]>
Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
e114e473 CS |
1 | |
2 | ||
3 | "Good for you, you've decided to clean the elevator!" | |
4 | - The Elevator, from Dark Star | |
5 | ||
6 | Smack is the the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. | |
7 | Smack is a kernel based implementation of mandatory access | |
8 | control that includes simplicity in its primary design goals. | |
9 | ||
10 | Smack is not the only Mandatory Access Control scheme | |
11 | available for Linux. Those new to Mandatory Access Control | |
12 | are encouraged to compare Smack with the other mechanisms | |
13 | available to determine which is best suited to the problem | |
14 | at hand. | |
15 | ||
16 | Smack consists of three major components: | |
17 | - The kernel | |
18 | - A start-up script and a few modified applications | |
19 | - Configuration data | |
20 | ||
21 | The kernel component of Smack is implemented as a Linux | |
22 | Security Modules (LSM) module. It requires netlabel and | |
23 | works best with file systems that support extended attributes, | |
24 | although xattr support is not strictly required. | |
25 | It is safe to run a Smack kernel under a "vanilla" distribution. | |
26 | Smack kernels use the CIPSO IP option. Some network | |
27 | configurations are intolerant of IP options and can impede | |
28 | access to systems that use them as Smack does. | |
29 | ||
30 | The startup script etc-init.d-smack should be installed | |
31 | in /etc/init.d/smack and should be invoked early in the | |
32 | start-up process. On Fedora rc5.d/S02smack is recommended. | |
33 | This script ensures that certain devices have the correct | |
34 | Smack attributes and loads the Smack configuration if | |
35 | any is defined. This script invokes two programs that | |
36 | ensure configuration data is properly formatted. These | |
37 | programs are /usr/sbin/smackload and /usr/sin/smackcipso. | |
38 | The system will run just fine without these programs, | |
39 | but it will be difficult to set access rules properly. | |
40 | ||
41 | A version of "ls" that provides a "-M" option to display | |
42 | Smack labels on long listing is available. | |
43 | ||
44 | A hacked version of sshd that allows network logins by users | |
45 | with specific Smack labels is available. This version does | |
46 | not work for scp. You must set the /etc/ssh/sshd_config | |
47 | line: | |
48 | UsePrivilegeSeparation no | |
49 | ||
50 | The format of /etc/smack/usr is: | |
51 | ||
52 | username smack | |
53 | ||
54 | In keeping with the intent of Smack, configuration data is | |
55 | minimal and not strictly required. The most important | |
56 | configuration step is mounting the smackfs pseudo filesystem. | |
57 | ||
58 | Add this line to /etc/fstab: | |
59 | ||
60 | smackfs /smack smackfs smackfsdef=* 0 0 | |
61 | ||
62 | and create the /smack directory for mounting. | |
63 | ||
64 | Smack uses extended attributes (xattrs) to store file labels. | |
65 | The command to set a Smack label on a file is: | |
66 | ||
67 | # attr -S -s SMACK64 -V "value" path | |
68 | ||
69 | NOTE: Smack labels are limited to 23 characters. The attr command | |
70 | does not enforce this restriction and can be used to set | |
71 | invalid Smack labels on files. | |
72 | ||
73 | If you don't do anything special all users will get the floor ("_") | |
74 | label when they log in. If you do want to log in via the hacked ssh | |
75 | at other labels use the attr command to set the smack value on the | |
76 | home directory and it's contents. | |
77 | ||
78 | You can add access rules in /etc/smack/accesses. They take the form: | |
79 | ||
80 | subjectlabel objectlabel access | |
81 | ||
82 | access is a combination of the letters rwxa which specify the | |
83 | kind of access permitted a subject with subjectlabel on an | |
84 | object with objectlabel. If there is no rule no access is allowed. | |
85 | ||
86 | A process can see the smack label it is running with by | |
87 | reading /proc/self/attr/current. A privileged process can | |
88 | set the process smack by writing there. | |
89 | ||
90 | Look for additional programs on http://schaufler-ca.com | |
91 | ||
92 | From the Smack Whitepaper: | |
93 | ||
94 | The Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel | |
95 | ||
96 | Casey Schaufler | |
97 | [email protected] | |
98 | ||
99 | Mandatory Access Control | |
100 | ||
101 | Computer systems employ a variety of schemes to constrain how information is | |
102 | shared among the people and services using the machine. Some of these schemes | |
103 | allow the program or user to decide what other programs or users are allowed | |
104 | access to pieces of data. These schemes are called discretionary access | |
105 | control mechanisms because the access control is specified at the discretion | |
106 | of the user. Other schemes do not leave the decision regarding what a user or | |
107 | program can access up to users or programs. These schemes are called mandatory | |
108 | access control mechanisms because you don't have a choice regarding the users | |
109 | or programs that have access to pieces of data. | |
110 | ||
111 | Bell & LaPadula | |
112 | ||
113 | From the middle of the 1980's until the turn of the century Mandatory Access | |
114 | Control (MAC) was very closely associated with the Bell & LaPadula security | |
115 | model, a mathematical description of the United States Department of Defense | |
116 | policy for marking paper documents. MAC in this form enjoyed a following | |
117 | within the Capital Beltway and Scandinavian supercomputer centers but was | |
118 | often sited as failing to address general needs. | |
119 | ||
120 | Domain Type Enforcement | |
121 | ||
122 | Around the turn of the century Domain Type Enforcement (DTE) became popular. | |
123 | This scheme organizes users, programs, and data into domains that are | |
124 | protected from each other. This scheme has been widely deployed as a component | |
125 | of popular Linux distributions. The administrative overhead required to | |
126 | maintain this scheme and the detailed understanding of the whole system | |
127 | necessary to provide a secure domain mapping leads to the scheme being | |
128 | disabled or used in limited ways in the majority of cases. | |
129 | ||
130 | Smack | |
131 | ||
132 | Smack is a Mandatory Access Control mechanism designed to provide useful MAC | |
133 | while avoiding the pitfalls of its predecessors. The limitations of Bell & | |
134 | LaPadula are addressed by providing a scheme whereby access can be controlled | |
135 | according to the requirements of the system and its purpose rather than those | |
136 | imposed by an arcane government policy. The complexity of Domain Type | |
137 | Enforcement and avoided by defining access controls in terms of the access | |
138 | modes already in use. | |
139 | ||
140 | Smack Terminology | |
141 | ||
142 | The jargon used to talk about Smack will be familiar to those who have dealt | |
143 | with other MAC systems and shouldn't be too difficult for the uninitiated to | |
144 | pick up. There are four terms that are used in a specific way and that are | |
145 | especially important: | |
146 | ||
147 | Subject: A subject is an active entity on the computer system. | |
148 | On Smack a subject is a task, which is in turn the basic unit | |
149 | of execution. | |
150 | ||
151 | Object: An object is a passive entity on the computer system. | |
152 | On Smack files of all types, IPC, and tasks can be objects. | |
153 | ||
154 | Access: Any attempt by a subject to put information into or get | |
155 | information from an object is an access. | |
156 | ||
157 | Label: Data that identifies the Mandatory Access Control | |
158 | characteristics of a subject or an object. | |
159 | ||
160 | These definitions are consistent with the traditional use in the security | |
161 | community. There are also some terms from Linux that are likely to crop up: | |
162 | ||
163 | Capability: A task that possesses a capability has permission to | |
164 | violate an aspect of the system security policy, as identified by | |
165 | the specific capability. A task that possesses one or more | |
166 | capabilities is a privileged task, whereas a task with no | |
167 | capabilities is an unprivileged task. | |
168 | ||
169 | Privilege: A task that is allowed to violate the system security | |
170 | policy is said to have privilege. As of this writing a task can | |
171 | have privilege either by possessing capabilities or by having an | |
172 | effective user of root. | |
173 | ||
174 | Smack Basics | |
175 | ||
176 | Smack is an extension to a Linux system. It enforces additional restrictions | |
177 | on what subjects can access which objects, based on the labels attached to | |
178 | each of the subject and the object. | |
179 | ||
180 | Labels | |
181 | ||
182 | Smack labels are ASCII character strings, one to twenty-three characters in | |
183 | length. Single character labels using special characters, that being anything | |
184 | other than a letter or digit, are reserved for use by the Smack development | |
185 | team. Smack labels are unstructured, case sensitive, and the only operation | |
186 | ever performed on them is comparison for equality. Smack labels cannot | |
187 | contain unprintable characters or the "/" (slash) character. | |
188 | ||
189 | There are some predefined labels: | |
190 | ||
191 | _ Pronounced "floor", a single underscore character. | |
192 | ^ Pronounced "hat", a single circumflex character. | |
193 | * Pronounced "star", a single asterisk character. | |
194 | ? Pronounced "huh", a single question mark character. | |
195 | ||
196 | Every task on a Smack system is assigned a label. System tasks, such as | |
197 | init(8) and systems daemons, are run with the floor ("_") label. User tasks | |
198 | are assigned labels according to the specification found in the | |
199 | /etc/smack/user configuration file. | |
200 | ||
201 | Access Rules | |
202 | ||
203 | Smack uses the traditional access modes of Linux. These modes are read, | |
204 | execute, write, and occasionally append. There are a few cases where the | |
205 | access mode may not be obvious. These include: | |
206 | ||
207 | Signals: A signal is a write operation from the subject task to | |
208 | the object task. | |
209 | Internet Domain IPC: Transmission of a packet is considered a | |
210 | write operation from the source task to the destination task. | |
211 | ||
212 | Smack restricts access based on the label attached to a subject and the label | |
213 | attached to the object it is trying to access. The rules enforced are, in | |
214 | order: | |
215 | ||
216 | 1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied. | |
217 | 2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^" | |
218 | is permitted. | |
219 | 3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_" | |
220 | is permitted. | |
221 | 4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted. | |
222 | 5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same | |
223 | label is permitted. | |
224 | 6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded | |
225 | rule set is permitted. | |
226 | 7. Any other access is denied. | |
227 | ||
228 | Smack Access Rules | |
229 | ||
230 | With the isolation provided by Smack access separation is simple. There are | |
231 | many interesting cases where limited access by subjects to objects with | |
232 | different labels is desired. One example is the familiar spy model of | |
233 | sensitivity, where a scientist working on a highly classified project would be | |
234 | able to read documents of lower classifications and anything she writes will | |
235 | be "born" highly classified. To accommodate such schemes Smack includes a | |
236 | mechanism for specifying rules allowing access between labels. | |
237 | ||
238 | Access Rule Format | |
239 | ||
240 | The format of an access rule is: | |
241 | ||
242 | subject-label object-label access | |
243 | ||
244 | Where subject-label is the Smack label of the task, object-label is the Smack | |
245 | label of the thing being accessed, and access is a string specifying the sort | |
246 | of access allowed. The Smack labels are limited to 23 characters. The access | |
247 | specification is searched for letters that describe access modes: | |
248 | ||
249 | a: indicates that append access should be granted. | |
250 | r: indicates that read access should be granted. | |
251 | w: indicates that write access should be granted. | |
252 | x: indicates that execute access should be granted. | |
253 | ||
254 | Uppercase values for the specification letters are allowed as well. | |
255 | Access mode specifications can be in any order. Examples of acceptable rules | |
256 | are: | |
257 | ||
258 | TopSecret Secret rx | |
259 | Secret Unclass R | |
260 | Manager Game x | |
261 | User HR w | |
262 | New Old rRrRr | |
263 | Closed Off - | |
264 | ||
265 | Examples of unacceptable rules are: | |
266 | ||
267 | Top Secret Secret rx | |
268 | Ace Ace r | |
269 | Odd spells waxbeans | |
270 | ||
271 | Spaces are not allowed in labels. Since a subject always has access to files | |
272 | with the same label specifying a rule for that case is pointless. Only | |
273 | valid letters (rwxaRWXA) and the dash ('-') character are allowed in | |
274 | access specifications. The dash is a placeholder, so "a-r" is the same | |
275 | as "ar". A lone dash is used to specify that no access should be allowed. | |
276 | ||
277 | Applying Access Rules | |
278 | ||
279 | The developers of Linux rarely define new sorts of things, usually importing | |
280 | schemes and concepts from other systems. Most often, the other systems are | |
281 | variants of Unix. Unix has many endearing properties, but consistency of | |
282 | access control models is not one of them. Smack strives to treat accesses as | |
283 | uniformly as is sensible while keeping with the spirit of the underlying | |
284 | mechanism. | |
285 | ||
286 | File system objects including files, directories, named pipes, symbolic links, | |
287 | and devices require access permissions that closely match those used by mode | |
288 | bit access. To open a file for reading read access is required on the file. To | |
289 | search a directory requires execute access. Creating a file with write access | |
290 | requires both read and write access on the containing directory. Deleting a | |
291 | file requires read and write access to the file and to the containing | |
292 | directory. It is possible that a user may be able to see that a file exists | |
293 | but not any of its attributes by the circumstance of having read access to the | |
294 | containing directory but not to the differently labeled file. This is an | |
295 | artifact of the file name being data in the directory, not a part of the file. | |
296 | ||
297 | IPC objects, message queues, semaphore sets, and memory segments exist in flat | |
298 | namespaces and access requests are only required to match the object in | |
299 | question. | |
300 | ||
301 | Process objects reflect tasks on the system and the Smack label used to access | |
302 | them is the same Smack label that the task would use for its own access | |
303 | attempts. Sending a signal via the kill() system call is a write operation | |
304 | from the signaler to the recipient. Debugging a process requires both reading | |
305 | and writing. Creating a new task is an internal operation that results in two | |
306 | tasks with identical Smack labels and requires no access checks. | |
307 | ||
308 | Sockets are data structures attached to processes and sending a packet from | |
309 | one process to another requires that the sender have write access to the | |
310 | receiver. The receiver is not required to have read access to the sender. | |
311 | ||
312 | Setting Access Rules | |
313 | ||
314 | The configuration file /etc/smack/accesses contains the rules to be set at | |
315 | system startup. The contents are written to the special file /smack/load. | |
316 | Rules can be written to /smack/load at any time and take effect immediately. | |
317 | For any pair of subject and object labels there can be only one rule, with the | |
318 | most recently specified overriding any earlier specification. | |
319 | ||
320 | The program smackload is provided to ensure data is formatted | |
321 | properly when written to /smack/load. This program reads lines | |
322 | of the form | |
323 | ||
324 | subjectlabel objectlabel mode. | |
325 | ||
326 | Task Attribute | |
327 | ||
328 | The Smack label of a process can be read from /proc/<pid>/attr/current. A | |
329 | process can read its own Smack label from /proc/self/attr/current. A | |
330 | privileged process can change its own Smack label by writing to | |
331 | /proc/self/attr/current but not the label of another process. | |
332 | ||
333 | File Attribute | |
334 | ||
335 | The Smack label of a filesystem object is stored as an extended attribute | |
336 | named SMACK64 on the file. This attribute is in the security namespace. It can | |
337 | only be changed by a process with privilege. | |
338 | ||
339 | Privilege | |
340 | ||
341 | A process with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is privileged. | |
342 | ||
343 | Smack Networking | |
344 | ||
345 | As mentioned before, Smack enforces access control on network protocol | |
346 | transmissions. Every packet sent by a Smack process is tagged with its Smack | |
347 | label. This is done by adding a CIPSO tag to the header of the IP packet. Each | |
348 | packet received is expected to have a CIPSO tag that identifies the label and | |
349 | if it lacks such a tag the network ambient label is assumed. Before the packet | |
350 | is delivered a check is made to determine that a subject with the label on the | |
351 | packet has write access to the receiving process and if that is not the case | |
352 | the packet is dropped. | |
353 | ||
354 | CIPSO Configuration | |
355 | ||
356 | It is normally unnecessary to specify the CIPSO configuration. The default | |
357 | values used by the system handle all internal cases. Smack will compose CIPSO | |
358 | label values to match the Smack labels being used without administrative | |
359 | intervention. Unlabeled packets that come into the system will be given the | |
360 | ambient label. | |
361 | ||
362 | Smack requires configuration in the case where packets from a system that is | |
363 | not smack that speaks CIPSO may be encountered. Usually this will be a Trusted | |
364 | Solaris system, but there are other, less widely deployed systems out there. | |
365 | CIPSO provides 3 important values, a Domain Of Interpretation (DOI), a level, | |
366 | and a category set with each packet. The DOI is intended to identify a group | |
367 | of systems that use compatible labeling schemes, and the DOI specified on the | |
368 | smack system must match that of the remote system or packets will be | |
369 | discarded. The DOI is 3 by default. The value can be read from /smack/doi and | |
370 | can be changed by writing to /smack/doi. | |
371 | ||
372 | The label and category set are mapped to a Smack label as defined in | |
373 | /etc/smack/cipso. | |
374 | ||
375 | A Smack/CIPSO mapping has the form: | |
376 | ||
377 | smack level [category [category]*] | |
378 | ||
379 | Smack does not expect the level or category sets to be related in any | |
380 | particular way and does not assume or assign accesses based on them. Some | |
381 | examples of mappings: | |
382 | ||
383 | TopSecret 7 | |
384 | TS:A,B 7 1 2 | |
385 | SecBDE 5 2 4 6 | |
386 | RAFTERS 7 12 26 | |
387 | ||
388 | The ":" and "," characters are permitted in a Smack label but have no special | |
389 | meaning. | |
390 | ||
391 | The mapping of Smack labels to CIPSO values is defined by writing to | |
392 | /smack/cipso. Again, the format of data written to this special file | |
393 | is highly restrictive, so the program smackcipso is provided to | |
394 | ensure the writes are done properly. This program takes mappings | |
395 | on the standard input and sends them to /smack/cipso properly. | |
396 | ||
397 | In addition to explicit mappings Smack supports direct CIPSO mappings. One | |
398 | CIPSO level is used to indicate that the category set passed in the packet is | |
399 | in fact an encoding of the Smack label. The level used is 250 by default. The | |
400 | value can be read from /smack/direct and changed by writing to /smack/direct. | |
401 | ||
402 | Socket Attributes | |
403 | ||
404 | There are two attributes that are associated with sockets. These attributes | |
405 | can only be set by privileged tasks, but any task can read them for their own | |
406 | sockets. | |
407 | ||
408 | SMACK64IPIN: The Smack label of the task object. A privileged | |
409 | program that will enforce policy may set this to the star label. | |
410 | ||
411 | SMACK64IPOUT: The Smack label transmitted with outgoing packets. | |
412 | A privileged program may set this to match the label of another | |
413 | task with which it hopes to communicate. | |
414 | ||
415 | Writing Applications for Smack | |
416 | ||
417 | There are three sorts of applications that will run on a Smack system. How an | |
418 | application interacts with Smack will determine what it will have to do to | |
419 | work properly under Smack. | |
420 | ||
421 | Smack Ignorant Applications | |
422 | ||
423 | By far the majority of applications have no reason whatever to care about the | |
424 | unique properties of Smack. Since invoking a program has no impact on the | |
425 | Smack label associated with the process the only concern likely to arise is | |
426 | whether the process has execute access to the program. | |
427 | ||
428 | Smack Relevant Applications | |
429 | ||
430 | Some programs can be improved by teaching them about Smack, but do not make | |
431 | any security decisions themselves. The utility ls(1) is one example of such a | |
432 | program. | |
433 | ||
434 | Smack Enforcing Applications | |
435 | ||
436 | These are special programs that not only know about Smack, but participate in | |
437 | the enforcement of system policy. In most cases these are the programs that | |
438 | set up user sessions. There are also network services that provide information | |
439 | to processes running with various labels. | |
440 | ||
441 | File System Interfaces | |
442 | ||
443 | Smack maintains labels on file system objects using extended attributes. The | |
444 | Smack label of a file, directory, or other file system object can be obtained | |
445 | using getxattr(2). | |
446 | ||
447 | len = getxattr("/", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof (value)); | |
448 | ||
449 | will put the Smack label of the root directory into value. A privileged | |
450 | process can set the Smack label of a file system object with setxattr(2). | |
451 | ||
452 | len = strlen("Rubble"); | |
453 | rc = setxattr("/foo", "security.SMACK64", "Rubble", len, 0); | |
454 | ||
455 | will set the Smack label of /foo to "Rubble" if the program has appropriate | |
456 | privilege. | |
457 | ||
458 | Socket Interfaces | |
459 | ||
460 | The socket attributes can be read using fgetxattr(2). | |
461 | ||
462 | A privileged process can set the Smack label of outgoing packets with | |
463 | fsetxattr(2). | |
464 | ||
465 | len = strlen("Rubble"); | |
466 | rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPOUT", "Rubble", len, 0); | |
467 | ||
468 | will set the Smack label "Rubble" on packets going out from the socket if the | |
469 | program has appropriate privilege. | |
470 | ||
471 | rc = fsetxattr(fd, "security.SMACK64IPIN, "*", strlen("*"), 0); | |
472 | ||
473 | will set the Smack label "*" as the object label against which incoming | |
474 | packets will be checked if the program has appropriate privilege. | |
475 | ||
476 | Administration | |
477 | ||
478 | Smack supports some mount options: | |
479 | ||
480 | smackfsdef=label: specifies the label to give files that lack | |
481 | the Smack label extended attribute. | |
482 | ||
483 | smackfsroot=label: specifies the label to assign the root of the | |
484 | file system if it lacks the Smack extended attribute. | |
485 | ||
486 | smackfshat=label: specifies a label that must have read access to | |
487 | all labels set on the filesystem. Not yet enforced. | |
488 | ||
489 | smackfsfloor=label: specifies a label to which all labels set on the | |
490 | filesystem must have read access. Not yet enforced. | |
491 | ||
492 | These mount options apply to all file system types. | |
493 |