2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
79 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
81 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
82 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
84 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
85 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
87 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
89 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
92 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
95 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
96 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
98 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
100 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
103 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
105 int selinux_enabled = 1;
108 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
109 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
111 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
112 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
113 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
114 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
115 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
117 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
118 before the policy was loaded. */
119 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
120 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
122 static kmem_cache_t *sel_inode_cache;
124 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
125 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
126 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
132 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
136 if (!buffer || !size)
137 goto getsecurity_exit;
141 goto getsecurity_exit;
143 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
150 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
152 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
161 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
162 task->security = tsec;
167 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
169 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
170 task->security = NULL;
174 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
177 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
179 isec = kmem_cache_alloc(sel_inode_cache, SLAB_KERNEL);
183 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(*isec));
184 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
185 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
187 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
188 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
189 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
190 inode->i_security = isec;
195 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
197 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
198 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
200 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
201 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
202 list_del_init(&isec->list);
203 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
205 inode->i_security = NULL;
206 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
209 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
211 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
212 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
214 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
219 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
220 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
221 file->f_security = fsec;
226 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
228 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
229 file->f_security = NULL;
233 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
235 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
237 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
241 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
242 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
243 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
244 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
246 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
247 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
248 sb->s_security = sbsec;
253 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
259 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
262 sb->s_security = NULL;
266 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
268 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
270 if (family != PF_UNIX)
273 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
278 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
279 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
286 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
288 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX)
291 sk->sk_security = NULL;
295 /* The security server must be initialized before
296 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
297 extern int ss_initialized;
299 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
301 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
303 "uses transition SIDs",
305 "uses genfs_contexts",
306 "not configured for labeling",
307 "uses mountpoint labeling",
310 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
312 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
314 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
323 static match_table_t tokens = {
324 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
325 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
326 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
329 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
331 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
333 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
336 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
337 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
338 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
343 name = sb->s_type->name;
345 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
347 /* NFS we understand. */
348 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
349 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
351 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
355 context = d->context;
362 /* Standard string-based options. */
363 char *p, *options = data;
365 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
367 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
372 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
378 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
381 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
392 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
394 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
397 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
404 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
408 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
411 "defcontext option is invalid "
412 "for this filesystem type\n");
415 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
420 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
427 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
432 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
444 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
446 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
447 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
448 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
452 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
457 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
458 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
464 if (seen & Opt_context)
465 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
469 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
471 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
472 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
473 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
477 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
480 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
481 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
485 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
486 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
490 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
502 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
504 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
505 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
506 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
510 if (sbsec->initialized)
513 if (!ss_initialized) {
514 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
515 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
516 server is ready to handle calls. */
517 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
518 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
519 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
520 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
524 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
525 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
527 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
528 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
532 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
536 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
537 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
538 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
539 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
540 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
541 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
542 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
543 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
544 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
548 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
549 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
550 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
551 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
552 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
553 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
555 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
556 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
557 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
562 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
565 sbsec->initialized = 1;
567 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
568 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
569 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
572 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
573 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
574 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
577 /* Initialize the root inode. */
578 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
580 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
581 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
582 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
584 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
586 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
587 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
588 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
589 struct inode_security_struct, list);
590 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
591 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
592 inode = igrab(inode);
594 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
598 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
599 list_del_init(&isec->list);
602 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
608 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
610 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
612 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
614 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
616 return SECCLASS_FILE;
618 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
622 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
624 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
628 return SECCLASS_FILE;
631 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
633 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
636 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
638 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
641 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
648 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
650 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
657 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
658 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
660 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
662 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
663 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
665 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
667 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
673 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
674 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
675 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
676 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
677 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
679 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
681 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
682 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
683 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
685 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
687 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
688 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
689 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
690 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
691 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
693 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
696 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
698 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
701 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
704 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
705 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
710 char *buffer, *path, *end;
712 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
722 while (de && de != de->parent) {
723 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
727 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
732 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
733 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
737 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
745 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
746 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
748 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
749 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
751 struct dentry *dentry;
752 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
753 char *context = NULL;
758 if (isec->initialized)
763 if (isec->initialized)
766 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
767 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
768 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
769 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
770 server is ready to handle calls. */
771 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
772 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
773 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
774 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
778 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
779 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
780 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
781 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
785 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
786 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
788 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
789 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
791 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
792 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
796 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
801 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
802 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
808 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
811 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
812 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
820 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
826 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
832 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
833 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
834 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
835 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
839 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
840 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
843 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
846 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
847 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
848 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
849 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
851 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
859 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
860 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
862 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
863 /* Default to the fs SID. */
864 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
866 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
867 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
868 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
877 /* Default to the fs SID. */
878 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
881 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
883 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
884 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
895 isec->initialized = 1;
898 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
899 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
906 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
907 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
913 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
914 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
917 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
918 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
921 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
922 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
925 /* All other signals. */
926 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
933 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
934 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
935 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
936 struct task_struct *tsk2,
939 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
941 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
942 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
943 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
944 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
947 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
948 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
951 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
952 struct avc_audit_data ad;
954 tsec = tsk->security;
956 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
960 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
961 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
964 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
965 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
968 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
970 tsec = tsk->security;
972 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
973 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
976 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
977 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
978 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
979 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
982 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
984 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
985 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
986 struct avc_audit_data ad;
988 tsec = tsk->security;
989 isec = inode->i_security;
993 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
994 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
997 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1000 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1001 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1002 pathname if needed. */
1003 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1004 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1005 struct dentry *dentry,
1008 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1009 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1010 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1012 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1013 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1016 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1017 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1018 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1019 check a particular permission to the file.
1020 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1021 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1022 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1023 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1024 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1028 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1029 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1030 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1031 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1032 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1033 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1036 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1038 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1040 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1041 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1049 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1051 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1056 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1057 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1058 struct dentry *dentry,
1061 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1062 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1063 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1065 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1068 tsec = current->security;
1069 dsec = dir->i_security;
1070 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1072 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1073 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1075 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1076 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1081 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1082 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1084 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1090 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1094 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1095 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1096 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1100 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1103 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1104 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1105 struct dentry *dentry,
1109 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1110 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1111 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1115 tsec = current->security;
1116 dsec = dir->i_security;
1117 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1119 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1120 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1123 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1124 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1139 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1143 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1147 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1148 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1149 struct inode *new_dir,
1150 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1152 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1153 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1154 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1156 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1159 tsec = current->security;
1160 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1161 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1162 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1163 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1165 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1167 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1168 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1169 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1172 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1173 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1176 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1177 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1178 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1183 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1184 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1185 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1186 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1187 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1190 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1191 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1192 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1193 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1195 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1203 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1204 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1205 struct super_block *sb,
1207 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1209 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1210 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1212 tsec = tsk->security;
1213 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1214 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1218 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1219 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1223 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1224 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1225 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1226 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1229 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1231 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1235 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1237 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1239 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1246 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1247 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1251 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1253 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1254 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1263 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1264 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1266 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1267 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1269 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1270 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1275 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1277 isec->initialized = 1;
1282 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1284 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1286 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1287 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1290 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1294 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1295 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1296 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1297 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1301 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1302 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1306 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1310 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1313 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1314 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1318 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1322 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1325 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1326 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1328 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1331 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1335 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1339 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1342 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1346 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1350 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1354 tsec = current->security;
1356 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1357 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1359 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1360 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1363 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1364 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1366 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1367 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1375 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1376 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1382 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1395 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1397 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1402 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1404 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1407 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1413 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1415 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1418 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1422 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1427 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1428 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1429 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1431 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1432 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1433 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1434 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1436 case 0: /* Close log */
1437 case 1: /* Open log */
1438 case 2: /* Read from log */
1439 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1440 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1442 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1449 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1450 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1451 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1453 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1454 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1455 * the capability is granted.
1457 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1458 * processes that allocate mappings.
1460 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1462 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1463 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1465 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1467 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1468 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1469 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1475 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1478 /* binprm security operations */
1480 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1482 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1484 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1489 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1492 bprm->security = bsec;
1496 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1498 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1499 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1500 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1501 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1503 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1506 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1510 bsec = bprm->security;
1515 tsec = current->security;
1516 isec = inode->i_security;
1518 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1519 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1521 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1522 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1524 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1525 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1526 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1529 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1530 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1531 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1536 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1537 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1538 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1540 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1543 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1544 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1545 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1549 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1550 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1551 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1555 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1556 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1560 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1561 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1563 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1571 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1573 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1577 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1579 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1582 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1583 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1584 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1585 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1586 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1588 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1591 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1594 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1596 kfree(bprm->security);
1597 bprm->security = NULL;
1600 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1601 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1603 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1604 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1606 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1607 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1608 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1609 struct fdtable *fdt;
1614 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1616 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1617 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1618 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1619 file may belong to another process and we are only
1620 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1621 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1622 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1623 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1624 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1625 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1626 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1632 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1634 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1636 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1638 unsigned long set, i;
1643 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1644 if (i >= fdt->max_fds || i >= fdt->max_fdset)
1646 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1649 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1650 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1655 if (file_has_perm(current,
1657 file_to_av(file))) {
1659 fd = get_unused_fd();
1669 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1676 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1681 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1684 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1687 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1689 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1690 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1694 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1696 tsec = current->security;
1698 bsec = bprm->security;
1701 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1703 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1704 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1705 unchanged and kill. */
1706 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1707 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1708 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1715 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1716 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1717 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1718 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1719 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1731 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1733 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1735 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1736 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1737 struct itimerval itimer;
1738 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1741 tsec = current->security;
1742 bsec = bprm->security;
1745 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1748 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1751 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1752 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1754 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1755 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1756 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1757 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1758 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1759 will be checked against the new SID. */
1760 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1761 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1763 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1764 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1765 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1766 flush_signals(current);
1767 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1768 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1769 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1770 recalc_sigpending();
1771 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1774 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1775 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1776 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1777 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1778 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1779 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1780 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1781 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1782 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1784 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1785 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1787 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1788 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1789 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1790 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1792 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1794 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1797 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1801 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1802 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1803 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1806 /* superblock security operations */
1808 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1810 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1813 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1815 superblock_free_security(sb);
1818 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1823 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1826 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1828 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1829 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1830 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1833 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1841 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1845 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1847 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1848 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1849 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1854 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1855 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1856 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1860 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1868 in_save = in_end = orig;
1871 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1872 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1874 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1875 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1877 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1879 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1881 } while (*in_end++);
1883 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1884 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1889 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1891 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1894 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1898 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1899 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1900 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1903 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1905 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1907 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1908 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1909 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1912 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1913 struct nameidata *nd,
1915 unsigned long flags,
1920 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1924 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1925 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1926 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1928 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1932 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1936 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
1940 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
1941 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
1944 /* inode security operations */
1946 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1948 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
1951 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1953 inode_free_security(inode);
1956 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1957 char **name, void **value,
1960 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1961 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1962 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1965 char *namep = NULL, *context;
1967 tsec = current->security;
1968 dsec = dir->i_security;
1969 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1971 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1972 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1974 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1975 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1978 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
1979 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1982 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1987 inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1989 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
1993 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2000 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2012 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2014 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2017 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2021 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2024 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2027 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2031 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2034 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2037 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2039 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2042 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2044 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2047 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2049 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2052 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2056 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2060 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2063 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2064 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2066 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2069 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2071 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2074 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2078 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2081 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2084 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2085 struct nameidata *nd)
2089 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2094 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2098 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2099 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2102 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2106 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2110 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2113 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2114 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2115 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2117 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2120 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2122 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2125 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2127 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2128 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2129 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2130 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2131 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2135 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2136 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2137 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2138 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2139 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2140 Restrict to administrator. */
2144 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2145 ordinary setattr permission. */
2146 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2149 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2150 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2153 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2156 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2157 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2159 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2160 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2164 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2168 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2169 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2173 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2178 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2180 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2181 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2185 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2186 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2188 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2189 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2193 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2194 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2198 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2200 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2201 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2209 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2211 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2214 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2216 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2219 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2221 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2222 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2223 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2224 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2225 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2226 Restrict to administrator. */
2230 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2231 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2232 permission for removexattr. */
2233 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2236 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2237 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2241 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2243 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2247 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2248 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2249 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2251 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2253 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2255 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2257 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2260 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2263 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2264 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2266 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2270 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2273 if (!value || !size)
2276 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2284 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2286 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2287 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2288 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2292 /* file security operations */
2294 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2296 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2299 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2303 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2304 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2307 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2308 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2311 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2313 return file_alloc_security(file);
2316 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2318 file_free_security(file);
2321 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2333 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2335 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2336 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2339 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2341 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2342 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2345 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2349 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2354 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2357 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2358 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2361 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2367 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2369 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2370 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2372 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2373 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2374 * This has an additional check.
2376 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2383 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2384 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2386 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2387 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2390 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2391 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2393 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2398 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2399 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2403 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2407 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2410 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2411 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2414 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2415 unsigned long reqprot,
2420 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2424 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2427 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2428 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2430 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2431 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2432 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2434 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2435 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2436 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2437 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2438 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2440 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2441 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2442 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2443 * modified content. This typically should only
2444 * occur for text relocations.
2446 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2454 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2457 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2459 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2462 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2469 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2474 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2475 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2484 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2485 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2490 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2495 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2499 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2506 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2508 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2509 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2511 tsec = current->security;
2512 fsec = file->f_security;
2513 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2518 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2519 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2523 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2524 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2526 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2527 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2529 tsec = tsk->security;
2530 fsec = file->f_security;
2533 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2535 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2537 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2538 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2541 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2543 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2546 /* task security operations */
2548 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2552 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2556 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2559 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2561 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2564 tsec1 = current->security;
2566 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2569 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2571 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2572 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2574 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2575 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2576 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2578 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2579 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2580 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2581 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2586 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2588 task_free_security(tsk);
2591 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2593 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2594 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2595 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2596 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2597 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2602 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2604 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2607 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2609 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2613 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2615 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2618 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2620 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2623 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2625 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2628 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2630 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2634 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2638 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2642 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2645 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2647 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2650 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2654 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2655 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2656 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2657 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2658 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2659 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2664 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2666 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2669 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2671 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2674 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2679 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2683 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2687 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2689 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2691 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2694 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2700 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2701 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2702 the state of the current process. */
2706 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2710 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2712 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2715 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2717 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2719 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2722 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2723 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2727 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2728 struct inode *inode)
2730 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2731 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2733 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2734 isec->initialized = 1;
2738 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2739 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2741 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2742 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2744 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2745 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2749 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2750 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2753 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2754 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2757 switch (ih->protocol) {
2759 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2761 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2765 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2769 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2770 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2775 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2777 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2781 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2785 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2786 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2797 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2799 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2800 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2803 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2804 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2806 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2807 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2811 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2812 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2815 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2816 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2817 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2823 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2825 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2829 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2830 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2835 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2837 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2841 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2842 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2846 /* includes fragments */
2856 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2857 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2861 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2863 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2867 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2868 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2871 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2873 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2877 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2878 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2888 /* socket security operations */
2889 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2892 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2893 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2894 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2897 tsec = task->security;
2898 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2900 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2903 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2904 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2905 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2911 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2912 int protocol, int kern)
2915 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2920 tsec = current->security;
2921 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2922 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2923 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2929 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2930 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2932 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2933 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2935 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2937 tsec = current->security;
2938 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2939 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2940 isec->initialized = 1;
2945 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2946 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2947 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2948 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2949 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2951 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2956 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
2961 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
2962 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
2963 * check the first address now.
2965 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
2966 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
2968 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2969 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2971 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
2972 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
2973 unsigned short snum;
2974 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2975 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
2977 tsec = current->security;
2978 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2980 if (family == PF_INET) {
2981 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
2982 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
2983 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
2984 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
2986 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
2987 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
2988 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
2989 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
2992 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
2993 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
2994 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
2995 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
2998 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2999 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3000 ad.u.net.family = family;
3001 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3003 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3008 switch(isec->sclass) {
3009 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3010 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3013 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3014 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3018 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3022 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3026 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3027 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3028 ad.u.net.family = family;
3030 if (family == PF_INET)
3031 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3033 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3035 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3036 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3044 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3046 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3049 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3054 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3056 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3057 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3058 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3059 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3060 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3061 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3062 unsigned short snum;
3065 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3066 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3067 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3069 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3071 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3072 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3074 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3077 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3078 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3082 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3083 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3084 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3085 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3086 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3095 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3097 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3100 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3103 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3104 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3106 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3110 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3112 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3113 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3114 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3115 newisec->initialized = 1;
3120 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3123 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3126 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3127 int size, int flags)
3129 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3132 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3134 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3137 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3139 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3142 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3144 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3147 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3150 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3153 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3155 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3158 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3159 struct socket *other,
3162 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3163 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3164 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3165 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3168 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3172 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3173 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3175 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3176 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3178 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3180 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3184 /* connecting socket */
3185 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3186 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3188 /* server child socket */
3189 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3190 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3195 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3196 struct socket *other)
3198 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3199 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3200 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3203 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3204 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3206 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3207 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3209 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3210 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3217 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3222 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3225 struct socket *sock;
3226 struct net_device *dev;
3227 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3229 family = sk->sk_family;
3230 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3233 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3234 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3237 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3238 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3240 struct inode *inode;
3241 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3243 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3244 isec = inode->i_security;
3245 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3246 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3249 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3257 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3261 switch (sock_class) {
3262 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3263 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3264 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3265 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3268 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3269 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3270 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3271 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3275 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3276 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3280 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3281 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3282 ad.u.net.family = family;
3284 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3288 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3292 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3293 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3297 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3304 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3305 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3306 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3311 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3312 sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3316 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb);
3322 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3323 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3328 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3329 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3332 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3334 /* if UNIX_STREAM check peer_sid, if TCP check dst for labelled sa */
3335 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3336 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3337 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3339 else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3340 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
3342 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3352 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3357 if (scontext_len > len) {
3362 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3366 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3374 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3377 u32 peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
3379 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
3382 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, secdata, seclen);
3391 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3393 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3396 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3398 sk_free_security(sk);
3401 static unsigned int selinux_sk_getsid_security(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl, u8 dir)
3403 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3404 u32 sock_sid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3407 return selinux_no_sk_sid(fl);
3409 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3410 isec = get_sock_isec(sk);
3413 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3415 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3419 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3423 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3424 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3425 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3427 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3431 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3433 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3435 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3436 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3437 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3438 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3439 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3440 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3450 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3455 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3457 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3458 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3459 const struct net_device *in,
3460 const struct net_device *out,
3461 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3465 int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3466 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3468 struct socket *sock;
3469 struct inode *inode;
3470 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3471 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3472 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3473 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3479 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3483 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3487 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3491 isec = inode->i_security;
3493 switch (isec->sclass) {
3494 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3495 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3496 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3497 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3500 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3501 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3502 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3503 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3507 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3508 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3513 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3514 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3515 ad.u.net.family = family;
3517 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3518 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3519 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3522 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3523 netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3524 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3527 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3528 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3529 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3530 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3533 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3534 node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3535 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3541 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3542 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3545 ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3546 &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3547 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3550 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3551 send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3554 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3557 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb);
3563 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3564 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3565 const struct net_device *in,
3566 const struct net_device *out,
3567 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3569 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3572 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3574 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3575 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3576 const struct net_device *in,
3577 const struct net_device *out,
3578 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3580 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3585 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3587 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3589 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3590 struct av_decision avd;
3593 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3597 tsec = current->security;
3600 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3601 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3602 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3604 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3605 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3610 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3612 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3617 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3618 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3621 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3622 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3624 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3628 isec->sclass = sclass;
3629 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3630 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3631 perm->security = isec;
3636 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3638 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3639 perm->security = NULL;
3643 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3645 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3647 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3652 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3653 msg->security = msec;
3658 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3660 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3662 msg->security = NULL;
3666 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3669 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3670 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3671 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3673 tsec = current->security;
3674 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3676 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3677 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3679 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3682 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3684 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3687 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3689 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3692 /* message queue security operations */
3693 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3695 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3696 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3697 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3700 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3704 tsec = current->security;
3705 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3707 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3708 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3710 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3713 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3719 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3721 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3724 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3726 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3727 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3728 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3730 tsec = current->security;
3731 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3733 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3734 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3736 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3737 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3740 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3748 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3749 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3752 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3755 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3758 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3764 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3768 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3770 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3771 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3772 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3773 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3776 tsec = current->security;
3777 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3778 msec = msg->security;
3781 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3783 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3785 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3786 * message queue this message will be stored in
3788 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3796 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3797 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3799 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3800 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3803 /* Can this process send the message */
3804 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3805 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3807 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3808 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3809 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3814 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3815 struct task_struct *target,
3816 long type, int mode)
3818 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3819 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3820 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3821 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3824 tsec = target->security;
3825 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3826 msec = msg->security;
3828 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3829 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3831 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3832 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3834 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3835 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3839 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3840 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3842 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3843 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3844 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3847 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3851 tsec = current->security;
3852 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3854 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3855 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3857 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3860 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3866 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3868 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3871 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3873 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3874 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3875 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3877 tsec = current->security;
3878 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3880 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3881 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3883 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3884 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3887 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3888 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3896 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3897 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3900 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3903 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3910 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3916 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3920 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3921 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3926 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3930 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3933 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3935 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3938 /* Semaphore security operations */
3939 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3941 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3942 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3943 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3946 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3950 tsec = current->security;
3951 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3953 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3954 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3956 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3959 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3965 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3967 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3970 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3972 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3973 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3974 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3976 tsec = current->security;
3977 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3979 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3980 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3982 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3983 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3986 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
3987 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3995 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3996 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4000 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4011 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4014 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4018 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4024 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4028 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4029 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4034 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4038 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4041 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4047 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4049 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4054 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4057 /* module stacking operations */
4058 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4060 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4061 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4062 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4066 secondary_ops = ops;
4068 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4075 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4077 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4078 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4079 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4083 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4088 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4091 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4094 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4095 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4097 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4102 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4109 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4111 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4113 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4114 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4115 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4116 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4123 return selinux_getsecurity(sid, value, size);
4126 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4127 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4129 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4135 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4136 security attributes. */
4141 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4142 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4143 * above restriction is ever removed.
4145 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4146 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4147 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4148 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4149 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4150 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4156 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4157 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4158 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4162 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4167 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4168 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4169 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4170 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4171 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4172 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4174 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4175 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4176 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4177 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4178 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4179 struct av_decision avd;
4184 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4185 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4186 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4187 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4188 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4189 do_each_thread(g, t)
4190 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4191 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4194 while_each_thread(g, t);
4195 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4198 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4199 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4200 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4204 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4205 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4207 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4208 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4210 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4214 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4215 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4229 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4230 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4231 .capget = selinux_capget,
4232 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4233 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4234 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4235 .capable = selinux_capable,
4236 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4237 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4238 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4239 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4241 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4242 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4244 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4245 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4246 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4247 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4248 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4249 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4250 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4252 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4253 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4254 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4255 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4256 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4257 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4258 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4260 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4261 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4262 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4263 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4264 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4265 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4266 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4267 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4268 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4269 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4270 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4271 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4272 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4273 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4274 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4275 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4276 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4277 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4278 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4279 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4280 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4281 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4282 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4283 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4284 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4286 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4287 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4288 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4289 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4290 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4291 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4292 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4293 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4294 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4295 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4296 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4298 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4299 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4300 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4301 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4302 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4303 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4304 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4305 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4306 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4307 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4308 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4309 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4310 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4311 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4312 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4313 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4314 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4315 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4316 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4318 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4320 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4321 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4323 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4324 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4325 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4326 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4327 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4328 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4330 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4331 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4332 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4333 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4334 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4336 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4337 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4338 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4339 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4340 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4342 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4343 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4345 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4347 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4348 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4350 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4351 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4353 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4354 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4355 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4356 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4357 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4358 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4359 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4360 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4361 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4362 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4363 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4364 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4365 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4366 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4367 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4368 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4369 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4370 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4371 .sk_getsid = selinux_sk_getsid_security,
4373 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4374 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4375 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4376 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4377 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4378 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4379 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4383 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4385 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4387 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4388 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4392 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4394 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4395 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4396 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4397 tsec = current->security;
4398 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4400 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4401 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4402 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);
4405 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4407 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4408 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4409 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4411 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4412 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4414 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4419 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4421 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4423 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4424 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4425 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4427 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4428 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4429 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4430 struct superblock_security_struct,
4432 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4433 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4435 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4436 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4437 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4439 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4441 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4442 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4445 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4448 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4449 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4450 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4452 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4454 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4455 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4456 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4458 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4459 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4462 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4464 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4465 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4466 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4468 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4469 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4474 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4478 if (!selinux_enabled)
4481 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4483 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4485 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4487 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4489 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4491 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4499 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4501 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4502 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4504 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4506 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4507 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4508 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4513 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4515 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4516 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4519 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4521 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4522 int selinux_disable(void)
4524 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4525 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4527 if (ss_initialized) {
4528 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4532 if (selinux_disabled) {
4533 /* Only do this once. */
4537 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4539 selinux_disabled = 1;
4540 selinux_enabled = 0;
4542 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4543 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4545 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4546 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4548 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */