From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date: Sat, 17 Dec 2022 20:06:53 +0000 (-0600)
Subject: Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
X-Git-Tag: v6.2-rc1~55
X-Git-Url: https://repo.jachan.dev/linux.git/commitdiff_plain/4f292c4de4f6fb83776c0ff22674121eb6ddfa2f

Merge tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

Pull x86 mm updates from Dave Hansen:
 "New Feature:

   - Randomize the per-cpu entry areas

  Cleanups:

   - Have CR3_ADDR_MASK use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK instead of open coding it

   - Move to "native" set_memory_rox() helper

   - Clean up pmd_get_atomic() and i386-PAE

   - Remove some unused page table size macros"

* tag 'x86_mm_for_6.2_v2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (35 commits)
  x86/mm: Ensure forced page table splitting
  x86/kasan: Populate shadow for shared chunk of the CPU entry area
  x86/kasan: Add helpers to align shadow addresses up and down
  x86/kasan: Rename local CPU_ENTRY_AREA variables to shorten names
  x86/mm: Populate KASAN shadow for entire per-CPU range of CPU entry area
  x86/mm: Recompute physical address for every page of per-CPU CEA mapping
  x86/mm: Rename __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias)
  x86/mm: Inhibit _PAGE_NX changes from cpa_process_alias()
  x86/mm: Untangle __change_page_attr_set_clr(.checkalias)
  x86/mm: Add a few comments
  x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK
  x86/mm: Remove P*D_PAGE_MASK and P*D_PAGE_SIZE macros
  mm: Convert __HAVE_ARCH_P..P_GET to the new style
  mm: Remove pointless barrier() after pmdp_get_lockless()
  x86/mm/pae: Get rid of set_64bit()
  x86_64: Remove pointless set_64bit() usage
  x86/mm/pae: Be consistent with pXXp_get_and_clear()
  x86/mm/pae: Use WRITE_ONCE()
  x86/mm/pae: Don't (ab)use atomic64
  mm/gup: Fix the lockless PMD access
  ...
---

4f292c4de4f6fb83776c0ff22674121eb6ddfa2f
diff --cc arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index ae0a8e515e20,03579460d0ec..5e7ead52cfdb
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@@ -423,9 -413,9 +423,7 @@@ create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *op
  	/* ALLOC_TRAMP flags lets us know we created it */
  	ops->flags |= FTRACE_OPS_FL_ALLOC_TRAMP;
  
- 	if (likely(system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING))
- 		set_memory_ro((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
- 	set_memory_x((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
 -	set_vm_flush_reset_perms(trampoline);
 -
+ 	set_memory_rox((unsigned long)trampoline, npages);
  	return (unsigned long)trampoline;
  fail:
  	tramp_free(trampoline);
diff --cc arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 01b8d956aa76,e7b7ca64acdf..66299682b6b7
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@@ -414,12 -414,8 +414,6 @@@ void *alloc_insn_page(void
  	if (!page)
  		return NULL;
  
- 	/*
- 	 * First make the page read-only, and only then make it executable to
- 	 * prevent it from being W+X in between.
- 	 */
- 	set_memory_ro((unsigned long)page, 1);
 -	set_vm_flush_reset_perms(page);
--
  	/*
  	 * TODO: Once additional kernel code protection mechanisms are set, ensure
  	 * that the page was not maliciously altered and it is still zeroed.