Auto merge of #3968 - bitcartel:3768_enable_mainnet_turnstile, r=bitcartel
Activate turnstile on mainnet
This PR enables [ZIP209](https://github.com/zcash/zips/blob/master/zip-0209.rst) support on mainnet, to mark blocks as invalid if they would lead to a turnstile violation in the Sprout or Sapling value pools.
To test this PR, I performed the following manual tests:
1. Used RPC call `getblock` to verify the fallback Sprout value.
2. Individually changed the fallback Sprout block hash, block height and chain value, recompiling and relaunching the node, verifying that each individual change resulted in an error. When the block hash and block height are incorrect, an error is logged to debug.log `FallbackSproutValuePoolBalance(): fallback block hash is incorrect`. An incorrect chain value results in node termination with error: `void FallbackSproutValuePoolBalance(CBlockIndex*, const CChainParams&): Assertion '*pindex->nChainSproutValue == chainparams.SproutValuePoolCheckpointBalance()' failed.`
3. Ran the `Smoke Testing` described in PR #3885, on mainnet.
4. Launched zcashd with experimental feature `-developersetpoolsizezero` to manually trigger a turnstile violation in both Sprout and Sapling shielded pools. The Sprout turnstile violation occurred after launch, due to chance, when the next incoming block 520786 contained a Sprout unshielding transaction. The Sapling turnstile violation was triggered after creating a Sapling unshielding transaction.
Auto merge of #3940 - str4d:3607-init-encrypted-wallet-without-hd-seed, r=bitcartel
init: Fix new HD seed generation for previously-encrypted wallets
Closes #3607.
How to verify (with `zcashd` flags `-testnet -wallet=wallet.3607.dat -experimentalfeatures -developerencryptwallet`):
- Start `zcashd` 2.0.0, encrypt the wallet, and stop the node.
- Start `zcashd` 2.0.1+ (before this branch), and see that it crashes during startup.
- Start `zcashd` built from this branch, and see that it does not crash during startup. Unlock the wallet, then stop.
- Start `zcashd` 2.0.1+ (before this branch), and see that it no longer crashes during startup.
Auto merge of #3964 - bitcartel:test_turnstile_violation, r=bitcartel
Test turnstile violation
Adds experimental feature -developersetpoolsizezero to enable developers to test Sprout and Sapling turnstile violations on testnet and in regtest mode.
depends: Support additional cross-compilation targets in Rust
This will make it easier for third parties to cross-compile `zcashd` for other platforms. The third commit in this PR shows how to add a new target to the Rust dependency builder.
The default Rust target during cross-compilation is the canonical host, which is derived from `HOST` using `depends/config.sub`. If the canonical host differs from the required Rust target, add the necessary mapping in addition to the target itself.
Also includes fixes for cross-compiling aarch64 targets.
Auto merge of #3848 - str4d:transaction-builder-sprout, r=Eirik0
Add Sprout support to TransactionBuilder
The logic in `TransactionBuilder::CreateJSDescriptions()` is a combination of the logic used by `z_sendmany`, `z_mergetoaddress` and `z_shieldcoinbase`, in order to support arbitrary numbers of Sprout inputs or outputs.
Homu [Tue, 19 Mar 2019 19:10:17 +0000 (12:10 -0700)]
Auto merge of #3885 - ebfull:turnstile, r=bitcartel
Reject blocks that violate turnstile
This is an implementation of a consensus rule which marks blocks as invalid if they would lead to a turnstile violation in the Sprout or Shielded value pools. The motivations and deployment details can be found in the [accompanying ZIP draft](https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/210).
**This PR only introduces the rule for testnet at the moment.**
We achieve the institution of this rule in three ways:
1. Nodes prior to #2795 did not record the "delta" in the Sprout value pool balance as part of the on-disk block index. This was a long time ago, though, and all nodes that are consensus-compatible with the network today have been recording this value for newer blocks. However, the value is absent from older block indexes unless the node has reindexed or synchronized from scratch in the time since. We shouldn't need to require nodes to reindex in order to enforce this consensus rule. We avoid this problem by falling back on a hardcoded Sprout shielded value pool balance in a very recent block.
2. If during `ConnectBlock` we observe that the resulting shielded value pool balance of Sprout or Sapling is negative, we reject the block.
3. During the miner's block assembly process the miner will skip over transactions if adding them to the assembled block might violate the turnstile, since the resulting block would be invalid. This means that theoretical transactions violating the turnstile would still be relayed in the network (and made available in users' memory pools) and so a turnstile violation would have some visibility outside of block relay.
## Smoke Testing
It's really tricky to test the behavior that automatically falls back to hardcoded shielded value pool balances in our architecture because it's very testnet-specific and node-version-specific. However, we can do some smoke tests to see that everything is working.
I modified the serialization of `CDiskBlockIndex` to serialize `boost::none` for `nSproutValue`
and then began a reindex of my node which I interruped around height 130k on testnet. I then restored the original serialization and resumed the reindex; I have thus _roughly_ simulated a older node "upgrading" to a newer node that records the deltas when processing new blocks. My node showed pool monitoring was disabled, as expected, for Sprout. I confirmed that some blocks following the reindex had nonzero Sprout `valueDelta` from `getblock`, as expected. I finished the reindex, restarted the node, and confirmed that the serialization worked for newer blocks but not older blocks by querying `getblock`, simply as a reassurance.
Finally, I introduced the code in this PR and reloaded the node. The desired behavior (that the chain began to be "monitored" again) worked, and the values were consistent with the hardcoded constant. I then made a payment to a Sprout z-addr from the transparent pool and the pool value increased as expected, as reported by `getblockchaininfo`. I reindexed the node again to exercise the remaining logic and check for turnstile violations throughout the history of testnet; there were none.
Homu [Tue, 19 Mar 2019 04:19:22 +0000 (21:19 -0700)]
Auto merge of #3846 - garethtdavies:updated-logo, r=bitcartel
Correcting logo on README
As a follow up to https://github.com/zcash/zcash/pull/3509 which I closed due to the updated branding. The logo [still has the wrong aspect ratio]. This corrects it with the logo taken from https://z.cash/press/ while preserving the original image dimensions and aspect ratio. I added it at 2x for retina displays.
projects / VerusCoin.git / log