1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Copyright 2002-2005, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
4 * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
7 * Copyright 2013-2014 Intel Mobile Communications GmbH
8 * Copyright 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
9 * Copyright 2018-2020, 2022 Intel Corporation
12 #include <linux/if_ether.h>
13 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
16 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
17 #include <linux/slab.h>
18 #include <linux/export.h>
19 #include <net/mac80211.h>
20 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
21 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
22 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
23 #include "driver-ops.h"
24 #include "debugfs_key.h"
32 * DOC: Key handling basics
34 * Key handling in mac80211 is done based on per-interface (sub_if_data)
35 * keys and per-station keys. Since each station belongs to an interface,
36 * each station key also belongs to that interface.
38 * Hardware acceleration is done on a best-effort basis for algorithms
39 * that are implemented in software, for each key the hardware is asked
40 * to enable that key for offloading but if it cannot do that the key is
41 * simply kept for software encryption (unless it is for an algorithm
42 * that isn't implemented in software).
43 * There is currently no way of knowing whether a key is handled in SW
44 * or HW except by looking into debugfs.
46 * All key management is internally protected by a mutex. Within all
47 * other parts of mac80211, key references are, just as STA structure
48 * references, protected by RCU. Note, however, that some things are
49 * unprotected, namely the key->sta dereferences within the hardware
50 * acceleration functions. This means that sta_info_destroy() must
51 * remove the key which waits for an RCU grace period.
54 static const u8 bcast_addr[ETH_ALEN] = { 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF };
56 static void assert_key_lock(struct ieee80211_local *local)
58 lockdep_assert_held(&local->key_mtx);
62 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int delta)
64 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
66 if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP)
69 /* crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is protected by this */
70 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
74 list_for_each_entry_rcu(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
75 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt += delta;
80 static void increment_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
83 * When this count is zero, SKB resizing for allocating tailroom
84 * for IV or MMIC is skipped. But, this check has created two race
85 * cases in xmit path while transiting from zero count to one:
87 * 1. SKB resize was skipped because no key was added but just before
88 * the xmit key is added and SW encryption kicks off.
90 * 2. SKB resize was skipped because all the keys were hw planted but
91 * just before xmit one of the key is deleted and SW encryption kicks
94 * In both the above case SW encryption will find not enough space for
95 * tailroom and exits with WARN_ON. (See WARN_ONs at wpa.c)
97 * Solution has been explained at
101 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
103 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
105 if (!sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt++) {
107 * Flush all XMIT packets currently using HW encryption or no
108 * encryption at all if the count transition is from 0 -> 1.
114 static void decrease_tailroom_need_count(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
117 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
119 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt < delta);
121 update_vlan_tailroom_need_count(sdata, -delta);
122 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt -= delta;
125 static int ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
127 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
128 struct sta_info *sta;
129 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
133 if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED) {
134 /* If we get here, it's during resume and the key is
135 * tainted so shouldn't be used/programmed any more.
136 * However, its flags may still indicate that it was
137 * programmed into the device (since we're in resume)
138 * so clear that flag now to avoid trying to remove
141 if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE &&
142 !(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
143 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
144 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
145 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
147 key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
151 if (!key->local->ops->set_key)
152 goto out_unsupported;
154 assert_key_lock(key->local);
159 * If this is a per-STA GTK, check if it
160 * is supported; if not, return.
162 if (sta && !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE) &&
163 !ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SUPPORTS_PER_STA_GTK))
164 goto out_unsupported;
166 if (sta && !sta->uploaded)
167 goto out_unsupported;
169 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
171 * The driver doesn't know anything about VLAN interfaces.
172 * Hence, don't send GTKs for VLAN interfaces to the driver.
174 if (!(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) {
176 goto out_unsupported;
180 ret = drv_set_key(key->local, SET_KEY, sdata,
181 sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
184 key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
186 if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
187 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
188 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
189 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
191 WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
192 (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV));
194 WARN_ON((key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) &&
195 (key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC));
200 if (ret != -ENOSPC && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP && ret != 1)
202 "failed to set key (%d, %pM) to hardware (%d)\n",
204 sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
207 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
208 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
209 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
210 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
211 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
212 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
213 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
214 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
215 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
216 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
217 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
218 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
219 /* all of these we can do in software - if driver can */
222 if (ieee80211_hw_check(&key->local->hw, SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL))
230 static void ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(struct ieee80211_key *key)
232 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
233 struct sta_info *sta;
238 if (!key || !key->local->ops->set_key)
241 assert_key_lock(key->local);
243 if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
249 if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
250 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
251 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
252 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
254 key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
255 ret = drv_set_key(key->local, DISABLE_KEY, sdata,
256 sta ? &sta->sta : NULL, &key->conf);
260 "failed to remove key (%d, %pM) from hardware (%d)\n",
262 sta ? sta->sta.addr : bcast_addr, ret);
265 static int _ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool force)
267 struct sta_info *sta = key->sta;
268 struct ieee80211_local *local = key->local;
270 assert_key_lock(local);
272 set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_USES_ENCRYPTION);
274 sta->ptk_idx = key->conf.keyidx;
276 if (force || !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT))
277 clear_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
278 ieee80211_check_fast_xmit(sta);
283 int ieee80211_set_tx_key(struct ieee80211_key *key)
285 return _ieee80211_set_tx_key(key, false);
288 static void ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(struct ieee80211_key *old,
289 struct ieee80211_key *new)
291 struct ieee80211_local *local = new->local;
292 struct sta_info *sta = new->sta;
295 assert_key_lock(local);
297 if (new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) {
298 /* Extended Key ID key install, initial one or rekey */
300 if (sta->ptk_idx != INVALID_PTK_KEYIDX &&
301 !ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT)) {
302 /* Aggregation Sessions with Extended Key ID must not
303 * mix MPDUs with different keyIDs within one A-MPDU.
304 * Tear down running Tx aggregation sessions and block
305 * new Rx/Tx aggregation requests during rekey to
306 * ensure there are no A-MPDUs when the driver is not
307 * supporting A-MPDU key borders. (Blocking Tx only
308 * would be sufficient but WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA gets the
309 * job done for the few ms we need it.)
311 set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
312 mutex_lock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
313 for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++)
314 ___ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_session(sta, i,
315 AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
316 mutex_unlock(&sta->ampdu_mlme.mtx);
319 /* Rekey without Extended Key ID.
320 * Aggregation sessions are OK when running on SW crypto.
321 * A broken remote STA may cause issues not observed with HW
324 if (!(old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
327 /* Stop Tx till we are on the new key */
328 old->flags |= KEY_FLAG_TAINTED;
329 ieee80211_clear_fast_xmit(sta);
330 if (ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, AMPDU_AGGREGATION)) {
331 set_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_BLOCK_BA);
332 ieee80211_sta_tear_down_BA_sessions(sta,
333 AGG_STOP_LOCAL_REQUEST);
335 if (!wiphy_ext_feature_isset(local->hw.wiphy,
336 NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0)) {
337 pr_warn_ratelimited("Rekeying PTK for STA %pM but driver can't safely do that.",
339 /* Flushing the driver queues *may* help prevent
340 * the clear text leaks and freezes.
342 ieee80211_flush_queues(local, old->sdata, false);
347 static void __ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
348 int idx, bool uni, bool multi)
350 struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
352 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
354 if (idx >= 0 && idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS) {
355 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->keys[idx]);
357 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sdata->deflink.gtk[idx]);
361 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->default_unicast_key, key);
362 ieee80211_check_fast_xmit_iface(sdata);
363 if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN)
364 drv_set_default_unicast_key(sdata->local, sdata, idx);
368 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->deflink.default_multicast_key, key);
370 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
373 void ieee80211_set_default_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx,
374 bool uni, bool multi)
376 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
377 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, idx, uni, multi);
378 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
382 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
384 struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
386 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
388 if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS &&
389 idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS)
390 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
391 sdata->deflink.gtk[idx]);
393 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->deflink.default_mgmt_key, key);
395 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
398 void ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
401 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
402 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, idx);
403 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
407 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, int idx)
409 struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL;
411 assert_key_lock(sdata->local);
413 if (idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS &&
414 idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
415 NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS)
416 key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
417 sdata->deflink.gtk[idx]);
419 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->deflink.default_beacon_key, key);
421 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
424 void ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
427 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
428 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, idx);
429 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
432 static int ieee80211_key_replace(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
433 struct sta_info *sta,
435 struct ieee80211_key *old,
436 struct ieee80211_key *new)
440 bool defunikey, defmultikey, defmgmtkey, defbeaconkey;
443 /* caller must provide at least one old/new */
444 if (WARN_ON(!new && !old))
448 idx = new->conf.keyidx;
449 list_add_tail_rcu(&new->list, &sdata->key_list);
450 is_wep = new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
451 new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104;
453 idx = old->conf.keyidx;
454 is_wep = old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 ||
455 old->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104;
458 if ((is_wep || pairwise) && idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)
461 WARN_ON(new && old && new->conf.keyidx != old->conf.keyidx);
463 if (new && sta && pairwise) {
464 /* Unicast rekey needs special handling. With Extended Key ID
465 * old is still NULL for the first rekey.
467 ieee80211_pairwise_rekey(old, new);
471 if (old->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
472 ieee80211_key_disable_hw_accel(old);
475 ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
478 if (!new->local->wowlan)
479 ret = ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(new);
487 rcu_assign_pointer(sta->ptk[idx], new);
489 !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX))
490 _ieee80211_set_tx_key(new, true);
492 rcu_assign_pointer(sta->deflink.gtk[idx], new);
494 /* Only needed for transition from no key -> key.
495 * Still triggers unnecessary when using Extended Key ID
496 * and installing the second key ID the first time.
499 ieee80211_check_fast_rx(sta);
502 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
503 sdata->default_unicast_key);
505 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
506 sdata->deflink.default_multicast_key);
508 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
509 sdata->deflink.default_mgmt_key);
510 defbeaconkey = old &&
511 old == key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
512 sdata->deflink.default_beacon_key);
514 if (defunikey && !new)
515 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, true, false);
516 if (defmultikey && !new)
517 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, -1, false, true);
518 if (defmgmtkey && !new)
519 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata, -1);
520 if (defbeaconkey && !new)
521 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata, -1);
523 if (is_wep || pairwise)
524 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->keys[idx], new);
526 rcu_assign_pointer(sdata->deflink.gtk[idx], new);
528 if (defunikey && new)
529 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
531 if (defmultikey && new)
532 __ieee80211_set_default_key(sdata, new->conf.keyidx,
534 if (defmgmtkey && new)
535 __ieee80211_set_default_mgmt_key(sdata,
537 if (defbeaconkey && new)
538 __ieee80211_set_default_beacon_key(sdata,
543 list_del_rcu(&old->list);
548 struct ieee80211_key *
549 ieee80211_key_alloc(u32 cipher, int idx, size_t key_len,
551 size_t seq_len, const u8 *seq)
553 struct ieee80211_key *key;
556 if (WARN_ON(idx < 0 ||
557 idx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS +
558 NUM_DEFAULT_BEACON_KEYS))
559 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
561 key = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ieee80211_key) + key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
563 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
566 * Default to software encryption; we'll later upload the
567 * key to the hardware if possible.
572 key->conf.cipher = cipher;
573 key->conf.keyidx = idx;
574 key->conf.keylen = key_len;
576 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40:
577 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104:
578 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN;
579 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN;
581 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
582 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN;
583 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
585 for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS; i++) {
586 key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv32 =
587 get_unaligned_le32(&seq[2]);
588 key->u.tkip.rx[i].iv16 =
589 get_unaligned_le16(seq);
592 spin_lock_init(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
594 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
595 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
596 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
598 for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
599 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
600 key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
601 seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
604 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
605 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
607 key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
608 key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN);
609 if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
610 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
615 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
616 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_HDR_LEN;
617 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN;
618 for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
619 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN; j++)
620 key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
621 seq[IEEE80211_CCMP_256_PN_LEN - j - 1];
622 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
623 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
625 key->u.ccmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_key_setup_encrypt(
626 key_data, key_len, IEEE80211_CCMP_256_MIC_LEN);
627 if (IS_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm)) {
628 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
633 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
634 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
635 key->conf.iv_len = 0;
636 if (cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC)
637 key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie);
639 key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16);
641 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN; j++)
642 key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn[j] =
643 seq[IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1];
645 * Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
646 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
648 key->u.aes_cmac.tfm =
649 ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len);
650 if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm)) {
651 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
656 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
657 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
658 key->conf.iv_len = 0;
659 key->conf.icv_len = sizeof(struct ieee80211_mmie_16);
661 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN; j++)
662 key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn[j] =
663 seq[IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN - j - 1];
664 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
665 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
667 key->u.aes_gmac.tfm =
668 ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_setup(key_data, key_len);
669 if (IS_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm)) {
670 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm);
675 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
676 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
677 key->conf.iv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
678 key->conf.icv_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
679 for (i = 0; seq && i < IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS + 1; i++)
680 for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN; j++)
681 key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[i][j] =
682 seq[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN - j - 1];
683 /* Initialize AES key state here as an optimization so that
684 * it does not need to be initialized for every packet.
686 key->u.gcmp.tfm = ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_setup_encrypt(key_data,
688 if (IS_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm)) {
689 err = PTR_ERR(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
695 memcpy(key->conf.key, key_data, key_len);
696 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&key->list);
701 static void ieee80211_key_free_common(struct ieee80211_key *key)
703 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
704 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
705 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
706 ieee80211_aes_key_free(key->u.ccmp.tfm);
708 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
709 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
710 ieee80211_aes_cmac_key_free(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm);
712 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
713 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
714 ieee80211_aes_gmac_key_free(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm);
716 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
717 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
718 ieee80211_aes_gcm_key_free(key->u.gcmp.tfm);
721 kfree_sensitive(key);
724 static void __ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
728 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = key->sdata;
730 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove(key);
732 if (delay_tailroom) {
733 /* see ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec */
734 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec++;
735 schedule_delayed_work(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk,
738 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata, 1);
742 ieee80211_key_free_common(key);
745 static void ieee80211_key_destroy(struct ieee80211_key *key,
752 * Synchronize so the TX path and rcu key iterators
753 * can no longer be using this key before we free/remove it.
757 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
760 void ieee80211_key_free_unused(struct ieee80211_key *key)
762 WARN_ON(key->sdata || key->local);
763 ieee80211_key_free_common(key);
766 static bool ieee80211_key_identical(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
767 struct ieee80211_key *old,
768 struct ieee80211_key *new)
770 u8 tkip_old[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP], tkip_new[WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP];
773 if (!old || new->conf.keylen != old->conf.keylen)
776 tk_old = old->conf.key;
777 tk_new = new->conf.key;
780 * In station mode, don't compare the TX MIC key, as it's never used
781 * and offloaded rekeying may not care to send it to the host. This
782 * is the case in iwlwifi, for example.
784 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
785 new->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP &&
786 new->conf.keylen == WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP &&
787 !(new->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE)) {
788 memcpy(tkip_old, tk_old, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP);
789 memcpy(tkip_new, tk_new, WLAN_KEY_LEN_TKIP);
790 memset(tkip_old + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8);
791 memset(tkip_new + NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY, 0, 8);
796 return !crypto_memneq(tk_old, tk_new, new->conf.keylen);
799 int ieee80211_key_link(struct ieee80211_key *key,
800 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
801 struct sta_info *sta)
803 static atomic_t key_color = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
804 struct ieee80211_key *old_key = NULL;
805 int idx = key->conf.keyidx;
806 bool pairwise = key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE;
808 * We want to delay tailroom updates only for station - in that
809 * case it helps roaming speed, but in other cases it hurts and
810 * can cause warnings to appear.
812 bool delay_tailroom = sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION;
813 int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
815 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
817 if (sta && pairwise) {
818 struct ieee80211_key *alt_key;
820 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx]);
821 alt_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local, sta->ptk[idx ^ 1]);
823 /* The rekey code assumes that the old and new key are using
824 * the same cipher. Enforce the assumption for pairwise keys.
826 if ((alt_key && alt_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher) ||
827 (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher))
830 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
831 sta->deflink.gtk[idx]);
833 if (idx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS)
834 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
837 old_key = key_mtx_dereference(sdata->local,
838 sdata->deflink.gtk[idx]);
841 /* Non-pairwise keys must also not switch the cipher on rekey */
843 if (old_key && old_key->conf.cipher != key->conf.cipher)
848 * Silently accept key re-installation without really installing the
849 * new version of the key to avoid nonce reuse or replay issues.
851 if (ieee80211_key_identical(sdata, old_key, key)) {
852 ieee80211_key_free_unused(key);
857 key->local = sdata->local;
862 * Assign a unique ID to every key so we can easily prevent mixed
863 * key and fragment cache attacks.
865 key->color = atomic_inc_return(&key_color);
867 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
869 ret = ieee80211_key_replace(sdata, sta, pairwise, old_key, key);
872 ieee80211_debugfs_key_add(key);
873 ieee80211_key_destroy(old_key, delay_tailroom);
875 ieee80211_key_free(key, delay_tailroom);
879 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
884 void ieee80211_key_free(struct ieee80211_key *key, bool delay_tailroom)
890 * Replace key with nothingness if it was ever used.
893 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
894 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
896 ieee80211_key_destroy(key, delay_tailroom);
899 void ieee80211_reenable_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata)
901 struct ieee80211_key *key;
902 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
904 lockdep_assert_wiphy(sdata->local->hw.wiphy);
906 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
908 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
909 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
911 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
912 list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list) {
913 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt = 0;
914 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
918 if (ieee80211_sdata_running(sdata)) {
919 list_for_each_entry(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
920 increment_tailroom_need_count(sdata);
921 ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel(key);
925 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
928 void ieee80211_iter_keys(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
929 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
930 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
931 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
932 struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
933 struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
937 struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
938 struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
939 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
941 lockdep_assert_wiphy(hw->wiphy);
943 mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
945 sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
946 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list)
947 iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
948 key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
949 &key->conf, iter_data);
951 list_for_each_entry(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
952 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp,
953 &sdata->key_list, list)
954 iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
955 key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
956 &key->conf, iter_data);
958 mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
960 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys);
963 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
964 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
965 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
966 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
967 struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
968 struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
972 struct ieee80211_key *key;
974 list_for_each_entry_rcu(key, &sdata->key_list, list) {
975 /* skip keys of station in removal process */
976 if (key->sta && key->sta->removed)
978 if (!(key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE))
981 iter(hw, &sdata->vif,
982 key->sta ? &key->sta->sta : NULL,
983 &key->conf, iter_data);
987 void ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
988 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
989 void (*iter)(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
990 struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
991 struct ieee80211_sta *sta,
992 struct ieee80211_key_conf *key,
996 struct ieee80211_local *local = hw_to_local(hw);
997 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
1000 sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
1001 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data);
1003 list_for_each_entry_rcu(sdata, &local->interfaces, list)
1004 _ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu(hw, sdata, iter, iter_data);
1007 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu);
1009 static void ieee80211_free_keys_iface(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
1010 struct list_head *keys)
1012 struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
1014 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata,
1015 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1016 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
1018 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_mgmt_default(sdata);
1019 ieee80211_debugfs_key_remove_beacon_default(sdata);
1021 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &sdata->key_list, list) {
1022 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
1023 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
1025 list_add_tail(&key->list, keys);
1028 ieee80211_debugfs_key_update_default(sdata);
1031 void ieee80211_free_keys(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,
1032 bool force_synchronize)
1034 struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
1035 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *vlan;
1036 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *master;
1037 struct ieee80211_key *key, *tmp;
1040 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&sdata->dec_tailroom_needed_wk);
1042 mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
1044 ieee80211_free_keys_iface(sdata, &keys);
1046 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
1047 list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
1048 ieee80211_free_keys_iface(vlan, &keys);
1051 if (!list_empty(&keys) || force_synchronize)
1053 list_for_each_entry_safe(key, tmp, &keys, list)
1054 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, false);
1056 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN) {
1058 master = container_of(sdata->bss,
1059 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
1062 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt !=
1063 master->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt);
1066 WARN_ON_ONCE(sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
1067 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1070 if (sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP) {
1071 list_for_each_entry(vlan, &sdata->u.ap.vlans, u.vlan.list)
1072 WARN_ON_ONCE(vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
1073 vlan->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1076 mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
1079 void ieee80211_free_sta_keys(struct ieee80211_local *local,
1080 struct sta_info *sta)
1082 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1085 mutex_lock(&local->key_mtx);
1086 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sta->deflink.gtk); i++) {
1087 key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->deflink.gtk[i]);
1090 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
1091 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
1093 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type ==
1094 NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION);
1097 for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) {
1098 key = key_mtx_dereference(local, sta->ptk[i]);
1101 ieee80211_key_replace(key->sdata, key->sta,
1102 key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PAIRWISE,
1104 __ieee80211_key_destroy(key, key->sdata->vif.type ==
1105 NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION);
1108 mutex_unlock(&local->key_mtx);
1111 void ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(struct work_struct *wk)
1113 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata;
1115 sdata = container_of(wk, struct ieee80211_sub_if_data,
1116 dec_tailroom_needed_wk.work);
1119 * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to
1120 * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted
1121 * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the
1122 * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes
1123 * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this
1124 * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on
1125 * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than
1126 * zero and no 0->1 transition happens.
1128 * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys
1129 * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no
1130 * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case
1131 * within an ESS this usually won't happen.
1134 mutex_lock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
1135 decrease_tailroom_need_count(sdata,
1136 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec);
1137 sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 0;
1138 mutex_unlock(&sdata->local->key_mtx);
1141 void ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify(struct ieee80211_vif *vif, const u8 *bssid,
1142 const u8 *replay_ctr, gfp_t gfp)
1144 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
1146 trace_api_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata, bssid, replay_ctr);
1148 cfg80211_gtk_rekey_notify(sdata->dev, bssid, replay_ctr, gfp);
1150 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify);
1152 void ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
1153 int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
1155 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1158 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1160 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1161 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
1162 if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1164 seq->tkip.iv32 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32;
1165 seq->tkip.iv16 = key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16;
1167 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
1168 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
1169 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1172 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1174 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
1175 memcpy(seq->ccmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
1177 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1178 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1179 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1181 pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
1182 memcpy(seq->aes_cmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN);
1184 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1185 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1186 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1188 pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn;
1189 memcpy(seq->aes_gmac.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN);
1191 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
1192 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
1193 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1196 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1198 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid];
1199 memcpy(seq->gcmp.pn, pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
1203 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_get_key_rx_seq);
1205 void ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf,
1206 int tid, struct ieee80211_key_seq *seq)
1208 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1211 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1213 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1214 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP:
1215 if (WARN_ON(tid < 0 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1217 key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv32 = seq->tkip.iv32;
1218 key->u.tkip.rx[tid].iv16 = seq->tkip.iv16;
1220 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
1221 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
1222 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1225 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1227 pn = key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[tid];
1228 memcpy(pn, seq->ccmp.pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
1230 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1231 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1232 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1234 pn = key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn;
1235 memcpy(pn, seq->aes_cmac.pn, IEEE80211_CMAC_PN_LEN);
1237 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1238 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1239 if (WARN_ON(tid != 0))
1241 pn = key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn;
1242 memcpy(pn, seq->aes_gmac.pn, IEEE80211_GMAC_PN_LEN);
1244 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
1245 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
1246 if (WARN_ON(tid < -1 || tid >= IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS))
1249 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS];
1251 pn = key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[tid];
1252 memcpy(pn, seq->gcmp.pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
1259 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq);
1261 void ieee80211_remove_key(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1263 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1265 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1267 assert_key_lock(key->local);
1270 * if key was uploaded, we assume the driver will/has remove(d)
1271 * it, so adjust bookkeeping accordingly
1273 if (key->flags & KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE) {
1274 key->flags &= ~KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE;
1276 if (!(key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
1277 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE |
1278 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RESERVE_TAILROOM)))
1279 increment_tailroom_need_count(key->sdata);
1282 ieee80211_key_free(key, false);
1284 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_remove_key);
1286 struct ieee80211_key_conf *
1287 ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
1288 struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1290 struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = vif_to_sdata(vif);
1291 struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
1292 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1295 if (WARN_ON(!local->wowlan))
1296 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1298 if (WARN_ON(vif->type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION))
1299 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
1301 key = ieee80211_key_alloc(keyconf->cipher, keyconf->keyidx,
1302 keyconf->keylen, keyconf->key,
1305 return ERR_CAST(key);
1307 if (sdata->u.mgd.mfp != IEEE80211_MFP_DISABLED)
1308 key->conf.flags |= IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_RX_MGMT;
1310 err = ieee80211_key_link(key, sdata, NULL);
1312 return ERR_PTR(err);
1316 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add);
1318 void ieee80211_key_mic_failure(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1320 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1322 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1324 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1325 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1326 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1327 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
1329 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1330 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1331 key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
1334 /* ignore the others for now, we don't keep counters now */
1338 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_mic_failure);
1340 void ieee80211_key_replay(struct ieee80211_key_conf *keyconf)
1342 struct ieee80211_key *key;
1344 key = container_of(keyconf, struct ieee80211_key, conf);
1346 switch (key->conf.cipher) {
1347 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP:
1348 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP_256:
1349 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
1351 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC:
1352 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_CMAC_256:
1353 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
1355 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_128:
1356 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_BIP_GMAC_256:
1357 key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
1359 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP:
1360 case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_GCMP_256:
1361 key->u.gcmp.replays++;
1365 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ieee80211_key_replay);