1 /* Manage a process's keyrings
3 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005, 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
12 #include <linux/module.h>
13 #include <linux/init.h>
14 #include <linux/sched.h>
15 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
17 #include <linux/err.h>
18 #include <linux/mutex.h>
19 #include <linux/security.h>
20 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
21 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
24 /* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */
25 static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_session_mutex);
27 /* User keyring creation semaphore */
28 static DEFINE_MUTEX(key_user_keyring_mutex);
30 /* The root user's tracking struct */
31 struct key_user root_key_user = {
32 .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(3),
33 .cons_lock = __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(root_key_user.cons_lock),
34 .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(root_key_user.lock),
35 .nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
36 .nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
37 .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
41 * Install the user and user session keyrings for the current process's UID.
43 int install_user_keyrings(void)
45 struct user_struct *user;
46 const struct cred *cred;
47 struct key *uid_keyring, *session_keyring;
48 key_perm_t user_keyring_perm;
53 user_keyring_perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_ALL;
54 cred = current_cred();
56 uid = from_kuid(cred->user_ns, user->uid);
58 kenter("%p{%u}", user, uid);
60 if (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) {
61 kleave(" = 0 [exist]");
65 mutex_lock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
68 if (!user->uid_keyring) {
69 /* get the UID-specific keyring
70 * - there may be one in existence already as it may have been
71 * pinned by a session, but the user_struct pointing to it
72 * may have been destroyed by setuid */
73 sprintf(buf, "_uid.%u", uid);
75 uid_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
76 if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
77 uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
78 cred, user_keyring_perm,
79 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
80 if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) {
81 ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring);
86 /* get a default session keyring (which might also exist
88 sprintf(buf, "_uid_ses.%u", uid);
90 session_keyring = find_keyring_by_name(buf, true);
91 if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
93 keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID,
94 cred, user_keyring_perm,
95 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
96 if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) {
97 ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring);
101 /* we install a link from the user session keyring to
102 * the user keyring */
103 ret = key_link(session_keyring, uid_keyring);
105 goto error_release_both;
108 /* install the keyrings */
109 user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring;
110 user->session_keyring = session_keyring;
113 mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
118 key_put(session_keyring);
120 key_put(uid_keyring);
122 mutex_unlock(&key_user_keyring_mutex);
123 kleave(" = %d", ret);
128 * Install a fresh thread keyring directly to new credentials. This keyring is
129 * allowed to overrun the quota.
131 int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
135 keyring = keyring_alloc("_tid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
136 KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
137 KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
139 return PTR_ERR(keyring);
141 new->thread_keyring = keyring;
146 * Install a fresh thread keyring, discarding the old one.
148 static int install_thread_keyring(void)
153 new = prepare_creds();
157 BUG_ON(new->thread_keyring);
159 ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
165 return commit_creds(new);
169 * Install a process keyring directly to a credentials struct.
171 * Returns -EEXIST if there was already a process keyring, 0 if one installed,
172 * and other value on any other error
174 int install_process_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *new)
178 if (new->process_keyring)
181 keyring = keyring_alloc("_pid", new->uid, new->gid, new,
182 KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW,
183 KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN, NULL);
185 return PTR_ERR(keyring);
187 new->process_keyring = keyring;
192 * Make sure a process keyring is installed for the current process. The
193 * existing process keyring is not replaced.
195 * Returns 0 if there is a process keyring by the end of this function, some
198 static int install_process_keyring(void)
203 new = prepare_creds();
207 ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
210 return ret != -EEXIST ? ret : 0;
213 return commit_creds(new);
217 * Install a session keyring directly to a credentials struct.
219 int install_session_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *cred, struct key *keyring)
226 /* create an empty session keyring */
228 flags = KEY_ALLOC_QUOTA_OVERRUN;
229 if (cred->session_keyring)
230 flags = KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA;
232 keyring = keyring_alloc("_ses", cred->uid, cred->gid, cred,
233 KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ,
236 return PTR_ERR(keyring);
241 /* install the keyring */
242 old = cred->session_keyring;
243 rcu_assign_pointer(cred->session_keyring, keyring);
252 * Install a session keyring, discarding the old one. If a keyring is not
253 * supplied, an empty one is invented.
255 static int install_session_keyring(struct key *keyring)
260 new = prepare_creds();
264 ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
270 return commit_creds(new);
274 * Handle the fsuid changing.
276 void key_fsuid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
278 /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
280 if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
281 down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
282 tsk->cred->thread_keyring->uid = tsk->cred->fsuid;
283 up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
288 * Handle the fsgid changing.
290 void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)
292 /* update the ownership of the thread keyring */
294 if (tsk->cred->thread_keyring) {
295 down_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
296 tsk->cred->thread_keyring->gid = tsk->cred->fsgid;
297 up_write(&tsk->cred->thread_keyring->sem);
302 * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first
305 * The search criteria are the type and the match function. The description is
306 * given to the match function as a parameter, but doesn't otherwise influence
307 * the search. Typically the match function will compare the description
308 * parameter to the key's description.
310 * This can only search keyrings that grant Search permission to the supplied
311 * credentials. Keyrings linked to searched keyrings will also be searched if
312 * they grant Search permission too. Keys can only be found if they grant
313 * Search permission to the credentials.
315 * Returns a pointer to the key with the key usage count incremented if
316 * successful, -EAGAIN if we didn't find any matching key or -ENOKEY if we only
317 * matched negative keys.
319 * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
320 * returned key reference.
322 key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
324 key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err;
326 /* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were
327 * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
328 * otherwise we want to return a sample error (probably -EACCES) if
329 * none of the keyrings were searchable
331 * in terms of priority: success > -ENOKEY > -EAGAIN > other error
335 err = ERR_PTR(-EAGAIN);
337 /* search the thread keyring first */
338 if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) {
339 key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
340 make_key_ref(ctx->cred->thread_keyring, 1), ctx);
341 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
344 switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
345 case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
346 case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
355 /* search the process keyring second */
356 if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) {
357 key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
358 make_key_ref(ctx->cred->process_keyring, 1), ctx);
359 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
362 switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
363 case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
366 case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
375 /* search the session keyring */
376 if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) {
378 key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
379 make_key_ref(rcu_dereference(ctx->cred->session_keyring), 1),
383 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
386 switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
387 case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
390 case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
398 /* or search the user-session keyring */
399 else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) {
400 key_ref = keyring_search_aux(
401 make_key_ref(ctx->cred->user->session_keyring, 1),
403 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
406 switch (PTR_ERR(key_ref)) {
407 case -EAGAIN: /* no key */
410 case -ENOKEY: /* negative key */
419 /* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
420 key_ref = ret ? ret : err;
427 * Search the process keyrings attached to the supplied cred for the first
428 * matching key in the manner of search_my_process_keyrings(), but also search
429 * the keys attached to the assumed authorisation key using its credentials if
432 * Return same as search_my_process_keyrings().
434 key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
436 struct request_key_auth *rka;
437 key_ref_t key_ref, ret = ERR_PTR(-EACCES), err;
441 key_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(ctx);
442 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
446 /* if this process has an instantiation authorisation key, then we also
447 * search the keyrings of the process mentioned there
448 * - we don't permit access to request_key auth keys via this method
450 if (ctx->cred->request_key_auth &&
451 ctx->cred == current_cred() &&
452 ctx->index_key.type != &key_type_request_key_auth
454 const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;
456 /* defend against the auth key being revoked */
457 down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
459 if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
460 rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
462 ctx->cred = rka->cred;
463 key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
466 up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
468 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
473 up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
477 /* no key - decide on the error we're going to go for */
478 if (err == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) || ret == ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
479 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
480 else if (err == ERR_PTR(-EACCES))
490 * See if the key we're looking at is the target key.
492 int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
494 return key == target;
498 * Look up a key ID given us by userspace with a given permissions mask to get
499 * the key it refers to.
501 * Flags can be passed to request that special keyrings be created if referred
502 * to directly, to permit partially constructed keys to be found and to skip
503 * validity and permission checks on the found key.
505 * Returns a pointer to the key with an incremented usage count if successful;
506 * -EINVAL if the key ID is invalid; -ENOKEY if the key ID does not correspond
507 * to a key or the best found key was a negative key; -EKEYREVOKED or
508 * -EKEYEXPIRED if the best found key was revoked or expired; -EACCES if the
509 * found key doesn't grant the requested permit or the LSM denied access to it;
510 * or -ENOMEM if a special keyring couldn't be created.
512 * In the case of a successful return, the possession attribute is set on the
513 * returned key reference.
515 key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
518 struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
519 .match = lookup_user_key_possessed,
520 .flags = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
521 KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
523 struct request_key_auth *rka;
525 key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref;
529 ctx.cred = get_current_cred();
530 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
533 case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
534 if (!ctx.cred->thread_keyring) {
535 if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
538 ret = install_thread_keyring();
540 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
546 key = ctx.cred->thread_keyring;
548 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
551 case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
552 if (!ctx.cred->process_keyring) {
553 if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
556 ret = install_process_keyring();
558 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
564 key = ctx.cred->process_keyring;
566 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
569 case KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING:
570 if (!ctx.cred->session_keyring) {
571 /* always install a session keyring upon access if one
572 * doesn't exist yet */
573 ret = install_user_keyrings();
576 if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE)
577 ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
579 ret = install_session_keyring(
580 ctx.cred->user->session_keyring);
585 } else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring ==
586 ctx.cred->user->session_keyring &&
587 lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE) {
588 ret = join_session_keyring(NULL);
595 key = rcu_dereference(ctx.cred->session_keyring);
598 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
601 case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING:
602 if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) {
603 ret = install_user_keyrings();
608 key = ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring;
610 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
613 case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
614 if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) {
615 ret = install_user_keyrings();
620 key = ctx.cred->user->session_keyring;
622 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
625 case KEY_SPEC_GROUP_KEYRING:
626 /* group keyrings are not yet supported */
627 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
630 case KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY:
631 key = ctx.cred->request_key_auth;
636 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
639 case KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
640 if (!ctx.cred->request_key_auth)
643 down_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
644 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
645 &ctx.cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
646 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
649 rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
650 key = rka->dest_keyring;
653 up_read(&ctx.cred->request_key_auth->sem);
656 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
660 key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
664 key = key_lookup(id);
666 key_ref = ERR_CAST(key);
670 key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
672 /* check to see if we possess the key */
673 ctx.index_key.type = key->type;
674 ctx.index_key.description = key->description;
675 ctx.index_key.desc_len = strlen(key->description);
676 ctx.match_data = key;
677 kdebug("check possessed");
678 skey_ref = search_process_keyrings(&ctx);
679 kdebug("possessed=%p", skey_ref);
681 if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
689 /* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
690 * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
691 if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
696 if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
697 ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
708 ret = key_validate(key);
714 if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
715 !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
718 /* check the permissions */
719 ret = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, perm);
723 key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
730 key_ref_put(key_ref);
731 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
734 /* if we attempted to install a keyring, then it may have caused new
735 * creds to be installed */
742 * Join the named keyring as the session keyring if possible else attempt to
743 * create a new one of that name and join that.
745 * If the name is NULL, an empty anonymous keyring will be installed as the
748 * Named session keyrings are joined with a semaphore held to prevent the
749 * keyrings from going away whilst the attempt is made to going them and also
750 * to prevent a race in creating compatible session keyrings.
752 long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
754 const struct cred *old;
759 new = prepare_creds();
762 old = current_cred();
764 /* if no name is provided, install an anonymous keyring */
766 ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, NULL);
770 serial = new->session_keyring->serial;
771 ret = commit_creds(new);
777 /* allow the user to join or create a named keyring */
778 mutex_lock(&key_session_mutex);
780 /* look for an existing keyring of this name */
781 keyring = find_keyring_by_name(name, false);
782 if (PTR_ERR(keyring) == -ENOKEY) {
783 /* not found - try and create a new one */
784 keyring = keyring_alloc(
785 name, old->uid, old->gid, old,
786 KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_LINK,
787 KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
788 if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
789 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
792 } else if (IS_ERR(keyring)) {
793 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring);
795 } else if (keyring == new->session_keyring) {
800 /* we've got a keyring - now to install it */
801 ret = install_session_keyring_to_cred(new, keyring);
806 mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
808 ret = keyring->serial;
814 mutex_unlock(&key_session_mutex);
821 * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
822 * the target process is about to resume userspace execution.
824 void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork)
826 const struct cred *old = current_cred();
827 struct cred *new = container_of(twork, struct cred, rcu);
829 if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
834 new-> uid = old-> uid;
835 new-> euid = old-> euid;
836 new-> suid = old-> suid;
837 new->fsuid = old->fsuid;
838 new-> gid = old-> gid;
839 new-> egid = old-> egid;
840 new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
841 new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
842 new->user = get_uid(old->user);
843 new->user_ns = get_user_ns(old->user_ns);
844 new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
846 new->securebits = old->securebits;
847 new->cap_inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
848 new->cap_permitted = old->cap_permitted;
849 new->cap_effective = old->cap_effective;
850 new->cap_bset = old->cap_bset;
852 new->jit_keyring = old->jit_keyring;
853 new->thread_keyring = key_get(old->thread_keyring);
854 new->process_keyring = key_get(old->process_keyring);
856 security_transfer_creds(new, old);
862 * Make sure that root's user and user-session keyrings exist.
864 static int __init init_root_keyring(void)
866 return install_user_keyrings();
869 late_initcall(init_root_keyring);