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[PATCH] tpm: fix bug introduced by the /proc/misc
[linux.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
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1da177e4
LT		 1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <[email protected]>
7 * Chris Vance, <[email protected]>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <[email protected]>
9 * James Morris <[email protected]>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <[email protected]>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <[email protected]>
15 *
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
19 */
20
21#include <linux/config.h>
22#include <linux/module.h>
23#include <linux/init.h>
24#include <linux/kernel.h>
25#include <linux/ptrace.h>
26#include <linux/errno.h>
27#include <linux/sched.h>
28#include <linux/security.h>
29#include <linux/xattr.h>
30#include <linux/capability.h>
31#include <linux/unistd.h>
32#include <linux/mm.h>
33#include <linux/mman.h>
34#include <linux/slab.h>
35#include <linux/pagemap.h>
36#include <linux/swap.h>
37#include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38#include <linux/spinlock.h>
39#include <linux/syscalls.h>
40#include <linux/file.h>
41#include <linux/namei.h>
42#include <linux/mount.h>
43#include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
45#include <linux/kd.h>
46#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48#include <linux/tty.h>
49#include <net/icmp.h>
50#include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52#include <asm/uaccess.h>
53#include <asm/semaphore.h>
54#include <asm/ioctls.h>
55#include <linux/bitops.h>
56#include <linux/interrupt.h>
57#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58#include <linux/netlink.h>
59#include <linux/tcp.h>
60#include <linux/udp.h>
61#include <linux/quota.h>
62#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64#include <linux/parser.h>
65#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
66#include <net/ipv6.h>
67#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68#include <linux/personality.h>
69#include <linux/sysctl.h>
70#include <linux/audit.h>
71
72#include "avc.h"
73#include "objsec.h"
74#include "netif.h"
75
76#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
77#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
78
79extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
80extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
81
82#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
83int selinux_enforcing = 0;
84
85static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
86{
87 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
88 return 1;
89}
90__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
91#endif
92
93#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
94int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
95
96static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
97{
98 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
99 return 1;
100}
101__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
102#endif
103
104/* Original (dummy) security module. */
105static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
106
107/* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
108 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
109 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
110 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
111static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
112
113/* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
114 before the policy was loaded. */
115static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
116static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
117
118/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
119
120static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
121{
122 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
123
124 tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
125 if (!tsec)
126 return -ENOMEM;
127
128 memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
129 tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
130 tsec->task = task;
131 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
132 task->security = tsec;
133
134 return 0;
135}
136
137static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
138{
139 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
140
141 if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
142 return;
143
144 task->security = NULL;
145 kfree(tsec);
146}
147
148static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
149{
150 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
151 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
152
153 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
154 if (!isec)
155 return -ENOMEM;
156
157 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
158 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
159 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
160 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
161 isec->inode = inode;
162 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
163 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
164 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
165 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
166 else
167 isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
168 inode->i_security = isec;
169
170 return 0;
171}
172
173static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
174{
175 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
176 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
177
178 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
179 return;
180
181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
182 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
183 list_del_init(&isec->list);
184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
185
186 inode->i_security = NULL;
187 kfree(isec);
188}
189
190static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
191{
192 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
193 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
194
195 fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
196 if (!fsec)
197 return -ENOMEM;
198
199 memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
200 fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
201 fsec->file = file;
202 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
203 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
204 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
205 } else {
206 fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
207 fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
208 }
209 file->f_security = fsec;
210
211 return 0;
212}
213
214static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
215{
216 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
217
218 if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
219 return;
220
221 file->f_security = NULL;
222 kfree(fsec);
223}
224
225static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
226{
227 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
228
229 sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
230 if (!sbsec)
231 return -ENOMEM;
232
233 memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
234 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
236 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
237 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
238 sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
239 sbsec->sb = sb;
240 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
241 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
242 sb->s_security = sbsec;
243
244 return 0;
245}
246
247static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
248{
249 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
250
251 if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
252 return;
253
254 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
255 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
256 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
257 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
258
259 sb->s_security = NULL;
260 kfree(sbsec);
261}
262
263#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
264static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
265{
266 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
267
268 if (family != PF_UNIX)
269 return 0;
270
271 ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
272 if (!ssec)
273 return -ENOMEM;
274
275 memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
276 ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
277 ssec->sk = sk;
278 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
279 sk->sk_security = ssec;
280
281 return 0;
282}
283
284static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
285{
286 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
287
288 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
289 return;
290
291 sk->sk_security = NULL;
292 kfree(ssec);
293}
294#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
295
296/* The security server must be initialized before
297 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
298extern int ss_initialized;
299
300/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
301
302static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
303 "uses xattr",
304 "uses transition SIDs",
305 "uses task SIDs",
306 "uses genfs_contexts",
307 "not configured for labeling",
308 "uses mountpoint labeling",
309};
310
311static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
312
313static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
314{
315 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
316}
317
318enum {
319 Opt_context = 1,
320 Opt_fscontext = 2,
321 Opt_defcontext = 4,
322};
323
324static match_table_t tokens = {
325 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
326 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
327 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
328};
329
330#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
331
332static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
333{
334 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
335 const char *name;
336 u32 sid;
337 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
338 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
340
341 if (!data)
342 goto out;
343
344 name = sb->s_type->name;
345
346 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
347
348 /* NFS we understand. */
349 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
350 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
351
352 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
353 goto out;
354
355 if (d->context[0]) {
356 context = d->context;
357 seen |= Opt_context;
358 }
359 } else
360 goto out;
361
362 } else {
363 /* Standard string-based options. */
364 char *p, *options = data;
365
366 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
367 int token;
368 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
369
370 if (!*p)
371 continue;
372
373 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
374
375 switch (token) {
376 case Opt_context:
377 if (seen) {
378 rc = -EINVAL;
379 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
380 goto out_free;
381 }
382 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
383 if (!context) {
384 rc = -ENOMEM;
385 goto out_free;
386 }
387 if (!alloc)
388 alloc = 1;
389 seen |= Opt_context;
390 break;
391
392 case Opt_fscontext:
393 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
394 rc = -EINVAL;
395 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
396 goto out_free;
397 }
398 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
399 if (!context) {
400 rc = -ENOMEM;
401 goto out_free;
402 }
403 if (!alloc)
404 alloc = 1;
405 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
406 break;
407
408 case Opt_defcontext:
409 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
410 rc = -EINVAL;
411 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
412 "defcontext option is invalid "
413 "for this filesystem type\n");
414 goto out_free;
415 }
416 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
417 rc = -EINVAL;
418 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
419 goto out_free;
420 }
421 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
422 if (!defcontext) {
423 rc = -ENOMEM;
424 goto out_free;
425 }
426 if (!alloc)
427 alloc = 1;
428 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
429 break;
430
431 default:
432 rc = -EINVAL;
433 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
434 "option\n");
435 goto out_free;
436
437 }
438 }
439 }
440
441 if (!seen)
442 goto out;
443
444 if (context) {
445 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
446 if (rc) {
447 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
448 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
449 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
450 goto out_free;
451 }
452
453 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
454 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
455 if (rc)
456 goto out_free;
457
458 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
459 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
460 if (rc)
461 goto out_free;
462
463 sbsec->sid = sid;
464
465 if (seen & Opt_context)
466 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
467 }
468
469 if (defcontext) {
470 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
471 if (rc) {
472 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
473 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
474 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
475 goto out_free;
476 }
477
478 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
479 goto out_free;
480
481 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
482 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
483 if (rc)
484 goto out_free;
485
486 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
487 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
488 if (rc)
489 goto out_free;
490
491 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
492 }
493
494out_free:
495 if (alloc) {
496 kfree(context);
497 kfree(defcontext);
498 }
499out:
500 return rc;
501}
502
503static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
504{
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
506 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
507 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
508 int rc = 0;
509
510 down(&sbsec->sem);
511 if (sbsec->initialized)
512 goto out;
513
514 if (!ss_initialized) {
515 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
516 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
517 server is ready to handle calls. */
518 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
519 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
520 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
521 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
522 goto out;
523 }
524
525 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
526 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
527 if (rc) {
528 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
529 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
530 goto out;
531 }
532
533 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
534 if (rc)
535 goto out;
536
537 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
538 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
539 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
540 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
541 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
542 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
543 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
544 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
545 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
546 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
547 goto out;
548 }
549 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
550 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
551 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
552 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
553 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
554 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
555 else
556 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
557 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
558 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
559 goto out;
560 }
561 }
562
563 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
564 sbsec->proc = 1;
565
566 sbsec->initialized = 1;
567
568 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
569 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
570 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
571 }
572 else {
573 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
574 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
575 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
576 }
577
578 /* Initialize the root inode. */
579 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
580
581 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
582 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
583 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
584 populates itself. */
585 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
586next_inode:
587 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
588 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
589 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
590 struct inode_security_struct, list);
591 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
592 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
593 inode = igrab(inode);
594 if (inode) {
595 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
596 inode_doinit(inode);
597 iput(inode);
598 }
599 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
600 list_del_init(&isec->list);
601 goto next_inode;
602 }
603 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
604out:
605 up(&sbsec->sem);
606 return rc;
607}
608
609static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
610{
611 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
612 case S_IFSOCK:
613 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
614 case S_IFLNK:
615 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
616 case S_IFREG:
617 return SECCLASS_FILE;
618 case S_IFBLK:
619 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
620 case S_IFDIR:
621 return SECCLASS_DIR;
622 case S_IFCHR:
623 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
624 case S_IFIFO:
625 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
626
627 }
628
629 return SECCLASS_FILE;
630}
631
632static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
633{
634 switch (family) {
635 case PF_UNIX:
636 switch (type) {
637 case SOCK_STREAM:
638 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
639 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
640 case SOCK_DGRAM:
641 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
642 }
643 break;
644 case PF_INET:
645 case PF_INET6:
646 switch (type) {
647 case SOCK_STREAM:
648 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
649 case SOCK_DGRAM:
650 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
651 case SOCK_RAW:
652 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
653 }
654 break;
655 case PF_NETLINK:
656 switch (protocol) {
657 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
658 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
659 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
660 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
661 case NETLINK_TCPDIAG:
662 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
663 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
664 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
665 case NETLINK_XFRM:
666 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
667 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
668 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
669 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
670 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
671 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
672 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
673 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
674 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
0c9b7942
JM		 675 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
676 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1da177e4
LT		 677 default:
678 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
679 }
680 case PF_PACKET:
681 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
682 case PF_KEY:
683 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
684 }
685
686 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
687}
688
689#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
690static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
691 u16 tclass,
692 u32 *sid)
693{
694 int buflen, rc;
695 char *buffer, *path, *end;
696
697 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
698 if (!buffer)
699 return -ENOMEM;
700
701 buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
702 end = buffer+buflen;
703 *--end = '\0';
704 buflen--;
705 path = end-1;
706 *path = '/';
707 while (de && de != de->parent) {
708 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
709 if (buflen < 0)
710 break;
711 end -= de->namelen;
712 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
713 *--end = '/';
714 path = end;
715 de = de->parent;
716 }
717 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
718 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
719 return rc;
720}
721#else
722static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
723 u16 tclass,
724 u32 *sid)
725{
726 return -EINVAL;
727}
728#endif
729
730/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
731static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
732{
733 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
734 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
735 u32 sid;
736 struct dentry *dentry;
737#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
738 char *context = NULL;
739 unsigned len = 0;
740 int rc = 0;
741 int hold_sem = 0;
742
743 if (isec->initialized)
744 goto out;
745
746 down(&isec->sem);
747 hold_sem = 1;
748 if (isec->initialized)
749 goto out;
750
751 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
752 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
753 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
754 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
755 server is ready to handle calls. */
756 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
757 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
758 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
759 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
760 goto out;
761 }
762
763 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
764 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
765 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
766 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
767 break;
768 }
769
770 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
771 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
772 if (opt_dentry) {
773 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
774 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
775 } else {
776 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
777 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
778 }
779 if (!dentry) {
780 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
781 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
782 inode->i_ino);
783 goto out;
784 }
785
786 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
787 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
788 if (!context) {
789 rc = -ENOMEM;
790 dput(dentry);
791 goto out;
792 }
793 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
794 context, len);
795 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
796 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
797 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
798 NULL, 0);
799 if (rc < 0) {
800 dput(dentry);
801 goto out;
802 }
803 kfree(context);
804 len = rc;
805 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
806 if (!context) {
807 rc = -ENOMEM;
808 dput(dentry);
809 goto out;
810 }
811 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
812 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
813 context, len);
814 }
815 dput(dentry);
816 if (rc < 0) {
817 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
818 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
819 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
820 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
821 kfree(context);
822 goto out;
823 }
824 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
825 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
826 rc = 0;
827 } else {
828 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, rc, &sid);
829 if (rc) {
830 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
831 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
832 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
833 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
834 kfree(context);
835 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
836 rc = 0;
837 break;
838 }
839 }
840 kfree(context);
841 isec->sid = sid;
842 break;
843 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
844 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
845 break;
846 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
847 /* Default to the fs SID. */
848 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
849
850 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
851 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
852 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
853 sbsec->sid,
854 isec->sclass,
855 &sid);
856 if (rc)
857 goto out;
858 isec->sid = sid;
859 break;
860 default:
861 /* Default to the fs SID. */
862 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
863
864 if (sbsec->proc) {
865 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
866 if (proci->pde) {
867 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
868 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
869 isec->sclass,
870 &sid);
871 if (rc)
872 goto out;
873 isec->sid = sid;
874 }
875 }
876 break;
877 }
878
879 isec->initialized = 1;
880
881out:
882 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
883 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
884
885 if (hold_sem)
886 up(&isec->sem);
887 return rc;
888}
889
890/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
891static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
892{
893 u32 perm = 0;
894
895 switch (sig) {
896 case SIGCHLD:
897 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
898 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
899 break;
900 case SIGKILL:
901 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
902 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
903 break;
904 case SIGSTOP:
905 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
906 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
907 break;
908 default:
909 /* All other signals. */
910 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
911 break;
912 }
913
914 return perm;
915}
916
917/* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
918 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
919static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
920 struct task_struct *tsk2,
921 u32 perms)
922{
923 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
924
925 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
926 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
927 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
928 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
929}
930
931/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
932static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
933 int cap)
934{
935 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
936 struct avc_audit_data ad;
937
938 tsec = tsk->security;
939
940 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
941 ad.tsk = tsk;
942 ad.u.cap = cap;
943
944 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
945 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
946}
947
948/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
949static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
950 u32 perms)
951{
952 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
953
954 tsec = tsk->security;
955
956 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
957 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
958}
959
960/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
961 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
962 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
963static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
964 struct inode *inode,
965 u32 perms,
966 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
967{
968 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
969 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
971
972 tsec = tsk->security;
973 isec = inode->i_security;
974
975 if (!adp) {
976 adp = &ad;
977 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
978 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
979 }
980
981 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
982}
983
984/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
985 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
986 pathname if needed. */
987static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
988 struct vfsmount *mnt,
989 struct dentry *dentry,
990 u32 av)
991{
992 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
993 struct avc_audit_data ad;
994 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
995 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
996 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
997 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
998}
999
1000/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1001 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1002 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1003 check a particular permission to the file.
1004 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1005 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1006 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1007 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1008static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1009 struct file *file,
1010 u32 av)
1011{
1012 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1013 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1014 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1015 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1016 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1017 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1018 int rc;
1019
1020 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1021 ad.u.fs.mnt = mnt;
1022 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1023
1024 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1025 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1026 SECCLASS_FD,
1027 FD__USE,
1028 &ad);
1029 if (rc)
1030 return rc;
1031 }
1032
1033 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1034 if (av)
1035 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1036
1037 return 0;
1038}
1039
1040/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1041static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1042 struct dentry *dentry,
1043 u16 tclass)
1044{
1045 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1046 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1047 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1048 u32 newsid;
1049 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1050 int rc;
1051
1052 tsec = current->security;
1053 dsec = dir->i_security;
1054 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1055
1056 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1057 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1058
1059 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1060 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1061 &ad);
1062 if (rc)
1063 return rc;
1064
1065 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1066 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1067 } else {
1068 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1069 &newsid);
1070 if (rc)
1071 return rc;
1072 }
1073
1074 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1075 if (rc)
1076 return rc;
1077
1078 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1079 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1080 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1081}
1082
1083#define MAY_LINK 0
1084#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1085#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1086
1087/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1088static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1089 struct dentry *dentry,
1090 int kind)
1091
1092{
1093 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1094 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1095 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1096 u32 av;
1097 int rc;
1098
1099 tsec = current->security;
1100 dsec = dir->i_security;
1101 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1102
1103 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1104 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1105
1106 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1107 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1108 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1109 if (rc)
1110 return rc;
1111
1112 switch (kind) {
1113 case MAY_LINK:
1114 av = FILE__LINK;
1115 break;
1116 case MAY_UNLINK:
1117 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1118 break;
1119 case MAY_RMDIR:
1120 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1121 break;
1122 default:
1123 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1124 return 0;
1125 }
1126
1127 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1128 return rc;
1129}
1130
1131static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1132 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1133 struct inode *new_dir,
1134 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1135{
1136 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1137 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1138 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1139 u32 av;
1140 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1141 int rc;
1142
1143 tsec = current->security;
1144 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1145 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1146 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1147 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1148
1149 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1150
1151 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1152 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1153 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1154 if (rc)
1155 return rc;
1156 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1157 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1158 if (rc)
1159 return rc;
1160 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1161 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1162 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1163 if (rc)
1164 return rc;
1165 }
1166
1167 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1168 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1169 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1170 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1171 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1172 if (rc)
1173 return rc;
1174 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1175 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1176 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1177 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1178 new_isec->sclass,
1179 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1180 if (rc)
1181 return rc;
1182 }
1183
1184 return 0;
1185}
1186
1187/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1188static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1189 struct super_block *sb,
1190 u32 perms,
1191 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1192{
1193 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1194 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1195
1196 tsec = tsk->security;
1197 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1198 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1199 perms, ad);
1200}
1201
1202/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1203static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1204{
1205 u32 av = 0;
1206
1207 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1208 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1209 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1210 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1211 av |= FILE__READ;
1212
1213 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1214 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1215 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1216 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1217
1218 } else {
1219 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1220 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1221 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1222 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1223 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1224 av |= DIR__READ;
1225 }
1226
1227 return av;
1228}
1229
1230/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1231static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1232{
1233 u32 av = 0;
1234
1235 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1236 av |= FILE__READ;
1237 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1238 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1239 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1240 else
1241 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1242 }
1243
1244 return av;
1245}
1246
1247/* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1248static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1249{
1250 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1251 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1252
1253 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1254 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257
1258 down(&isec->sem);
1259 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1260 isec->sid = sid;
1261 isec->initialized = 1;
1262 up(&isec->sem);
1263 return 0;
1264}
1265
1266/* Set the security attributes on a newly created file. */
1267static int post_create(struct inode *dir,
1268 struct dentry *dentry)
1269{
1270
1271 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1272 struct inode *inode;
1273 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1275 u32 newsid;
1276 char *context;
1277 unsigned int len;
1278 int rc;
1279
1280 tsec = current->security;
1281 dsec = dir->i_security;
1282 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1283
1284 inode = dentry->d_inode;
1285 if (!inode) {
1286 /* Some file system types (e.g. NFS) may not instantiate
1287 a dentry for all create operations (e.g. symlink),
1288 so we have to check to see if the inode is non-NULL. */
1289 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: no inode, dir (dev=%s, "
1290 "ino=%ld)\n", dir->i_sb->s_id, dir->i_ino);
1291 return 0;
1292 }
1293
1294 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1295 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1296 } else {
1297 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1298 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1299 &newsid);
1300 if (rc) {
1301 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: "
1302 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1303 "ino=%ld)\n",
1304 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1305 return rc;
1306 }
1307 }
1308
1309 rc = inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1310 if (rc) {
1311 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: inode_security_set_sid "
1312 "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1313 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1314 return rc;
1315 }
1316
1317 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
1318 inode->i_op->setxattr) {
1319 /* Use extended attributes. */
1320 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &len);
1321 if (rc) {
1322 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: sid_to_context "
1323 "failed, rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1324 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1325 return rc;
1326 }
1327 down(&inode->i_sem);
1328 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dentry,
1329 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1330 context, len, 0);
1331 up(&inode->i_sem);
1332 kfree(context);
1333 if (rc < 0) {
1334 printk(KERN_WARNING "post_create: setxattr failed, "
1335 "rc=%d (dev=%s ino=%ld)\n",
1336 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1337 return rc;
1338 }
1339 }
1340
1341 return 0;
1342}
1343
1344
1345/* Hook functions begin here. */
1346
1347static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1348{
1349 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1350 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1351 int rc;
1352
1353 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1354 if (rc)
1355 return rc;
1356
1357 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1358 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1359 if (!rc)
1360 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1361 return rc;
1362}
1363
1364static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1365 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1366{
1367 int error;
1368
1369 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1370 if (error)
1371 return error;
1372
1373 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1374}
1375
1376static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1377 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1378{
1379 int error;
1380
1381 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1382 if (error)
1383 return error;
1384
1385 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1386}
1387
1388static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1389 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1390{
1391 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1392}
1393
1394static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1395{
1396 int rc;
1397
1398 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1399 if (rc)
1400 return rc;
1401
1402 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1403}
1404
1405static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1406{
1407 int error = 0;
1408 u32 av;
1409 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1410 u32 tsid;
1411 int rc;
1412
1413 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1414 if (rc)
1415 return rc;
1416
1417 tsec = current->security;
1418
1419 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1420 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1421 if (rc) {
1422 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1423 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1424 }
1425
1426 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1427 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1428 if(op == 001) {
1429 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1430 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1431 } else {
1432 av = 0;
1433 if (op & 004)
1434 av |= FILE__READ;
1435 if (op & 002)
1436 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1437 if (av)
1438 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1439 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1440 }
1441
1442 return error;
1443}
1444
1445static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1446{
1447 int rc = 0;
1448
1449 if (!sb)
1450 return 0;
1451
1452 switch (cmds) {
1453 case Q_SYNC:
1454 case Q_QUOTAON:
1455 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1456 case Q_SETINFO:
1457 case Q_SETQUOTA:
1458 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1459 sb,
1460 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1461 break;
1462 case Q_GETFMT:
1463 case Q_GETINFO:
1464 case Q_GETQUOTA:
1465 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1466 sb,
1467 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1468 break;
1469 default:
1470 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1471 break;
1472 }
1473 return rc;
1474}
1475
1476static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1477{
1478 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1479}
1480
1481static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1482{
1483 int rc;
1484
1485 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1486 if (rc)
1487 return rc;
1488
1489 switch (type) {
1490 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1491 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1492 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1493 break;
1494 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1495 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1496 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1497 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1498 break;
1499 case 0: /* Close log */
1500 case 1: /* Open log */
1501 case 2: /* Read from log */
1502 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1503 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1504 default:
1505 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1506 break;
1507 }
1508 return rc;
1509}
1510
1511/*
1512 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1513 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1514 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1515 *
1516 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1517 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1518 * the capability is granted.
1519 *
1520 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1521 * processes that allocate mappings.
1522 */
1523static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1524{
1525 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1526 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1527
1528 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1529 if (rc == 0)
1530 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1531 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1532 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1533 NULL);
1534
1535 if (rc == 0)
1536 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1537
1538 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1539}
1540
1541/* binprm security operations */
1542
1543static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1544{
1545 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1546
1547 bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1548 if (!bsec)
1549 return -ENOMEM;
1550
1551 memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
1552 bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
1553 bsec->bprm = bprm;
1554 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1555 bsec->set = 0;
1556
1557 bprm->security = bsec;
1558 return 0;
1559}
1560
1561static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1562{
1563 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1564 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1565 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1566 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1567 u32 newsid;
1568 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1569 int rc;
1570
1571 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1572 if (rc)
1573 return rc;
1574
1575 bsec = bprm->security;
1576
1577 if (bsec->set)
1578 return 0;
1579
1580 tsec = current->security;
1581 isec = inode->i_security;
1582
1583 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1584 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1585
1586 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1587 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1588
1589 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1590 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1591 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1592 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1593 } else {
1594 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1595 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1597 if (rc)
1598 return rc;
1599 }
1600
1601 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1602 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1603 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1604
1605 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1606 newsid = tsec->sid;
1607
1608 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1609 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1610 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1611 if (rc)
1612 return rc;
1613 } else {
1614 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1615 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1616 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1617 if (rc)
1618 return rc;
1619
1620 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1621 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1622 if (rc)
1623 return rc;
1624
1625 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1626 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1627
1628 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1629 bsec->sid = newsid;
1630 }
1631
1632 bsec->set = 1;
1633 return 0;
1634}
1635
1636static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1637{
1638 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1639}
1640
1641
1642static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1643{
1644 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1645 int atsecure = 0;
1646
1647 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1648 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1649 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1650 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1651 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1652 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1653 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1654 }
1655
1656 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1657}
1658
1659static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1660{
9a5f04bf 1661 kfree(bprm->security);
1da177e4 1662 bprm->security = NULL;
1da177e4
LT		 1663}
1664
1665extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1666extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1667
1668/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1669static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1670{
1671 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1672 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1673 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1674 long j = -1;
1675
1676 if (tty) {
1677 file_list_lock();
1678 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
1679 if (file) {
1680 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1681 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1682 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1683 file may belong to another process and we are only
1684 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1685 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1686 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1687 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1688 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1689 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1690 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1691 }
1692 }
1693 file_list_unlock();
1694 }
1695
1696 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1697
1698 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1699
1700 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1701 for (;;) {
1702 unsigned long set, i;
1703 int fd;
1704
1705 j++;
1706 i = j * __NFDBITS;
1707 if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
1708 break;
1709 set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1710 if (!set)
1711 continue;
1712 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1713 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1714 if (set & 1) {
1715 file = fget(i);
1716 if (!file)
1717 continue;
1718 if (file_has_perm(current,
1719 file,
1720 file_to_av(file))) {
1721 sys_close(i);
1722 fd = get_unused_fd();
1723 if (fd != i) {
1724 if (fd >= 0)
1725 put_unused_fd(fd);
1726 fput(file);
1727 continue;
1728 }
1729 if (devnull) {
1730 atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
1731 } else {
1732 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1733 if (!devnull) {
1734 put_unused_fd(fd);
1735 fput(file);
1736 continue;
1737 }
1738 }
1739 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1740 }
1741 fput(file);
1742 }
1743 }
1744 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1745
1746 }
1747 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1748}
1749
1750static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1751{
1752 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1753 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1754 u32 sid;
1755 int rc;
1756
1757 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1758
1759 tsec = current->security;
1760
1761 bsec = bprm->security;
1762 sid = bsec->sid;
1763
1764 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1765 bsec->unsafe = 0;
1766 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1767 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1768 unchanged and kill. */
1769 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1770 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1771 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1772 if (rc) {
1773 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1774 return;
1775 }
1776 }
1777
1778 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1779 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1780 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1781 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1782 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1783 NULL);
1784 if (rc) {
1785 bsec->unsafe = 1;
1786 return;
1787 }
1788 }
1789 tsec->sid = sid;
1790 }
1791}
1792
1793/*
1794 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1795 */
1796static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1797{
1798 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1799 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1800 struct itimerval itimer;
1801 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1802 int rc, i;
1803
1804 tsec = current->security;
1805 bsec = bprm->security;
1806
1807 if (bsec->unsafe) {
1808 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1809 return;
1810 }
1811 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1812 return;
1813
1814 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1815 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1816
1817 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1818 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1819 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1820 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1821 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1822 will be checked against the new SID. */
1823 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1824 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1825 if (rc) {
1826 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1827 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1828 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1829 flush_signals(current);
1830 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1831 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1832 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
1833 recalc_sigpending();
1834 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
1835 }
1836
1837 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1838 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1839 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1840 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1841 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1842 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1843 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1844 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1845 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1846 RLIMIT_STACK.*/
1847 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1848 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1849 if (rc) {
1850 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1851 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1852 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1853 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1854 }
1855 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1856 /*
1857 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1858 * to be refigured.
1859 */
1860 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1861 }
1862 }
1863
1864 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1865 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1866 wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1867}
1868
1869/* superblock security operations */
1870
1871static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1872{
1873 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1874}
1875
1876static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1877{
1878 superblock_free_security(sb);
1879}
1880
1881static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1882{
1883 if (plen > olen)
1884 return 0;
1885
1886 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1887}
1888
1889static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1890{
1891 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1892 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1893 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1894}
1895
1896static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1897{
1898 if (!*first) {
1899 **to = ',';
1900 *to += 1;
1901 }
1902 else
1903 *first = 0;
1904 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1905 *to += len;
1906}
1907
1908static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1909{
1910 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1911 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1912 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1913
1914 in_curr = orig;
1915 sec_curr = copy;
1916
1917 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1918 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1919 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1920 goto out;
1921 }
1922
1923 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1924 if (!nosec) {
1925 rc = -ENOMEM;
1926 goto out;
1927 }
1928
1929 nosec_save = nosec;
1930 fnosec = fsec = 1;
1931 in_save = in_end = orig;
1932
1933 do {
1934 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1935 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1936
1937 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1938 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1939 else
1940 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1941
1942 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1943 }
1944 } while (*in_end++);
1945
1946 copy_page(in_save, nosec_save);
da3caa20 1947 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1da177e4
LT		 1948out:
1949 return rc;
1950}
1951
1952static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1953{
1954 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1955 int rc;
1956
1957 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1958 if (rc)
1959 return rc;
1960
1961 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1962 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1963 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1964}
1965
1966static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1967{
1968 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1969
1970 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1971 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1972 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1973}
1974
1975static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1976 struct nameidata *nd,
1977 char * type,
1978 unsigned long flags,
1979 void * data)
1980{
1981 int rc;
1982
1983 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1984 if (rc)
1985 return rc;
1986
1987 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1988 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1989 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1990 else
1991 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1992 FILE__MOUNTON);
1993}
1994
1995static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1996{
1997 int rc;
1998
1999 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2000 if (rc)
2001 return rc;
2002
2003 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2004 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2005}
2006
2007/* inode security operations */
2008
2009static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2010{
2011 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2012}
2013
2014static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2015{
2016 inode_free_security(inode);
2017}
2018
2019static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2020{
2021 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2022}
2023
2024static void selinux_inode_post_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2025{
2026 post_create(dir, dentry);
2027}
2028
2029static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2030{
2031 int rc;
2032
2033 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2034 if (rc)
2035 return rc;
2036 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2037}
2038
2039static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2040{
2041 return;
2042}
2043
2044static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2045{
2046 int rc;
2047
2048 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2049 if (rc)
2050 return rc;
2051 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2052}
2053
2054static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2055{
2056 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2057}
2058
2059static void selinux_inode_post_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2060{
2061 post_create(dir, dentry);
2062}
2063
2064static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2065{
2066 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2067}
2068
2069static void selinux_inode_post_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2070{
2071 post_create(dir, dentry);
2072}
2073
2074static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2075{
2076 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2077}
2078
2079static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2080{
2081 int rc;
2082
2083 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2084 if (rc)
2085 return rc;
2086
2087 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2088}
2089
2090static void selinux_inode_post_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2091{
2092 post_create(dir, dentry);
2093}
2094
2095static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2096 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2097{
2098 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2099}
2100
2101static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2102 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2103{
2104 return;
2105}
2106
2107static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2108{
2109 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2110}
2111
2112static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2113{
2114 int rc;
2115
2116 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2117 if (rc)
2118 return rc;
2119 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2120}
2121
2122static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2123 struct nameidata *nd)
2124{
2125 int rc;
2126
2127 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2128 if (rc)
2129 return rc;
2130
2131 if (!mask) {
2132 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2133 return 0;
2134 }
2135
2136 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2137 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2138}
2139
2140static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2141{
2142 int rc;
2143
2144 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2145 if (rc)
2146 return rc;
2147
2148 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2149 return 0;
2150
2151 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2152 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2153 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2154
2155 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2156}
2157
2158static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2159{
2160 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2161}
2162
2163static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2164{
2165 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2166 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2168 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2169 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2170 u32 newsid;
2171 int rc = 0;
2172
2173 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2174 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2175 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2176 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2177 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2178 Restrict to administrator. */
2179 return -EPERM;
2180 }
2181
2182 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2183 ordinary setattr permission. */
2184 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2185 }
2186
2187 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2188 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2189 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2190
2191 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2192 return -EPERM;
2193
2194 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2195 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2196
2197 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2198 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2199 if (rc)
2200 return rc;
2201
2202 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2203 if (rc)
2204 return rc;
2205
2206 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2207 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2208 if (rc)
2209 return rc;
2210
2211 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2212 isec->sclass);
2213 if (rc)
2214 return rc;
2215
2216 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2217 sbsec->sid,
2218 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2219 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2220 &ad);
2221}
2222
2223static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2224 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2225{
2226 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2227 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2228 u32 newsid;
2229 int rc;
2230
2231 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2232 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2233 return;
2234 }
2235
2236 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2237 if (rc) {
2238 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2239 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2240 return;
2241 }
2242
2243 isec->sid = newsid;
2244 return;
2245}
2246
2247static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2248{
2249 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2250 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2251
2252 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2253 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2254
2255 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2256}
2257
2258static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2259{
2260 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2261}
2262
2263static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2264{
2265 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2266 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2267 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2268 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2269 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2270 Restrict to administrator. */
2271 return -EPERM;
2272 }
2273
2274 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2275 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2276 permission for removexattr. */
2277 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2278 }
2279
2280 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2281 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2282 return -EACCES;
2283}
2284
2285static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
2286{
2287 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2288 char *context;
2289 unsigned len;
2290 int rc;
2291
2292 /* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
2293
2294 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2295 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2296
2297 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
2298 if (rc)
2299 return rc;
2300
2301 if (!buffer || !size) {
2302 kfree(context);
2303 return len;
2304 }
2305 if (size < len) {
2306 kfree(context);
2307 return -ERANGE;
2308 }
2309 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
2310 kfree(context);
2311 return len;
2312}
2313
2314static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2315 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2316{
2317 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2318 u32 newsid;
2319 int rc;
2320
2321 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2322 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2323
2324 if (!value || !size)
2325 return -EACCES;
2326
2327 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2328 if (rc)
2329 return rc;
2330
2331 isec->sid = newsid;
2332 return 0;
2333}
2334
2335static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2336{
2337 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2338 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2339 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2340 return len;
2341}
2342
2343/* file security operations */
2344
2345static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2346{
2347 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2348
2349 if (!mask) {
2350 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2351 return 0;
2352 }
2353
2354 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2355 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2356 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2357
2358 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2359 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2360}
2361
2362static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2363{
2364 return file_alloc_security(file);
2365}
2366
2367static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2368{
2369 file_free_security(file);
2370}
2371
2372static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2373 unsigned long arg)
2374{
2375 int error = 0;
2376
2377 switch (cmd) {
2378 case FIONREAD:
2379 /* fall through */
2380 case FIBMAP:
2381 /* fall through */
2382 case FIGETBSZ:
2383 /* fall through */
2384 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2385 /* fall through */
2386 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2387 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2388 break;
2389
2390 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2391 /* fall through */
2392 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2393 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2394 break;
2395
2396 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2397 case FIONBIO:
2398 /* fall through */
2399 case FIOASYNC:
2400 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2401 break;
2402
2403 case KDSKBENT:
2404 case KDSKBSENT:
2405 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2406 break;
2407
2408 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2409 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2410 */
2411 default:
2412 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2413
2414 }
2415 return error;
2416}
2417
2418static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2419{
2420#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2421 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2422 /*
2423 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2424 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2425 * This has an additional check.
2426 */
2427 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2428 if (rc)
2429 return rc;
2430 }
2431#endif
2432
2433 if (file) {
2434 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2435 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2436
2437 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2438 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2439 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2440
2441 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2442 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2443
2444 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2445 }
2446 return 0;
2447}
2448
2449static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2450 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2451{
2452 int rc;
2453
2454 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2455 if (rc)
2456 return rc;
2457
2458 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2459 prot = reqprot;
2460
2461 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2462 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2463}
2464
2465static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2466 unsigned long reqprot,
2467 unsigned long prot)
2468{
2469 int rc;
2470
2471 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2472 if (rc)
2473 return rc;
2474
2475 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2476 prot = reqprot;
2477
2478#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32