PF_APPLETALK:
1235                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1236         }
1237
1238         if (extsockclass) {
1239                 switch (family) {
1240                 case PF_AX25:
1241                         return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1242                 case PF_IPX:
1243                         return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1244                 case PF_NETROM:
1245                         return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1246                 case PF_ATMPVC:
1247                         return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1248                 case PF_X25:
1249                         return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1250                 case PF_ROSE:
1251                         return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1252                 case PF_DECnet:
1253                         return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1254                 case PF_ATMSVC:
1255                         return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1256                 case PF_RDS:
1257                         return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1258                 case PF_IRDA:
1259                         return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1260                 case PF_PPPOX:
1261                         return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1262                 case PF_LLC:
1263                         return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1264                 case PF_CAN:
1265                         return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1266                 case PF_TIPC:
1267                         return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1268                 case PF_BLUETOOTH:
1269                         return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1270                 case PF_IUCV:
1271                         return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1272                 case PF_RXRPC:
1273                         return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1274                 case PF_ISDN:
1275                         return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1276                 case PF_PHONET:
1277                         return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1278                 case PF_IEEE802154:
1279                         return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1280                 case PF_CAIF:
1281                         return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1282                 case PF_ALG:
1283                         return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1284                 case PF_NFC:
1285                         return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1286                 case PF_VSOCK:
1287                         return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1288                 case PF_KCM:
1289                         return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1290                 case PF_QIPCRTR:
1291                         return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1292                 case PF_SMC:
1293                         return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1294                 case PF_XDP:
1295                         return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1296                 case PF_MCTP:
1297                         return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1298 #if PF_MAX > 46
1299 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1300 #endif
1301                 }
1302         }
1303
1304         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1305 }
1306
1307 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1308                                  u16 tclass,
1309                                  u16 flags,
1310                                  u32 *sid)
1311 {
1312         int rc;
1313         struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1314         char *buffer, *path;
1315
1316         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1317         if (!buffer)
1318                 return -ENOMEM;
1319
1320         path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1321         if (IS_ERR(path))
1322                 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1323         else {
1324                 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1325                         /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1326                          * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1327                          * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1328                         while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1329                                 path[1] = '/';
1330                                 path++;
1331                         }
1332                 }
1333                 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
1334                                         path, tclass, sid);
1335                 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1336                         /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1337                         *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1338                         rc = 0;
1339                 }
1340         }
1341         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1342         return rc;
1343 }
1344
1345 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1346                                   u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1347 {
1348 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1349         char *context;
1350         unsigned int len;
1351         int rc;
1352
1353         len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1354         context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1355         if (!context)
1356                 return -ENOMEM;
1357
1358         context[len] = '\0';
1359         rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1360         if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1361                 kfree(context);
1362
1363                 /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1364                 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1365                 if (rc < 0)
1366                         return rc;
1367
1368                 len = rc;
1369                 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1370                 if (!context)
1371                         return -ENOMEM;
1372
1373                 context[len] = '\0';
1374                 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1375                                     context, len);
1376         }
1377         if (rc < 0) {
1378                 kfree(context);
1379                 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1380                         pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1381                                 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1382                         return rc;
1383                 }
1384                 *sid = def_sid;
1385                 return 0;
1386         }
1387
1388         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
1389                                              def_sid, GFP_NOFS);
1390         if (rc) {
1391                 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1392                 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1393
1394                 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1395                         pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1396                                               ino, dev, context);
1397                 } else {
1398                         pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1399                                 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1400                 }
1401         }
1402         kfree(context);
1403         return 0;
1404 }
1405
1406 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1407 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1408 {
1409         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1410         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1411         u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1412         u16 sclass;
1413         struct dentry *dentry;
1414         int rc = 0;
1415
1416         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1417                 return 0;
1418
1419         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1420         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1421                 goto out_unlock;
1422
1423         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1424                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1425
1426         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1427         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1428                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1429                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1430                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1431                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1432                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1433                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1434                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1435                 goto out_unlock;
1436         }
1437
1438         sclass = isec->sclass;
1439         task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1440         sid = isec->sid;
1441         isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1442         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1443
1444         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1445         /*
1446          * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
1447          * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
1448          */
1449         case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1450         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1451                 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1452                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1453                         break;
1454                 }
1455                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1456                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1457                 if (opt_dentry) {
1458                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1459                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1460                 } else {
1461                         /*
1462                          * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1463                          * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1464                          * that first.  We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1465                          * two, depending upon that...
1466                          */
1467                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1468                         if (!dentry)
1469                                 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1470                 }
1471                 if (!dentry) {
1472                         /*
1473                          * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1474                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1475                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1476                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
1477                          * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1478                          * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1479                          * be used again by userspace.
1480                          */
1481                         goto out_invalid;
1482                 }
1483
1484                 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1485                                             &sid);
1486                 dput(dentry);
1487                 if (rc)
1488                         goto out;
1489                 break;
1490         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1491                 sid = task_sid;
1492                 break;
1493         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1494                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1495                 sid = sbsec->sid;
1496
1497                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1498                 rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
1499                                              sclass, NULL, &sid);
1500                 if (rc)
1501                         goto out;
1502                 break;
1503         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1504                 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1505                 break;
1506         default:
1507                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1508                 sid = sbsec->sid;
1509
1510                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1511                      (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1512                       selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1513                         /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1514                          * procfs inodes */
1515                         if (opt_dentry) {
1516                                 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1517                                  * d_splice_alias. */
1518                                 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1519                         } else {
1520                                 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1521                                  * find a dentry.  Some filesystems really want
1522                                  * a connected one, so try that first.
1523                                  */
1524                                 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1525                                 if (!dentry)
1526                                         dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1527                         }
1528                         /*
1529                          * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1530                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1531                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1532                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as
1533                          * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1534                          * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1535                          * could be used again by userspace.
1536                          */
1537                         if (!dentry)
1538                                 goto out_invalid;
1539                         rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1540                                                    sbsec->flags, &sid);
1541                         if (rc) {
1542                                 dput(dentry);
1543                                 goto out;
1544                         }
1545
1546                         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1547                             (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1548                                 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1549                                                             sid, &sid);
1550                                 if (rc) {
1551                                         dput(dentry);
1552                                         goto out;
1553                                 }
1554                         }
1555                         dput(dentry);
1556                 }
1557                 break;
1558         }
1559
1560 out:
1561         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1562         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1563                 if (rc) {
1564                         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1565                         goto out_unlock;
1566                 }
1567                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1568                 isec->sid = sid;
1569         }
1570
1571 out_unlock:
1572         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1573         return rc;
1574
1575 out_invalid:
1576         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1577         if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1578                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1579                 isec->sid = sid;
1580         }
1581         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1582         return 0;
1583 }
1584
1585 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1586 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1587 {
1588         u32 perm = 0;
1589
1590         switch (sig) {
1591         case SIGCHLD:
1592                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1593                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1594                 break;
1595         case SIGKILL:
1596                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1597                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1598                 break;
1599         case SIGSTOP:
1600                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1601                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1602                 break;
1603         default:
1604                 /* All other signals. */
1605                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1606                 break;
1607         }
1608
1609         return perm;
1610 }
1611
1612 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1613 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1614 #endif
1615
1616 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1617 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1618                                int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1619 {
1620         struct common_audit_data ad;
1621         struct av_decision avd;
1622         u16 sclass;
1623         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1624         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1625         int rc;
1626
1627         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1628         ad.u.cap = cap;
1629
1630         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1631         case 0:
1632                 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1633                 break;
1634         case 1:
1635                 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1636                 break;
1637         default:
1638                 pr_err("SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1639                 BUG();
1640                 return -EINVAL;
1641         }
1642
1643         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1644         if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1645                 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1646                 if (rc2)
1647                         return rc2;
1648         }
1649         return rc;
1650 }
1651
1652 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1653    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1654    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1655 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1656                           struct inode *inode,
1657                           u32 perms,
1658                           struct common_audit_data *adp)
1659 {
1660         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1661         u32 sid;
1662
1663         validate_creds(cred);
1664
1665         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1666                 return 0;
1667
1668         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1669         isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1670
1671         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1672 }
1673
1674 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1675    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1676    pathname if needed. */
1677 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1678                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1679                                   u32 av)
1680 {
1681         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1682         struct common_audit_data ad;
1683
1684         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1685         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1686         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1687         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1688 }
1689
1690 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1691    the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1692    pathname if needed. */
1693 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1694                                 const struct path *path,
1695                                 u32 av)
1696 {
1697         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1698         struct common_audit_data ad;
1699
1700         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1701         ad.u.path = *path;
1702         __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1703         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1704 }
1705
1706 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1707 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1708                                      struct file *file,
1709                                      u32 av)
1710 {
1711         struct common_audit_data ad;
1712
1713         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1714         ad.u.file = file;
1715         return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1716 }
1717
1718 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1719 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
1720 #endif
1721
1722 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1723    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1724    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1725    check a particular permission to the file.
1726    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1727    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1728    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1729    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1730 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1731                          struct file *file,
1732                          u32 av)
1733 {
1734         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1735         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1736         struct common_audit_data ad;
1737         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1738         int rc;
1739
1740         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1741         ad.u.file = file;
1742
1743         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1744                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1745                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1746                                   FD__USE,
1747                                   &ad);
1748                 if (rc)
1749                         goto out;
1750         }
1751
1752 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1753         rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1754         if (rc)
1755                 return rc;
1756 #endif
1757
1758         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1759         rc = 0;
1760         if (av)
1761                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1762
1763 out:
1764         return rc;
1765 }
1766
1767 /*
1768  * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1769  */
1770 static int
1771 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1772                                  struct inode *dir,
1773                                  const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1774                                  u32 *_new_isid)
1775 {
1776         const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1777                                                 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1778
1779         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1780             (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1781                 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1782         } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1783                    tsec->create_sid) {
1784                 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1785         } else {
1786                 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1787                 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
1788                                                dsec->sid, tclass,
1789                                                name, _new_isid);
1790         }
1791
1792         return 0;
1793 }
1794
1795 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1796 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1797                       struct dentry *dentry,
1798                       u16 tclass)
1799 {
1800         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1801         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1802         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1803         u32 sid, newsid;
1804         struct common_audit_data ad;
1805         int rc;
1806
1807         dsec = inode_security(dir);
1808         sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1809
1810         sid = tsec->sid;
1811
1812         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1813         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1814
1815         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1816                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1817                           &ad);
1818         if (rc)
1819                 return rc;
1820
1821         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1822                                            &newsid);
1823         if (rc)
1824                 return rc;
1825
1826         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1827         if (rc)
1828                 return rc;
1829
1830         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1831                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1832                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1833 }
1834
1835 #define MAY_LINK        0
1836 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1837 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1838
1839 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1840 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1841                     struct dentry *dentry,
1842                     int kind)
1843
1844 {
1845         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1846         struct common_audit_data ad;
1847         u32 sid = current_sid();
1848         u32 av;
1849         int rc;
1850
1851         dsec = inode_security(dir);
1852         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1853
1854         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1855         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1856
1857         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1858         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1859         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1860         if (rc)
1861                 return rc;
1862
1863         switch (kind) {
1864         case MAY_LINK:
1865                 av = FILE__LINK;
1866                 break;
1867         case MAY_UNLINK:
1868                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1869                 break;
1870         case MAY_RMDIR:
1871                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1872                 break;
1873         default:
1874                 pr_warn("SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1875                         __func__, kind);
1876                 return 0;
1877         }
1878
1879         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1880         return rc;
1881 }
1882
1883 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1884                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1885                              struct inode *new_dir,
1886                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1887 {
1888         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1889         struct common_audit_data ad;
1890         u32 sid = current_sid();
1891         u32 av;
1892         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1893         int rc;
1894
1895         old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1896         old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1897         old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1898         new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1899
1900         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1901
1902         ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1903         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1904                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1905         if (rc)
1906                 return rc;
1907         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1908                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1909         if (rc)
1910                 return rc;
1911         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1912                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1913                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1914                 if (rc)
1915                         return rc;
1916         }
1917
1918         ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1919         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1920         if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1921                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1922         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1923         if (rc)
1924                 return rc;
1925         if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1926                 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1927                 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1928                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1929                                   new_isec->sclass,
1930                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1931                 if (rc)
1932                         return rc;
1933         }
1934
1935         return 0;
1936 }
1937
1938 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1939 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1940                                struct super_block *sb,
1941                                u32 perms,
1942                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
1943 {
1944         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1945         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1946
1947         sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1948         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1949 }
1950
1951 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1952 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1953 {
1954         u32 av = 0;
1955
1956         if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1957                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1958                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1959                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1960                         av |= FILE__READ;
1961
1962                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1963                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1964                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1965                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1966
1967         } else {
1968                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1969                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1970                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1971                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1972                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1973                         av |= DIR__READ;
1974         }
1975
1976         return av;
1977 }
1978
1979 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1980 static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
1981 {
1982         u32 av = 0;
1983
1984         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1985                 av |= FILE__READ;
1986         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1987                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1988                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1989                 else
1990                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1991         }
1992         if (!av) {
1993                 /*
1994                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1995                  */
1996                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1997         }
1998
1999         return av;
2000 }
2001
2002 /*
2003  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2004  * open permission.
2005  */
2006 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2007 {
2008         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2009         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2010
2011         if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2012             inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2013                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2014
2015         return av;
2016 }
2017
2018 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2019
2020 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
2021 {
2022         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2023                             BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2024 }
2025
2026 static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2027                                       const struct cred *to)
2028 {
2029         u32 mysid = current_sid();
2030         u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2031         u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2032         int rc;
2033
2034         if (mysid != fromsid) {
2035                 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2036                                   BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2037                 if (rc)
2038                         return rc;
2039         }
2040
2041         return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
2042                             SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2043 }
2044
2045 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2046                                           const struct cred *to)
2047 {
2048         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2049                             SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2050                             NULL);
2051 }
2052
2053 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2054                                         const struct cred *to,
2055                                         const struct file *file)
2056 {
2057         u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2058         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2059         struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2060         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2061         struct common_audit_data ad;
2062         int rc;
2063
2064         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2065         ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2066
2067         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2068                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2069                                   SECCLASS_FD,
2070                                   FD__USE,
2071                                   &ad);
2072                 if (rc)
2073                         return rc;
2074         }
2075
2076 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2077         rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2078         if (rc)
2079                 return rc;
2080 #endif
2081
2082         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2083                 return 0;
2084
2085         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2086         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2087                             &ad);
2088 }
2089
2090 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2091                                        unsigned int mode)
2092 {
2093         u32 sid = current_sid();
2094         u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2095
2096         if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2097                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
2098                                 NULL);
2099
2100         return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
2101                         NULL);
2102 }
2103
2104 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2105 {
2106         return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2107                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2108 }
2109
2110 static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2111                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2112 {
2113         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
2114                         SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2115 }
2116
2117 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2118                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2119                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2120                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2121 {
2122         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2123                             PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2124 }
2125
2126 /*
2127  * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2128  * which was removed).
2129  *
2130  * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2131  * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2132  * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
2133  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2134  */
2135
2136 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2137                            int cap, unsigned int opts)
2138 {
2139         return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2140 }
2141
2142 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2143 {
2144         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2145         int rc = 0;
2146
2147         if (!sb)
2148                 return 0;
2149
2150         switch (cmds) {
2151         case Q_SYNC:
2152         case Q_QUOTAON:
2153         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2154         case Q_SETINFO:
2155         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2156         case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
2157         case Q_XQUOTAON:
2158         case Q_XSETQLIM:
2159                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2160                 break;
2161         case Q_GETFMT:
2162         case Q_GETINFO:
2163         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2164         case Q_XGETQUOTA:
2165         case Q_XGETQSTAT:
2166         case Q_XGETQSTATV:
2167         case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2168                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2169                 break;
2170         default:
2171                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2172                 break;
2173         }
2174         return rc;
2175 }
2176
2177 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2178 {
2179         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2180
2181         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2182 }
2183
2184 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2185 {
2186         switch (type) {
2187         case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:    /* Read last kernel messages */
2188         case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2189                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2190                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2191         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2192         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:  /* Enable logging to console */
2193         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2194         case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2195                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2196                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2197                                     NULL);
2198         }
2199         /* All other syslog types */
2200         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2201                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2202 }
2203
2204 /*
2205  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2206  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2207  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2208  *
2209  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2210  * processes that allocate mappings.
2211  */
2212 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2213 {
2214         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2215
2216         rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2217                                  CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2218         if (rc == 0)
2219                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2220
2221         return cap_sys_admin;
2222 }
2223
2224 /* binprm security operations */
2225
2226 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2227 {
2228         u32 sid = 0;
2229         struct task_struct *tracer;
2230
2231         rcu_read_lock();
2232         tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2233         if (tracer)
2234                 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2235         rcu_read_unlock();
2236
2237         return sid;
2238 }
2239
2240 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2241                             const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2242                             const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2243 {
2244         int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2245         int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2246         int rc;
2247         u32 av;
2248
2249         if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2250                 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2251
2252         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2253                 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2254
2255         /*
2256          * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2257          * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2258          * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2259          * the old and new contexts.
2260          */
2261         if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2262                 av = 0;
2263                 if (nnp)
2264                         av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2265                 if (nosuid)
2266                         av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2267                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2268                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2269                 if (!rc)
2270                         return 0;
2271         }
2272
2273         /*
2274          * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2275          * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2276          * of the permissions of the current SID.
2277          */
2278         rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid,
2279                                          new_tsec->sid);
2280         if (!rc)
2281                 return 0;
2282
2283         /*
2284          * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2285          * NNP:  Operation not permitted for caller.
2286          * nosuid:  Permission denied to file.
2287          */
2288         if (nnp)
2289                 return -EPERM;
2290         return -EACCES;
2291 }
2292
2293 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2294 {
2295         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2296         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2297         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2298         struct common_audit_data ad;
2299         struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2300         int rc;
2301
2302         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2303          * the script interpreter */
2304
2305         old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2306         new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2307         isec = inode_security(inode);
2308
2309         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2310         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2311         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2312
2313         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2314         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2315         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2316         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2317
2318         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2319                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2320                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2321                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2322
2323                 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2324                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2325                 if (rc)
2326                         return rc;
2327         } else {
2328                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2329                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid,
2330                                              isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2331                                              &new_tsec->sid);
2332                 if (rc)
2333                         return rc;
2334
2335                 /*
2336                  * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2337                  * transition.
2338                  */
2339                 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2340                 if (rc)
2341                         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2342         }
2343
2344         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2345         ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2346
2347         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2348                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2349                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2350                 if (rc)
2351                         return rc;
2352         } else {
2353                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2354                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2355                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2356                 if (rc)
2357                         return rc;
2358
2359                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2360                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2361                 if (rc)
2362                         return rc;
2363
2364                 /* Check for shared state */
2365                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2366                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2367                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2368                                           NULL);
2369                         if (rc)
2370                                 return -EPERM;
2371                 }
2372
2373                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2374                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2375                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2376                         u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2377                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2378                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2379                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2380                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2381                                 if (rc)
2382                                         return -EPERM;
2383                         }
2384                 }
2385
2386                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2387                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2388
2389                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2390                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2391                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2392                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2393                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2394                                   NULL);
2395                 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2396         }
2397
2398         return 0;
2399 }
2400
2401 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2402 {
2403         return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2404 }
2405
2406 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2407 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2408                                             struct files_struct *files)
2409 {
2410         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2411         struct tty_struct *tty;
2412         int drop_tty = 0;
2413         unsigned n;
2414
2415         tty = get_current_tty();
2416         if (tty) {
2417                 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2418                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2419                         struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2420
2421                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2422                            Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2423                            rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2424                            open file may belong to another process and we are
2425                            only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2426                         file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2427                                                 struct tty_file_private, list);
2428                         file = file_priv->file;
2429                         if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2430                                 drop_tty = 1;
2431                 }
2432                 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2433                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2434         }
2435         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2436         if (drop_tty)
2437                 no_tty();
2438
2439         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2440         n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2441         if (!n) /* none found? */
2442                 return;
2443
2444         devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2445         if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2446                 devnull = NULL;
2447         /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2448         do {
2449                 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2450         } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2451         if (devnull)
2452                 fput(devnull);
2453 }
2454
2455 /*
2456  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2457  */
2458 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2459 {
2460         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2461         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2462         int rc, i;
2463
2464         new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2465         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2466                 return;
2467
2468         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2469         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2470
2471         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2472         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2473
2474         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2475          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2476          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2477          *
2478          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2479          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2480          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2481          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2482          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2483          */
2484         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2485                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2486         if (rc) {
2487                 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2488                 task_lock(current);
2489                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2490                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2491                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2492                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2493                 }
2494                 task_unlock(current);
2495                 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2496                         update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2497         }
2498 }
2499
2500 /*
2501  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2502  * due to exec
2503  */
2504 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2505 {
2506         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2507         u32 osid, sid;
2508         int rc;
2509
2510         osid = tsec->osid;
2511         sid = tsec->sid;
2512
2513         if (sid == osid)
2514                 return;
2515
2516         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2517          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2518          * flush and unblock signals.
2519          *
2520          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2521          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2522          */
2523         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2524         if (rc) {
2525                 clear_itimer();
2526
2527                 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2528                 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2529                         flush_sigqueue(&current->pending);
2530                         flush_sigqueue(&current->signal->shared_pending);
2531                         flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2532                         sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2533                         recalc_sigpending();
2534                 }
2535                 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2536         }
2537
2538         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2539          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2540         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2541         __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2542         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2543 }
2544
2545 /* superblock security operations */
2546
2547 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2548 {
2549         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2550
2551         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2552         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2553         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2554         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2555         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2556         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2557
2558         return 0;
2559 }
2560
2561 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2562 {
2563         bool open_quote = false;
2564         int len;
2565         char c;
2566
2567         for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2568                 if (c == '"')
2569                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2570                 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2571                         break;
2572         }
2573         return len;
2574 }
2575
2576 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2577 {
2578         char *from = options;
2579         char *to = options;
2580         bool first = true;
2581         int rc;
2582
2583         while (1) {
2584                 int len = opt_len(from);
2585                 int token;
2586                 char *arg = NULL;
2587
2588                 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2589
2590                 if (token != Opt_error) {
2591                         char *p, *q;
2592
2593                         /* strip quotes */
2594                         if (arg) {
2595                                 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2596                                         char c = *p;
2597                                         if (c != '"')
2598                                                 *q++ = c;
2599                                 }
2600                                 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2601                                 if (!arg) {
2602                                         rc = -ENOMEM;
2603                                         goto free_opt;
2604                                 }
2605                         }
2606                         rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2607                         kfree(arg);
2608                         arg = NULL;
2609                         if (unlikely(rc)) {
2610                                 goto free_opt;
2611                         }
2612                 } else {
2613                         if (!first) {   // copy with preceding comma
2614                                 from--;
2615                                 len++;
2616                         }
2617                         if (to != from)
2618                                 memmove(to, from, len);
2619                         to += len;
2620                         first = false;
2621                 }
2622                 if (!from[len])
2623                         break;
2624                 from += len + 1;
2625         }
2626         *to = '\0';
2627         return 0;
2628
2629 free_opt:
2630         if (*mnt_opts) {
2631                 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2632                 *mnt_opts = NULL;
2633         }
2634         return rc;
2635 }
2636
2637 static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2638 {
2639         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2640         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2641
2642         /*
2643          * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2644          * options specified, otherwise accept.
2645          */
2646         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2647                 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2648
2649         /*
2650          * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2651          * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2652          */
2653         if (!opts)
2654                 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2655
2656         if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2657                 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2658                                opts->fscontext_sid))
2659                         return 1;
2660         }
2661         if (opts->context_sid) {
2662                 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2663                                opts->context_sid))
2664                         return 1;
2665         }
2666         if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2667                 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2668
2669                 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2670                 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2671                                opts->rootcontext_sid))
2672                         return 1;
2673         }
2674         if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2675                 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2676                                opts->defcontext_sid))
2677                         return 1;
2678         }
2679         return 0;
2680 }
2681
2682 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2683 {
2684         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2685         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2686
2687         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2688                 return 0;
2689
2690         if (!opts)
2691                 return 0;
2692
2693         if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2694                 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2695                                opts->fscontext_sid))
2696                         goto out_bad_option;
2697         }
2698         if (opts->context_sid) {
2699                 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2700                                opts->context_sid))
2701                         goto out_bad_option;
2702         }
2703         if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2704                 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2705                 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2706                 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2707                                opts->rootcontext_sid))
2708                         goto out_bad_option;
2709         }
2710         if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2711                 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2712                                opts->defcontext_sid))
2713                         goto out_bad_option;
2714         }
2715         return 0;
2716
2717 out_bad_option:
2718         pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2719                "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2720                sb->s_type->name);
2721         return -EINVAL;
2722 }
2723
2724 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2725 {
2726         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2727         struct common_audit_data ad;
2728
2729         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2730         ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2731         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2732 }
2733
2734 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2735 {
2736         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2737         struct common_audit_data ad;
2738
2739         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2740         ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2741         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2742 }
2743
2744 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2745                          const struct path *path,
2746                          const char *type,
2747                          unsigned long flags,
2748                          void *data)
2749 {
2750         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2751
2752         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2753                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2754                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2755         else
2756                 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2757 }
2758
2759 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2760                               const struct path *to_path)
2761 {
2762         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2763
2764         return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2765 }
2766
2767 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2768 {
2769         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2770
2771         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2772                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2773 }
2774
2775 static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
2776                                    struct super_block *reference)
2777 {
2778         const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2779         struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2780
2781         opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2782         if (!opts)
2783                 return -ENOMEM;
2784
2785         sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
2786         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
2787                 opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
2788         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
2789                 opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2790         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
2791                 opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
2792         fc->security = opts;
2793         return 0;
2794 }
2795
2796 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2797                                   struct fs_context *src_fc)
2798 {
2799         const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2800
2801         if (!src)
2802                 return 0;
2803
2804         fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2805         return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2806 }
2807
2808 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2809         fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR,     Opt_context),
2810         fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR,  Opt_defcontext),
2811         fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR,   Opt_fscontext),
2812         fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2813         fsparam_flag  (SECLABEL_STR,    Opt_seclabel),
2814         {}
2815 };
2816
2817 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2818                                           struct fs_parameter *param)
2819 {
2820         struct fs_parse_result result;
2821         int opt;
2822
2823         opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2824         if (opt < 0)
2825                 return opt;
2826
2827         return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2828 }
2829
2830 /* inode security operations */
2831
2832 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2833 {
2834         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2835         u32 sid = current_sid();
2836
2837         spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2838         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2839         isec->inode = inode;
2840         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2841         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2842         isec->task_sid = sid;
2843         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2844
2845         return 0;
2846 }
2847
2848 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2849 {
2850         inode_free_security(inode);
2851 }
2852
2853 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2854                                         const struct qstr *name,
2855                                         const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2856                                         u32 *ctxlen)
2857 {
2858         u32 newsid;
2859         int rc;
2860
2861         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2862                                            d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2863                                            inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2864                                            &newsid);
2865         if (rc)
2866                 return rc;
2867
2868         if (xattr_name)
2869                 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2870
2871         return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx,
2872                                        ctxlen);
2873 }
2874
2875 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2876                                           struct qstr *name,
2877                                           const struct cred *old,
2878                                           struct cred *new)
2879 {
2880         u32 newsid;
2881         int rc;
2882         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2883
2884         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2885                                            d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2886                                            inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2887                                            &newsid);
2888         if (rc)
2889                 return rc;
2890
2891         tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2892         tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2893         return 0;
2894 }
2895
2896 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2897                                        const struct qstr *qstr,
2898                                        struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
2899 {
2900         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2901         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2902         struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
2903         u32 newsid, clen;
2904         int rc;
2905         char *context;
2906
2907         sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2908
2909         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2910
2911         rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2912                 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2913                 &newsid);
2914         if (rc)
2915                 return rc;
2916
2917         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2918         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2919                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2920                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2921                 isec->sid = newsid;
2922                 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2923         }
2924
2925         if (!selinux_initialized() ||
2926             !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2927                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2928
2929         if (xattr) {
2930                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
2931                                                    &context, &clen);
2932                 if (rc)
2933                         return rc;
2934                 xattr->value = context;
2935                 xattr->value_len = clen;
2936                 xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2937         }
2938
2939         return 0;
2940 }
2941
2942 static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2943                                             const struct qstr *name,
2944                                             const struct inode *context_inode)
2945 {
2946         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2947         struct common_audit_data ad;
2948         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2949         int rc;
2950
2951         if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
2952                 return 0;
2953
2954         isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2955
2956         /*
2957          * We only get here once per ephemeral inode.  The inode has
2958          * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2959          * untouched.
2960          */
2961
2962         if (context_inode) {
2963                 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2964                         selinux_inode(context_inode);
2965                 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2966                         pr_err("SELinux:  context_inode is not initialized\n");
2967                         return -EACCES;
2968                 }
2969
2970                 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2971                 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2972         } else {
2973                 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2974                 rc = security_transition_sid(
2975                         tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2976                         isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2977                 if (rc)
2978                         return rc;
2979         }
2980
2981         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2982         /*
2983          * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
2984          * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
2985          */
2986
2987         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
2988         ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
2989
2990         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid,
2991                             isec->sid,
2992                             isec->sclass,
2993                             FILE__CREATE,
2994                             &ad);
2995 }
2996
2997 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2998 {
2999         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3000 }
3001
3002 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3003 {
3004         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3005 }
3006
3007 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3008 {
3009         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3010 }
3011
3012 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3013 {
3014         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3015 }
3016
3017 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3018 {
3019         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3020 }
3021
3022 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3023 {
3024         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3025 }
3026
3027 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3028 {
3029         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3030 }
3031
3032 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3033                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3034 {
3035         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3036 }
3037
3038 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3039 {
3040         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3041
3042         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3043 }
3044
3045 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3046                                      bool rcu)
3047 {
3048         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3049         struct common_audit_data ad;
3050         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3051         u32 sid;
3052
3053         validate_creds(cred);
3054
3055         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3056         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3057         sid = cred_sid(cred);
3058         isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3059         if (IS_ERR(isec))
3060                 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3061
3062         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3063 }
3064
3065 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3066                                            u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3067                                            int result)
3068 {
3069         struct common_audit_data ad;
3070         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3071
3072         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3073         ad.u.inode = inode;
3074
3075         return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3076                             audited, denied, result, &ad);
3077 }
3078
3079 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3080 {
3081         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3082         u32 perms;
3083         bool from_access;
3084         bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3085         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3086         u32 sid;
3087         struct av_decision avd;
3088         int rc, rc2;
3089         u32 audited, denied;
3090
3091         from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3092         mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3093
3094         /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3095         if (!mask)
3096                 return 0;
3097
3098         validate_creds(cred);
3099
3100         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3101                 return 0;
3102
3103         perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3104
3105         sid = cred_sid(cred);
3106         isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3107         if (IS_ERR(isec))
3108                 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3109
3110         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3111                                   &avd);
3112         audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3113                                      from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3114                                      &denied);
3115         if (likely(!audited))
3116                 return rc;
3117
3118         rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3119         if (rc2)
3120                 return rc2;
3121         return rc;
3122 }
3123
3124 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3125 {
3126         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3127         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3128         unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3129         __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3130
3131         /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3132         if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3133                 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3134                               ATTR_FORCE);
3135                 if (!ia_valid)
3136                         return 0;
3137         }
3138
3139         if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3140                         ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3141                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3142
3143         if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3144             inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3145             (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3146             !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3147                 av |= FILE__OPEN;
3148
3149         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3150 }
3151
3152 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3153 {
3154         return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3155 }
3156
3157 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3158 {
3159         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3160         unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3161
3162         if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3163                 return false;
3164         if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3165                 return false;
3166         return true;
3167 }
3168
3169 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3170                                   struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3171                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3172 {
3173         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3174         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3175         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3176         struct common_audit_data ad;
3177         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3178         int rc = 0;
3179
3180         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3181                 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3182                 if (rc)
3183                         return rc;
3184
3185                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3186                    ordinary setattr permission. */
3187                 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3188         }
3189
3190         if (!selinux_initialized())
3191                 return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3192
3193         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3194         if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3195                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3196
3197         if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
3198                 return -EPERM;
3199
3200         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3201         ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3202
3203         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3204         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3205                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3206         if (rc)
3207                 return rc;
3208
3209         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3210                                      GFP_KERNEL);
3211         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3212                 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3213                         struct audit_buffer *ab;
3214                         size_t audit_size;
3215
3216                         /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3217                          * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3218                         if (value) {
3219                                 const char *str = value;
3220
3221                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3222                                         audit_size = size - 1;
3223                                 else
3224                                         audit_size = size;
3225                         } else {
3226                                 audit_size = 0;
3227                         }
3228                         ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3229                                              GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3230                         if (!ab)
3231                                 return rc;
3232                         audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3233                         audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3234                         audit_log_end(ab);
3235
3236                         return rc;
3237                 }
3238                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
3239                                                    size, &newsid);
3240         }
3241         if (rc)
3242                 return rc;
3243
3244         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3245                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3246         if (rc)
3247                 return rc;
3248
3249         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
3250                                           sid, isec->sclass);
3251         if (rc)
3252                 return rc;
3253
3254         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3255                             sbsec->sid,
3256                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3257                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3258                             &ad);
3259 }
3260
3261 static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3262                                  struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3263                                  struct posix_acl *kacl)
3264 {
3265         return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3266 }
3267
3268 static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3269                                  struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3270 {
3271         return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3272 }
3273
3274 static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3275                                     struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3276 {
3277         return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3278 }
3279
3280 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3281                                         const void *value, size_t size,
3282                                         int flags)
3283 {
3284         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3285         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3286         u32 newsid;
3287         int rc;
3288
3289         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3290                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3291                 return;
3292         }
3293
3294         if (!selinux_initialized()) {
3295                 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3296                  * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3297                  * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3298                  * we've since initialized.
3299                  */
3300                 return;
3301         }
3302
3303         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
3304                                            &newsid);
3305         if (rc) {
3306                 pr_err("SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
3307                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3308                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3309                 return;
3310         }
3311
3312         isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3313         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3314         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3315         isec->sid = newsid;
3316         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3317         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3318 }
3319
3320 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3321 {
3322         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3323
3324         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3325 }
3326
3327 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3328 {
3329         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3330
3331         return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3332 }
3333
3334 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3335                                      struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3336 {
3337         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3338                 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
3339                 if (rc)
3340                         return rc;
3341
3342                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3343                    ordinary setattr permission. */
3344                 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3345         }
3346
3347         if (!selinux_initialized())
3348                 return 0;
3349
3350         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3351            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3352         return -EACCES;
3353 }
3354
3355 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3356                                                 unsigned int obj_type)
3357 {
3358         int ret;
3359         u32 perm;
3360
3361         struct common_audit_data ad;
3362
3363         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3364         ad.u.path = *path;
3365
3366         /*
3367          * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3368          * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3369          */
3370         switch (obj_type) {
3371         case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3372                 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3373                 break;
3374         case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3375                 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3376                 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3377                                                 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3378                 if (ret)
3379                         return ret;
3380                 break;
3381         case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3382                 perm = FILE__WATCH;
3383                 break;
3384         default:
3385                 return -EINVAL;
3386         }
3387
3388         /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3389         if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3390                 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3391
3392         /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3393         if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3394                 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3395
3396         return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3397 }
3398
3399 /*
3400  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3401  *
3402  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3403  */
3404 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3405                                      struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3406                                      void **buffer, bool alloc)
3407 {
3408         u32 size;
3409         int error;
3410         char *context = NULL;
3411         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3412
3413         /*
3414          * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3415          * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3416          */
3417         if (!selinux_initialized() ||
3418             strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3419                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3420
3421         /*
3422          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3423          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3424          * use the in-core value under current policy.
3425          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3426          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3427          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3428          * in-core context value, not a denial.
3429          */
3430         isec = inode_security(inode);
3431         if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3432                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3433                                                       &size);
3434         else
3435                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
3436                                                 &context, &size);
3437         if (error)
3438                 return error;
3439         error = size;
3440         if (alloc) {
3441                 *buffer = context;
3442                 goto out_nofree;
3443         }
3444         kfree(context);
3445 out_nofree:
3446         return error;
3447 }
3448
3449 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3450                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3451 {
3452         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3453         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3454         u32 newsid;
3455         int rc;
3456
3457         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3458                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3459
3460         sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3461         if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3462                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3463
3464         if (!value || !size)
3465                 return -EACCES;
3466
3467         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3468                                      GFP_KERNEL);
3469         if (rc)
3470                 return rc;
3471
3472         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3473         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3474         isec->sid = newsid;
3475         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3476         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3477         return 0;
3478 }
3479
3480 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3481 {
3482         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3483
3484         if (!selinux_initialized())
3485                 return 0;
3486
3487         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3488                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3489         return len;
3490 }
3491
3492 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3493 {
3494         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3495         *secid = isec->sid;
3496 }
3497
3498 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3499 {
3500         u32 sid;
3501         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3502         struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3503
3504         if (new_creds == NULL) {
3505                 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3506                 if (!new_creds)
3507                         return -ENOMEM;
3508         }
3509
3510         tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3511         /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3512         selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3513         tsec->create_sid = sid;
3514         *new = new_creds;
3515         return 0;
3516 }
3517
3518 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3519 {
3520         /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3521          * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3522          * xattrs up.  Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3523          */
3524         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3525                 return 1; /* Discard */
3526         /*
3527          * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3528          * by selinux.
3529          */
3530         return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3531 }
3532
3533 /* kernfs node operations */
3534
3535 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3536                                         struct kernfs_node *kn)
3537 {
3538         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3539         u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3540         int rc;
3541         char *context;
3542
3543         rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3544         if (rc == -ENODATA)
3545                 return 0;
3546         else if (rc < 0)
3547                 return rc;
3548
3549         clen = (u32)rc;
3550         context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3551         if (!context)
3552                 return -ENOMEM;
3553
3554         rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3555         if (rc < 0) {
3556                 kfree(context);
3557                 return rc;
3558         }
3559
3560         rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
3561                                      GFP_KERNEL);
3562         kfree(context);
3563         if (rc)
3564                 return rc;
3565
3566         if (tsec->create_sid) {
3567                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3568         } else {
3569                 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3570                 struct qstr q;
3571
3572                 q.name = kn->name;
3573                 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3574
3575                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3576                                              parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3577                                              &newsid);
3578                 if (rc)
3579                         return rc;
3580         }
3581
3582         rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
3583                                            &context, &clen);
3584         if (rc)
3585                 return rc;
3586
3587         rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3588                               XATTR_CREATE);
3589         kfree(context);
3590         return rc;
3591 }
3592
3593
3594 /* file security operations */
3595
3596 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3597 {
3598         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3599         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3600
3601         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3602         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3603                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3604
3605         return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3606                              file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3607 }
3608
3609 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3610 {
3611         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3612         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3613         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3614         u32 sid = current_sid();
3615
3616         if (!mask)
3617                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3618                 return 0;
3619
3620         isec = inode_security(inode);
3621         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3622             fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3623                 /* No change since file_open check. */
3624                 return 0;
3625
3626         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3627 }
3628
3629 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3630 {
3631         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3632         u32 sid = current_sid();
3633
3634         fsec->sid = sid;
3635         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3636
3637         return 0;
3638 }
3639
3640 /*
3641  * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3642  * operation to an inode.
3643  */
3644 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3645                 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3646 {
3647         struct common_audit_data ad;
3648         struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3649         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3650         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3651         struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3652         u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3653         int rc;
3654         u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3655         u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3656
3657         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3658         ad.u.op = &ioctl;
3659         ad.u.op->cmd = cmd;
3660         ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3661
3662         if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3663                 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3664                                 SECCLASS_FD,
3665                                 FD__USE,
3666                                 &ad);
3667                 if (rc)
3668                         goto out;
3669         }
3670
3671         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3672                 return 0;
3673
3674         isec = inode_security(inode);
3675         rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3676                                     requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3677 out:
3678         return rc;
3679 }
3680
3681 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3682                               unsigned long arg)
3683 {
3684         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3685         int error = 0;
3686
3687         switch (cmd) {
3688         case FIONREAD:
3689         case FIBMAP:
3690         case FIGETBSZ:
3691         case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3692         case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3693                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3694                 break;
3695
3696         case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3697         case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3698                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3699                 break;
3700
3701         /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3702         case FIONBIO:
3703         case FIOASYNC:
3704                 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3705                 break;
3706
3707         case KDSKBENT:
3708         case KDSKBSENT:
3709                 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3710                                             CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3711                 break;
3712
3713         case FIOCLEX:
3714         case FIONCLEX:
3715                 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3716                         error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3717                 break;
3718
3719         /* default case assumes that the command will go
3720          * to the file's ioctl() function.
3721          */
3722         default:
3723                 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3724         }
3725         return error;
3726 }
3727
3728 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3729
3730 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3731 {
3732         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3733         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3734         int rc = 0;
3735
3736         if (default_noexec &&
3737             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3738                                    (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3739                 /*
3740                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3741                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3742                  * This has an additional check.
3743                  */
3744                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3745                                   PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3746                 if (rc)
3747                         goto error;
3748         }
3749
3750         if (file) {
3751                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3752                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3753
3754                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3755                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3756                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3757
3758                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3759                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3760
3761                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3762         }
3763
3764 error:
3765         return rc;
3766 }
3767
3768 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3769 {
3770         int rc = 0;
3771
3772         if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3773                 u32 sid = current_sid();
3774                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3775                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3776         }
3777
3778         return rc;
3779 }
3780
3781 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
3782                              unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3783                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3784 {
3785         struct common_audit_data ad;
3786         int rc;
3787
3788         if (file) {
3789                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3790                 ad.u.file = file;
3791                 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3792                                     FILE__MAP, &ad);
3793                 if (rc)
3794                         return rc;
3795         }
3796
3797         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3798                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3799 }
3800
3801 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3802                                  unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3803                                  unsigned long prot)
3804 {
3805         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3806         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3807
3808         if (default_noexec &&
3809             (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3810                 int rc = 0;
3811                 if (vma_is_initial_heap(vma)) {
3812                         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3813                                           PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3814                 } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
3815                             vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3816                         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3817                                           PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3818                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3819                         /*
3820                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3821                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3822                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3823                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3824                          * occur for text relocations.
3825                          */
3826                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3827                 }
3828                 if (rc)
3829                         return rc;
3830         }
3831
3832         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3833 }
3834
3835 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3836 {
3837         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3838
3839         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3840 }
3841
3842 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3843                               unsigned long arg)
3844 {
3845         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3846         int err = 0;
3847
3848         switch (cmd) {
3849         case F_SETFL:
3850                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3851                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3852                         break;
3853                 }
3854                 fallthrough;
3855         case F_SETOWN:
3856         case F_SETSIG:
3857         case F_GETFL:
3858         case F_GETOWN:
3859         case F_GETSIG:
3860         case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3861                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3862                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3863                 break;
3864         case F_GETLK:
3865         case F_SETLK:
3866         case F_SETLKW:
3867         case F_OFD_GETLK:
3868         case F_OFD_SETLK:
3869         case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3870 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3871         case F_GETLK64:
3872         case F_SETLK64:
3873         case F_SETLKW64:
3874 #endif
3875                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3876                 break;
3877         }
3878
3879         return err;
3880 }
3881
3882 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3883 {
3884         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3885
3886         fsec = selinux_file(file);
3887         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3888 }
3889
3890 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3891                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3892 {
3893         struct file *file;
3894         u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3895         u32 perm;
3896         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3897
3898         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3899         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3900
3901         fsec = selinux_file(file);
3902
3903         if (!signum)
3904                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3905         else
3906                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3907
3908         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3909                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3910 }
3911
3912 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3913 {
3914         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3915
3916         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3917 }
3918
3919 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3920 {
3921         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3922         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3923
3924         fsec = selinux_file(file);
3925         isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3926         /*
3927          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3928          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3929          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3930          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3931          * struct as its SID.
3932          */
3933         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3934         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3935         /*
3936          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3937          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3938          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3939          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3940          * new inode label or new policy.
3941          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3942          */
3943         return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3944 }
3945
3946 /* task security operations */
3947
3948 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3949                               unsigned long clone_flags)
3950 {
3951         u32 sid = current_sid();
3952
3953         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3954 }
3955
3956 /*
3957  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3958  */
3959 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3960                                 gfp_t gfp)
3961 {
3962         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3963         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3964
3965         *tsec = *old_tsec;
3966         return 0;
3967 }
3968
3969 /*
3970  * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3971  */
3972 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3973 {
3974         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3975         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3976
3977         *tsec = *old_tsec;
3978 }
3979
3980 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
3981 {
3982         *secid = cred_sid(c);
3983 }
3984
3985 /*
3986  * set the security data for a kernel service
3987  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3988  */
3989 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3990 {
3991         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3992         u32 sid = current_sid();
3993         int ret;
3994
3995         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3996                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3997                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3998                            NULL);
3999         if (ret == 0) {
4000                 tsec->sid = secid;
4001                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4002                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4003                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4004         }
4005         return ret;
4006 }
4007
4008 /*
4009  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4010  * objective context of the specified inode
4011  */
4012 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4013 {
4014         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4015         struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4016         u32 sid = current_sid();
4017         int ret;
4018
4019         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4020                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4021                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4022                            NULL);
4023
4024         if (ret == 0)
4025                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4026         return ret;
4027 }
4028
4029 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4030 {
4031         struct common_audit_data ad;
4032
4033         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4034         ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4035
4036         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4037                             SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4038 }
4039
4040 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4041 {
4042         struct common_audit_data ad;
4043         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4044         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4045         u32 sid = current_sid();
4046         int rc;
4047
4048         /* init_module */
4049         if (file == NULL)
4050                 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4051                                         SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4052
4053         /* finit_module */
4054
4055         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4056         ad.u.file = file;
4057
4058         fsec = selinux_file(file);
4059         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4060                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4061                 if (rc)
4062                         return rc;
4063         }
4064
4065         isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4066         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4067                                 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4068 }
4069
4070 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4071                                     enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4072                                     bool contents)
4073 {
4074         int rc = 0;
4075
4076         switch (id) {
4077         case READING_MODULE:
4078                 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4079                 break;
4080         default:
4081                 break;
4082         }
4083
4084         return rc;
4085 }
4086
4087 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4088 {
4089         int rc = 0;
4090
4091         switch (id) {
4092         case LOADING_MODULE:
4093                 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4094                 break;
4095         default:
4096                 break;
4097         }
4098
4099         return rc;
4100 }
4101
4102 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4103 {
4104         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4105                             PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4106 }
4107
4108 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4109 {
4110         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4111                             PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4112 }
4113
4114 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4115 {
4116         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4117                             PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4118 }
4119
4120 static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4121 {
4122         *secid = current_sid();
4123 }
4124
4125 static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4126 {
4127         *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4128 }
4129
4130 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4131 {
4132         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4133                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4134 }
4135
4136 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4137 {
4138         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4139                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4140 }
4141
4142 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4143 {
4144         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4145                             PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4146 }
4147
4148 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4149                                 unsigned int flags)
4150 {
4151         u32 av = 0;
4152
4153         if (!flags)
4154                 return 0;
4155         if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4156                 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4157         if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4158                 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4159         return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4160                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4161 }
4162
4163 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4164                 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4165 {
4166         struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4167
4168         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4169            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4170            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4171            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4172         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4173                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4174                                     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4175
4176         return 0;
4177 }
4178
4179 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4180 {
4181         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4182                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4183 }
4184
4185 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4186 {
4187         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4188                             PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4189 }
4190
4191 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4192 {
4193         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4194                             PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4195 }
4196
4197 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4198                                 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4199 {
4200         u32 secid;
4201         u32 perm;
4202
4203         if (!sig)
4204                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4205         else
4206                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4207         if (!cred)
4208                 secid = current_sid();
4209         else
4210                 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4211         return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4212 }
4213
4214 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4215                                   struct inode *inode)
4216 {
4217         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4218         u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4219
4220         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4221         isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4222         isec->sid = sid;
4223         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4224         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4225 }
4226
4227 static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4228 {
4229         u32 sid = current_sid();
4230
4231         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4232                         USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4233 }
4234
4235 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4236 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4237                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4238 {
4239         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4240         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4241
4242         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4243         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4244         if (ih == NULL)
4245                 goto out;
4246
4247         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4248         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4249                 goto out;
4250
4251         ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4252         ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4253         ret = 0;
4254
4255         if (proto)
4256                 *proto = ih->protocol;
4257
4258         switch (ih->protocol) {
4259         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4260                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4261
4262                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4263                         break;
4264
4265                 offset += ihlen;
4266                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4267                 if (th == NULL)
4268                         break;
4269
4270                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4271                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4272                 break;
4273         }
4274
4275         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4276                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4277
4278                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4279                         break;
4280
4281                 offset += ihlen;
4282                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4283                 if (uh == NULL)
4284                         break;
4285
4286                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4287                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4288                 break;
4289         }
4290
4291         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4292                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4293
4294                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4295                         break;
4296
4297                 offset += ihlen;
4298                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4299                 if (dh == NULL)
4300                         break;
4301
4302                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4303                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4304                 break;
4305         }
4306
4307 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4308         case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4309                 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4310
4311                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4312                         break;
4313
4314                 offset += ihlen;
4315                 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4316                 if (sh == NULL)
4317                         break;
4318
4319                 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4320                 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4321                 break;
4322         }
4323 #endif
4324         default:
4325                 break;
4326         }
4327 out:
4328         return ret;
4329 }
4330
4331 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4332
4333 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4334 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4335                         struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4336 {
4337         u8 nexthdr;
4338         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4339         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4340         __be16 frag_off;
4341
4342         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4343         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4344         if (ip6 == NULL)
4345                 goto out;
4346
4347         ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4348         ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4349         ret = 0;
4350
4351         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4352         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4353         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4354         if (offset < 0)
4355                 goto out;
4356
4357         if (proto)
4358                 *proto = nexthdr;
4359
4360         switch (nexthdr) {
4361         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
4362                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4363
4364                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4365                 if (th == NULL)
4366                         break;
4367
4368                 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4369                 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4370                 break;
4371         }
4372
4373         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
4374                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4375
4376                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4377                 if (uh == NULL)
4378                         break;
4379
4380                 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4381                 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4382                 break;
4383         }
4384
4385         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4386                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4387
4388                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4389                 if (dh == NULL)
4390                         break;
4391
4392                 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4393                 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4394                 break;
4395         }
4396
4397 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4398         case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4399                 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4400
4401                 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4402                 if (sh == NULL)
4403                         break;
4404
4405                 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4406                 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4407                 break;
4408         }
4409 #endif
4410         /* includes fragments */
4411         default:
4412                 break;
4413         }
4414 out:
4415         return ret;
4416 }
4417
4418 #endif /* IPV6 */
4419
4420 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4421                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4422 {
4423         char *addrp;
4424         int ret;
4425
4426         switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4427         case PF_INET:
4428                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4429                 if (ret)
4430                         goto parse_error;
4431                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4432                                        &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4433                 goto okay;
4434
4435 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4436         case PF_INET6:
4437                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4438                 if (ret)
4439                         goto parse_error;
4440                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4441                                        &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4442                 goto okay;
4443 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4444         default:
4445                 addrp = NULL;
4446                 goto okay;
4447         }
4448
4449 parse_error:
4450         pr_warn(
4451                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4452                " unable to parse packet\n");
4453         return ret;
4454
4455 okay:
4456         if (_addrp)
4457                 *_addrp = addrp;
4458         return 0;
4459 }
4460
4461 /**
4462  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4463  * @skb: the packet
4464  * @family: protocol family
4465  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4466  *
4467  * Description:
4468  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4469  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4470  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
4471  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4472  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4473  * peer labels.
4474  *
4475  */
4476 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4477 {
4478         int err;
4479         u32 xfrm_sid;
4480         u32 nlbl_sid;
4481         u32 nlbl_type;
4482
4483         err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4484         if (unlikely(err))
4485                 return -EACCES;
4486         err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4487         if (unlikely(err))
4488                 return -EACCES;
4489
4490         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
4491                                            nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4492         if (unlikely(err)) {
4493                 pr_warn(
4494                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4495                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4496                 return -EACCES;
4497         }
4498
4499         return 0;
4500 }
4501
4502 /**
4503  * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4504  * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4505  * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4506  * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4507  *
4508  * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4509  * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4510  * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4511  * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4512  *
4513  */
4514 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4515 {
4516         int err = 0;
4517
4518         if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4519                 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
4520                                             conn_sid);
4521         else
4522                 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
4523
4524         return err;
4525 }
4526
4527 /* socket security operations */
4528
4529 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4530                                  u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4531 {
4532         if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4533                 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4534                 return 0;
4535         }
4536
4537         return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4538                                        secclass, NULL, socksid);
4539 }
4540
4541 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4542 {
4543         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4544         struct common_audit_data ad;
4545         struct lsm_network_audit net;
4546
4547         if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4548                 return 0;
4549
4550         ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
4551
4552         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4553                             &ad);
4554 }
4555
4556 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4557                                  int protocol, int kern)
4558 {
4559         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4560         u32 newsid;
4561         u16 secclass;
4562         int rc;
4563
4564         if (kern)
4565                 return 0;
4566
4567         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4568         rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4569         if (rc)
4570                 return rc;
4571
4572         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4573 }
4574
4575 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4576                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
4577 {
4578         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4579         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4580         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4581         u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4582         u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4583         int err = 0;
4584
4585         if (!kern) {
4586                 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4587                 if (err)
4588                         return err;
4589         }
4590
4591         isec->sclass = sclass;
4592         isec->sid = sid;
4593         isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4594
4595         if (sock->sk) {
4596                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4597                 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4598                 sksec->sid = sid;
4599                 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4600                 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4601                         sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4602
4603                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4604         }
4605
4606         return err;
4607 }
4608
4609 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4610                                      struct socket *sockb)
4611 {
4612         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4613         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4614
4615         sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4616         sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4617
4618         return 0;
4619 }
4620
4621 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4622    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4623    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4624
4625 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4626 {
4627         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4628         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4629         u16 family;
4630         int err;
4631
4632         err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4633         if (err)
4634                 goto out;
4635
4636         /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4637         family = sk->sk_family;
4638         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4639                 char *addrp;
4640                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4641                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4642                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4643                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4644                 u16 family_sa;
4645                 unsigned short snum;
4646                 u32 sid, node_perm;
4647
4648                 /*
4649                  * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4650                  * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4651                  * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4652                  * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4653                  */
4654                 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4655                         return -EINVAL;
4656                 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4657                 switch (family_sa) {
4658                 case AF_UNSPEC:
4659                 case AF_INET:
4660                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4661                                 return -EINVAL;
4662                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4663                         if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4664                                 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4665                                  * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4666                                  */
4667                                 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4668                                         goto err_af;
4669                                 family_sa = AF_INET;
4670                         }
4671                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4672                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4673                         break;
4674                 case AF_INET6:
4675                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4676                                 return -EINVAL;
4677                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4678                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4679                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4680                         break;
4681                 default:
4682                         goto err_af;
4683                 }
4684
4685                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4686                 ad.u.net = &net;
4687                 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4688                 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4689
4690                 if (snum) {
4691                         int low, high;
4692
4693                         inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4694
4695                         if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4696                             snum < low || snum > high) {
4697                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4698                                                       snum, &sid);
4699                                 if (err)
4700                                         goto out;
4701                                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4702                                                    sksec->sclass,
4703                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4704                                 if (err)
4705                                         goto out;
4706                         }
4707                 }
4708
4709                 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4710                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4711                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4712                         break;
4713
4714                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4715                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4716                         break;
4717
4718                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4719                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4720                         break;
4721
4722                 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4723                         node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4724                         break;
4725
4726                 default:
4727                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4728                         break;
4729                 }
4730
4731                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4732                 if (err)
4733                         goto out;
4734
4735                 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4736                         ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4737                 else
4738                         ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4739
4740                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4741                                    sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4742                 if (err)
4743                         goto out;
4744         }
4745 out:
4746         return err;
4747 err_af:
4748         /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4749         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4750                 return -EINVAL;
4751         return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4752 }
4753
4754 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4755  * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4756  */
4757 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4758                                          struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4759 {
4760         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4761         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4762         int err;
4763
4764         err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4765         if (err)
4766                 return err;
4767         if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4768                 return -EINVAL;
4769
4770         /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4771          * way to disconnect the socket
4772          */
4773         if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4774                 return 0;
4775
4776         /*
4777          * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4778          * for the port.
4779          */
4780         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4781             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4782             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4783                 struct common_audit_data ad;
4784                 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4785                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4786                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4787                 unsigned short snum;
4788                 u32 sid, perm;
4789
4790                 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4791                  * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4792                  * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4793                  * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4794                  */
4795                 switch (address->sa_family) {
4796                 case AF_INET:
4797                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4798                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4799                                 return -EINVAL;
4800                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4801                         break;
4802                 case AF_INET6:
4803                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4804                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4805                                 return -EINVAL;
4806                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4807                         break;
4808                 default:
4809                         /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4810                          * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4811                          */
4812                         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4813                                 return -EINVAL;
4814                         else
4815                                 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4816                 }
4817
4818                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4819                 if (err)
4820                         return err;
4821
4822                 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4823                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4824                         perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4825                         break;
4826                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4827                         perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4828                         break;
4829                 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4830                         perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4831                         break;
4832                 }
4833
4834                 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4835                 ad.u.net = &net;
4836                 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4837                 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4838                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4839                 if (err)
4840                         return err;
4841         }
4842
4843         return 0;
4844 }
4845
4846 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4847 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4848                                   struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4849 {
4850         int err;
4851         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4852
4853         err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4854         if (err)
4855                 return err;
4856
4857         return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4858 }
4859
4860 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4861 {
4862         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4863 }
4864
4865 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4866 {
4867         int err;
4868         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4869         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4870         u16 sclass;
4871         u32 sid;
4872
4873         err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4874         if (err)
4875                 return err;
4876
4877         isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4878         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4879         sclass = isec->sclass;
4880         sid = isec->sid;
4881         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4882
4883         newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4884         newisec->sclass = sclass;
4885         newisec->sid = sid;
4886         newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4887
4888         return 0;
4889 }
4890
4891 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4892                                   int size)
4893 {
4894         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4895 }
4896
4897 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4898                                   int size, int flags)
4899 {
4900         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4901 }
4902
4903 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4904 {
4905         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4906 }
4907
4908 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4909 {
4910         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4911 }
4912
4913 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4914 {
4915         int err;
4916
4917         err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4918         if (err)
4919                 return err;
4920
4921         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4922 }
4923
4924 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4925                                      int optname)
4926 {
4927         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4928 }
4929
4930 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4931 {
4932         return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4933 }
4934
4935 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4936                                               struct sock *other,
4937                                               struct sock *newsk)
4938 {
4939         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4940         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4941         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4942         struct common_audit_data ad;
4943         struct lsm_network_audit net;
4944         int err;
4945
4946         ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
4947
4948         err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4949                            sksec_other->sclass,
4950                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4951         if (err)
4952                 return err;
4953
4954         /* server child socket */
4955         sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4956         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
4957                                     sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4958         if (err)
4959                 return err;
4960
4961         /* connecting socket */
4962         sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4963
4964         return 0;
4965 }
4966
4967 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4968                                         struct socket *other)
4969 {
4970         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4971         struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4972         struct common_audit_data ad;
4973         struct lsm_network_audit net;
4974
4975         ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
4976
4977         return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4978                             &ad);
4979 }
4980
4981 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4982                                     char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4983                                     struct common_audit_data *ad)
4984 {
4985         int err;
4986         u32 if_sid;
4987         u32 node_sid;
4988
4989         err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4990         if (err)
4991                 return err;
4992         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4993                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4994         if (err)
4995                 return err;
4996
4997         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4998         if (err)
4999                 return err;
5000         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5001                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5002 }
5003
5004 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5005                                        u16 family)
5006 {
5007         int err = 0;
5008         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5009         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5010         struct common_audit_data ad;
5011         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5012         char *addrp;
5013
5014         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5015         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5016         if (err)
5017                 return err;
5018
5019         if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5020                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5021                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5022                 if (err)
5023                         return err;
5024         }
5025
5026         err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5027         if (err)
5028                 return err;
5029         err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5030
5031         return err;
5032 }
5033
5034 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5035 {
5036         int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
5037         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5038         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5039         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5040         struct common_audit_data ad;
5041         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5042         char *addrp;
5043
5044         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5045                 return 0;
5046
5047         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5048         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5049                 family = PF_INET;
5050
5051         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5052          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5053          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5054          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5055         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5056                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5057
5058         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5059         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5060         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5061                 return 0;
5062
5063         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5064         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5065         if (err)
5066                 return err;
5067
5068         if (peerlbl_active) {
5069                 u32 peer_sid;
5070
5071                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5072                 if (err)
5073                         return err;
5074                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5075                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5076                 if (err) {
5077                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5078                         return err;
5079                 }
5080                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5081                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
5082                 if (err) {
5083                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5084                         return err;
5085                 }
5086         }
5087
5088         if (secmark_active) {
5089                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5090                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
5091                 if (err)
5092                         return err;
5093         }
5094
5095         return err;
5096 }
5097
5098 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5099                                             sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5100                                             unsigned int len)
5101 {
5102         int err = 0;
5103         char *scontext = NULL;
5104         u32 scontext_len;
5105         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5106         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5107
5108         if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5109             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5110             sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5111                 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5112         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5113                 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5114
5115         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
5116                                       &scontext_len);
5117         if (err)
5118                 return err;
5119         if (scontext_len > len) {
5120                 err = -ERANGE;
5121                 goto out_len;
5122         }
5123
5124         if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5125                 err = -EFAULT;
5126 out_len:
5127         if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5128                 err = -EFAULT;
5129         kfree(scontext);
5130         return err;
5131 }
5132
5133 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5134 {
5135         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5136         u16 family;
5137         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5138
5139         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5140                 family = PF_INET;
5141         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5142                 family = PF_INET6;
5143         else if (sock)
5144                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5145         else
5146                 goto out;
5147
5148         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5149                 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5150                 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5151         } else if (skb)
5152                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5153
5154 out:
5155         *secid = peer_secid;
5156         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5157                 return -EINVAL;
5158         return 0;
5159 }
5160
5161 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5162 {
5163         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5164
5165         sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5166         if (!sksec)
5167                 return -ENOMEM;
5168
5169         sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5170         sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5171         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5172         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5173         sk->sk_security = sksec;
5174
5175         return 0;
5176 }
5177
5178 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5179 {
5180         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5181
5182         sk->sk_security = NULL;
5183         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5184         kfree(sksec);
5185 }
5186
5187 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5188 {
5189         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5190         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5191
5192         newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5193         newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5194         newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5195
5196         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5197 }
5198
5199 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5200 {
5201         if (!sk)
5202                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5203         else {
5204                 const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5205
5206                 *secid = sksec->sid;
5207         }
5208 }
5209
5210 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5211 {
5212         struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5213                 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5214         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5215
5216         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5217             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5218                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5219         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5220 }
5221
5222 /*
5223  * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5224  * if it's the first association on the socket.
5225  */
5226 static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5227                                           struct sk_buff *skb)
5228 {
5229         struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5230         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5231         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5232         struct common_audit_data ad;
5233         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5234         int err;
5235
5236         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5237         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5238                 family = PF_INET;
5239
5240         if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5241                 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5242
5243                 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5244                  * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5245                  */
5246                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5247                 if (err)
5248                         return err;
5249
5250                 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5251                         asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5252         } else {
5253                 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5254         }
5255
5256         if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5257                 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5258
5259                 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5260                  * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5261                  * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5262                  * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5263                  */
5264                 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5265         } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5266                 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5267                  * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5268                  */
5269                 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
5270                 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5271                                    sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5272                                    &ad);
5273                 if (err)
5274                         return err;
5275         }
5276         return 0;
5277 }
5278
5279 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5280  * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5281  * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5282  */
5283 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5284                                       struct sk_buff *skb)
5285 {
5286         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5287         u32 conn_sid;
5288         int err;
5289
5290         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5291                 return 0;
5292
5293         err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5294         if (err)
5295                 return err;
5296
5297         /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5298          * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5299          * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5300          * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5301          * plug this into the new socket.
5302          */
5303         err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5304         if (err)
5305                 return err;
5306
5307         asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5308
5309         /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5310         return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5311 }
5312
5313 /* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5314  * response to an association request (initited by us).
5315  */
5316 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5317                                           struct sk_buff *skb)
5318 {
5319         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5320
5321         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5322                 return 0;
5323
5324         /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5325          * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5326          * into a new socket.
5327          */
5328         asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5329
5330         return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5331 }
5332
5333 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5334  * based on their @optname.
5335  */
5336 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5337                                      struct sockaddr *address,
5338                                      int addrlen)
5339 {
5340         int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5341         void *addr_buf;
5342         struct sockaddr *addr;
5343         struct socket *sock;
5344
5345         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5346                 return 0;
5347
5348         /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5349         sock = sk->sk_socket;
5350         addr_buf = address;
5351
5352         while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5353                 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5354                         return -EINVAL;
5355
5356                 addr = addr_buf;
5357                 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5358                 case AF_UNSPEC:
5359                 case AF_INET:
5360                         len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5361                         break;
5362                 case AF_INET6:
5363                         len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5364                         break;
5365                 default:
5366                         return -EINVAL;
5367                 }
5368
5369                 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5370                         return -EINVAL;
5371
5372                 err = -EINVAL;
5373                 switch (optname) {
5374                 /* Bind checks */
5375                 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5376                 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5377                 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5378                         err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5379                         break;
5380                 /* Connect checks */
5381                 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5382                 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5383                 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5384                 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5385                         err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5386                         if (err)
5387                                 return err;
5388
5389                         /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5390                          * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5391                          * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5392                          * is called here. The situations handled are:
5393                          * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5394                          * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5395                          * primary address is selected.
5396                          * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5397                          * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5398                          * selinux_socket_connect().
5399                          */
5400                         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5401                         break;
5402                 }
5403
5404                 if (err)
5405                         return err;
5406
5407                 addr_buf += len;
5408                 walk_size += len;
5409         }
5410
5411         return 0;
5412 }
5413
5414 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5415 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5416                                   struct sock *newsk)
5417 {
5418         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5419         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5420
5421         /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5422          * the non-sctp clone version.
5423          */
5424         if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5425                 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5426
5427         newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5428         newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5429         newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5430         selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5431 }
5432
5433 static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
5434 {
5435         struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security;
5436         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5437
5438         ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5439         ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5440
5441         /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
5442          * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
5443          */
5444         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
5445         return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
5446 }
5447
5448 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5449                                      struct request_sock *req)
5450 {
5451         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5452         int err;
5453         u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5454         u32 connsid;
5455         u32 peersid;
5456
5457         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5458         if (err)
5459                 return err;
5460         err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5461         if (err)
5462                 return err;
5463         req->secid = connsid;
5464         req->peer_secid = peersid;
5465
5466         return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5467 }
5468
5469 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5470                                    const struct request_sock *req)
5471 {
5472         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5473
5474         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5475         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5476         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5477            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5478            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5479            time it will have been created and available. */
5480
5481         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5482          * thread with access to newsksec */
5483         selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5484 }
5485
5486 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5487 {
5488         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5489         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5490
5491         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5492         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5493                 family = PF_INET;
5494
5495         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5496 }
5497
5498 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5499 {
5500         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5501         u32 tsid;
5502
5503         tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5504         tsid = tsec->sid;
5505
5506         return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5507                             NULL);
5508 }
5509
5510 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5511 {
5512         atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5513 }
5514
5515 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5516 {
5517         atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5518 }
5519
5520 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5521                                       struct flowi_common *flic)
5522 {
5523         flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5524 }
5525
5526 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5527 {
5528         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5529
5530         tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5531         if (!tunsec)
5532                 return -ENOMEM;
5533         tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5534
5535         *security = tunsec;
5536         return 0;
5537 }
5538
5539 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5540 {
5541         kfree(security);
5542 }
5543
5544 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5545 {
5546         u32 sid = current_sid();
5547
5548         /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5549          * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5550          * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5551          * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5552          * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5553          * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5554
5555         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5556                             NULL);
5557 }
5558
5559 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5560 {
5561         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5562
5563         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5564                             TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5565 }
5566
5567 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5568 {
5569         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5570         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5571
5572         /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5573          * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5574          * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5575          * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5576          * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5577          * protocols were being used */
5578
5579         sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5580         sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5581
5582         return 0;
5583 }
5584
5585 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5586 {
5587         struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5588         u32 sid = current_sid();
5589         int err;
5590
5591         err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5592                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5593         if (err)
5594                 return err;
5595         err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5596                            TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5597         if (err)
5598                 return err;
5599         tunsec->sid = sid;
5600
5601         return 0;
5602 }
5603
5604 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5605
5606 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5607                                        const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5608 {
5609         int ifindex;
5610         u16 family;
5611         char *addrp;
5612         u32 peer_sid;
5613         struct common_audit_data ad;
5614         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5615         int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5616
5617         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5618                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5619
5620         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5621         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5622         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5623                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5624
5625         family = state->pf;
5626         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5627                 return NF_DROP;
5628
5629         ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5630         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5631         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5632                 return NF_DROP;
5633
5634         if (peerlbl_active) {
5635                 int err;
5636
5637                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5638                                                addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5639                 if (err) {
5640                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5641                         return NF_DROP;
5642                 }
5643         }
5644
5645         if (secmark_active)
5646                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5647                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5648                         return NF_DROP;
5649
5650         if (netlbl_enabled())
5651                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5652                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5653                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5654                  * protection */
5655                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5656                         return NF_DROP;
5657
5658         return NF_ACCEPT;
5659 }
5660
5661 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5662                                       const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5663 {
5664         struct sock *sk;
5665         u32 sid;
5666
5667         if (!netlbl_enabled())
5668                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5669
5670         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5671          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5672          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5673         sk = skb->sk;
5674         if (sk) {
5675                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5676
5677                 if (sk_listener(sk))
5678                         /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5679                          * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5680                          * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5681                          * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
5682                          * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5683                          * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5684                          * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5685                          * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5686                          * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5687                          * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5688                          * security label in the packet itself this is the
5689                          * best we can do. */
5690                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5691
5692                 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5693                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5694                 sid = sksec->sid;
5695         } else
5696                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5697         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5698                 return NF_DROP;
5699
5700         return NF_ACCEPT;
5701 }
5702
5703
5704 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5705                                         const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5706 {
5707         struct sock *sk;
5708         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5709         struct common_audit_data ad;
5710         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5711         u8 proto = 0;
5712
5713         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5714         if (sk == NULL)
5715                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5716         sksec = sk->sk_security;
5717
5718         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
5719         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5720                 return NF_DROP;
5721
5722         if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5723                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5724                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5725                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5726
5727         if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5728                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5729
5730         return NF_ACCEPT;
5731 }
5732
5733 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5734                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
5735                                          const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5736 {
5737         u16 family;
5738         u32 secmark_perm;
5739         u32 peer_sid;
5740         int ifindex;
5741         struct sock *sk;
5742         struct common_audit_data ad;
5743         struct lsm_network_audit net;
5744         char *addrp;
5745         int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5746
5747         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5748          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5749          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5750          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5751         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5752                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5753
5754         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5755         peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5756         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5757                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5758
5759         sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5760
5761 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
5762         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5763          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5764          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5765          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5766          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5767          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5768          * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5769          *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5770          *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5771          *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5772          *       connection. */
5773         if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5774             !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5775                 return NF_ACCEPT;
5776 #endif
5777
5778         family = state->pf;
5779         if (sk == NULL) {
5780                 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5781                  * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5782                  * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5783                  * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5784                 if (skb->skb_iif) {
5785                         secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5786                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5787                                 return NF_DROP;
5788                 } else {
5789                         secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5790                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5791                 }
5792         } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5793                 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5794                  * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
5795                  * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5796                  * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5797                  * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5798                  * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5799                  * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5800                  * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
5801                  * for similar problems. */
5802                 u32 skb_sid;
5803                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5804
5805                 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5806                 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5807                         return NF_DROP;
5808                 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5809                  * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5810                  * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5811                  * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5812                  * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5813                  * pass the packet. */
5814                 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5815                         switch (family) {
5816                         case PF_INET:
5817                                 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5818                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5819                                 break;
5820                         case PF_INET6:
5821                                 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5822                                         return NF_ACCEPT;
5823                                 break;
5824                         default:
5825                                 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5826                         }
5827                 }
5828                 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5829                         return NF_DROP;
5830                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5831         } else {
5832                 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5833                  * associated socket. */
5834                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5835                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5836                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5837         }
5838
5839         ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5840         ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5841         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5842                 return NF_DROP;
5843
5844         if (secmark_active)
5845                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5846                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5847                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5848
5849         if (peerlbl_active) {
5850                 u32 if_sid;
5851                 u32 node_sid;
5852
5853                 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5854                         return NF_DROP;
5855                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5856                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5857                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5858
5859                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5860                         return NF_DROP;
5861                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5862                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5863                         return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5864         }
5865
5866         return NF_ACCEPT;
5867 }
5868 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5869
5870 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5871 {
5872         int rc = 0;
5873         unsigned int msg_len;
5874         unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5875         unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5876         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5877         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5878         u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5879         u32 perm;
5880
5881         while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5882                 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5883
5884                 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5885                  *       users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5886                  *       length fields; our solution is to follow what
5887                  *       netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5888                  *       messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5889                  */
5890                 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5891                         return 0;
5892
5893                 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5894                 if (rc == 0) {
5895                         rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5896                         if (rc)
5897                                 return rc;
5898                 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5899                         /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5900                         pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5901                                 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5902                                 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5903                                 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5904                                 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5905                                 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5906                         if (enforcing_enabled() &&
5907                             !security_get_allow_unknown())
5908                                 return rc;
5909                         rc = 0;
5910                 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5911                         /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5912                         rc = 0;
5913                 } else {
5914                         return rc;
5915                 }
5916
5917                 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5918                 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5919                 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5920                         return 0;
5921                 data_len -= msg_len;
5922                 data += msg_len;
5923         }
5924
5925         return rc;
5926 }
5927
5928 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5929 {
5930         isec->sclass = sclass;
5931         isec->sid = current_sid();
5932 }
5933
5934 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5935                         u32 perms)
5936 {
5937         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5938         struct common_audit_data ad;
5939         u32 sid = current_sid();
5940
5941         isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5942
5943         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5944         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5945
5946         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5947 }
5948
5949 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5950 {
5951         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5952
5953         msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5954         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5955
5956         return 0;
5957 }
5958
5959 /* message queue security operations */
5960 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5961 {
5962         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5963         struct common_audit_data ad;
5964         u32 sid = current_sid();
5965
5966         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5967         ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5968
5969         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5970         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5971
5972         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5973                             MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5974 }
5975
5976 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
5977 {
5978         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5979         struct common_audit_data ad;
5980         u32 sid = current_sid();
5981
5982         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
5983
5984         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5985         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
5986
5987         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5988                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5989 }
5990
5991 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
5992 {
5993         u32 perms;
5994
5995         switch (cmd) {
5996         case IPC_INFO:
5997         case MSG_INFO:
5998                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5999                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6000                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6001         case IPC_STAT:
6002         case MSG_STAT:
6003         case MSG_STAT_ANY:
6004                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6005                 break;
6006         case IPC_SET:
6007                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6008                 break;
6009         case IPC_RMID:
6010                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6011                 break;
6012         default:
6013                 return 0;
6014         }
6015
6016         return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6017 }
6018
6019 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6020 {
6021         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6022         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6023         struct common_audit_data ad;
6024         u32 sid = current_sid();
6025         int rc;
6026
6027         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6028         msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6029
6030         /*
6031          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6032          */
6033         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6034                 /*
6035                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
6036                  * message queue this message will be stored in
6037                  */
6038                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
6039                                              SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6040                 if (rc)
6041                         return rc;
6042         }
6043
6044         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6045         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6046
6047         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6048         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6049                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
6050         if (!rc)
6051                 /* Can this process send the message */
6052                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6053                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
6054         if (!rc)
6055                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6056                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6057                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6058
6059         return rc;
6060 }
6061
6062 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6063                                     struct task_struct *target,
6064                                     long type, int mode)
6065 {
6066         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6067         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6068         struct common_audit_data ad;
6069         u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6070         int rc;
6071
6072         isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6073         msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6074
6075         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6076         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6077
6078         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
6079                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6080         if (!rc)
6081                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
6082                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6083         return rc;
6084 }
6085
6086 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6087 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6088 {
6089         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6090         struct common_audit_data ad;
6091         u32 sid = current_sid();
6092
6093         isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6094         ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6095
6096         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6097         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6098
6099         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6100                             SHM__CREATE, &ad);
6101 }
6102
6103 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6104 {
6105         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6106         struct common_audit_data ad;
6107         u32 sid = current_sid();
6108
6109         isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6110
6111         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6112         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6113
6114         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6115                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6116 }
6117
6118 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6119 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6120 {
6121         u32 perms;
6122
6123         switch (cmd) {
6124         case IPC_INFO:
6125         case SHM_INFO:
6126                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6127                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6128                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6129         case IPC_STAT:
6130         case SHM_STAT:
6131         case SHM_STAT_ANY:
6132                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6133                 break;
6134         case IPC_SET:
6135                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6136                 break;
6137         case SHM_LOCK:
6138         case SHM_UNLOCK:
6139                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
6140                 break;
6141         case IPC_RMID:
6142                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6143                 break;
6144         default:
6145                 return 0;
6146         }
6147
6148         return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6149 }
6150
6151 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6152                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6153 {
6154         u32 perms;
6155
6156         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6157                 perms = SHM__READ;
6158         else
6159                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6160
6161         return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6162 }
6163
6164 /* Semaphore security operations */
6165 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6166 {
6167         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6168         struct common_audit_data ad;
6169         u32 sid = current_sid();
6170
6171         isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6172         ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6173
6174         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6175         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6176
6177         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6178                             SEM__CREATE, &ad);
6179 }
6180
6181 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6182 {
6183         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6184         struct common_audit_data ad;
6185         u32 sid = current_sid();
6186
6187         isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6188
6189         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6190         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6191
6192         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6193                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6194 }
6195
6196 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6197 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6198 {
6199         int err;
6200         u32 perms;
6201
6202         switch (cmd) {
6203         case IPC_INFO:
6204         case SEM_INFO:
6205                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6206                 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6207                                     SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6208         case GETPID:
6209         case GETNCNT:
6210         case GETZCNT:
6211                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6212                 break;
6213         case GETVAL:
6214         case GETALL:
6215                 perms = SEM__READ;
6216                 break;
6217         case SETVAL:
6218         case SETALL:
6219                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
6220                 break;
6221         case IPC_RMID:
6222                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6223                 break;
6224         case IPC_SET:
6225                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6226                 break;
6227         case IPC_STAT:
6228         case SEM_STAT:
6229         case SEM_STAT_ANY:
6230                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6231                 break;
6232         default:
6233                 return 0;
6234         }
6235
6236         err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6237         return err;
6238 }
6239
6240 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6241                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6242 {
6243         u32 perms;
6244
6245         if (alter)
6246                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6247         else
6248                 perms = SEM__READ;
6249
6250         return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6251 }
6252
6253 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6254 {
6255         u32 av = 0;
6256
6257         av = 0;
6258         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
6259                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6260         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
6261                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6262
6263         if (av == 0)
6264                 return 0;
6265
6266         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6267 }
6268
6269 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6270 {
6271         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6272         *secid = isec->sid;
6273 }
6274
6275 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6276 {
6277         if (inode)
6278                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6279 }
6280
6281 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6282                                const char *name, char **value)
6283 {
6284         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6285         u32 sid;
6286         int error;
6287         unsigned len;
6288
6289         rcu_read_lock();
6290         __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6291
6292         if (current != p) {
6293                 error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6294                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6295                 if (error)
6296                         goto bad;
6297         }
6298
6299         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6300                 sid = __tsec->sid;
6301         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6302                 sid = __tsec->osid;
6303         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6304                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6305         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6306                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6307         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6308                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6309         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6310                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6311         else {
6312                 error = -EINVAL;
6313                 goto bad;
6314         }
6315         rcu_read_unlock();
6316
6317         if (!sid)
6318                 return 0;
6319
6320         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
6321         if (error)
6322                 return error;
6323         return len;
6324
6325 bad:
6326         rcu_read_unlock();
6327         return error;
6328 }
6329
6330 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6331 {
6332         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6333         struct cred *new;
6334         u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6335         int error;
6336         char *str = value;
6337
6338         /*
6339          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6340          */
6341         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6342                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6343                                      PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6344         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6345                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6346                                      PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6347         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6348                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6349                                      PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6350         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6351                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6352                                      PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6353         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6354                 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6355                                      PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6356         else
6357                 error = -EINVAL;
6358         if (error)
6359                 return error;
6360
6361         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6362         if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6363                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6364                         str[size-1] = 0;
6365                         size--;
6366                 }
6367                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
6368                                                 &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
6369                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6370                         if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6371                                 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6372                                 size_t audit_size;
6373
6374                                 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6375                                  * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6376                                 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6377                                         audit_size = size - 1;
6378                                 else
6379                                         audit_size = size;
6380                                 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6381                                                      GFP_ATOMIC,
6382                                                      AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
6383                                 if (!ab)
6384                                         return error;
6385                                 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6386                                 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6387                                 audit_log_end(ab);
6388
6389                                 return error;
6390                         }
6391                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
6392                                                         &sid);
6393                 }
6394                 if (error)
6395                         return error;
6396         }
6397
6398         new = prepare_creds();
6399         if (!new)
6400                 return -ENOMEM;
6401
6402         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6403            performed during the actual operation (execve,
6404            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6405            operation.  See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6406            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6407            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6408         tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6409         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6410                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6411         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6412                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6413         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6414                 if (sid) {
6415                         error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
6416                                              SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6417                         if (error)
6418                                 goto abort_change;
6419                 }
6420                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6421         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6422                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6423         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6424                 error = -EINVAL;
6425                 if (sid == 0)
6426                         goto abort_change;
6427
6428                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6429                 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6430                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
6431                         if (error)
6432                                 goto abort_change;
6433                 }
6434
6435                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6436                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6437                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6438                 if (error)
6439                         goto abort_change;
6440
6441                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6442                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6443                 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6444                 if (ptsid != 0) {
6445                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6446                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6447                         if (error)
6448                                 goto abort_change;
6449                 }
6450
6451                 tsec->sid = sid;
6452         } else {
6453                 error = -EINVAL;
6454                 goto abort_change;
6455         }
6456
6457         commit_creds(new);
6458         return size;
6459
6460 abort_change:
6461         abort_creds(new);
6462         return error;
6463 }
6464
6465 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6466 {
6467         return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6468 }
6469
6470 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6471 {
6472         return security_sid_to_context(secid,
6473                                        secdata, seclen);
6474 }
6475
6476 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6477 {
6478         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
6479                                        secid, GFP_KERNEL);
6480 }
6481
6482 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6483 {
6484         kfree(secdata);
6485 }
6486
6487 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6488 {
6489         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6490
6491         spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6492         isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6493         spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6494 }
6495
6496 /*
6497  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
6498  */
6499 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6500 {
6501         int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6502                                            ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6503         /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6504         return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6505 }
6506
6507 /*
6508  *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
6509  */
6510 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6511 {
6512         return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6513                                      ctx, ctxlen, 0);
6514 }
6515
6516 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6517 {
6518         int len = 0;
6519         len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
6520                                         XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6521         if (len < 0)
6522                 return len;
6523         *ctxlen = len;
6524         return 0;
6525 }
6526 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6527
6528 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6529                              unsigned long flags)
6530 {
6531         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6532         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6533
6534         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6535         if (!ksec)
6536                 return -ENOMEM;
6537
6538         tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6539         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6540                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6541         else
6542                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6543
6544         k->security = ksec;
6545         return 0;
6546 }
6547
6548 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6549 {
6550         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6551
6552         k->security = NULL;
6553         kfree(ksec);
6554 }
6555
6556 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6557                                   const struct cred *cred,
6558                                   enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6559 {
6560         struct key *key;
6561         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6562         u32 perm, sid;
6563
6564         switch (need_perm) {
6565         case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
6566                 perm = KEY__VIEW;
6567                 break;
6568         case KEY_NEED_READ:
6569                 perm = KEY__READ;
6570                 break;
6571         case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6572                 perm = KEY__WRITE;
6573                 break;
6574         case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6575                 perm = KEY__SEARCH;
6576                 break;
6577         case KEY_NEED_LINK:
6578                 perm = KEY__LINK;
6579                 break;
6580         case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6581                 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6582                 break;
6583         case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6584         case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6585         case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6586         case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6587                 return 0;
6588         default:
6589                 WARN_ON(1);
6590                 return -EPERM;
6591
6592         }
6593
6594         sid = cred_sid(cred);
6595         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6596         ksec = key->security;
6597
6598         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6599 }
6600
6601 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6602 {
6603         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6604         char *context = NULL;
6605         unsigned len;
6606         int rc;
6607
6608         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
6609                                      &context, &len);
6610         if (!rc)
6611                 rc = len;
6612         *_buffer = context;
6613         return rc;
6614 }
6615
6616 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6617 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6618 {
6619         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6620         u32 sid = current_sid();
6621
6622         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6623 }
6624 #endif
6625 #endif
6626
6627 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6628 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6629 {
6630         struct common_audit_data ad;
6631         int err;
6632         u32 sid = 0;
6633         struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6634         struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6635
6636         err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6637         if (err)
6638                 return err;
6639
6640         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6641         ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6642         ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6643         ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6644         return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6645                             SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6646                             INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6647 }
6648
6649 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6650                                             u8 port_num)
6651 {
6652         struct common_audit_data ad;
6653         int err;
6654         u32 sid = 0;
6655         struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6656         struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6657
6658         err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
6659                                       &sid);
6660
6661         if (err)
6662                 return err;
6663
6664         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6665         ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6666         ibendport.port = port_num;
6667         ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6668         return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6669                             SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6670                             INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6671 }
6672
6673 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6674 {
6675         struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6676
6677         sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6678         if (!sec)
6679                 return -ENOMEM;
6680         sec->sid = current_sid();
6681
6682         *ib_sec = sec;
6683         return 0;
6684 }
6685
6686 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6687 {
6688         kfree(ib_sec);
6689 }
6690 #endif
6691
6692 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6693 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6694                                      unsigned int size)
6695 {
6696         u32 sid = current_sid();
6697         int ret;
6698
6699         switch (cmd) {
6700         case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6701                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6702                                    NULL);
6703                 break;
6704         case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
6705                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6706                                    NULL);
6707                 break;
6708         default:
6709                 ret = 0;
6710                 break;
6711         }
6712
6713         return ret;
6714 }
6715
6716 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6717 {
6718         u32 av = 0;
6719
6720         if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6721                 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6722         if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6723                 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6724         return av;
6725 }
6726
6727 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6728  * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6729  * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6730  * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6731  * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6732  * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6733  * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6734  */
6735 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
6736 {
6737         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6738         struct bpf_prog *prog;
6739         struct bpf_map *map;
6740         int ret;
6741
6742         if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6743                 map = file->private_data;
6744                 bpfsec = map->security;
6745                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6746                                    bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6747                 if (ret)
6748                         return ret;
6749         } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6750                 prog = file->private_data;
6751                 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6752                 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6753                                    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6754                 if (ret)
6755                         return ret;
6756         }
6757         return 0;
6758 }
6759
6760 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6761 {
6762         u32 sid = current_sid();
6763         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6764
6765         bpfsec = map->security;
6766         return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6767                             bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6768 }
6769
6770 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6771 {
6772         u32 sid = current_sid();
6773         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6774
6775         bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6776         return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6777                             BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6778 }
6779
6780 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6781 {
6782         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6783
6784         bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6785         if (!bpfsec)
6786                 return -ENOMEM;
6787
6788         bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6789         map->security = bpfsec;
6790
6791         return 0;
6792 }
6793
6794 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6795 {
6796         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6797
6798         map->security = NULL;
6799         kfree(bpfsec);
6800 }
6801
6802 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6803 {
6804         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6805
6806         bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6807         if (!bpfsec)
6808                 return -ENOMEM;
6809
6810         bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6811         aux->security = bpfsec;
6812
6813         return 0;
6814 }
6815
6816 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6817 {
6818         struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6819
6820         aux->security = NULL;
6821         kfree(bpfsec);
6822 }
6823 #endif
6824
6825 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
6826         .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6827         .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6828         .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6829         .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6830         .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6831         .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6832         .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
6833 };
6834
6835 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6836 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6837 {
6838         u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6839
6840         if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6841                 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6842         else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6843                 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6844         else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6845                 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6846         else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6847                 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6848         else
6849                 return -EINVAL;
6850
6851         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6852                             requested, NULL);
6853 }
6854
6855 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6856 {
6857         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6858
6859         perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6860         if (!perfsec)
6861                 return -ENOMEM;
6862
6863         perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6864         event->security = perfsec;
6865
6866         return 0;
6867 }
6868
6869 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6870 {
6871         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6872
6873         event->security = NULL;
6874         kfree(perfsec);
6875 }
6876
6877 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6878 {
6879         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6880         u32 sid = current_sid();
6881
6882         return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
6883                             SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6884 }
6885
6886 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6887 {
6888         struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6889         u32 sid = current_sid();
6890
6891         return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
6892                             SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6893 }
6894 #endif
6895
6896 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
6897 /**
6898  * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
6899  * @new: the target creds
6900  *
6901  * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
6902  * to service an io_uring operation.
6903  */
6904 static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
6905 {
6906         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
6907                             SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
6908 }
6909
6910 /**
6911  * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
6912  *
6913  * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
6914  * kernel polling thread.
6915  */
6916 static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
6917 {
6918         u32 sid = current_sid();
6919
6920         return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
6921                             SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
6922 }
6923
6924 /**
6925  * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
6926  * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
6927  *
6928  * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
6929  * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
6930  *
6931  */
6932 static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
6933 {
6934         struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
6935         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
6936         struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6937         struct common_audit_data ad;
6938
6939         ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
6940         ad.u.file = file;
6941
6942         return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
6943                             SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
6944 }
6945 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
6946
6947 /*
6948  * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6949  * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6950  * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6951  *    structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6952  *    hooks),
6953  * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6954  *    hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6955  *
6956  * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6957  */
6958 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
6959         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6960         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6961         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6962         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6963
6964         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6965         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
6966         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
6967         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
6968         LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
6969         LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
6970         LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
6971         LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
6972         LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
6973
6974         LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
6975
6976         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
6977         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
6978         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
6979
6980         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
6981         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
6982         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
6983         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
6984         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
6985         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
6986         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
6987         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
6988         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
6989         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
6990
6991         LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
6992
6993         LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
6994         LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
6995
6996         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
6997         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
6998         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
6999         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7000         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7001         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7002         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7003         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7004         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7005         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7006         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7007         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7008         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7009         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7010         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7011         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7012         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7013         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7014         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7015         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7016         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7017         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7018         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7019         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7020         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7021         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7022         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7023         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7024         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7025         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7026         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7027
7028         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7029
7030         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7031         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7032         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7033         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7034         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7035         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7036         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7037         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7038         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7039         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7040         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7041
7042         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7043
7044         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7045         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7046         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7047         LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7048         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7049         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7050         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7051         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7052         LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7053         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7054         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7055         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7056         LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7057         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7058         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7059         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7060         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7061         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7062         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7063         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7064         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7065         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7066         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7067         LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7068         LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7069
7070         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7071         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7072
7073         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7074         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7075         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7076         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7077
7078         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7079         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7080         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7081
7082         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7083         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7084         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7085
7086         LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7087
7088         LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7089         LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7090
7091         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7092         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7093         LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7094         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7095         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7096         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7097
7098         LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7099         LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7100
7101         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7102         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7103         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7104         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7105         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7106         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7107         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7108         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7109         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7110         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7111         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7112         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7113         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7114         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7115         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7116         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7117                         selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7118         LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7119         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7120         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7121         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7122         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7123         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7124         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7125         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7126         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7127         LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
7128         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7129         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7130         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7131         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7132         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7133         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7134         LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7135         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7136         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7137         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7138         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7139         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7140 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7141         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7142         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7143                       selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7144         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7145 #endif
7146 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7147         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7148         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7149         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7150         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7151         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7152         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7153                         selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7154         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7155 #endif
7156
7157 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7158         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7159         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7160         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7161 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7162         LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7163 #endif
7164 #endif
7165
7166 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7167         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7168         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7169         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7170 #endif
7171
7172 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7173         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7174         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7175         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7176         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7177         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7178 #endif
7179
7180 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7181         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7182         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7183         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7184         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7185 #endif
7186
7187 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7188         LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7189         LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7190         LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7191 #endif
7192
7193         /*
7194          * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7195          */
7196         LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
7197         LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7198         LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7199         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7200 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7201         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7202 #endif
7203
7204         /*
7205          * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7206          */
7207         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7208         LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7209                       selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7210         LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7211         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7212         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7213         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7214         LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7215         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7216         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7217         LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7218 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7219         LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7220 #endif
7221 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7222         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7223         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7224         LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7225                       selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7226 #endif
7227 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
7228         LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7229 #endif
7230 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
7231         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7232 #endif
7233 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7234         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7235         LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7236 #endif
7237 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7238         LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7239 #endif
7240 };
7241
7242 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7243 {
7244         pr_info("SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
7245
7246         memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7247         enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
7248         selinux_avc_init();
7249         mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7250         mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7251
7252         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7253         cred_init_security();
7254
7255         default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7256         if (!default_noexec)
7257                 pr_notice("SELinux:  virtual memory is executable by default\n");
7258
7259         avc_init();
7260
7261         avtab_cache_init();
7262
7263         ebitmap_cache_init();
7264
7265         hashtab_cache_init();
7266
7267         security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7268
7269         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7270                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7271
7272         if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7273                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7274
7275         if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7276                 pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7277         else
7278                 pr_debug("SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
7279
7280         fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7281
7282         return 0;
7283 }
7284
7285 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7286 {
7287         selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7288 }
7289
7290 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7291 {
7292         pr_debug("SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
7293
7294         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7295         pr_debug("SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7296         iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7297 }
7298
7299 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7300    all processes and objects when they are created. */
7301 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7302         .name = "selinux",
7303         .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7304         .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7305         .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7306         .init = selinux_init,
7307 };
7308
7309 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7310 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7311         {
7312                 .hook =         selinux_ip_postroute,
7313                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
7314                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7315                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7316         },
7317         {
7318                 .hook =         selinux_ip_forward,
7319                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
7320                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
7321                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7322         },
7323         {
7324                 .hook =         selinux_ip_output,
7325                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV4,
7326                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7327                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7328         },
7329 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7330         {
7331                 .hook =         selinux_ip_postroute,
7332                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
7333                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7334                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7335         },
7336         {
7337                 .hook =         selinux_ip_forward,
7338                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
7339                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
7340                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7341         },
7342         {
7343                 .hook =         selinux_ip_output,
7344                 .pf =           NFPROTO_IPV6,
7345                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7346                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7347         },
7348 #endif  /* IPV6 */
7349 };
7350
7351 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7352 {
7353         return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7354                                      ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7355 }
7356
7357 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7358 {
7359         nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7360                                 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7361 }
7362
7363 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7364         .init = selinux_nf_register,
7365         .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7366 };
7367
7368 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7369 {
7370         int err;
7371
7372         if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7373                 return 0;
7374
7375         pr_debug("SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7376
7377         err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7378         if (err)
7379                 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7380
7381         return 0;
7382 }
7383 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7384 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */