1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
3 # General architecture dependent options
17 tristate "OProfile system profiling"
19 depends on HAVE_OPROFILE
21 select RING_BUFFER_ALLOW_SWAP
23 OProfile is a profiling system capable of profiling the
24 whole system, include the kernel, kernel modules, libraries,
29 config OPROFILE_EVENT_MULTIPLEX
30 bool "OProfile multiplexing support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
32 depends on OPROFILE && X86
34 The number of hardware counters is limited. The multiplexing
35 feature enables OProfile to gather more events than counters
36 are provided by the hardware. This is realized by switching
37 between events at a user specified time interval.
44 config OPROFILE_NMI_TIMER
46 depends on PERF_EVENTS && HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI && !PPC64
51 depends on HAVE_KPROBES
54 Kprobes allows you to trap at almost any kernel address and
55 execute a callback function. register_kprobe() establishes
56 a probepoint and specifies the callback. Kprobes is useful
57 for kernel debugging, non-intrusive instrumentation and testing.
61 bool "Optimize very unlikely/likely branches"
62 depends on HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
64 This option enables a transparent branch optimization that
65 makes certain almost-always-true or almost-always-false branch
66 conditions even cheaper to execute within the kernel.
68 Certain performance-sensitive kernel code, such as trace points,
69 scheduler functionality, networking code and KVM have such
70 branches and include support for this optimization technique.
72 If it is detected that the compiler has support for "asm goto",
73 the kernel will compile such branches with just a nop
74 instruction. When the condition flag is toggled to true, the
75 nop will be converted to a jump instruction to execute the
76 conditional block of instructions.
78 This technique lowers overhead and stress on the branch prediction
79 of the processor and generally makes the kernel faster. The update
80 of the condition is slower, but those are always very rare.
82 ( On 32-bit x86, the necessary options added to the compiler
83 flags may increase the size of the kernel slightly. )
85 config STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST
86 bool "Static key selftest"
89 Boot time self-test of the branch patching code.
93 depends on KPROBES && HAVE_OPTPROBES
94 select TASKS_RCU if PREEMPT
96 config KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
98 depends on KPROBES && HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
99 depends on DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS
101 If function tracer is enabled and the arch supports full
102 passing of pt_regs to function tracing, then kprobes can
103 optimize on top of function tracing.
107 depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES
109 Uprobes is the user-space counterpart to kprobes: they
110 enable instrumentation applications (such as 'perf probe')
111 to establish unintrusive probes in user-space binaries and
112 libraries, by executing handler functions when the probes
113 are hit by user-space applications.
115 ( These probes come in the form of single-byte breakpoints,
116 managed by the kernel and kept transparent to the probed
119 config HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS
120 def_bool 64BIT && !HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
122 Some architectures require 64 bit accesses to be 64 bit
123 aligned, which also requires structs containing 64 bit values
124 to be 64 bit aligned too. This includes some 32 bit
125 architectures which can do 64 bit accesses, as well as 64 bit
126 architectures without unaligned access.
128 This symbol should be selected by an architecture if 64 bit
129 accesses are required to be 64 bit aligned in this way even
130 though it is not a 64 bit architecture.
132 See Documentation/unaligned-memory-access.txt for more
133 information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses.
135 config HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
138 Some architectures are unable to perform unaligned accesses
139 without the use of get_unaligned/put_unaligned. Others are
140 unable to perform such accesses efficiently (e.g. trap on
141 unaligned access and require fixing it up in the exception
144 This symbol should be selected by an architecture if it can
145 perform unaligned accesses efficiently to allow different
146 code paths to be selected for these cases. Some network
147 drivers, for example, could opt to not fix up alignment
148 problems with received packets if doing so would not help
151 See Documentation/unaligned-memory-access.txt for more
152 information on the topic of unaligned memory accesses.
154 config ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
157 Modern versions of GCC (since 4.4) have builtin functions
158 for handling byte-swapping. Using these, instead of the old
159 inline assembler that the architecture code provides in the
160 __arch_bswapXX() macros, allows the compiler to see what's
161 happening and offers more opportunity for optimisation. In
162 particular, the compiler will be able to combine the byteswap
163 with a nearby load or store and use load-and-swap or
164 store-and-swap instructions if the architecture has them. It
165 should almost *never* result in code which is worse than the
166 hand-coded assembler in <asm/swab.h>. But just in case it
167 does, the use of the builtins is optional.
169 Any architecture with load-and-swap or store-and-swap
170 instructions should set this. And it shouldn't hurt to set it
171 on architectures that don't have such instructions.
175 depends on KPROBES && HAVE_KRETPROBES
177 config USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
179 depends on HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
181 Provide a kernel-internal notification when a cpu is about to
184 config HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT
190 config HAVE_KRETPROBES
193 config HAVE_OPTPROBES
196 config HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
199 config HAVE_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION
206 # An arch should select this if it provides all these things:
208 # task_pt_regs() in asm/processor.h or asm/ptrace.h
209 # arch_has_single_step() if there is hardware single-step support
210 # arch_has_block_step() if there is hardware block-step support
211 # asm/syscall.h supplying asm-generic/syscall.h interface
212 # linux/regset.h user_regset interfaces
213 # CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET #define'd in linux/elf.h
214 # TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE calls tracehook_report_syscall_{entry,exit}
215 # TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME calls tracehook_notify_resume()
216 # signal delivery calls tracehook_signal_handler()
218 config HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
221 config HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS
224 config GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD
227 config GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
230 config ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
233 An architecture should select this when it can successfully
234 build and run with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE.
236 # Select if arch has all set_memory_ro/rw/x/nx() functions in asm/cacheflush.h
237 config ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY
240 # Select if arch init_task must go in the __init_task_data section
241 config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ON_STACK
244 # Select if arch has its private alloc_task_struct() function
245 config ARCH_TASK_STRUCT_ALLOCATOR
248 # Select if arch has its private alloc_thread_stack() function
249 config ARCH_THREAD_STACK_ALLOCATOR
252 # Select if arch wants to size task_struct dynamically via arch_task_struct_size:
253 config ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT
256 config HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API
259 This symbol should be selected by an architecure if it supports
260 the API needed to access registers and stack entries from pt_regs,
261 declared in asm/ptrace.h
262 For example the kprobes-based event tracer needs this API.
267 The <linux/clk.h> calls support software clock gating and
268 thus are a key power management tool on many systems.
270 config HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG
273 config HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
275 depends on PERF_EVENTS
277 config HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS
279 depends on HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT
281 Depending on the arch implementation of hardware breakpoints,
282 some of them have separate registers for data and instruction
283 breakpoints addresses, others have mixed registers to store
284 them but define the access type in a control register.
285 Select this option if your arch implements breakpoints under the
288 config HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
291 config HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
294 System hardware can generate an NMI using the perf event
295 subsystem. Also has support for calculating CPU cycle events
296 to determine how many clock cycles in a given period.
298 config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_PERF
300 depends on HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI
302 The arch chooses to use the generic perf-NMI-based hardlockup
303 detector. Must define HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI.
305 config HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG
309 The arch provides a low level NMI watchdog. It provides
310 asm/nmi.h, and defines its own arch_touch_nmi_watchdog().
312 config HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH
314 select HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG
316 The arch chooses to provide its own hardlockup detector, which is
317 a superset of the HAVE_NMI_WATCHDOG. It also conforms to config
318 interfaces and parameters provided by hardlockup detector subsystem.
320 config HAVE_PERF_REGS
323 Support selective register dumps for perf events. This includes
324 bit-mapping of each registers and a unique architecture id.
326 config HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP
329 Support user stack dumps for perf event samples. This needs
330 access to the user stack pointer which is not unified across
333 config HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL
336 config HAVE_RCU_TABLE_FREE
339 config ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG
342 config HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE
345 This makes sure that struct pages are double word aligned and that
346 e.g. the SLUB allocator can perform double word atomic operations
347 on a struct page for better performance. However selecting this
348 might increase the size of a struct page by a word.
350 config HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
353 config HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
356 config ARCH_WEAK_RELEASE_ACQUIRE
359 config ARCH_WANT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
362 config ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
365 config ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC
366 select ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION
369 config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
372 An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
374 - syscall_get_arguments()
376 - syscall_set_return_value()
377 - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
378 - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
379 - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
380 results in the system call being skipped immediately.
381 - seccomp syscall wired up
383 config SECCOMP_FILTER
385 depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER && SECCOMP && NET
387 Enable tasks to build secure computing environments defined
388 in terms of Berkeley Packet Filter programs which implement
389 task-defined system call filtering polices.
391 See Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
393 config HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
396 An arch should select this symbol if it supports building with
399 menuconfig GCC_PLUGINS
401 depends on HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
402 depends on !COMPILE_TEST
404 GCC plugins are loadable modules that provide extra features to the
405 compiler. They are useful for runtime instrumentation and static analysis.
407 See Documentation/gcc-plugins.txt for details.
409 config GCC_PLUGIN_CYC_COMPLEXITY
410 bool "Compute the cyclomatic complexity of a function" if EXPERT
411 depends on GCC_PLUGINS
412 depends on !COMPILE_TEST
414 The complexity M of a function's control flow graph is defined as:
418 E = the number of edges
419 N = the number of nodes
420 P = the number of connected components (exit nodes).
422 Enabling this plugin reports the complexity to stderr during the
423 build. It mainly serves as a simple example of how to create a
424 gcc plugin for the kernel.
426 config GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV
428 depends on GCC_PLUGINS
430 This plugin inserts a __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc() call at the start of
431 basic blocks. It supports all gcc versions with plugin support (from
432 gcc-4.5 on). It is based on the commit "Add fuzzing coverage support"
435 config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
436 bool "Generate some entropy during boot and runtime"
437 depends on GCC_PLUGINS
439 By saying Y here the kernel will instrument some kernel code to
440 extract some entropy from both original and artificially created
441 program state. This will help especially embedded systems where
442 there is little 'natural' source of entropy normally. The cost
443 is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
446 Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
449 This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
450 * https://grsecurity.net/
451 * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
453 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
454 bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses"
455 depends on GCC_PLUGINS
457 This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a
458 __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information
461 This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
462 * https://grsecurity.net/
463 * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
465 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
466 bool "Force initialize all struct type variables passed by reference"
467 depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
469 Zero initialize any struct type local variable that may be passed by
470 reference without having been initialized.
472 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
473 bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
474 depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
475 depends on !COMPILE_TEST
477 This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
478 structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
479 initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
480 by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
482 config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
483 bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
484 depends on GCC_PLUGINS
485 select MODVERSIONS if MODULES
487 If you say Y here, the layouts of structures that are entirely
488 function pointers (and have not been manually annotated with
489 __no_randomize_layout), or structures that have been explicitly
490 marked with __randomize_layout, will be randomized at compile-time.
491 This can introduce the requirement of an additional information
492 exposure vulnerability for exploits targeting these structure
495 Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact,
496 slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic
497 tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel
498 source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation).
500 The seed used for compilation is located at
501 scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after
502 a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with
503 the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or
506 Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer.
508 This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
509 * https://grsecurity.net/
510 * https://pax.grsecurity.net/
512 config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE
513 bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization"
514 depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT
515 depends on !COMPILE_TEST
517 If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a
518 best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized
519 groups of elements. It will further not randomize bitfields
520 in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT
521 at the cost of weakened randomization.
523 config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
526 An arch should select this symbol if:
527 - its compiler supports the -fstack-protector option
528 - it has implemented a stack canary (e.g. __stack_chk_guard)
530 config CC_STACKPROTECTOR
533 Set when a stack-protector mode is enabled, so that the build
534 can enable kernel-side support for the GCC feature.
537 prompt "Stack Protector buffer overflow detection"
538 depends on HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
539 default CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
541 This option turns on the "stack-protector" GCC feature. This
542 feature puts, at the beginning of functions, a canary value on
543 the stack just before the return address, and validates
544 the value just before actually returning. Stack based buffer
545 overflows (that need to overwrite this return address) now also
546 overwrite the canary, which gets detected and the attack is then
547 neutralized via a kernel panic.
549 config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE
552 Disable "stack-protector" GCC feature.
554 config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR
556 select CC_STACKPROTECTOR
558 Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added if they
559 have an 8-byte or larger character array on the stack.
561 This feature requires gcc version 4.2 or above, or a distribution
562 gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector").
564 On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
565 about 3% of all kernel functions, which increases kernel code size
568 config CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
570 select CC_STACKPROTECTOR
572 Functions will have the stack-protector canary logic added in any
573 of the following conditions:
575 - local variable's address used as part of the right hand side of an
576 assignment or function argument
577 - local variable is an array (or union containing an array),
578 regardless of array type or length
579 - uses register local variables
581 This feature requires gcc version 4.9 or above, or a distribution
582 gcc with the feature backported ("-fstack-protector-strong").
584 On an x86 "defconfig" build, this feature adds canary checks to
585 about 20% of all kernel functions, which increases the kernel code
593 Select this if the architecture wants to use thin archives
594 instead of ld -r to create the built-in.o files.
596 config LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION
599 Select this if the architecture wants to do dead code and
600 data elimination with the linker by compiling with
601 -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections and linking with
604 This requires that the arch annotates or otherwise protects
605 its external entry points from being discarded. Linker scripts
606 must also merge .text.*, .data.*, and .bss.* correctly into
607 output sections. Care must be taken not to pull in unrelated
608 sections (e.g., '.text.init'). Typically '.' in section names
609 is used to distinguish them from label names / C identifiers.
611 config HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES
614 An architecture should select this if it can walk the kernel stack
615 frames to determine if an object is part of either the arguments
616 or local variables (i.e. that it excludes saved return addresses,
617 and similar) by implementing an inline arch_within_stack_frames(),
618 which is used by CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
620 config HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING
623 Provide kernel/user boundaries probes necessary for subsystems
624 that need it, such as userspace RCU extended quiescent state.
625 Syscalls need to be wrapped inside user_exit()-user_enter() through
626 the slow path using TIF_NOHZ flag. Exceptions handlers must be
627 wrapped as well. Irqs are already protected inside
628 rcu_irq_enter/rcu_irq_exit() but preemption or signal handling on
629 irq exit still need to be protected.
631 config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING
634 config ARCH_HAS_SCALED_CPUTIME
637 config HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
641 With VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN, cputime_t becomes 64-bit.
642 Before enabling this option, arch code must be audited
643 to ensure there are no races in concurrent read/write of
644 cputime_t. For example, reading/writing 64-bit cputime_t on
645 some 32-bit arches may require multiple accesses, so proper
646 locking is needed to protect against concurrent accesses.
649 config HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING
652 Archs need to ensure they use a high enough resolution clock to
653 support irq time accounting and then call enable_sched_clock_irqtime().
655 config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
658 config HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD
661 config HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP
664 config HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
667 config HAVE_MOD_ARCH_SPECIFIC
670 The arch uses struct mod_arch_specific to store data. Many arches
671 just need a simple module loader without arch specific data - those
672 should not enable this.
674 config MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA
677 Modules only use ELF RELA relocations. Modules with ELF REL
678 relocations will give an error.
680 config MODULES_USE_ELF_REL
683 Modules only use ELF REL relocations. Modules with ELF RELA
684 relocations will give an error.
686 config HAVE_UNDERSCORE_SYMBOL_PREFIX
689 Some architectures generate an _ in front of C symbols; things like
690 module loading and assembly files need to know about this.
692 config HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK
695 Architecture doesn't only execute the irq handler on the irq stack
696 but also irq_exit(). This way we can process softirqs on this irq
697 stack instead of switching to a new one when we call __do_softirq()
698 in the end of an hardirq.
699 This spares a stack switch and improves cache usage on softirq
702 config PGTABLE_LEVELS
706 config ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE
709 An architecture supports choosing randomized locations for
710 stack, mmap, brk, and ET_DYN. Defined functions:
712 - arch_randomize_brk()
714 config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
717 An arch should select this symbol if it supports setting a variable
718 number of bits for use in establishing the base address for mmap
719 allocations, has MMU enabled and provides values for both:
720 - ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
721 - ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
723 config HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
726 An architecture implements exit_thread.
728 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
731 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
734 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
737 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
738 int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
739 range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
740 default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
741 default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
742 depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
744 This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
745 determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions
746 resulting from mmap allocations. This value will be bounded
747 by the architecture's minimum and maximum supported values.
749 This value can be changed after boot using the
750 /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_bits tunable
752 config HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
755 An arch should select this symbol if it supports running applications
756 in compatibility mode, supports setting a variable number of bits for
757 use in establishing the base address for mmap allocations, has MMU
758 enabled and provides values for both:
759 - ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
760 - ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
762 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
765 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
768 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
771 config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
772 int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
773 range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
774 default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
775 default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
776 depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
778 This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
779 determine the random offset to the base address of vma regions
780 resulting from mmap allocations for compatible applications This
781 value will be bounded by the architecture's minimum and maximum
784 This value can be changed after boot using the
785 /proc/sys/vm/mmap_rnd_compat_bits tunable
787 config HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES
790 This allows 64bit applications to invoke 32-bit mmap() syscall
791 and vice-versa 32-bit applications to call 64-bit mmap().
792 Required for applications doing different bitness syscalls.
794 config HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS
797 Architecture provides copy_thread_tls to accept tls argument via
798 normal C parameter passing, rather than extracting the syscall
799 argument from pt_regs.
801 config HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION
804 Architecture supports the 'objtool check' host tool command, which
805 performs compile-time stack metadata validation.
807 config HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE
810 Architecture has a save_stack_trace_tsk_reliable() function which
811 only returns a stack trace if it can guarantee the trace is reliable.
813 config HAVE_ARCH_HASH
817 If this is set, the architecture provides an <asm/hash.h>
818 file which provides platform-specific implementations of some
819 functions in <linux/hash.h> or fs/namei.c.
827 config CLONE_BACKWARDS
830 Architecture has tls passed as the 4th argument of clone(2),
833 config CLONE_BACKWARDS2
836 Architecture has the first two arguments of clone(2) swapped.
838 config CLONE_BACKWARDS3
841 Architecture has tls passed as the 3rd argument of clone(2),
844 config ODD_RT_SIGACTION
847 Architecture has unusual rt_sigaction(2) arguments
849 config OLD_SIGSUSPEND
852 Architecture has old sigsuspend(2) syscall, of one-argument variety
854 config OLD_SIGSUSPEND3
857 Even weirder antique ABI - three-argument sigsuspend(2)
862 Architecture has old sigaction(2) syscall. Nope, not the same
863 as OLD_SIGSUSPEND | OLD_SIGSUSPEND3 - alpha has sigsuspend(2),
864 but fairly different variant of sigaction(2), thanks to OSF/1
867 config COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION
870 config ARCH_NO_COHERENT_DMA_MMAP
873 config CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS
876 config HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK
879 An arch should select this symbol if it can support kernel stacks
880 in vmalloc space. This means:
882 - vmalloc space must be large enough to hold many kernel stacks.
883 This may rule out many 32-bit architectures.
885 - Stacks in vmalloc space need to work reliably. For example, if
886 vmap page tables are created on demand, either this mechanism
887 needs to work while the stack points to a virtual address with
888 unpopulated page tables or arch code (switch_to() and switch_mm(),
889 most likely) needs to ensure that the stack's page table entries
890 are populated before running on a possibly unpopulated stack.
892 - If the stack overflows into a guard page, something reasonable
893 should happen. The definition of "reasonable" is flexible, but
894 instantly rebooting without logging anything would be unfriendly.
898 bool "Use a virtually-mapped stack"
899 depends on HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK && !KASAN
901 Enable this if you want the use virtually-mapped kernel stacks
902 with guard pages. This causes kernel stack overflows to be
903 caught immediately rather than causing difficult-to-diagnose
906 This is presently incompatible with KASAN because KASAN expects
907 the stack to map directly to the KASAN shadow map using a formula
908 that is incorrect if the stack is in vmalloc space.
910 config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
913 config ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
916 config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
919 config STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
920 bool "Make kernel text and rodata read-only" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
921 depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX
922 default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
924 If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
925 and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
926 protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap
929 These features are considered standard security practice these days.
930 You should say Y here in almost all cases.
932 config ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX
935 config STRICT_MODULE_RWX
936 bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO" if ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX
937 depends on ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX && MODULES
938 default !ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX || ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT
940 If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
941 and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
942 protection against certain security exploits (e.g. writing to text)
944 # select if the architecture provides an asm/dma-direct.h header
945 config ARCH_HAS_PHYS_TO_DMA
948 config ARCH_HAS_REFCOUNT
951 An architecture selects this when it has implemented refcount_t
952 using open coded assembly primitives that provide an optimized
953 refcount_t implementation, possibly at the expense of some full
954 refcount state checks of CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL=y.
956 The refcount overflow check behavior, however, must be retained.
957 Catching overflows is the primary security concern for protecting
958 against bugs in reference counts.
961 bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed"
963 Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast
964 unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked
965 implementation, which can be (slightly) slower but provides protections
966 against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in
967 security flaw exploits.
969 source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig"